Town & Country Animal Hospital v. Dawn E. Mead ( 2013 )


Menu:
  •                                STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
    SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    Town & Country Animal Hospital, Inc.,
    Respondent Below, Petitioner                                                        FILED
    February 11, 2013
    vs) No. 12-0154 (Kanawha County 10-AA-121)                                     RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK
    SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    OF WEST VIRGINIA
    Dawn E. Mead,
    Petitioner Below, Respondent
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Petitioner Town & Country Animal Hospital, Inc. (“Town & Country”), by counsel
    David L. Delk Jr., appeals the January 9, 2012 order of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County
    reversing the decision of the Board of Review of Workforce West Virginia (“Board of Review”).
    Respondent Mead, by counsel Ronald Kasserman Jr., has filed a response.
    The Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal
    arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided
    by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record
    presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these
    reasons, a memorandum decision is appropriate under Rule 21 of the Revised Rules of Appellate
    Procedure.
    Respondent Mead worked for Petitioner Town & Country until her employment ended on
    January 14, 2010. Following respondent’s last day of work, the parties disputed the cause for the
    end of her employment. Petitioner claimed that respondent resigned, while respondent claimed
    that petitioner terminated her employment. Respondent thereafter filed a claim for
    unemployment compensation, which was denied because she had failed to prove that her
    separation from employment involved fault on the part of her employer. Respondent appealed
    the decision. A hearing was held before an administrative law judge on April 6, 2010, who again
    found that petitioner was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits because she left
    work voluntarily without good cause involving fault on the part of her employer. Respondent
    again appealed this decision and the Board of Review affirmed the administrative law judge’s
    decision by order dated June 30, 2010. On July 30, 2010, respondent appealed the decision to the
    circuit court, which reversed the Board of Review’s decision.
    On appeal, petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in reversing the Board of Review
    and finding that respondent had been terminated. According to petitioner, applying a clearly
    erroneous standard to the board’s findings, as required by Tabor v. Gatson, 
    207 W.Va. 424
    , 426,
    
    533 S.E.2d 356
    , 358 (2000), should have resulted in the decision being upheld. However,
    petitioner argues that the circuit court simply did not like the Board of Review’s decision and
    would have decided the case differently, which requires the subsequent order to be overturned. In
    response, Respondent Mead argues that the circuit court did not err in reversing the board’s
    1
    ­
    decision because the administrative law judge’s findings were clearly erroneous. According to
    respondent, the evidence established that she never intended to resign from her position, but was
    instead terminated.
    This Court has previously held that
    [t]he findings of fact of the Board of Review . . . are entitled to substantial
    deference unless a reviewing court believes the findings are clearly wrong. If the
    question on review is one purely of law, no deference is given and the standard of
    judicial review by the court is de novo.
    Syl. Pt. 3, in part, Adkins v. Gatson, 
    192 W.Va. 561
    , 
    453 S.E.2d 395
     (1994). After careful
    consideration of the parties’ arguments, this Court concludes that the circuit court did not err in
    reversing the board’s decision. The Court notes that the circuit court stated an improper standard
    of review in the order at issue, but upon our review it is apparent that the circuit court believed
    the board’s findings to be clearly wrong in accordance with the standard articulated above.
    For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the decision of the circuit court and its
    January 9, 2012 order reversing the board’s decision is affirmed.
    Affirmed.
    ISSUED: February 11, 2013
    CONCURRED IN BY:
    Chief Justice Brent D. Benjamin
    Justice Robin Jean Davis
    Justice Margaret L. Workman
    Justice Menis E. Ketchum
    Justice Allen H. Loughry II
    2
    ­
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 12-0154

Filed Date: 2/11/2013

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014