Robert L. Holcomb v. David Ballard , 232 W. Va. 253 ( 2013 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
September 2013 Term
FILED
_____________ October 17, 2013
released at 3:00 p.m.
No. 12-0396 RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK
SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
_____________ OF WEST VIRGINIA
ROBERT L. HOLCOMB,
Petitioner
V.
DAVID BALLARD, WARDEN,
MOUNT OLIVE CORRECTIONAL COMPLEX,
Respondent
____________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Nicholas County
Honorable Jack Alsop, Judge
Civil Action No. 09-C-44
REVERSED AND REMANDED
____________________________________________________________________
Submitted: October 1, 2013
Filed: October 17, 2013
Steven B. Nanners Patrick Morrisey
Nanners & Willett Attorney General
Buckhannon, West Virginia Benjamin Yancey
Attorney for Petitioner Assistant Attorney General
Charleston, West Virginia
Attorneys for Respondent
JUSTICE DAVIS delivered the Opinion of the Court.
JUSTICE WORKMAN and JUSTICE LOUGHRY concur and reserve the right to file
concurring opinions.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. The procedural recidivist requirements of W. Va. Code § 61-11-19(1943) (Repl. Vol. 2010) are mandatory, jurisdictional, and not subject to harmless error
analysis.
2. “‘Habitual criminal proceedings providing for enhanced or additional
punishment on proof of one or more prior convictions are wholly statutory. In such
proceedings, a court has no inherent or common law power or jurisdiction. Being in
derogation of the common law, such statutes are generally held to require a strict construction
in favor of the prisoner.’ State ex rel. Ringer v. Boles, 151 W. Va. 864, 871, 157 S.E.2d 554,
558 (1967).” Syllabus point 2, Wanstreet v. Bordenkircher, 166 W. Va. 523, 276 S.E.2d 205(1981).
3. A recidivist sentence under W. Va. Code § 61-11-19 (1943) (Repl. Vol.
2010) is automatically vacated whenever the underlying felony conviction is vacated.
Davis, Justice:
i
This appeal was brought by Robert L. Holcomb (hereinafter referred to as “Mr.
Holcomb”) from an order of the Circuit Court of Nicholas County that denied his petition for
habeas corpus relief. In this appeal, Mr. Holcomb argues that the circuit court committed
error in ruling that his recidivist life imprisonment sentence was valid, that his life
imprisonment sentence was not disproportionate, and that his trial counsel did not improperly
advise him to stipulate to the recidivist charges. After a careful review of the briefs, the
record submitted on appeal, and listening to the argument of the parties, we reverse and
remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 5, 2006, a jury convicted Mr. Holcomb of child neglect creating a
substantial risk of injury or death.1 On that same day, the State filed a recidivist information
charging Mr. Holcomb with having previously been convicted of five felony offenses.2 On
August 1, 2006, a jury convicted Mr. Holcomb on the recidivist charges and he was
ultimately sentenced to life imprisonment.3 On October 13, 2006, the trial court granted Mr.
1
The record does not reveal the underlying facts of the case.
2
The prior felony offenses included: two grand larceny convictions, two
receiving stolen goods convictions, and one unlawful wounding conviction.
3
The record does not indicate the date of sentencing.
1
Holcomb a new trial on the underlying child neglect felony.4
A second trial on the child neglect felony was held on January 4, 2007. On the
same day, a jury returned a verdict finding Mr. Holcomb guilty of the child neglect felony
charge. The State filed a recidivist information on January 5, 2007, seeking a life
imprisonment sentence.5 Mr. Holcomb was not served with a copy of the information until
January 8, 2007, the last day of the term of court. At a new term of court on April 30, 2007,
Mr. Holcomb appeared before the trial court and admitted that he was the person named in
each count of the information.6 The trial court subsequently sentenced Mr. Holcomb to life
imprisonment. On February 13, 2008, Mr. Holcomb filed a petition for appeal with this
Court, which was refused.7
On March 17, 2009, Mr. Holcomb filed a pro se habeas corpus petition with
the circuit court. Following the appointment of counsel, Mr. Holcomb filed an amended
4
A new trial was granted as a result of an erroneous jury instruction.
