Edward Jesse Dreyfuse, In re Application to Present Complaint to the Grand Jury ( 2020 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
January 2020 Term
_______________ FILED
April 3, 2020
No. 18-0271 released at 3:00 p.m.
_______________ EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
OF WEST VIRGINIA
EDWARD JESSE DREYFUSE,
IN RE: APPLICATION TO PRESENT COMPLAINT
TO THE GRAND JURY
____________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cabell County
The Honorable Alfred E. Ferguson, Judge
Case No. 17-C-394
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
____________________________________________________________
Submitted: January 28, 2020
Filed: April 3, 2020
Crystal L. Walden, Esq. Patrick Morrisey, Esq.
Director of Appellate Advocacy Division Attorney General
Robert F. Evans, Esq. Lindsay S. See, Esq.
Public Defender Services Solicitor General
Charleston, West Virginia Thomas T. Lampman, Esq.
Counsel for Petitioner, Assistant Solicitor General
Edward Jesse Dreyfuse Charleston, West Virginia
Counsel for Respondent,
State of West Virginia
CHIEF JUSTICE ARMSTEAD delivered the Opinion of the Court.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. “In reviewing challenges to the findings and conclusions of the circuit
court, we apply a two-prong deferential standard of review. We review the final order and
the ultimate disposition under an abuse of discretion standard, and we review the circuit
court’s underlying factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard. Questions of law
are subject to a de novo review.” Syl. Pt. 2, Walker v. W. Va. Ethics Comm’n, 201 W.Va.
108, 492 S.E.2d 167 (1997).
2. “By application to the circuit judge, whose duty is to insure access to
the grand jury, any person may go to the grand jury to present a complaint to it. W.Va.
Const. art. 3, § 17.” Syl. Pt. 1, State ex rel. Miller v. Smith, 168 W. Va. 745, 285 S.E.2d
500 (1981).
3. “Under West Virginia Constitution art. III, § 17, the right of self-
representation in civil proceedings is a fundamental right which cannot be arbitrarily or
unreasonably denied.” Syl. Pt. 1, Blair v. Maynard, 174 W.Va. 247, 324 S.E.2d 391 (1984).
4. “The fundamental right of self-representation recognized in West
Virginia Constitution art. III, § 17 may not be denied without a clear showing in the record
that the pro se litigant is engaging in a course of conduct which demonstrates a clear
intention to obstruct the administration of justice.” Syl. Pt. 2, Blair v. Maynard, 174 W.Va.
247, 324 S.E.2d 391 (1984).
5. “Under West Virginia Constitution art. III, § 17, prisoners have a
Constitutional right to meaningful access to our courts subject to reasonable limitations
imposed to protect courts from abuse.” Syl. Pt. 2, Mathena v. Haines, 219 W.Va. 417, 633
S.E.2d 771 (2006).
6. “Where a circuit court is faced with a potential abuse of process by a
prisoner or a prisoner’s threat to abuse the judicial process, the circuit court may, subject
to the following, enter an order imposing reasonable limitations on the prisoner’s right to
access the court. Prior to the entry of such an order, the circuit court must provide the
prisoner an opportunity to show cause why such a limitation should not be imposed. If the
record demonstrates a clear intention to obstruct the administration of justice, the circuit
court may impose limitations on the prisoner’s right of access. Any order limiting a
prisoner’s access to the courts must be designed to preserve his right to adequate, effective,
and meaningful access to our courts. The circuit court’s order imposing such a limitation
must include such findings of fact and conclusions of law adequate for meaningful
appellate review.” Syl. Pt. 5, Mathena v. Haines, 219 W.Va. 417, 633 S.E.2d 771 (2006).
7. “[A] circuit court has supervisory powers over grand jury
proceedings to preserve the integrity of the grand jury process and to insure the proper
administration of justice[.]” Syl. Pt. 2, in part, State ex rel. Hamstead v. Dostert, 173 W.Va.
133, 313 S.E.2d 409 (1984).
8. A private citizen’s right under West Virginia Constitution art. III, §
17 to present a complaint to the grand jury upon application to the circuit court is subject
to reasonable limitations to protect our judicial system from abuse.
9. A circuit court may not deny a private citizen’s application to present
a complaint to the grand jury without a showing that the private citizen’s conduct
demonstrates a clear intention to obstruct the administration of justice. A circuit court’s
order denying a private citizen’s application to present a complaint to the grand jury must
include such findings of fact and conclusions of law adequate for meaningful appellate
review.
10. “Except where there is a specific statutory exception, a magistrate
may not issue a warrant or summons for a misdemeanor or felony solely upon the complaint
of a private citizen without a prior evaluation of the citizen’s complaint by the prosecuting
attorney or an investigation by the appropriate law enforcement agency.” Syl. Pt. 1, in part,
Harman v. Frye, 188 W.Va. 611, 425 S.E.2d 566 (1992).
