Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. E. Lavoyd Morgan, Jr. ( 2020 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
September 2020 Term
FILED
October 16, 2020
released at 3:00 p.m.
No. 19-0879 EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
OF WEST VIRGINIA
LAWYER DISCIPLINARY BOARD,
Petitioner
V.
E. LAVOYD MORGAN, JR.,
A Member of the West Virginia State Bar,
Respondent
________________________________________________________
Lawyer Disciplinary Proceedings
No. 17-05-329
No. 17-05-523
No. 17-02-554
No. 17-05-574
No. 18-03-081
No. 18-05-236
No. 18-05-240
No. 18-05-246
No. 18-05-268
No. 18-05-276
No. 18-05-282
No. 18-05-284
No. 18-05-304
No. 18-05-312
No. 18-05-313
No. 18-05-314
No. 18-05-343
No. 18-05-370
No. 18-05-418
No. 18-05-490
No. 19-03-135
No. 19-05-152
LAW LICENSE ANNULLED AND OTHER SANCTIONS IMPOSED
_________________________________________________________
Submitted: September 2, 2020
Filed: October 16, 2020
Rachael L. Fletcher Cipoletti Lonnie C. Simmons
Chief Lawyer Disciplinary Counsel DIPIERO SIMMONS MCGINLEY &
Jessica Donahue Rhodes BASTRESS, PLLC
Lawyer Disciplinary Counsel Charleston, West Virginia
Office of Lawyer Disciplinary Counsel Attorney for the Respondent
Charleston, West Virginia
Attorneys for the Petitioner
JUSTICE JENKINS delivered the Opinion of the Court.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. “A de novo standard applies to a review of the adjudicatory record
made before the [Lawyer Disciplinary Board] as to questions of law, questions of
application of the law to the facts, and questions of appropriate sanctions; this Court gives
respectful consideration to the [Board’s] recommendations while ultimately exercising its
own independent judgment. On the other hand, substantial deference is given to the
[Board’s] findings of fact, unless such findings are not supported by reliable, probative,
and substantial evidence on the whole record.” Syllabus point 3, Committee on Legal
Ethics v. McCorkle, 192 W. Va. 286, 452 S.E.2d 377 (1994).
2. “Rule 3.16 of the West Virginia Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary
Procedure enumerates factors to be considered in imposing sanctions and provides as
follows: ‘In imposing a sanction after a finding of lawyer misconduct, unless otherwise
provided in these rules, the Court [West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals] or Board
[Lawyer Disciplinary Board] shall consider the following factors: (1) whether the lawyer
has violated a duty owed to a client, to the public, to the legal system, or to the profession;
(2) whether the lawyer acted intentionally, knowingly, or negligently; (3) the amount of
the actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct; and (4) the existence of
any aggravating or mitigating factors.’” Syllabus point 4, Office of Lawyer Disciplinary
Counsel v. Jordan, 204 W. Va. 495, 513 S.E.2d 722 (1998).
i
3. “Aggravating factors in a lawyer disciplinary proceeding are any
considerations or factors that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be
imposed.” Syllabus point 4, Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Scott, 213 W. Va. 209, 579
S.E.2d 550 (2003).
4. “Mitigating factors which may be considered in determining the
appropriate sanction to be imposed against a lawyer for violating the Rules of Professional
Conduct include: (1) absence of a prior disciplinary record; (2) absence of a dishonest or
selfish motive; (3) personal or emotional problems; (4) timely good faith effort to make
restitution or to rectify consequences of misconduct; (5) full and free disclosure to
disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings; (6) inexperience in the
practice of law; (7) character or reputation; (8) physical or mental disability or impairment;
(9) delay in disciplinary proceedings; (10) interim rehabilitation; (11) imposition of other
penalties or sanctions; (12) remorse; and (13) remoteness of prior offenses.” Syllabus
point 3, Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Scott, 213 W. Va. 209, 579 S.E.2d 550 (2003).
5. “In deciding on the appropriate disciplinary action for ethical
violations, this Court must consider not only what steps would appropriately punish the
respondent attorney, but also whether the discipline imposed is adequate to serve as an
effective deterrent to other members of the Bar and at the same time restore public
confidence in the ethical standards of the legal profession.” Syllabus point 3, Committee
on Legal Ethics v. Walker, 178 W. Va. 150, 358 S.E.2d 234 (1987).
ii
Jenkins, Justice:
This lawyer disciplinary proceeding against E. Lavoyd Morgan (“Mr.
Morgan”) was brought to this Court by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) on
behalf of the Lawyer Disciplinary Board (“LDB”). The Hearing Panel Subcommittee
(“HPS”) of the LDB recommended the following disposition in its report to this Court: that
Mr. Morgan’s license to practice law be annulled; that Mr. Morgan refund monies to
specified clients; that Mr. Morgan comply with the mandates of Rule 3.28 1 of the West
1
Rule 3.28 states, in full:
(a) A disbarred or suspended lawyer shall promptly
notify by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested,
or by first-class mail with the prior consent of the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, all clients being represented in pending
matters, other than litigated or administrative matters or
proceedings pending in any court of agency, of the lawyer’s
inability to act as a lawyer after the effective date of disbarment
or suspension and shall advise said clients to seek legal advice
elsewhere. Failure of a disbarred or suspended lawyer to notify
all clients of his or her inability to act as a lawyer shall
constitute an aggravating factor in any subsequent disciplinary
proceeding.
(b) A disbarred or suspended lawyer shall promptly
notify by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested,
or by first-class mail with the prior consent of the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, each of the lawyer’s clients who is
involved in litigated or administrative matters or proceedings
pending, of the lawyer’s inability to act as a lawyer after the
effective date of disbarment or suspension and shall advise said
client to promptly substitute another lawyer in his or her place.
In the event the client does not obtain substitute counsel before
the effective date of the disbarment or suspension, it shall be
the responsibility of the disbarred or suspended lawyer to move
pro se in the court or agency in which the proceeding is pending
for leave to withdraw as counsel. The notice to be given to the
1
Virginia Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedure unless he has submitted such as part of
his immediate suspension in Case No. 19-0885; 2 and that he pay the costs of these
proceedings pursuant to Rule 3.15 3 of the West Virginia Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary
lawyer for any adverse party shall state the place of residence
of the client of the disbarred or suspended lawyer.