5
The information alleged the same offenses that were set out in the first
information.
6
Mr. Holcomb’s admission was conditioned on his right to challenge the
timeliness of the information proceeding on appeal.
7
Mr. Holcomb was resentenced so that he could timely file the petition for
appeal.
2
habeas petition on April 22, 2011.8 An omnibus hearing was held on August 26, 2011.
Subsequent to the hearing, the trial court entered an order denying habeas relief. This appeal
timely followed.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This appeal is from an order of the circuit court denying Mr. Holcomb habeas
corpus relief. In Syllabus point 1 of Mathena v. Haines, 219 W. Va. 417, 633 S.E.2d 771(2006), we held the following regarding the standard of review:
In reviewing challenges to the findings and conclusions
of the circuit court in a habeas corpus action, we apply a
three-prong standard of review. We review the final order and
the ultimate disposition under an abuse of discretion standard;
the underlying factual findings under a clearly erroneous
standard; and questions of law are subject to a de novo review.
With this standard in mind, we proceed to determine whether the circuit court committed
error in denying habeas corpus relief to Mr. Holcomb.
8
Mr. Holcomb asserted 19 grounds for relief in the petition. However, in this
appeal, Mr. Holcomb has raised only three issues. The issues that were not raised in this
appeal are deemed waived. See Mack–Evans v. Hilltop Healthcare Ctr., Inc., 226 W. Va.
257, 264 n.12, 700 S.E.2d 317, 324 n.12 (2010) (“To the extent that the issue was raised
below, but not on appeal, it is deemed waived.”); State v. Lockhart, 208 W. Va. 622, 627 n.4,
542 S.E.2d 443, 448 n.4 (2000) (“Assignments of error that are not briefed are deemed
waived.”).
3
III.
DISCUSSION
Mr. Holcomb contends that his second recidivist life sentence was invalid
because he was not arraigned on the recidivist information during the same term of court in
which he was convicted on retrial for the underlying offense.9 The trial court held that any
error in not arraigning Mr. Holcomb on the recidivist charge, during the term of court in
which he was convicted, was harmless error. Here, the State now disagrees with the trial
court. The State concedes that the second recidivist proceeding was invalid. However, the
State urges this Court to vacate the life sentence imposed under the second recidivist
proceeding, and remand the case so that the trial court can sentence Mr. Holcomb to life
imprisonment under the first recidivist sentence.
We begin by observing that the issue presented requires this Court to review
the language of the recidivist statute. Our rules of statutory construction are well established.
“The primary object in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the
Legislature.” Syl. pt. 1, Smith v. State Workmen’s Comp. Comm’r, 159 W. Va. 108, 219
S.E.2d 361 (1975). “In ascertaining legislative intent, effect must be given to each part of
the statute and to the statute as a whole so as to accomplish the general purpose of the
9
We will note as a general matter that “[s]ince a recidivist proceeding does not
involve a separate substantive offense, double jeopardy principles do not bar a retrial of that
proceeding.” Syl. pt. 6, State ex rel. McMannis v. Mohn, 163 W. Va. 129, 254 S.E.2d 805(1979).
4
legislation.” Vanderbilt Mortg. & Fin., Inc. v. Cole, 230 W. Va. 505, ___, 740 S.E.2d 562,
567-68 (2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We have recognized that
“[w]hen a statute is clear and unambiguous and the legislative intent is plain, the statute
should not be interpreted by the courts, and in such case it is the duty of the courts not to
construe but to apply the statute.” Syl. pt. 5, State v. General Daniel Morgan Post No. 548,
V.F.W., 144 W. Va. 137, 107 S.E.2d 353 (1959). “Only when such language is ambiguous
may we interpret and construe a statutory provision.” Webster Cnty.. Comm’n v. Clayton,
206 W. Va. 107, 112, 522 S.E.2d 201, 206 (1999). We should also note as relevant to this
case, “silence does not, in and of itself, render a statute ambiguous.” Griffith v. Frontier
West Virginia, Inc., 228 W. Va. 277, 285, 719 S.E.2d 747, 755 (2011). Moreover, “it is not
for [courts] arbitrarily to read into [a statute] that which it does not say. Just as courts are not
to eliminate through judicial interpretation words that were purposely included, we are
obliged not to add to statutes something the Legislature purposely omitted.” Banker v.