11. When a private citizen seeks to present a complaint to the grand jury,
he must first apply to the circuit court. The circuit court shall then provide a copy of the
application to the prosecuting attorney. Upon receipt of the private citizen’s application,
the prosecuting attorney may then initiate grand jury proceedings based on the allegations
in the private citizen’s application or he may decline to do so. If a prosecuting attorney
declines to initiate grand jury proceedings, or does not act upon the application within a
reasonable period of time, the private citizen may seek review of their application in the
circuit court. In reviewing the private citizen’s application after a prosecuting attorney
declines to initiate grand jury proceedings or does not act upon the application within a
reasonable period of time, the circuit court shall conduct an in camera hearing to provide
the private citizen and the prosecuting attorney an opportunity to address the court
regarding the private citizen’s application.
ARMSTEAD, Chief Justice:
Petitioner Edward Jesse Dreyfuse (“Mr. Dreyfuse”) was convicted of first-
degree murder and burglary in October of 2013. The evidence presented at trial
demonstrated that Mr. Dreyfuse attacked an elderly, disabled man (“victim”) with a baseball
bat. Mr. Dreyfuse did not pursue a direct appeal following his convictions. He has,
however, sought both state and federal habeas relief. Additionally, in November of 2017,
Mr. Dreyfus filed a private citizen application seeking to present a complaint to the grand
jury. In his application to the circuit court, Mr. Dreyfuse asserted that during the course of
the grand jury proceedings that resulted in his indictments for murder and burglary, a police
officer perjured himself and the prosecuting attorney suborned perjury, when the police
officer testified about the injuries Mr. Dreyfuse’s victim suffered. The circuit court denied
Mr. Dreyfuse’s application to present a complaint to the grand jury. The circuit court’s
order only provides “[u]pon review of the application, the Court is of the opinion that the
application should be denied.”
Following entry of this order, Mr. Dreyfuse filed the instant appeal. He asserts
that the circuit court’s order denying his application was improper because the circuit court
usurped the grand jury’s role. According to Mr. Dreyfuse, a circuit court’s sole function
when presented with a private citizen’s application to present a complaint to the grand jury
“is to ‘insure’ that any person may go to the grand jury to present a complaint.” By contrast,
the State argues that Mr. Dreyfuse’s application to present a complaint to the grand jury was
abusive and frivolous. According to the State, the circuit court’s supervisory power over
1
the grand jury imbues it with the discretion to refuse a private citizen’s application to present
a complaint to the grand jury when the application is abusive or frivolous.
After review, we agree with the State that a circuit court may refuse a private
citizen’s application to present a complaint to the grand jury if it determines that such
application constitutes an abuse of process. However, the circuit court failed to set forth
any findings of fact or conclusions of law explaining why it denied Mr. Dreyfuse’s
application. Therefore, we reverse the circuit court’s order and remand this matter to the
circuit court for further proceedings consistent with our ruling herein.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mr. Dreyfuse was indicted on one count of first-degree murder, one count of
burglary, and two counts of assault during the commission of a felony in June of 2012. 1
During the grand jury proceedings, the prosecuting attorney, Christopher Chiles 2
(“Prosecutor Chiles”), had the following exchange with a police officer, Ryan Bentley
(“Officer Bentley”):
Q. Would you tell the Grand Jury about this case?
A. Yes, sir. On Monday, April 9th, 2012, at approximately
0129 hours, an Edward Jesse Dreyfuse forcibly kicked open and
entered 938 Washington Avenue, in Cabell County, without
permission. The residence is that of Otis Clay, Jr.
1
The two assault charges were dismissed prior to trial.
2
Mr. Chiles was Cabell County’s prosecutor in 2012. He is currently a circuit court
judge in Cabell County.
2
Inside Mr. Clay’s residence, Mr. Dreyfuse obtained a
black aluminum baseball bat and struck Mr. Clay about the face,
head and body multiple times causing the following injuries: a
broken leg, a broken arm, four broken ribs, three broken fingers,
facial fractures, and a major skull fracture. . . .
Mr. Clay was transported to St. Mary’s Hospital where
he slipped into a coma, remaining in that state until he died from
his injuries on May 2nd, 2012.
The case proceeded to trial in October of 2013. Multiple witnesses testified
that Mr. Dreyfuse attacked the victim with a baseball bat because Mr. Dreyfuse believed
the victim provided fake crack cocaine that Mr. Dreyfuse purchased. One eyewitness to the
attack, James Marcum, testified “I seen him [Mr. Dreyfuse] busting his [the victim’s] head
and brains and everything. I cleaned his brains and blood up, I did.” Mr. Marcum identified
the baseball bat and then stated, “[t]hat’s what beat his [the victim’s] brains out.” Another
witness, Laura Malone, walked into the residence as Mr. Dreyfuse was holding the baseball
bat while standing over the victim. She stated that after another individual attempted to
subdue Mr. Dreyfuse, “I went to [the victim]. I took my shirt off, I wrapped it around [the
victim’s] head.” When asked if the victim’s head was bleeding “pretty badly,” Ms. Malone
replied, “yes.”
