State of West Virginia v. Jessica Lynn Skupnick ( 2014 )


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  •                              STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
    SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    State of West Virginia,                                                             FILED
    Plaintiff Below, Respondent                                                       June 2, 2014
    RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK
    SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    vs) No. 13-0746 (Berkeley County 11-F-224)                                      OF WEST VIRGINIA
    Jessica Lynn Skupnick,
    Defendant Below, Petitioner
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Petitioner Jessica Lynn Skupnick’s appeal, filed by counsel B. Craig Manford, arises
    from the Circuit Court of Berkeley County, which sentenced petitioner to three to fifteen years in
    prison for her conviction of neglect of a child resulting in death under West Virginia Code § 61­
    8D-4a. The circuit court entered the sentencing order on July 21, 2013, after which petitioner
    filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence. The circuit court denied this motion by order
    entered on October 16, 2013. The State, by counsel Christopher C. Quasebarth, filed a response
    in support of the circuit court’s order. On appeal, petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in
    denying her motion for reconsideration of sentence so that she could have additional diagnostic
    testing in aid of sentencing and in sentencing petitioner to three to fifteen years in prison rather
    than alternative sentencing.
    This Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal
    arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided
    by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record
    presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these
    reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate under Rule 21
    of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    Petitioner was born completely deaf in one ear and partially deaf in the other ear, for
    which she uses a hearing aid. In late September of 2010, petitioner gave birth to her child. In
    early December of 2010, the Berkeley County Sheriff’s Department responded to a call
    concerning the suspicious death of the two-month-old child, who was found strapped to a car
    seat, unresponsive, and with bruising on his face. Present in the home were petitioner, her
    boyfriend, and her boyfriend’s mother. The autopsy of the child revealed two fractured, but
    healing ribs; two deep scalp hemorrhages and a large pool of blood within the skull; three bruises
    on the face and forehead; and abrasions to his nose, lip, and inside gum line. The death was ruled
    a homicide due to multiple blunt force trauma.
    In September of 2012, petitioner pled no contest to child neglect resulting in death under
    West Virginia Code § 61-8D-4a. Petitioner’s plea agreement with the State provided that
    petitioner would “receive the statutory sentence of three to fifteen years; however[,] the parties
    are free to argue and make recommendations to the [circuit] [c]ourt regarding sentencing.” The
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    circuit court deferred sentencing for a later hearing and granted petitioner’s motion for a
    diagnostic evaluation at Lakin Correction Center Diagnostic Unit.
    Two different evaluators at Lakin evaluated petitioner in February of 2013. Their reports
    revealed that petitioner was born deaf but able to read lips and communicate verbally. The
    reports also revealed that petitioner has an extensive history of psycho-social problems and
    would benefit from psychotherapy, incarceration, and a referral to a physician for further
    medication to manage her symptoms of depression and anxiety. Also included in the reports
    were statements made by petitioner that if she was released into the community, she planned to
    reside in a house with four friends; that she does not need any mental health or substance abuse
    treatment; and that, to avoid future legal difficulties, she stated, “I learned my lessons. I haven’t
    been focused on relationships, work on college course online, and go to church and Celebrate
    Recovery meetings.” Neither report indicated that petitioner had any difficulty communicating
    with either evaluator, that she revealed that she was without her hearing aid that day, or that she
    did not understand the questions asked of her. One of the evaluations was conducted through the
    use of printed questions and answers, rather than an entirely oral interview.
    At petitioner’s sentencing in April of 2013, she filed a motion for alternative sentencing
    of probation. Petitioner testified of her past abusive relationships with former boyfriends,
    including the one who was convicted of killing her baby. More specifically, petitioner testified
    that shortly after the baby was born, her boyfriend became physically and emotionally abusive
    towards her and the baby. Whenever petitioner tried to confront her boyfriend or her boyfriend’s
    mother about bruises she would notice on the baby, her concerns would be cast aside with
    excuses. For instance, the boyfriend once explained that he must have accidentally pinched the
    baby’s belly while changing his diaper to explain a bruise about two inches in diameter above the
    baby’s belly button. The day before the baby died, the baby had a doctor’s appointment
    scheduled. However, due to bruises and injuries visible on the baby, petitioner’s boyfriend and
    the boyfriend’s mother suggested that they ought to cancel the doctor’s appointment. Petitioner
    did not bring the baby to his doctor’s appointment the next day.
    At petitioner’s sentencing hearing, she never raised any issue with the fact that she did
    not have her hearing aid with her during her evaluations at Lakin, nor did she object to the circuit
    court’s consideration of the evaluations. After considering petitioner’s testimony and the
    testimony of other witnesses, the evaluation reports, and discussions with the Division of
    Corrections concerning possible and available psychological and social treatment, the circuit
    court denied petitioner’s motion for probation and sentenced her to three to fifteen years in
    prison.
    Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence under Rule 35(b) of
    the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure. A hearing was held on this motion in September
    of 2013. Petitioner testified that “if the time comes” when she is released from incarceration, she
    wants to go to therapy and classes. Petitioner also testified that she felt that her evaluators were
    frustrated with her during the evaluations and that she made one of her evaluators fully aware
    that she could not hear her and that she explained that she was having a hard time reading the
    evaluator’s lips. After considering petitioner’s motion and the testimony at the hearing on this
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    motion, the circuit court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of her sentence. From this
    order, petitioner now appeals.
    “Sentences imposed by the trial court, if within statutory limits and if not based on some
    [im]permissible factor, are not subject to appellate review.” Syl. Pt. 4, State v. Goodnight, 169
    W.Va. 366, 
    287 S.E.2d 504
    (1982). With regard to orders denying motions for reconsideration of
    sentence, we have held as follows:
    In reviewing the findings of fact and conclusions of law of a circuit court
    concerning an order on a motion made under Rule 35 of the West Virginia Rules
    of Criminal Procedure, we apply a three-pronged standard of review. We review
    the decision on the Rule 35 motion under an abuse of discretion standard; the
    underlying facts are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard; and questions of
    law and interpretations of statutes and rules are subject to a de novo review.
    Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Head, 198 W.Va. 298, 
    480 S.E.2d 507
    (1996). With these standards in mind,
    we turn to petitioner’s arguments on appeal.
    Petitioner first argues that the circuit court erred and abused its discretion when it denied
    petitioner’s motion for reconsideration so that she could have additional diagnostic testing in aid
    of sentencing. Petitioner asserts that expert testimony from Dr. Bernard Lewis revealed that the
    results of petitioner’s testing showed “classic signs” of confusion by petitioner. Due to such
    confusion, petitioner argues that she should receive another evaluation with the assistance of her
    hearing aid. Petitioner also argues that the circuit court erred and abused its discretion when it
    sentenced petitioner to three to fifteen years in prison and denied her motion for alternative
    sentencing. Petitioner asserts that she should have received probation instead of incarceration
    because she had a lack of criminal history, she was susceptible to her boyfriend and his mother’s
    influence due to her dependence on them, she has great remorse and contrition over her inability
    to protect her child, she has attempted efforts at self-rehabilitation, and she lacked insight in
    choosing appropriate romantic partners.
    Upon our review of the record and the briefs on appeal, we find that the circuit court did
    not err or abuse its discretion in sentencing petitioner or in denying petitioner’s motion for
    reconsideration of her sentence. We recognize the following:
    When considering West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure 35(b)
    motions, circuit courts generally should consider only those events that occur
    within the 120-day filing period; however, as long as the circuit court does not
    usurp the role of the parole board, it may consider matters beyond the filing
    period when such consideration serves the ends of justice.
    Syl. Pt. 5, State v. Head, 198 W.Va. 298, 
    480 S.E.2d 507
    (1996). The record reveals that, at
    petitioner’s hearing on her motion for reconsideration, the circuit court considered the time
    between petitioner’s sentencing and her motion for reconsideration of sentence and concluded
    that the reasons that supported petitioner’s sentence had not changed during this time frame.
    Rather, petitioner’s arguments in her motion for reconsideration stemmed from events that
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    occurred prior to her sentencing. Petitioner did not choose to raise these arguments until later,
    under the disguise of a motion for reconsideration. The hearing transcript of the reconsideration
    motion reveals that although Dr. Lewis testified that petitioner’s evaluations might indicate her
    confusion, he also testified that he did not dispute petitioner’s diagnoses. When asked what she
    would like the circuit court to know in making its decision, petitioner’s first reply concerned her
    “extremely rough” incarceration due to the other inmates bullying her. She further insisted that
    she could not get the type of therapy she had with a former grief counselor while incarcerated.
    Petitioner’s counsel admitted that no problems concerning petitioner’s ability to communicate at
    her evaluations were previously raised at sentencing. This evidence supports the circuit court’s
    decision to deny petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of her sentence.
    The circuit court’s sentencing order reflects that petitioner’s sentence for her conviction
    of neglect of a child resulting in death is within the statutory limits provided in West Virginia
    Code § 61-8D-4a. The circuit court considered petitioner’s circumstances, surmising that
    although “[petitioner] has a hearing impairment, [it] should not cause there to be any less
    expectation than of any other mother of her protecting her helpless two-month-old infant from
    ongoing severe physical abuse leading to death. [Her] inaction was just as clearly a contributing
    cause of the infant’s death as [her boyfriend’s] actions.” Absent any showing that the circuit
    court considered any impermissible factor at sentencing, we find no error or abuse of discretion
    by the circuit court in denying petitioner probation.
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
    Affirmed.
    ISSUED: June 2, 2014
    CONCURRED IN BY:
    Chief Justice Robin Jean Davis
    Justice Margaret L. Workman
    Justice Menis E. Ketchum
    Justice Allen H. Loughry II
    DISSENTING:
    Justice Brent D. Benjamin
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Document Info

Docket Number: 13-0746

Filed Date: 6/2/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014