Banker, 196 W. Va. 535, 546-47, 474 S.E.2d 465, 476-77 (1996).
The procedure for imposing recidivist punishment on a defendant is contained
in W. Va. Code § 61-11-19 (1943) (Repl. Vol. 2010).10 This statute provides in relevant part
as follows:
It shall be the duty of the prosecuting attorney when he
10
The substantive or punishment provision for recidivism is contained in
W. Va. Code § 61-11-18 (2000) (Repl. Vol. 2010).
5
has knowledge of former sentence or sentences to the
penitentiary of any person convicted of an offense punishable by
confinement in the penitentiary to give information thereof to
the court immediately upon conviction and before sentence. Said
court shall, before expiration of the term at which such person
was convicted, cause such person or prisoner to be brought
before it, and upon an information filed by the prosecuting
attorney, setting forth the records of conviction and sentence, or
convictions and sentences, as the case may be, and alleging the
identity of the prisoner with the person named in each, shall
require the prisoner to say whether he is the same person or
not. . . .
(Emphasis added). This Court previously has held that “[t]he language of the above quoted
statute is clear and the procedural requirements contained therein are mandatory.” State ex
rel. Foster v. Boles, 147 W. Va. 655, 658, 130 S.E.2d 111, 114 (1963). First, the statute
requires a prosecutor to present an information to a court after a defendant is convicted, but
before the defendant is sentenced. Second, a court must arraign the defendant on the
information before expiration of the term of court at which the defendant was convicted.
In the analysis that follows, we will separately examine the trial court’s
harmless error ruling and the State’s alternative sentencing proposal.
(1) Failure to arraign Mr. Holcomb on the recidivist charge during the
same term of court. As previously noted, under W. Va. Code § 61-11-19, a trial court is
obligated to arraign a defendant on a recidivist information during the term of court in which
the defendant is convicted. The trial court and the parties agree that Mr. Holcomb was not
6
arraigned on the second recidivist information during the term of court of his second
conviction. The trial court found that this error was harmless and that Mr. Holcomb could
be arraigned on the second recidivist information during a subsequent term of court. There
is no support in our cases for the trial court’s harmless error ruling. The seminal case on this
issue is State ex rel. Housden v. Adams, 143 W. Va. 601, 103 S.E.2d 873 (1958).
The defendant in Housden was convicted by a jury of sodomy. Before the
defendant was sentenced, but after the term of court had expired, the State filed a recidivist
information charging the defendant with having been convicted of three prior felonies. The
trial court arraigned the defendant on the information, and the defendant admitted that he was
the person named in the information. The trial court thereafter sentenced the defendant to
life imprisonment.11 The defendant filed a habeas corpus petition directly with this Court
seeking to vacate the recidivist sentence. The defendant argued that the trial court did not
have jurisdiction to impose the recidivist sentence because he was not arraigned during the
term of court in which he was convicted. This Court agreed with the defendant as follows:
Here the petitioner was convicted of a criminal offense
. . . in one term of court, and in a subsequent term of the court he
was charged and sentenced under the habitual criminal statute.
This course of action is not in compliance with the plain and
unambiguous provisions of such statute, and as compliance with
the provisions of the habitual criminal statute is jurisdictional
and mandatory, there can be no material deviation therefrom,
and must be applied. While procedural steps relating to
11
The punishment for sodomy was only one to ten years imprisonment.
7
sentencing and other matters, including sentencing, may be done
at a subsequent term, if the habitual criminal statute is sought to
be enforced, the information must be given and the convicted
person confronted with the charge of previous convictions
“before expiration of the term at which such person was
convicted.”
....
The judgment sentencing the petitioner to life
imprisonment, being in excess of imprisonment for a term of ten
years, which is the maximum sentence of imprisonment which
the Circuit Court had jurisdiction to pronounce upon the verdict
convicting the petitioner of the crime of sodomy, is a void
judgment to the extent it exceeds the maximum sentence of
imprisonment for ten years from the date of its rendition.