The victim’s attending physician, Dr. David Denning, testified that the
victim’s cause of death was “multiple trauma due to assault. Injuries included cerebral
concussion, left sided rib fractures, right femur fracture, left elbow fracture, [and] left
phalanx, which is finger fracture.” Dr. Denning stated that the victim suffered a traumatic
brain injury. When asked if the victim’s injuries “were consistent with the injuries which
3
would have been received by being beaten with a baseball bat,” Dr. Denning replied, “sure.”
Dr. Allen Mock, an assistant medical examiner for the State of West Virginia, performed
the autopsy. Dr. Mock testified that “the manner of death was a homicide . . . [and] there
was evidence of blunt force injuries to the head and the extremities and the thorax.”
At the conclusion of the four-day jury trial, Mr. Dreyfuse was convicted of
first-degree murder and burglary. He was sentenced to a term of life, without mercy, for
his first-degree murder conviction, and one to fifteen years of incarceration for his burglary
conviction. Mr. Dreyfuse did not pursue a direct appeal following his convictions. 3
In November of 2017, Mr. Dreyfuse filed a private citizen application to
present a complaint to the Cabell County Grand Jury to obtain indictments against
Prosecutor Chiles and Officer Bentley. According to Mr. Dreyfuse, Officer Bentley
perjured himself in his testimony before the grand jury—and Prosecutor Chiles suborned
perjury by eliciting the testimony—when he testified about the injuries that Mr. Dreyfuse
caused the victim to suffer. Mr. Dreyfuse asserts that Officer Bentley falsely testified that
3
Mr. Dreyfuse filed an appeal in December of 2014. However, after the matter
remained on the Court’s docket for over a year without being perfected, Mr. Dreyfuse
withdrew the appeal. The State’s brief to this Court notes that Mr. Dreyfuse has been “an
extremely active litigant in the wake of his conviction, instigating a variety of collateral
proceedings including multiple state habeas petitions, a petition for review, a FOIA request,
and at least one mandamus petition in this Court, as well as a petition seeking federal habeas
relief.” In addition, Mr. Dreyfuse has sought recusal of various judicial officials throughout
these proceedings.
(continued . . .)
4
the victim suffered broken ribs, broken fingers, facial fractures and a major skull fracture.
These alleged injuries “are all absent from the decedent’s medical records,” according to
Mr. Dreyfuse.
On March 29, 2018, the circuit court issued an order denying Mr. Dreyfuse’s
application to appear before the grand jury. 4 The circuit court’s order did not include any
findings of fact or conclusions of law explaining its ruling. The order only provides “[u]pon
review of the application, the Court is of the opinion that the application should be denied.”
After entry of this order, Mr. Dreyfuse filed the present appeal of the circuit court’s March
29, 2018, order. 5
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court has held that
[i]n reviewing challenges to the findings and conclusions of the
circuit court, we apply a two-prong deferential standard of
review. We review the final order and the ultimate disposition
under an abuse of discretion standard, and we review the circuit
court’s underlying factual findings under a clearly erroneous
standard. Questions of law are subject to a de novo review.
4
The circuit court issued an order denying Mr. Dreyfuse’s application on March 7,
2018. It issued a second, nearly identical, order denying the application on March 29, 2018.
It appears that the purpose of the second order was to make clear that its denial of Mr.
Dreyfuse’s application was a final order.
5
Mr. Dreyfuse was self-represented when he filed his initial brief to this Court. By
order entered on September 5, 2019, this Court granted Mr. Dreyfuse’s motion for
appointment of counsel. Counsel for Mr. Dreyfuse subsequently filed a supplemental brief.
5
Syl. Pt. 2, Walker v. W. Va. Ethics Comm’n, 201 W.Va. 108, 492 S.E.2d 167 (1997). With
these standards as guidance, we consider the parties’ arguments.
III. ANALYSIS
This case requires us to examine a circuit court’s role when it is presented
with a private citizen’s application to present a complaint to the grand jury. Both parties
agree that this Court has not addressed this issue in detail. Mr. Dreyfuse argues that the
circuit court’s denial of his application to present a complaint to the grand jury was
unconstitutional because “the [circuit] court’s function is to ‘insure’ that any person may go
to the grand jury to present a complaint.” He asserts that “there is no manner by which a
[circuit] court can determine the merit of a person’s felony complaint, because both the
United States Constitution and the West Virginia Constitution grant that power to the grand
jury alone.” Allowing a circuit court to determine whether a private citizen’s complaint has
merit would make the grand jury moot according to Mr. Dreyfuse. Stated simply, Mr.