(c) The disbarred or suspended lawyer, after entry of the
disbarment or suspension order, shall not accept any new
retainer or engage as attorney for another in any new case or
legal matter of any nature. During the period from the entry
date of the order to its effective date, however, the lawyer may
wind up and complete, on behalf of any client, all matters
which were pending on the entry date. Within twenty days after
the effective date of the disbarment or suspension order, the
lawyer shall file under seal with the Supreme Court of Appeals
an affidavit showing (1) the names of each client being
represented in pending matters who were notified pursuant to
subsections (a) and (b); (2) a copy of each letter of notification
which was sent; (3) a list of fees and expenses paid by each
client and whether escrowed funds have been or need to be
reimbursed; and (4) an accounting of all trust money held by
the lawyer on the date the disbarment or suspension order was
issued. Such affidavit shall also set forth the residence or other
address of the disbarred or suspended lawyer where
communications may thereafter be directed and a list of all
other courts and jurisdictions in which the disbarred or
suspended lawyer is admitted to practice. A copy of this report
shall also be filed with the Office of Disciplinary Counsel.
2
Office of Disc. Counsel v. Morgan, 242 W. Va. 667, 839 S.E.2d 145 (2020).
3
Rule 3.15 states, in full:
A Hearing Panel Subcommittee may recommend or the
Supreme Court of Appeals may impose any one or more of the
following sanctions for a violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct or pursuant to Rule 3.14: (1) probation; (2) restitution;
(3) limitation on the nature or extent of future practice;
(4) supervised practice; (5) community service;
2
Procedure. Thereafter, the LDB submitted its consent to the recommendation and Mr.
Morgan filed his objection. Upon careful review of the record submitted, the parties’ briefs
and oral arguments, and the relevant law, this Court agrees with the recommendations of
the HPS, and finds that the recommended sanctions are warranted.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mr. Morgan is a practicing attorney in Lewisburg, West Virginia. He was
admitted to the West Virginia State Bar on October 2, 1995, having passed the bar exam.
As such, Mr. Morgan is subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of this Court and its properly
constituted LDB.
A. Count I—Complaint of the Office of Lawyer Disciplinary Counsel
The ODC obtained information that Mr. Morgan had eighteen days of billing
in excess of eighteen hours a day submitted for payments from the Public Defender
Services (“Public Defender”). Specifically, the times and days were listed as follows:
(6) admonishment; (7) reprimand; (8) suspension; or
(9) annulment. When a sanction is imposed, the Hearing Panel
Subcommittee or the Court shall order the lawyer to reimburse
the Lawyer Disciplinary Board for the costs of the disciplinary
proceeding unless the panel or the Court finds the
reimbursement will pose an undue hardship on the lawyer.
Willful failure to reimburse the Board may be punished as
contempt of the Court.
3
Date Number of Hours
Submitted to PDS
2/22/16 18.6
3/22/16 19.1
5/2/16 22.8
5/6/16 18.3
5/23/16 22.4
7/6/16 18.5
7/12/16 20.2
7/26/16 27.0
8/4/16 18.3
8/9/16 23.7
8/17/16 20.3
8/30/16 20.4
9/2/16 26.9
9/26/16 18.6
9/28/16 19.2
10/17/16 21.8
12/13/16 20.1
1/3/17 20.2
Mr. Morgan responded that some of this time was work he would perform
on the weekends which was then billed to a weekday. Further, he noted that some of the
time was “reconstructed,” and that he had actually underbilled many of his cases. Mr.
Morgan asserted that any billing errors were due to misidentifications by the billing
attorney and clerical errors on duplicate entries.
After Mr. Morgan corrected some of the billing entries, the Public Defender
provided information that showed three days still consisted of eighteen hours of services
billed, and two days were between fifteen and eighteen hours of billed services. Moreover,
one day showed a billing of nearly twenty-nine hours for that day—which is impossible
4
considering there are only twenty-four hours in a day. Upon additional information
provided by the Public Defender, the ODC discovered that Mr. Morgan had sixteen more
days of billing eighteen or more hours. When questioned once again about the excessive
billing, Mr. Morgan claimed that some of the time was for work completed by an associate,
and he admitted to overbilling for approximately five and a half hours. When asked by the
ODC to address this excessive time, Mr. Morgan stated that the time was for weekends and
other days were submitted for the wrong dates. Regarding his high hours billed for
weekends, Mr. Morgan stated that he was required to work weekends to handle follow-up
work made necessary by his weekday schedule. Two of Mr. Morgan’s former employees
provided statements that his billings to the Public Defender were incorrect, and that he
rarely worked on the weekends. By the time the Public Defender was finished sending
information to the ODC, there were thirty-eight days with eighteen hours or more of billed
services.
Mr. Morgan was charged with providing false information to the tribunal on
his billings in violation of Rule 3.3(a)(1); 4 providing improper and unsubstantiated billings
4
Rule 3.3 of the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct states: “(a) A
lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to
correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the
lawyer.”
5
in violation of Rules 1.5(a), 5 8.4(c), 6 and 8.4(d); 7 failing to make sure his staff’s conduct
was in line with the rules in violation of Rule 5.3; 8 and making false statements about his
Public Defender work in violation of Rule 8.1(a). 9
5
Rule 1.5 of the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct states:
(a) A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge,
or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for
expenses. The factors to be considered in determining the
reasonableness of a fee include the following:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and
difficulty of the questions involved, and skill
requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(2) the likelihood that the acceptance of the
particular employment will preclude other
employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for
similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or
by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the
lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
6
Rule 8.4(c) of the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct provides
that “[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.”
6
7
Rule 8.4(d) of the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct provides
that “[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is prejudicial
to the administration of justice.”
8
Rule 5.3 of the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct states:
With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or
associated with a lawyer:
(a) a partner, and a lawyer who individually or together
with other lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority
in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the
firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that
the person’s conduct is compatible with the professional
obligations of the lawyer;
(b) a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over
the nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the
person’s conduct is compatible with the professional
obligations of the lawyer; and
(c) a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a
person that would be a violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer if:
(1) the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the
specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or
(2) the lawyer is a partner or has comparable
managerial authority in the law firm in which the person
is employed, or has direct supervisory authority over the
person, and knows of the conduct at a time when its
consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to
take reasonable remedial action.