Housden, 143 W. Va. at 606-08, 103 S.E.2d at 876-77.
In State ex rel. Foster v. Boles, 147 W. Va. 655, 130 S.E.2d 111 (1963), we
were again called upon to address the issue of a defendant being arraigned on an information
in a term of court in which he was not convicted of the principal offense. The defendant in
Foster was convicted by a jury of buying and receiving stolen goods. After the conviction,
the State filed a recidivist information alleging the defendant previously had been convicted
of two felony offenses. However, the defendant was not arraigned on the information until
after the expiration of the term of court in which he was convicted. When the trial court
arraigned the defendant on the information, the defendant admitted that he was the person
named in the information. The trial court thereafter sentenced the defendant to life
8
imprisonment.12 The defendant filed a habeas corpus petition directly with this Court seeking
to vacate the recidivist sentence. One of the arguments made was that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to impose the recidivist sentence. We agreed with the defendant as follows:
The procedure, as set out in Section 19 of the habitual
criminal statute, expressly requires that the prosecutor not only
give information of previous convictions to the court but that the
court shall, before expiration of the term at which such person
was convicted, cause such person to be brought before it and
require him to say whether or not he is the same person named
in the information. This language is clear and unequivocal. The
record clearly reveals that the petitioner was not confronted with
the charges contained in the information until February 10,
1961, admittedly at a term of court subsequent to that at which
he was tried and convicted of the principal offense. Clearly, this
procedure did not satisfy the requirements of the statute (Code,
61–11–19).
When it affirmatively appears from the record in the trial
of a criminal case, on an indictment for a felony punishable by
confinement in the penitentiary for a period of less than life
imprisonment, that the trial court entered a judgment imposing
a life sentence but did not comply with the provisions of the
habitual criminal act, then that part of the sentence, in excess of
the maximum statutory sentence for the particular offense
charged in the indictment, is void. The trial court lacks
jurisdiction to render such judgment and its enforcement will be
prevented in a habeas corpus proceeding.
Foster, 147 W. Va. at 658-59, 130 S.E.2d at 114.
The decision in State ex rel. Robb v. Boles, 148 W. Va. 641, 136 S.E.2d 89112
The punishment for buying and receiving stolen goods was one to ten years
imprisonment.
9
(1964), concerned the addition of five years to a sentence under the recidivist statute. The
defendant in Robb entered a plea of guilty to a charge of forgery. Subsequent to the
conviction, the State filed a recidivist information alleging the defendant had a prior felony
conviction.13 The court did not, however, arraign the defendant on the information until
after the expiration of the term of court in which he was convicted. Upon being arraigned
on the information, the defendant admitted that he was the person named in the information.
The trial court thereafter sentenced the defendant to not less than two years nor more than
ten years imprisonment on the forgery offense, and imposed an additional five years
imprisonment on the recidivist charge.14 The defendant filed a habeas corpus petition
directly with this Court seeking to vacate the recidivist sentence. The defendant contended
that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to impose the recidivist sentence. We agreed with the
defendant as follows:
When, as here, it affirmatively appears from the record
in the trial of a criminal case on an indictment for a felony
punishable by confinement in the penitentiary for a period of
less than life imprisonment that the trial court entered a
judgment imposing an additional period of imprisonment under
the habitual criminal statute, Sections 18 and 19, Article 11,
Chapter 61, Code, 1931, as amended, but did not fully comply
with the provisions of that statute by failing to cause the
defendant in such case to be confronted with the charges in the
information and to be duly cautioned at the same term of court
13
The information actually alleged the defendant previously had been convicted
of two felony offenses. However, without explanation, the opinion indicated that the trial
court only considered one of the offenses.
14
The court ordered the sentences be served consecutively.
10
at which he was convicted of the principal offense charged in
the indictment, the added portion of the sentence, in excess of
the maximum statutory sentence for such principal offense, is
void for the reason that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
impose such additional sentence.
....
The sentence of confinement for the additional period of
five years, being void, can not be enforced. The relief from that
portion of the sentence imposed upon the petitioner as prayed
for by him is granted, and the petitioner after completely serving
the valid portion of his sentence must be released.