Dreyfuse claims that a circuit court’s singular duty upon receiving a private citizen’s
application to present a complaint to the grand jury is to grant access to the grand jury.
The State argues that the circuit court’s denial of Mr. Dreyfuse’s application
should be affirmed. It asserts that “this Court has routinely held that the circuit courts have
both the power and the duty to supervise grand jury proceedings to prevent abuse of the
judicial process and to ensure the fairness and integrity” of our criminal justice system. The
State suggests that Mr. Dreyfuse’s application “was both abusive and frivolous.” However,
the State acknowledges that the circuit court’s order failed to include any analysis
6
explaining its ruling and concedes that remanding this case to the circuit court for entry of
an order explaining its ruling would be proper.
Our review will begin with an examination of State ex rel. Miller v. Smith,
168 W. Va. 745, 285 S.E.2d 500 (1981) (“Miller”), in which this Court recognized that a
private citizen has a constitutional right to present a complaint to the grand jury. After
discussing Miller, we will proceed to examine: 1) whether a circuit court may apply
reasonable limitations to a private citizen’s constitutional right to access our court system;
2) whether a circuit court possesses supervisory authority over a grand jury; and 3) the
specific process that should occur when a private citizen seeks to present a complaint to the
grand jury.
A. Miller
In Miller, a malicious assault victim submitted evidence of the assault to the
prosecuting attorney. Id. at 747, 285 S.E.2d at 501. After the prosecuting attorney declined
to present the matter to the grand jury, the victim applied to the circuit court to present a
complaint to the grand jury. The victim was not permitted to present his complaint to the
grand jury and filed a writ with this Court. Id. at 748, 285 S.E.2d at 502. This Court’s
review began with an examination of the purpose of our grand jury system. It noted that
“historically the grand jury serves a dual function: it is intended to operate both as a sword,
investigating cases to bring to trial persons accused on just grounds, and as a shield,
protecting citizens against unfounded malicious or frivolous prosecutions.” Id. at 751, 285
S.E.2d at 504. Additionally, the Court provided:
7
As criminal offenses are offenses against the State which must
be prosecuted in the name of the State, the prosecutor, as the
officer charged with prosecuting such offenses, has a duty to
vindicate the victims and the public’s constitutional right of
redress for a criminal invasion of rights. The “spirit of law” has
long been and it has been long held that the public has rights as
well as the accused, and one of the first of these is that of
redressing or punishing their wrongs.
Id. at 752–53, 285 S.E.2d at 504 (citations and quotation omitted).
The Court, relying on West Virginia Constitution art. III, § 17, 6 concluded
that the grand jury must be open to the public as a matter of constitutional right and held
that “[b]y application to the circuit judge, whose duty is to insure access to the grand jury,
any person may go to the grand jury to present a complaint to it. W.Va. Const. art. 3, § 17.”
Syl. Pt. 1, Miller.
After Miller, this Court has reaffirmed the right of a private citizen to present
a complaint to the grand jury. See State ex rel. R.L. v. Bedell, 192 W. Va. 435, 452 S.E.2d
893 (1994) (holding that indictment obtained by way of private citizen application is valid
even in the absence of attesting signature of prosecuting attorney); Comm. on Legal Ethics
of the W. Va. State Bar v. Sheatsley, 192 W. Va. 272, 278 452 S.E.2d 75, 81 (1994) (Cleckey,
J., concurring) (discussing art. III, § 17 and reiterating that the Court relied on it to hold that
a private citizen may present a complaint to a grand jury). However, this Court has not
6
West Virginia Constitution art. III, § 17 provides “[t]he courts of this State shall be
open, and every person, for an injury done to him, in his person, property or reputation, shall
have remedy by due course of law; and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or
delay.”
8
addressed the scope of a circuit court’s role upon receiving an application from a private
citizen seeking to present a complaint to the grand jury.
B. Constitutional Right to Access Our Courts Subject to Reasonable Limitations
In examining the circuit court’s role upon receiving a private citizen’s
application, we begin by addressing whether a circuit court may apply reasonable
limitations to a private citizen’s constitutional right, West Virginia Constitution art. III, §
17, to access our court system. According to Mr. Dreyfuse, the circuit court may not limit
a private citizen’s constitutional right to appear before the grand jury. Rather, the circuit
court’s singular role in this regard is to grant the private citizen access to the grand jury. We
disagree.