9
According to Rule 8.1(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Professional
Conduct, “[a]n applicant for admission to the bar, or a lawyer in connection with a bar
admission application or in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not . . . knowingly
make a false statement of material fact.”
7
B. Count II—Complaint of Travis R. Norwood
Mr. Norwood retained Mr. Morgan for representation in multiple criminal
cases, and in turn, paid Mr. Morgan an $8,000.00 retainer fee. Mr. Norwood alleged that
Mr. Morgan failed to properly represent him, and as such, he terminated Mr. Morgan as
his counsel. Upon his termination, Mr. Morgan failed to provide the client file to Mr.
Norwood, and failed to refund the unearned portion of his retainer fee. A former employee
of Mr. Morgan provided a statement averring that Mr. Morgan falsified the invoice for his
work in Mr. Norwood’s case. A review of Mr. Morgan’s IOLTA account did not show a
deposit of the $8,000.00 retainer fee when it was paid, and two months later the IOLTA
account had a negative balance. Mr. Morgan also failed to respond to two letters from
Disciplinary Counsel.
Mr. Morgan was charged with not having a written fee agreement in violation
of Rule 1.5(b); 10 failing to provide the client file and unearned fees in violation of Rule
10
Under Rule 1.5(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct,
[t]he scope of the representation and the basis or rate of
the fee and expenses for which the client will be responsible
shall be communicated to the client in writing before or within
a reasonable time after commencing the representation, except
when the lawyer will charge a regularly represented client on
the same basis or rate. Any changes in the basis or rate of the
fee or expenses shall also be communicated to the client in
writing.
8
1.16(d); 11 failing to hold client funds in an account designated as a “client’s trust account”
and failing to keep complete records of the funds paid to him in violation or Rule 1.15(a); 12
failing to place unearned fees into a client trust account and leaving unearned fees in his
account in violation of Rule 1.15(c); 13 misrepresenting the case to Mr. Norwood and
11
Rule 1.16(d) of the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct provides
that
[u]pon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take
steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s
interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client,
allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering
papers and property to which the client is entitled and
refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that has not
been earned or incurred. The lawyer may retain papers relating
to the client to the extent permitted by other law.
12
Rule 1.15(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct provides:
A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons
that is in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a
representation separate from the lawyer’s own property. Funds
shall be kept in a separate account designated as a “client’s
trust account” in an institution whose accounts are federally
insured and maintained in the state where the lawyer’s office
is situated, or in a separate account elsewhere with the consent
of the client or third person. Such separate accounts must
comply with State Bar Administrative Rule 10 with regard to
overdraft reporting. Other property shall be identified as such
and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such
account funds and other property shall be kept by the lawyer
and shall be preserved for a period of five years after
termination of the representation.
13
Rule 1.15(c) of the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct states that
“[a] lawyer shall deposit into a client trust account legal fees and expenses that have been
paid in advance, to be withdrawn by the lawyer only as fees are earned or expenses
incurred.”
9
misappropriating and converting client funds in violation of Rules 8.4(c) and 8.4(d);
providing false information to the ODC about the accounting in violation of Rule 8.1(a);
and failing to timely respond to the ODC in violation of Rule 8.1(b). 14
C. Count III—Complaint of Lori Ann McKinney
Lori Ann McKinney hired Mr. Morgan to represent her husband in a criminal
case. She alleged that Mr. Morgan failed to communicate with them and failed to properly
handle the case. Ms. McKinney also sought Mr. Morgan’s representation in a medical
malpractice case, which he allegedly did not pursue and never told the client that he was
not going to pursue. Mr. Morgan is charged with failing to act diligently, failing to expedite
both cases, failing to communicate with his clients about both cases, failing to keep records
14
According to Rule 8.1(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Professional
Conduct,
[a]n applicant for admission to the bar, or a lawyer in
connection with a bar admission application or in connection
with a disciplinary matter, shall not:
....
fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a
misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the
matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for
information from an admissions or disciplinary authority,
except that this Rule does not require disclosure of information
otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.
10
of the funds paid to him, and failing to provide the client file. He is accused of violating
Rules 1.3, 151.4(b), 16 1.15(a), 1.16(d), 3.2, 17 8.4(c) and 8.4(d).
D. Count IV—Complaint of W.T.
Mr. Morgan represented W.T.’s granddaughter in a family court matter.
According to the granddaughter, she saw Mr. Morgan only at the initial consultation and
at two hearings. Once the representation ended, he never provided her with the client file.
Further, a review of the IOLTA account was unclear as to when or if the retainer was
deposited; however, at the end of the next month, the IOLTA account had a negative
balance. Mr. Morgan also failed to respond to two letters from the ODC.
Mr. Morgan was charged with not having a written fee agreement in violation
of Rule 1.5(b); failing to hold client funds in an account designated as a “client’s trust
account” and failing to keep complete records of the funds paid to him in violation of Rule
1.15(a); failing to place unearned fees in a trust account and leaving earned fees in his own
trust account in violation of Rule 1.15(c); failing to provide the client file and unearned
Rule 1.3 of the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct provides that
15
“[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.”
16
Rule 1.4(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct provides
that “[a] lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client
to make informed decisions regarding the representation.”
Rule 3.2 of the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct provides that
17
“[a] lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interest
of the client.”
11
fees in violation of Rule 1.16(d); misappropriating and converting client funds in violation
of Rules 8.4(c) and 8.4(d); and failing to timely respond to the ODC in violation of Rule
8.1(b).
E. Count V—Complaint of Denney W. Bostic
Mr. Bostic is a former employee of Mr. Morgan. He alleged that Mr. Morgan
withheld money from his paycheck for taxes and insurance but did not pay those funds to
the proper agencies. He also alleged that Mr. Morgan wrote him a worthless check for his
wages. Additionally, Mr. Bostic stated that Mr. Morgan’s law firm was operating under a
false name—the law firm name is “E. Lavoyd Morgan, Jr. and Associates,” but there were
not associates at the firm. Multiple other former employees attested that there were no
associate attorneys working at the firm.
Mr. Morgan was charged with failing to hold client funds in an account
designated as a “client’s trust account” in violation of Rule 1.15(a); failing to place
unearned fees in a trust account in violation of Rule 1.15(c); using “and Associates” in the
name of his firm when he was the only attorney in violation of Rule 7.5; 18 failing to timely
18
Rule 7.5 of the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct states:
(a) A lawyer shall not use a firm name, letterhead or
other professional designation that violates Rule 7.1. A
trade name may be used by a lawyer in private practice if it
does not imply a connection with a government agency or
with a public or charitable legal services organization and is
not otherwise in violation of Rule 7.1.