Robb, 148 W. Va. at 647-48, 136 S.E.2d at 894-95. See State ex rel. Albright v. Boles, 149
W. Va. 561, 564, 142 S.E.2d 725, 727 (1965) (“It is clear from the authorities cited herein
that the additional five year sentence is void and cannot be enforced.”); State ex rel. Bonnette
v. Boles, 148 W. Va. 649, 655, 136 S.E.2d 873, 877 (1964) (“The sentence of confinement
for the additional period of five years, being void, can not be enforced.”).
The decision in State v. Cain, 178 W. Va. 353, 359 S.E.2d 581 (1987),
involved an amendment to an information after the expiration of the term of court in which
the defendant was convicted. In Cain, the defendant was convicted of breaking and entering.
After the conviction, the State filed an information alleging the defendant had two prior
felony convictions. The defendant was properly arraigned on the information before the
expiration of the term of court in which he was convicted. However, after the term expired,
the State amended the information and charged the defendant with having previously
committed a third felony offense. The defendant was convicted on the information and was
11
sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant argued that the recidivist sentence
was void because he was not arraigned on the amended recidivist charge during the term of
court in which he was convicted. The State argued that such amendment was proper because
the recidivist statute did not expressly prohibit such amendment. Justice McHugh, writing
for the Court, rejected the State’s position as follows:
We note that W. Va. Code, 61-11-19 [1943] does not
explicitly prohibit a prosecuting attorney from filing an
amendment or amendments to a recidivist information
subsequent to the term at which a defendant was convicted and
the original information was filed. However, to hold that a
prosecuting attorney may file amendments to that information
subsequent to the term at which the defendant was convicted
would deprive the defendant of his right to confront all the
charges against him, particularly when the sole reason for the
amendment is to add another offense. In addition, such a
holding would ignore the mandatory language as well as the
spirit of the recidivist provisions embodied in W. Va. Code,
61-11-19. Furthermore, there is strong precedent in this State as
evidenced by [State ex rel. Housden v. Adams, 143 W. Va. 601,
103 S.E.2d 873 (1958),] and its progeny for holding that
amendments to a recidivist information, which in essence
constitute the complete information, must be filed “before
expiration of the term at which [a defendant] was convicted.”
Accordingly, we conclude that a person convicted of a
felony may not be sentenced pursuant to W. Va. Code,
61-11-18, -19 [1943], unless a recidivist information and any or
all material amendments thereto as to the person’s prior
conviction or convictions are filed by the prosecuting attorney
with the court before expiration of the term at which such person
was convicted, so that such person is confronted with the facts
charged in the entire information, including any or all material
amendments thereto.
Cain, 178 W. Va. at 357-58, 359 S.E.2d at 585-86 (citation omitted).
12
In State v. Cavallaro, 210 W. Va. 237, 557 S.E.2d 291 (2001), the defendant
was convicted of unlawful wounding. After the conviction, the State filed a recidivist
information alleging the defendant had been convicted of four prior felonies. However, the
defendant was not arraigned on the information until after the expiration of the term of court
in which he was convicted. A jury ultimately convicted the defendant under the information,
and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to impose the recidivist sentence because he was not arraigned
during the same term of court that he was convicted of the principal offense.15 We agreed
with the defendant as follows:
The disposition of the present case is controlled by State
ex rel. Housden v. Adams, 143 W. Va. 601, 103 S.E.2d 873(1958). . . . We agreed with the defendant in Housden that the
recidivist statute required that he be arraigned (not tried) on the
recidivist information during the same term of court in which he
was convicted of the underlying crime. . . .
In this case, immediately after the jury was discharged,
the prosecutor expressly informed the trial court that a recidivist
information was being filed against Mr. Cavallaro and that the
trial court had to confront Mr. Cavallaro regarding the
information. The trial court erroneously believed that so long as
the information was filed during the term of court in which Mr.
Cavallaro was convicted, the recidivist statute was followed.
Consequently, the trial court delayed arraigning Mr. Cavallaro
on the recidivist information until the subsequent term of court.