This Court has, on multiple occasions, determined that a person’s
constitutional right to access our court system is subject to reasonable limitations. In Blair
v. Maynard, 174 W.Va. 247, 324 S.E.2d 391 (1984), the Court addressed a person’s right
of self-representation in a civil proceeding. In syllabus point one of Blair, we held, “[u]nder
West Virginia Constitution art. III, § 17, the right of self-representation in civil proceedings
is a fundamental right which cannot be arbitrarily or unreasonably denied.” The Court
recognized that the right of self-representation is not absolute. In syllabus point two of
Blair, we held “[t]he fundamental right of self-representation recognized in West Virginia
Constitution art. III, § 17 may not be denied without a clear showing in the record that the
pro se litigant is engaging in a course of conduct which demonstrates a clear intention to
obstruct the administration of justice.” (Emphasis added.)
9
Similarly, this Court has recognized that a prisoner has a constitutional right
to access our courts. In syllabus point two of Mathena v. Haines, 219 W.Va. 417, 633
S.E.2d 771 (2006), the Court held, “[u]nder West Virginia Constitution art. III, § 17,
prisoners have a Constitutional right to meaningful access to our courts subject to
reasonable limitations imposed to protect courts from abuse.” 7 (Emphasis added.) The
Court in Mathena provided the following process for a circuit court to follow when
confronted with a prisoner’s potential abuse of process:
Where a circuit court is faced with a potential abuse of
process by a prisoner or a prisoner’s threat to abuse the judicial
process, the circuit court may, subject to the following, enter an
order imposing reasonable limitations on the prisoner’s right to
access the court. Prior to the entry of such an order, the circuit
court must provide the prisoner an opportunity to show cause
why such a limitation should not be imposed. If the record
demonstrates a clear intention to obstruct the administration of
justice, the circuit court may impose limitations on the
prisoner’s right of access. Any order limiting a prisoner’s access
to the courts must be designed to preserve his right to adequate,
effective, and meaningful access to our courts. The circuit
court’s order imposing such a limitation must include such
findings of fact and conclusions of law adequate for meaningful
appellate review.
Syl. Pt. 5, Mathena.
7
“Generally, abuse of process consists of the willful or malicious misuse or
misapplication of lawfully issued process to accomplish some purpose not intended or
warranted by that process.” Preiser v. MacQueen, 177 W.Va. 273, 279, 352 S.E.2d 22, 28
(1985).
10
Likewise, in State ex rel. James v. Hun, 201 W. Va. 139, 141, 494 S.E.2d 503,
505 (1997), the Court noted that the “right of meaningful access to the courts is not
completely unfettered.” We recently emphasized that the legal process may not be used for
an improper purpose:
Everyone who has a good faith dispute requiring a
decision by an impartial arbiter is entitled to his day in court.
On the other hand, every person is not entitled to his day in court
regardless of the frivolous nature of the suit. Parties whose
interest in the legal process is to oppress or cheat others should
be discouraged.
Mark V.H. v. Dolores J.M., No. 18-0230, 2019 WL 4257183, at *13 (W.Va. September 9,
2019), 2019) (memorandum decision) (quoting Nelson v. W.Va. Pub. Emp. Ins. Bd., 171 W.
Va. 445, 453-54, 300 S.E.2d 86, 95 (1982)).
C. Circuit Court’s Supervisory Authority Over the Grand Jury
Consistent with the foregoing case law demonstrating that the right of access
to our courts does not permit a person to abuse the judicial process, this Court has provided
that a circuit court has supervisory authority over the grand jury to prevent abuse. In State
ex rel. Casey v. Wood, 156 W.Va. 329, 333-34, 193 S.E.2d 143, 145 (1972), the Court
provided:
It is true that normally there is no limitation on the
character of the evidence that may be presented to the grand
jury. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 33
L.Ed.2d 626. But this does not mean that the court which
convened the grand jury does not have control over its process
and does not have jurisdiction to rule on a motion pertaining
thereto. United States v. United States District Court, 4 Cir., 238
F.2d 713; In Re Grand Jury Proceedings, Harrisburg,
11
Pennsylvania, 3 Cir., 450 F.2d 199, affirmed in Gelbard v.
United States, 408 U.S. 41, 92 S.Ct. 2357, 33 L.Ed.2d 179.
The grand jury is an arm or agency of the court by which
it is convened and such court has control and supervision over
the grand jury. United States v. Smyth, D.C., 104 F. Supp. 283.
A grand jury has no independent existence, but is a part of and
an adjunct to the court. State ex rel. Martin v. Michell, Fla.App.,
188 So.2d 684. It should also be noted that a grand jury has no
power to compel a witness to testify, but only the court can
exercise such compulsion. 9 M.J., Grand Jury, s 20; Siklek v.
Commonwealth, 133 Va. 789, 112 S.E. 605.