12
respond to the ODC in violation of Rule 8.1(b); failing to pay taxes and compensation
premiums in violations of Rule 8.4(b); 19 and providing a worthless check in violation of
Rules 8.4(b) and 8.4(d).
F. Count VI—Complaint of E.L.
Mr. Morgan was retained by E.L. for representation in a property issue. E.L.
claimed that she was unable to communicate with Mr. Morgan, and she never received an
itemization or her client file. Moreover, a review of Mr. Morgan’s IOLTA account was
unclear as to when the retainer was deposited, but at the end of the next month, the IOLTA
(b) A law firm with offices in more than one
jurisdiction may use the same name or other professional
designation in each jurisdiction, but identification of the
lawyers in an office of the firm shall indicate the
jurisdictional limitations on those not licensed to practice in
the jurisdiction where the office is located.
(c) The name of a lawyer holding a public office
shall not be used in the name of a law firm, or in
communications on its behalf, during any substantial period
in which the lawyer is not actively and regularly practicing
with the firm.
(d) Lawyers may state or imply that they practice in
a partnership or other organization only when that is the fact.
19
Rule 8.4(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct provides
that “[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to commit a criminal act that reflects
adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.”
13
account had a negative balance. Mr. Morgan also failed to respond to one letter from the
ODC requiring it to send an additional letter.
Mr. Morgan was charged with not properly communicating with his client
and failing to keep his client reasonably informed about the status of the case in violation
of Rule 1.4(a); 20 failing to hold client funds in an account designated as a “client’s trust
account” and failing to keep complete records of the funds paid to him in violation of Rule
1.15(a); failing to provide a full accounting as requested by E.L. in violation of Rule
20
Rule 1.4(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct provides:
(a) A lawyer shall:
(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or
circumstance with respect to which the client’s
informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(e), is required
by these Rules;
(2) reasonably consult with the client about the
means by which the client’s objectives are to be
accomplished;
(3) keep the client reasonably informed about the
status of the matter;
(4) promptly comply with reasonable requests for
information; and
(5) consult with the client about any relevant
limitation on the lawyer’s conduct when the lawyer
knows that the client expects assistance not permitted
by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.
14
1.15(d); 21 failing to provide the client file and unearned fees in violation of Rule 1.16(d);
and failing to timely respond to the ODC in violation of Rule 8.1(b).
G. Complaint VII—Complaint of Todd W. Clutter
Mr. Clutter paid Mr. Morgan for representation in four cases. Mr. Morgan
failed to appear at hearings and failed to communicate with him. A review of Mr. Morgan’s
IOLTA account was unclear as to when the retainer was deposited, but at the end of July
2017, the account had a negative balance. Further, it was found that Mr. Morgan’s
operating account had Mr. Clutter’s retainer checks deposited into it. Mr. Morgan also
failed to respond to one letter from the ODC requiring it to send an additional letter.
Mr. Morgan was charged with not properly communicating with his client,
failing to keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the case, and failing to
promptly comply with reasonable requests for information in violation of Rule 1.4(a) and
1.4(b); failing to hold client funds in an account designated as a “client’s trust account” in
violation of Rule 1.15(a); failing to place unearned fees in a trust account and leaving
21
Rule 1.15(d) of the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct states:
Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client
or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify
the client or third person. Except as stated in this Rule or
otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a
lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any
funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled
to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall
promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.
15
earned fees in his trust account in violation of Rule 1.15(c); failing to provide the client file
and unearned fees in violation of Rule 1.16(d); and failing to timely respond to the ODC
in violation of Rule 8.1(b).
H. Count VIII—Complaint of Lonnie Dennis Lilly
Mr. Lilly hired Mr. Morgan for representation in a vehicle accident case. He
stated that Mr. Morgan failed to communicate with him. There was no written fee
agreement in Mr. Lilly’s client file. Further, a review of Mr. Morgan’s IOLTA account
was unclear as to when the retainer was deposited, but the account had a negative balance
three months later, and Mr. Morgan failed to respond to two letters from the ODC requiring
it to send additional letters.
Mr. Morgan was charged with not acting competently and diligently in
handling the case in violation of Rules 1.1 22 and 1.3; failing to properly communicate,
failing to keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the case, and failing to
promptly comply with reasonable requests for information in violation of Rules 1.4(a) and
1.4(b); failing to obtain a written fee agreement in violation of Rule 1.5(b); failing to hold
client funds in an account designated as a “client’s trust account” and failing to keep
records of the funds in violation of Rule 1.15(a); failing to place unearned fees in a trust
22
Rule 1.1 of the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct provides that
“[a] lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation
requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for
the representation.”
16
account and leaving earned fees in his trust account in violation of Rule 1.15(c); and failing
to timely respond to the ODC in violation of Rule 8.1(b).
I. Count IX—Complaint of Dani K. Jones and Andrew M. Arrick
Ms. Jones and Mr. Arrick contacted Mr. Morgan’s law office and spoke to
an employee about hiring Mr. Morgan to handle a case involving their house. The
employee met with Ms. Jones, reviewed her files and agreed to take the files for Mr.
Morgan to review. Ms. Jones was concerned about the statute of limitations running soon,
but the employee assured her that it “was fine.” A few weeks later, after not hearing back
from Mr. Morgan’s firm, Ms. Jones texted the employee and asked for her file back. She
stated that another attorney confirmed that the statute of limitations indeed had passed. Mr.
Morgan failed to respond to one letter from the ODC requiring it to send an additional
letter.
Mr. Morgan was charged with not acting competently and diligently in
handling the case in violation of Rules 1.1 and 1.3; failing to properly communicate, failing
to keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the case, and failing to promptly
comply with reasonable requests for information in violation of Rules 1.4(a) and 1.4(b);
failing to ensure his staff’s conduct was compatible with Mr. Morgan’s obligation under
the rules in violation of Rule 5.3; and failing to timely respond to the ODC in violation of
Rule 8.1(b).