Pursuant to Housden, the trial court was without
15
We note that, in Cavallaro, “the state concede[d] that the recidivist
proceeding was invalid and that the life sentence should be vacated.” Cavallaro, 210 W. Va.
at 239, 557 S.E.2d at 293.
13
jurisdiction under the facts of this case to permit the prosecution
and sentence of Mr. Cavallaro on the recidivist information.
Consequently, we must reverse the recidivist sentence. In doing
so, however, we do not disturb the sentence for the underlying
conviction of unlawful wounding.
Cavallaro, 210 W. Va. at 239-40, 557 S.E.2d at 293-94.
Under the teachings of Housden and its progeny, we make clear today, and so
hold, that the procedural recidivist requirements of W. Va. Code § 61-11-19 (1943) (Repl.
Vol. 2010) are mandatory, jurisdictional, and not subject to harmless error analysis. See
State ex rel. Ringer v. Boles, 151 W. Va. 864, 871, 157 S.E.2d 554, 558 (1967) (“This Court
has consistently held that the habitual criminal statutes of this state are mandatory and
jurisdictional.”). In the instant proceeding, the State failed to comply with the requirements
of W. Va. Code § 61-11-19 insofar as Mr. Holcomb was not arraigned on the information
during the term of court in which he was convicted of the principal offense. The trial court
found that this error was harmless. Our holding today has made clear that the harmless error
analysis is inapplicable to a violation of the procedures outlined under W. Va. Code
§ 61-11-19.
(2) The status of a recidivist judgment when the underlying conviction is
vacated. As pointed out earlier, the State concedes that the circuit court committed error in
applying harmless error to Mr. Holcomb’s improperly held second recidivist proceeding.
However, the State urges this Court to remand the case so that the trial court can merge the
14
first recidivist sentence with the second conviction for felony child neglect. Although this
Court understands that judicial economy would be served by allowing the prior valid
recidivist judgment to be used against Mr. Holcomb, our cases teach us that judicial economy
has limitations under W. Va. Code § 61-11-19. We have made clear that
“[h]abitual criminal proceedings providing for enhanced
or additional punishment on proof of one or more prior
convictions are wholly statutory. In such proceedings, a court
has no inherent or common law power or jurisdiction. Being in
derogation of the common law, such statutes are generally held
to require a strict construction in favor of the prisoner.” State ex
rel. Ringer v. Boles, 151 W. Va. 864, 871, 157 S.E.2d 554, 558
(1967).
Syl. pt. 2, Wanstreet v. Bordenkircher, 166 W. Va. 523, 276 S.E.2d 205 (1981). In other
words, the “[h]abitual criminal statutes are generally held to be highly penal, in derogation
of common law, to be strictly construed against the prosecution and not to be extended to
embrace cases not falling clearly within the statutory provisions.” State ex rel. Smith v.
Boles, 150 W. Va. 1, 8, 146 S.E.2d 585, 590 (1965) (Calhoun, J., dissenting). There is no
language in W. Va. Code § 61-11-19 that permits the alternative disposition argued by the
State.
Although the State contends that this Court has not previously addressed the
issue of what happens to a recidivist sentence when the principal conviction is reversed, we
have, in fact, previously squarely addressed the issue. This issue was confronted by the
Court in State ex rel. Young v. Morgan, 173 W. Va. 452, 317 S.E.2d 812 (1984). The
15
defendant in Young was convicted of second degree murder. He was subsequently properly
arraigned on a recidivist information for having previously been convicted of one prior
felony. Upon a determination that the defendant was the person charged in the information,
the trial court added an additional five years to his sentence, as required by the recidivist
statute. The defendant's conviction for second degree murder was ultimately vacated by a
federal court in a habeas proceeding. The State retried the defendant, and he was found
guilty of first degree murder. The trial court sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment.
As a result of the sentence, the State did not file a new recidivist information. The defendant
appealed the first degree murder conviction to this Court. On appeal, this Court vacated the
defendant’s first degree murder conviction on double jeopardy grounds,16 and remanded the
case back to the circuit court for resentencing for second degree murder. On remand the
State filed a new information seeking to impose recidivist punishment during the
resentencing proceeding. The defendant filed a writ a prohibition with this Court seeking to
prevent a new recidivist charge.