It has been held by the United States Supreme Court that
courts have inherent power over their own process to prevent
abuse, oppression, and injustice. See Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110
U.S. 276, 4 S.Ct. 27, 28 L.Ed. 145. Subpoenas for witnesses to
appear before a grand jury and testify are the court’s process
and not the process of the grand jury. It is the duty of the court
to see that its process is not abused. Krippendorf v. Hyde,
Supra.(Emphasis added.) See also Syl. Pt. 2, in part, State ex rel. Hamstead v. Dostert, 173 W.Va.
133, 313 S.E.2d 409 (1984) (“[A] circuit court has supervisory powers over grand jury
proceedings to preserve the integrity of the grand jury process and to insure the proper
administration of justice[.]”).
In sum, this Court has consistently held that 1) the right of meaningful access
to our courts, under West Virginia Constitution art. III, § 17, is subject to reasonable
limitations to prevent judicial abuse, and 2) a circuit court has supervisory authority over
the grand jury to prevent judicial abuse. We therefore hold that a private citizen’s right
under West Virginia Constitution art. III, § 17 to present a complaint to the grand jury upon
application to the circuit court is subject to reasonable limitations to protect our judicial
12
system from abuse. In so holding, we reject Mr. Dreyfuse’s argument that the circuit court’s
singular duty upon receiving a private citizen’s application to present a complaint to the
grand jury is to grant unfettered access to the grand jury.
The precise scope of a circuit court’s duty to protect the judicial system from
abuse cannot be easily reduced to a formula. In describing a circuit court’s twin duties to
ensure that a private citizen has access to the grand jury while also imposing reasonable
limitations to protect our judicial system from abuse, we find the following language from
Blair to be illuminating:
This Court recognizes that the proper scope of the court’s
responsibility is necessarily an expression of careful exercise of
judicial discretion and cannot be fully described by specific
formula. . . . Each case presents a wholly different set of
circumstances which require careful attention so as to preserve
the rights of all parties. Nevertheless, the fundamental right . . .
recognized in West Virginia Constitution art. III, § 17 may not
be denied without a clear showing in the record that the pro se
litigant is engaging in a course of conduct which demonstrates
a clear intention to obstruct the administration of justice.
174 W.Va. at 253, 324 S.E.2d at 396 (internal citation and quotation omitted).
Consistent with the Court’s reasoning in Blair, as well as our ruling in
Mathena, 8 we hold that a circuit court may not deny a private citizen’s application to present
8
“If the record demonstrates a clear intention to obstruct the administration of
justice, the circuit court may impose limitations on the prisoner’s right of access.” Syl. Pt.
5, Mathena, in relevant part. (Emphasis added.)
(continued . . .)
13
a complaint to the grand jury without a showing that the private citizen’s conduct
demonstrates a clear intention to obstruct the administration of justice. A circuit court’s
order denying a private citizen’s application to present a complaint to the grand jury must
include such findings of fact and conclusions of law adequate for meaningful appellate
review. 9 Again, we find that a single formula cannot encompass all of the possible scenarios
with which a circuit court may be presented when deciding whether a particular course of
conduct constitutes a clear intention to obstruct the administration of justice. We rely on
our circuit courts to make this determination on a case-by-case basis, guided by our
recognition that access to our court system does not permit a party to pursue a claim for
“vexatious, wanton, or oppressive purposes”:
Although there is an undeniable interest in the maintenance of
unrestricted access to the judicial system, unfounded claims or
defenses asserted for vexatious, wanton, or oppressive purposes
place an unconscionable burden upon precious judicial
resources already stretched to their limits in an increasingly
litigious society. In reality, to the extent that these claims or
defenses increase delay or divert attention from valid claims or
9
We have long adhered to the general rule that a lower court’s order “must be
sufficient to indicate the factual and legal basis for the [court]’s ultimate conclusion so as
to facilitate a meaningful review of the issues presented.” Province v. Province, 196 W.Va.
473, 483, 473 S.E.2d 894, 904 (1996); see also Nestor v. Bruce Hardwood Flooring, L.P.,
206 W.Va. 453, 456, 525 S.E.2d 334, 337 (1999) (“[O]ur task as an appellate court is to
determine whether the circuit court’s reasons for its order are supported by the record.”).
“Where the lower tribunals fail to meet this standard—i.e. making only general, conclusory
or inexact findings—we must vacate the judgment and remand the case for further findings
and development.” Province, 196 W.Va. at 483, 473 S.E.2d at 904. This Court has stated,
“[w]ithout factual or legal findings, this Court is greatly at sea without a chart or compass
in making a determination as to whether the [lower] court’s decision was right or wrong.”
In re Timber M., 231 W.Va. 44, 59, 743 S.E.2d 352, 367 (2013) (internal citation omitted).
14
defenses asserted in good faith, they serve to deny the very
access to the judicial system they would claim as justification
for their immunity from sanction.