17
J. Count X—Complaint of R.D.
R.D. hired Mr. Morgan to represent her in her divorce case. R.D. was upset
with Mr. Morgan’s representation and his lack of communication with her. Further, a
review of Mr. Morgan’s IOLTA account did not show a deposit during the month R.D.
paid the retainer even though Mr. Morgan stated it was deposited into the IOLTA account.
The balance of the IOLTA account at the end of the month was less than the amount paid
by R.D. Mr. Morgan also failed to respond to a letter from the ODC requiring it to send
an additional letter.
Mr. Morgan was charged with not acting competently and diligently in
handling the case in violation of Rules 1.1 and 1.3; failing to properly communicate, failing
to keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the case, and failing to promptly
comply with reasonable requests for information in violation of Rules 1.4(a) and 1.4(b);
failing to hold client funds in an account designated as a “client’s trust account” funds in
violation of Rule 1.15(a); failing to place unearned fees in a trust account in violation of
Rule 1.15(c); making a false statement during the investigation of the ethics complaint in
violation of Rule 8.1(a); and failing to timely respond to the ODC in violation of Rule
8.1(b).
K. Count XI—Complaint of T.R.
T.R. hired Mr. Morgan to represent her in her divorce case. T.R. was upset
with Mr. Morgan’s representation and his lack of communication with her. T.R.’s new
18
counsel indicated that Mr. Morgan did not file anything in the divorce case beyond the
original pleading. Moreover, T.R.’s new counsel stated that she was unable to obtain the
client file even though she requested it.
On or about July 3, 2018, Disciplinary Counsel obtained a subpoena for Mr.
Morgan to appear for a sworn statement in August. He was sent a copy of the ethics
complaint along with a letter informing him to file a verified response within twenty days—
he failed to file a response. Mr. Morgan then obtained counsel and the ethics complaint
was sent to his counsel. Mr. Morgan responded that much of the communication issues
occurred while he was having medical issues. He stated that he had T.R.’s file, and that he
filed the divorce petition in August of 2017 and represented her at a temporary support
hearing.
Further investigation and the docket sheet show that Mr. Morgan did nothing
in T.R.’s case beyond the original filing in August of 2018. T.R. also denied that Mr.
Morgan ever represented her in a temporary support hearing because no hearing was ever
held. In his sworn statement in November of 2018, Mr. Morgan stated that he did not
remember T.R. and was unaware of the retainer paid to him. He also alleged that he could
not remember what he filed on T.R.’s behalf. He had no accounting of this case and was
unaware of why T.R. never received her file. These were found to be false statements.
19
A review of Mr. Morgan’s IOLTA account did not show a deposit during the
month T.R. paid the retainer fee and the IOLTA account had a negative balance by the end
of that month. T.R. never received the unearned fees. Rather, the bank statements show
that the checks were deposited into Mr. Morgan’s operating account. Lastly, Mr. Morgan
failed to respond to two letters from the ODC requiring it to send additional letters.
Mr. Morgan was charged with not acting competently and diligently in
handling the case in violation of Rules 1.1 and 1.3; failing to hold client funds in an account
designated as a “client’s trust account” in violation of Rule 1.15(a); failing to place
unearned fees into a client trust account in violation of 1.15(c); failing to provide the client
with unearned fees in violation of Rule 1.16(d); failing to ensure his staff’s conduct was
compatible with his professional obligations under the Rules in violation of Rule 5.3;
providing a false statement during the investigation in violation of Rule 8.1(a); and failing
to timely respond to the ODC in violation of Rule 8.1(b).
L. Count XII—Complaint of D.K.
D.K. hired Mr. Morgan to represent her in her divorce case. D.K. stated that
she spoke with Mr. Morgan’s employee and was unable to communicate with Mr. Morgan
himself. When asked, Mr. Morgan said he did not recall having D.K. as a client, but her
new counsel indicated that Mr. Morgan filed D.K.’s divorce and appeared in court on her
behalf. New counsel further noted that Mr. Morgan did not file the proper pleadings in the
case. A review of Mr. Morgan’s IOLTA account did not show a deposit during the month
20
D.K. paid the retainer even though Mr. Morgan stated it was deposited into the IOLTA
account. A check for $50.00 was written out to Mr. Morgan from D.K. on August 3, 2017.
Another check for $3,000.00 to Mr. Morgan was signed by D.K. and dated August 4. The
balance of the IOLTA account at the end of August was $35.43. Mr. Morgan also failed
to respond to two letters from the ODC requiring it to send additional letters.
Mr. Morgan was charged with not acting competently and diligently in
handling the case in violation of Rules 1.1 and 1.3; failing to properly communicate; failing
to keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the case, and failing to promptly
comply with reasonable requests for information in violation of Rules 1.4(a) and 1.4(b);
failing to hold client funds in an account designated as a “client’s trust account” and failing
to keep records of the funds in violation of Rule 1.15(a); failing to place unearned fees in
a trust account in violation of Rule 1.15(c); failing to ensure his staff’s conduct was
compatible with the rules in violation of Rule 5.3; providing a false statement during the
investigation in violation of Rule 8.1(a); and failing to timely respond to the ODC in
violation of Rule 8.1(b).
M. Count XIII—Complaint of Hunter P. Chellis
Ms. Chellis hired Mr. Morgan for representation regarding an auto accident.
Ms. Chellis stated that she was unable to communicate with Mr. Morgan. Mr. Morgan
settled Ms. Chellis’ case; the settlement check was deposited into the IOLTA account; and
a check was written out to Ms. Chellis from the same account. There was no written fee
21
agreement in the client file. Mr. Morgan also failed to respond to a letter from the ODC
requiring it to send an additional letter.
Mr. Morgan was charged with not acting diligently in handling the case in
violation of Rule 1.3; failing to properly communicate, failing to keep the client reasonably
informed about the status of the case, and failing to promptly comply with reasonable
requests for information in violation of Rules 1.4(a) and 1.4(b); failing to obtain a written
fee agreement in a contingent case in violation of Rule 1.5(b); and failing to timely respond
to the ODC in violation of Rule 8.1(b).
N. Count XIV—Complaint of Sara E. Reynolds
Ms. Reynolds hired Mr. Morgan for representation regarding an automobile
accident. Ms. Reynolds stated that she was unable to communicate with Mr. Morgan. Mr.
Morgan settled Ms. Reynolds’ case; the settlement check was deposited into the IOLTA
account; and a check was written out to Ms. Reynolds from the same account. Mr. Morgan
also failed to respond to a letter from the ODC requiring it to send an additional letter.