One of the arguments made by the State in Young was that the prior recidivist
conviction was still valid, and could be imposed on the defendant, because the federal court
reversed only the underlying second degree murder conviction–not the recidivist judgment.
We disagreed with the State as follows:
16
Double jeopardy prevents a higher conviction on retrial.
16
We find no merit in the respondent’s argument that the
recidivist penalty added to Young’s sentence on his initial
conviction of second degree murder survived the setting aside
of that conviction by the federal district court. The recidivist
penalty cannot survive the vacating of the principal felony
offense. We have consistently held under the habitual criminal
statutes that the recidivist penalty authorized for a second felony
conviction must be added to and incorporated in the underlying
sentence to form a single sentence. The recidivist penalty is not
a separate sentence. Consequently, when Young’s second degree
murder conviction was set aside, he was no longer a habitual
offender. The legal predicate for the penalty was removed and
it fell along with the conviction.
Young, 173 W. Va. at 454, 317 S.E.2d at 814.17 See Syl. pt. 3, State ex rel. Keenan v.
Hatcher, 210 W. Va. 307, 557 S.E.2d 361 (2001) (“Where a recidivist proceeding has
previously been initiated against a criminal defendant by an information filed pursuant to
W. Va. Code §§ 61-11-18 & -19, and it is later determined that the prosecuting attorney who
initiated the charge was disqualified from acting in the case at the time such instrument was
filed, the recidivist information is invalid and may not serve as a basis for further
proceedings.”).
In view of our decision in Young, we make clear and now hold that a recidivist
sentence under W. Va. Code § 61-11-19 (1943) (Repl. Vol. 2010) is automatically vacated
whenever the underlying felony conviction is vacated. In view of our holding, Mr.
17
The opinion went on to hold that the State could prosecute a new recidivist
charge because the defendant delayed the proceeding by appealing the conviction. Insofar
as the ground relied upon in Young to allow a new recidivist proceeding to take place is not
before this Court, we will not address the soundness of the opinion’s reasoning on that issue.
17
Holcomb’s first recidivist sentence was vacated when the trial court set aside the principal
conviction in the first proceeding. Consequently, we reject the State’s request that we
remand this case and order the first recidivist judgment be merged with Mr. Holcomb’s
second conviction for felony child neglect.18
IV.
CONCLUSION
In view of the foregoing, the recidivist life imprisonment sentence imposed
upon Mr. Holcomb is void and unenforceable. This case is remanded for a determination of
whether Mr. Holcomb has served the maximum term for his conviction under W. Va. Code
§ 61-8D-4(e) (1996) (Repl. Vol. 2010).19 See Syl. pt. 5, State ex rel. McMannis v. Mohn, 163
W. Va. 129, 254 S.E.2d 805 (1979) (“The void portion of a judgment can be attacked in a
habeas corpus proceeding, but if there remains a valid portion of the sentence yet to be
served, the relator is not entitled to a discharge.”); Syl. pt. 3, State ex rel. Albright v. Boles,
149 W. Va. 561, 142 S.E.2d 725 (1965) (“Where an additional sentence imposed under the
provisions of the habitual criminal statute is void, a petitioner in a habeas corpus proceeding
is not entitled to release from confinement in the penitentiary until the expiration of the
18
Because of our resolution of the Mr. Holcomb’s first assignment of error, we
need not address his remaining assignments of error.
19
The punishment under this statute is a fine of three thousand dollars and
confinement for not less than one nor more than five years.
18
maximum term provided by the statute as punishment for the principal offense.”); Syl. pt. 2,
State ex rel. Medley v. Skeen, 138 W. Va. 409, 76 S.E.2d 146 (1953) (“A petitioner in a
habeas corpus proceeding upon whom punishment by imprisonment for life has been
imposed, under Code, 61–11–19, may be relieved of the void portion of the punishment, but
will not be discharged from serving the maximum terms provided by statute as punishment
for the principal offenses.”). If it is determined on remand that Mr. Holcomb has served the
maximum sentence for the felony child neglect conviction and is not serving an unexpired
sentence for another offense, he is to be discharged from confinement forthwith.
Reversed and Remanded.
19