Daily Gazette Co., Inc. v. Canady, 175 W.Va. 249, 252, 332 S.E.2d 262, 265 (1985). See
also Hunter v. Beckley Newspapers Corp., 129 W. Va. 302, 306-07, 40 S.E.2d 332, 335
(1946) (“If there is one principle firmly embedded in our jurisprudence, it is that the
processes of the courts must be maintained to the highest point of integrity, and free from
abuse. Unless that principle is rigidly maintained, courts of justice will become the subject
of suspicion, and one of the bulwarks of our governmental system will be thereby
undermined.”).
One factor a circuit court may consider when reviewing a private citizen’s
application to present a complaint to the grand jury is whether the application complies with
Rule 11 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. Under Rule 11(b), an attorney or an
unrepresented party must certify that their submission to the court is not submitted for an
improper purpose, is warranted by existing law or the establishment of new law, and that
the factual contentions contained therein have evidentiary support:
(b) Representations to Court. By presenting to the court
(whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a
pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or
unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person’s
knowledge, information, and belief formed after an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances,
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as
to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in
the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are
warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for
15
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the
establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have
evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely
to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for
further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the
evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based
on a lack of information or belief.
In Hinchman v. Gillette, 217 W.Va. 378, 391-392, 618 S.E.2d 387, 400-401
(2005) (Davis, J., concurring), the Court noted that Rule 11 permits a circuit court to
preclude frivolous lawsuits:
Rule 11 is the “gatekeeper” employed by this Court to
keep out frivolous lawsuits. We have previously indicated that
Rule 11 “reflects the dual concern with discouraging both
frivolity and abuse . . ., and places certain burdens upon the
attorney with respect to his or her gatekeeping function.” Daily
Gazette Co., Inc. v. Canady, 175 W.Va. 249, 252, 332 S.E.2d
262, 265 (1985). Under Rule 11(a), all pleadings must be
signed by an attorney or unrepresented party. It has been noted
“that a signature certifies to the court that the signer has read the
document, has conducted a reasonable inquiry into the facts and
the law and is satisfied that the document is well grounded in
both, and is acting without any improper motive.” Cleckley,
Davis & Palmer, Litigation Handbook § 11(a), at 241 (2002).
Consistent with Rule 11, a circuit court may deny a private citizen’s
application to present a complaint to the grand jury if it determines that the complaint is
being presented for an improper purpose.
D. Specific Process
While we have addressed the scope of a circuit court’s review of a private
citizen’s application to present a complaint to the grand jury, we now address the specific
16
process that should occur when a private citizen seeks to present a complaint to the grand
jury. This Court has not addressed whether a private citizen should submit their proposed
grand jury complaint to a prosecuting attorney before filing an application with the circuit
court. We note that in this Court’s seminal case on this issue, Miller, the private citizen
submitted his complaint to the prosecuting attorney prior to seeking relief before the circuit
court. 168 W.Va. at 747, 285 S.E.2d at 501. Additionally, during oral argument in this
matter, counsel for Mr. Dreyfuse stated that he was not proposing that a private citizen “go
around” the prosecuting attorney. Instead, counsel agreed that a private citizen should bring
their proposed grand jury complaint to a prosecuting attorney first, and, if the prosecuting
attorney declines to present the matter to the grand jury, then the private citizen could file
their application with the circuit court.
While we have not addressed this precise issue, we find guidance in the
Court’s ruling in Harman v. Frye, 188 W.Va. 611, 425 S.E.2d 566 (1992). The Court in
Harman addressed “the complex and troublesome issue of whether private citizens should
be required to present a criminal complaint for both felony and misdemeanor cases to the
prosecuting attorney or the appropriate law enforcement agency before the matter is
presented to a magistrate for the issuance of a summons or complaint.” Id. at 613, 425
S.E.2d at 568. The Court concluded that, except where there is a specific statutory
exception, a private citizen’s criminal complaint should be evaluated by a prosecuting
attorney or law enforcement official before being submitted to a magistrate:
Except where there is a specific statutory exception, a
magistrate may not issue a warrant or summons for a
17
misdemeanor or felony solely upon the complaint of a private
citizen without a prior evaluation of the citizen’s complaint by
the prosecuting attorney or an investigation by the appropriate
law enforcement agency.
Syl. Pt. 1, in part, Harman.
The Court cited a litany of reasons for reaching this holding, including the
protection of citizens from having to defend against “unfounded, vindictive or frivolous”
charges, as well as fostering a more effective system of administering our judicial process:
[A] rule requiring the prosecuting attorney to evaluate or the
proper law enforcement agency to investigate citizens’
criminal complaints before such matters are presented to the
magistrate for a probable cause determination provides a more
effective administration of criminal law under our justice
system for several reasons. First, prosecuting attorneys
institute criminal proceedings on behalf of the State of West
Virginia as a whole, rather than to vindicate private rights. . . .