Mr. Morgan was charged with failing to properly communicate, failing to
keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the case, and failing to promptly
comply with reasonable requests for information in violation of Rules 1.4(a) and 1.4(b);
and failing to timely respond to the ODC in violation of Rule 8.1(b).
22
O. Count XV—Complaint of Theresa L. Reynolds
Ms. Reynolds hired Mr. Morgan for representation regarding an automobile
accident. Ms. Reynolds stated that she was unable to communicate with Mr. Morgan. Each
time, she was told that Mr. Morgan would call her back, but he never did. Mr. Morgan
settled Ms. Reynolds’ case; the settlement check was deposited into the IOLTA account;
and a check was written out to Ms. Reynolds in July from the same account. However, at
the end of July, the IOLTA account had a negative balance of -$153.57. Mr. Morgan also
failed to respond to a letter from the ODC requiring it to send an additional letter.
Mr. Morgan was charged with not acting diligently in handling the case in
violation of Rule 1.3; failing to properly communicate, failing to keep the client reasonably
informed about the status of the case, and failing to promptly comply with reasonable
requests for information in violation of Rules 1.4(a) and 1.4(b); failing to obtain a written
fee agreement in a contingent case in violation of Rule 1.5(b); failing to hold third party
funds in an account designated as a “client’s trust account” in violation of Rule 1.15(a);
misappropriating and converting client finds in violation of Rules 8.4(c) and 8.4(d); and
failing to timely respond to the ODC in violation of Rule 8.1(b).
P. Count XVI—Complaint of Crystal M. Sheppard
Ms. Sheppard hired Mr. Morgan for representation regarding an auto
accident. Ms. Sheppard stated that she was unable to communicate with Mr. Morgan and
she ended up terminating Mr. Morgan as her counsel. Mr. Morgan did not provide Ms.
23
Sheppard with her client file or the unearned fees. Mr. Morgan also failed to respond to a
letter from the ODC requiring it to send an additional letter.
Mr. Morgan was charged with not acting diligently in handling the case in
violation of Rule 1.3; failing to properly communicate, failing to keep the client reasonably
informed about the status of the case, and failing to promptly comply with reasonable
requests for information in violation of Rules 1.4(a) and 1.4(b); failing to provide the client
file and unearned fees in violation of Rule 1.16(d); and failing to timely respond to the
ODC in violation of Rule 8.1(b).
Q. Count XVII—Complaint of J.H.
J.H. hired Mr. Morgan for representation in a family court matter. J.H. stated
that he had issues communicating with Mr. Morgan. Mr. Morgan stated that any payment
from J.H. was placed in the IOLTA account. However, a review of the IOLTA account
did not show a deposit during the month J.H. paid Mr. Morgan, and the balance in the
IOLTA account was negative that same month.
Mr. Morgan was charged with not acting competently and diligently in
handling the case in violation of Rules 1.1 and 1.3; failing to properly communicate, failing
to keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the case, and failing to promptly
comply with reasonable requests for information in violation of Rules 1.4(a) and 1.4(b);
failing to hold client funds in an account designated as a “client’s trust account” and failing
24
to keep complete records of the funds paid to him in violation of Rule 1.15(a); failing to
place unearned fees in his trust account in violation of Rule 1.15(c); and engaging in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation in violation of Rule 8.4(c).
R. Count XVIII—Complaint of Elizabeth Ann Good
Ms. Good was an employee of Mr. Morgan, and Mr. Morgan failed to pay
her wages in a timely manner. Mr. Morgan acknowledged that Ms. Good was owed wages.
Mr. Morgan was charged with failing to timely respond to the ODC in violation of Rule
8.1(b); and failing to timely pay wages in violation of Rule 8.4(b).
S. Count XIX—Complaint of Kelsea Hower and Lisa Stansell
Ms. Stansell hired Mr. Morgan to represent her daughter, Ms. Hower,
regarding an automobile accident. The lawsuit was settled in April of 2017, but Ms. Hower
never received any settlement money, and both Ms. Hower and Ms. Stansell were unable
to communicate with Mr. Morgan. Mr. Morgan asserted that he was working on
subrogation issues, and that the settlement funds would have been placed in the IOLTA
account. However, upon review of the account, although the settlement was deposited into
the account, the account had a negative balance four months later—and no payments were
ever made to Ms. Hower. Mr. Morgan eventually did send Ms. Hower a check from his
IOLTA account, but it is unknown where these funds came from as the funds had already
disappeared from the IOLTA account.
25
Mr. Morgan was charged with not acting competently and diligently in
handling the case in violation of Rules 1.1 and 1.3; failing to properly communicate, failing
to keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the case, and failing to promptly
comply with reasonable requests for information in violation of Rules 1.4(a) and 1.4(b);
failing to hold client funds in an account designated as a “client’s trust account” and failing
to keep complete records of the funds in violation of Rule 1.15(a); failing to ensure his
staff’s conduct was compatible with the rules in violation of Rule 5.3; providing a false
statement during the investigation in violation of Rule 8.1(a); and misappropriating and
converting client funds in violation of Rules 8.4(c) and 8.4(d).
T. Count XX—Complaint of the Office of Disciplinary Counsel
The ODC received information from the West Virginia State Bar about an
application filed with the Lawyers Fund for Client Protection Committee by P.B. P.B.
paid a retainer fee to an employee of Mr. Morgan for representation in a divorce
proceeding. There was no written fee arrangement in the case. Mr. Morgan stated that he
earned some of the retainer, but not all of it. P.B. hired new counsel and was not provided
with his client file or a refund of the unearned fees. Finally, a review of Mr. Morgan’s
IOLTA account did not show a deposit of P.B.’s retainer.
Mr. Morgan was charged with not acting diligently or expeditiously in
handling the case in violation of Rules 1.3 and 3.2; failing to obtain a written fee agreement
in violation of Rule 1.5(b); failing to properly communicate, failing to keep the client
26
reasonably informed about the status of the case, and failing to promptly comply with
reasonable requests for information in violation of Rules 1.4(a) and 1.4(b); failing to hold
client funds in an account designated as a “client’s trust account” and failing to keep
complete records of the funds in violation of Rule 1.15(a); failing to place unearned fees
in a client trust account in violation of Rule 1.15(c); failing to provide the client file and
unearned fees in violation of Rule 1.16(d); and failing to ensure his staff’s conduct was
compatible with the rules in violation of Rule 5.3.
U. Count XXI—Complaint of Brandon E. Perdue
Mr. Morgan was appointed to represent Mr. Perdue in a criminal matter. Mr.
Morgan failed to appear for a court hearing, and Mr. Perdue had issues communicating
with Mr. Morgan. According to Mr. Morgan, he was not informed of the court hearing and
was unaware of letters from his client that were in the client file. After seven months, new
counsel was appointed for Mr. Perdue, and the case was resolved three and a half months
later.
Mr. Morgan was charged with not acting competently and diligently in
handling the case in violation of Rules 1.1 and 1.3; failing to properly communicate, failing
to keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the case, and failing to promptly
comply with reasonable requests for information in violation of Rules 1.4(a) and 1.4(b);
and failing to expeditiously handle Mr. Perdue’s case in violation of Rule 3.2.
27
V. Count XXII—Complaint of Zana G. Osborne
Ms. Osborne met with an employee of Mr. Morgan regarding an automobile
accident. When Ms. Osborne attempted to communicate with Mr. Morgan on a later date,
she was told that the employee took her paperwork when he left the firm. Mr. Morgan
does not dispute that his employee spoke with Ms. Osborne. Mr. Morgan was charged
with failing to ensure his staff’s conduct was compatible with the rules in violation of Rule
5.3.
W. Statement of Charges and Recommendation of the HPS
A Statement of Charges was issued against Mr. Morgan and filed with this
Court on September 30, 2019. It set forth the following alleged violations of the West
Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct:
Rule 1.1: failing to competently and diligently handle client
cases
Rule 1.3: failing to be diligent; failing to expedite litigation;
allowing a statute of limitations to expire; failing to
competently handle client cases
Rule 1.4(a): failing to keep clients reasonably informed about
the state of their cases; failing to promptly comply with
reasonable requests for information; failure to communicate
Rule 1.4(b): failing to communicate; failing to keep clients
reasonably informed about the state of their cases; failing to
promptly comply with reasonable requests for information
Rule 1.5(a): engaging in improper and unsubstantiated billing
in his Public Defender cases
28
Rule 1.5(b): representing clients without a written fee
agreement
Rule 1.15(a): failing to hold client funds in separate client trust
accounts; failing to keep complete records of funds
Rule 1.15(c): failing to put unearned client funds in a trust
account; leaving unearned fees in his trust account
Rule 1.15(d): failing to provide a full accounting upon client
request
Rule 1.16(d): failing to refund unearned fees; failing to provide
the client file
Rule 3.2: failing to be diligent; failing to expedite litigation;
allowing a statute of limitations to expire
Rule 3.3(a): misrepresenting his actual and necessary time
expended for services performed in Public Defender filings
before the appointed circuit judge and/or appointing tribunal
Rule 5.3: failing to supervise legal assistants
Rule 7.5: using “and Associates” in his law office name when
he was the only attorney
Rule 8.1(a): making false statements about the work he
performed on Public Defender cases; providing false
information about the accounting he provided; providing false
information about client having the client file and placing the
retainer in the trust account during the disciplinary
investigation; providing false information about not fulfilling
a request for a client file for new counsel; being unaware of the
retainer paid to him; providing false information about not
recalling having a client and not being aware of the retainer
contract or payment
Rule 8.1(b): failing to timely respond to the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel
Rule 8.4(b): failing to pay state and federal taxes; failing to pay
his workers’ compensation premiums
29
Rule 8.4(c): engaging in improper and unsubstantiated billing
in his Public Defender cases; misrepresenting the state of
cases; converting client funds into his own funds; failing to be
diligent; failing to expedite litigation; allowing a statute of
limitations to expire; misappropriating and converting client
funds; providing worthless checks; engaging in dishonest,
fraudulent, and deceitful conduct by stating in his sworn
statement that he would have filed a competent petition for
client had he known of the issues, when in fact he had filed a
petition
Rule 8.4(d): engaging in improper and unsubstantiated billing
in his Public Defender cases; misrepresenting the state of
cases; converting client funds into his own funds; failing to be
diligent; failing to expedite litigation; allowing a statute of
limitations to expire; misappropriating and converting client
funds; providing worthless checks
The HPS found, in its Statement of Charges, that Mr. Morgan committed 134 separate
violations of the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct. 23 Mr. Morgan timely filed
his answer to the Statement of Charges on November 4, 2019. A hearing was held before
the HPS on January 27, 2020, during which Mr. Morgan provided sworn testimony.
In October of 2019, the ODC filed a petition for the immediate suspension
of Mr. Morgan’s license to practice law pending the resolution of the disciplinary charges
against him. The ODC argued that Rule 3.27 of the West Virginia Rules of Lawyer
23
The number for each rule violation is as follows: Rule 1.1 (8 violations);
Rule 1.3 (13 violations); Rule 1.4(a) (13 violations); Rule 1.4(b) (13 violations); Rule
1.5(a) (1 violation); Rule 1.5(b) (5 violations); Rule 1.15(a) (14 violations); Rule 1.15(c)
(10 violations); Rule 1.15(d) (1 violation); Rule 1.16(d) (8 violations); Rule 3.2 (3
violations); Rule 3.3(a) (1 violation); Rule 5.3 (7 violations); Rule 7.5 (1 violation); Rule
8.1(a) (6 violations); Rule 8.1(b) (15 violations); Rule 8.4(b) (1 violation); Rule 8.4(c) (7
violations); and Rule 8.4(d) (7 violations).
30
Disciplinary Procedure provides a mechanism to suspend a lawyer from the practice of law
when he or she “(1) has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or is
under a disability and (2) poses a substantial threat of irreparable harm to the public.”
W. Va. R. Law. Disc. P. 3.27(a). “If the Court, after proceeding in accordance with [Rule]
3.27(c), [24] concludes that the respondent lawyer should be temporarily suspended, it will
so order.” Syl. pt. 3, in part, Office of Disc. Counsel v. Battistelli, 193 W. Va. 629, 457
S.E.2d 652 (1995) (footnote added). Upon review, this Court found sufficient evidence to
initially demonstrate that Mr. Morgan had violated the West Virginia Rules of Professional
Conduct and that he posed a substantial threat of irreparable harm to the public.