Furthermore, by having an impartial prosecuting attorney
screen criminal complaints or having law enforcement officers
assist prosecuting attorneys by investigating such complaints
before they are presented to a magistrate, individuals can be
protected from having to defend against charges which are
unfounded, vindictive or frivolous, and the prosecuting
attorney’s office can be spared the time and expense of
prosecuting such charges. Moreover, if private citizens are no
longer permitted to file criminal complaints before a
magistrate, the problem of citizens racing to the courthouse to
file unfounded or retaliatory charges and counter-charges
against each other could be avoided. Finally, private citizens
have not undergone the same professional training as
prosecuting attorneys or law enforcement officers nor are they
subject to the same rules of professional conduct and discipline
which are imposed on prosecuting attorneys and law
enforcement officers. See generally State ex rel. Skinner v.
Dostert, 166 W.Va. at 750-52, 278 S.E.2d at 630-32. There is
a presumption that prosecuting attorneys and law enforcement
officers will perform their duties with integrity, and will
18
evaluate or investigate these criminal complaints fairly and
skillfully.
Thus, we conclude that private citizens should submit
their criminal complaints to the prosecuting attorney for
evaluation or to the appropriate law enforcement agency for
investigation before such complaints are presented to the
magistrate for a probable cause determination. We emphasize
that the evaluation of private citizen criminal complaints by a
prosecuting attorney or the investigation of such complaints by
a law enforcement agency before presenting such complaints
to a magistrate shall in no way affect the judicial function to be
performed by the magistrate in making a probable cause
determination. We are adopting a rule requiring either the
prosecuting attorney to evaluate private citizen complaints or
the appropriate law enforcement agency to assist the
prosecuting attorney by investigating such criminal complaints
prior to presenting them to a magistrate to: (1) protect citizens
from the issuance of warrants based on frivolous, retaliatory or
unfounded complaints; (2) avoid the time and expense of
having such complaints prosecuted; and (3) to foster a more
effective and efficient administration of our criminal justice
system.
Id. at 619-20, 425 S.E.2d at 574-75.
After a private citizen submits their complaint to a prosecutor or law
enforcement official, the Court in Harman described the next step in the process: “the
prosecuting attorney shall institute all necessary and proper proceedings before the
magistrate, and, in suitable cases, law enforcement officers may obtain warrants and assist
private citizens in obtaining the warrant or summons from the magistrate.” Id. at 621, 425
S.E.2d 576. If the prosecutor refused to initiate proceedings, the Court noted that a private
citizen retained the right to present an application to the circuit court to appear before the
grand jury. Id.19
Based on our ruling in Harman and consistent with syllabus point one of
Miller (“[b]y application to the circuit judge . . .”) we hold that when a private citizen seeks
to present a complaint to the grand jury, he must first apply to the circuit court. The circuit
court shall then provide a copy of the application to the prosecuting attorney. Upon receipt
of the private citizen’s application, the prosecuting attorney may then initiate grand jury
proceedings based on the allegations in the private citizen’s application or he may decline
to do so. If a prosecuting attorney declines to initiate grand jury proceedings, or does not
act upon the application within a reasonable period of time, the private citizen may seek
review of their application in the circuit court. In reviewing the private citizen’s application
after a prosecuting attorney declines to initiate grand jury proceedings or does not act upon
the application within a reasonable period of time, the circuit court shall conduct an in
camera hearing to provide the private citizen and the prosecuting attorney an opportunity
to address the court regarding the private citizen’s application. As previously stated, a
circuit court may not deny a private citizen’s application to present a complaint to the grand
jury without a clear showing that the private citizen is engaging in conduct which
demonstrates a clear intention to obstruct the administration of justice.
E. Instant Case
Returning to the instant case, the circuit court’s denial of Mr. Dreyfuse’s
application did not include any findings of fact or conclusions of law. While the State
argues that Mr. Dreyfuse’s application was “both abusive and frivolous,” the circuit court
has not made such a ruling. Therefore, we find it necessary to remand this matter to the
20
circuit court for further proceedings. Upon remand, the circuit court should provide a copy
of Mr. Dreyfuse’s proposed complaint to the prosecuting attorney for evaluation. 10 If the
prosecuting attorney declines to initiate grand jury proceedings, Mr. Dreyfuse may seek
review of his application with the circuit court consistent with our ruling herein.
IV. CONCLUSION
The circuit court’s March 29, 2018, order is reversed. This matter is remanded
to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
Reversed and Remanded With Directions.
10
Given the nature of Mr. Dreyfuse’s complaint—seeking an indictment against
Cabell County’s former prosecutor—we leave it to the county’s current prosecutor to
determine if their office should be recused from this matter.
21