Accordingly, the ODC’s petition for interim suspension was granted, and we also ordered
the HPS to file its report no later than sixty days from the date of the Court’s opinion. 25
Further, we ordered the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Greenbrier County to appoint
a lawyer to serve as trustee for Mr. Morgan’s law practice. 26
24
Rule 3.27(c) provides:
Upon receipt of this report, the Supreme Court, upon
determining the existence of good cause, shall provide notice
of the charges to the lawyer with the right to a hearing in not
less than thirty days before the Court. The Supreme Court may
appoint a trustee to protect the interest of the lawyer’s clients
during the pendency of these proceedings. After such hearing,
the Supreme Court may temporarily suspend the lawyer or may
order such other action as it deems appropriate until underlying
disciplinary proceedings before the Lawyer Disciplinary Board
have been completed.
25
Office of Disc. Counsel v. Morgan, 242 W. Va. at ___, 839 S.E.2d at 157.
26
See id.
31
 On April 9, 2020, the HPS issued its report in this matter, and found the
evidence established that Mr. Morgan had violated the West Virginia Rules of Professional
Conduct as suggested in the Statement of Charges. The HPS recommended that the
following sanctions be imposed:
1. That [Mr. Morgan]’s law license be annulled;
2. That [Mr. Morgan] refund the following:
i. $1,192.50 to Public Defender Services;
ii. $7,500.00 to Valerie Norwood;
iii. $3,500.00 to W.T.;
iv. $3,500.00 to E.L.;
v. $9,000.00 to Todd Clutter;
vi. $1,250.00 to Lonnie Lilly;
vii. $3,000.00 to R.D.;
viii. $4,800.00 to T.R.;
ix. $3,050.00 to D.K.;
x. $1,300.00 to J.H.;
xi. Judgment plus interest to Elizabeth Good; and
xii. $3,500.00 to P.B.
3. That [Mr. Morgan] must comply with the mandates of
Rule 3.28 of the Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary
Procedure unless he has submitted such as part of his
immediate suspension in Case No. 19-0885; and
4. [Mr. Morgan] be ordered to pay the costs of these
proceedings pursuant to Rule 3.15 of the Rules of
Lawyer Disciplinary Procedure.
Thereafter, on April 30, 2020, the ODC filed its consent to the
recommendation of the HPS. Mr. Morgan filed his objection to the recommendation on
May 6, 2020. By order dated May 28, 2020, this Court ordered the matter to be briefed
and set for oral argument.
32
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When this Court considers a lawyer disciplinary matter,
[a] de novo standard applies to a review of the
adjudicatory record made before the [Hearing Panel
Subcommittee of the Lawyer Disciplinary Board (“HPS”)] as
to questions of law, questions of application of the law to the
facts, and questions of appropriate sanctions; this Court gives
respectful consideration to the [HPS’s] recommendations
while ultimately exercising its own independent judgment. On
the other hand, substantial deference is given to the [HPS’s]
findings of fact, unless such findings are not supported by
reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole
record.
Syl. pt. 3, Comm. on Legal Ethics v. McCorkle, 192 W. Va. 286, 452 S.E.2d 377 (1994).
Further, while we give respectful consideration to the recommendations of the HPS, “[t]his
Court is the final arbiter of legal ethics problems and must make the ultimate decisions
about public reprimands, suspensions[,] or annulments of attorneys’ licenses to practice
law.” Syl. pt. 3, Comm. on Legal Ethics v. Blair, 174 W. Va. 494, 327 S.E.2d 671 (1984).
Finally, in an effort to ensure the highest quality of legal services in this State,
we also have stated that “[a]ttorney disciplinary proceedings are not designed solely to
punish the attorney, but rather to protect the public, to reassure it as to the reliability and
integrity of attorneys and to safeguard its interest in the administration of justice.” Lawyer
Disc. Bd. v. Taylor, 192 W. Va. 139, 144, 451 S.E.2d 440, 445 (1994). With these
standards in mind, we proceed to consider the arguments before the Court.
33
III.
DISCUSSION
Upon review of lawyer disciplinary cases, we recognize that the ODC is
required “to prove the allegations of the formal charge by clear and convincing evidence.”
Syl. pt. 1, in part, Lawyer Disc. Bd. v. McGraw, 194 W. Va. 788, 461 S.E.2d 850 (1995).
The various sanctions which may be recommended to this Court are set forth in Rule 3.15 27
of the West Virginia Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedure. This Court then looks to
Syllabus point 4 of Office of Lawyer Disciplinary Counsel v. Jordan, 204 W. Va. 495, 513
S.E.2d 722 (1998), for guidance in determining the appropriateness of sanctions:
Rule 3.16 of the West Virginia Rules of Lawyer
Disciplinary Procedure enumerates factors to be considered in
imposing sanctions and provides as follows: “In imposing a
sanction after a finding of lawyer misconduct, unless otherwise
provided in these rules, the Court [West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals] or Board [Lawyer Disciplinary Board] shall
consider the following factors: (1) whether the lawyer has
27
According to Rule 3.15 of the West Virginia Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary
Procedure,
[a] Hearing Panel Subcommittee may recommend or the
Supreme Court of Appeals may impose any one or more of the
following sanctions for a violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct or pursuant to Rule 3.14: (1) probation; (2) restitution;
(3) limitation on the nature or extent of future practice; (4)
supervised practice; (5) community service; (6)
admonishment; (7) reprimand; (8) suspension; or (9)
annulment. When a sanction is imposed, the Hearing Panel
Subcommittee or the Court shall order the lawyer to reimburse
the Lawyer Disciplinary Board for the costs of the disciplinary
proceeding unless the panel or the Court finds the
reimbursement will pose an undue hardship on the lawyer.
Willful failure to reimburse the Board may be punished as
contempt of the Court.
34
violated a duty owed to a client, to the public, to the legal
system, or to the profession; (2) whether the lawyer acted
intentionally, knowingly, or negligently; (3) the amount of the
actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct;
and (4) the existence of any aggravating or mitigating factors.”
With these principles in mind, we will consider each of the Jordan factors. Then, we will
address the imposition of appropriate sanctions.
A. Duty Violated
The first Jordan factor questions “whether the lawyer has violated a duty
owed to a client, to the public, to the legal system, or to the profession.” Syl. pt. 4, in part,
Jordan, 204 W. Va. 495, 513 S.E.2d 722. This Court continuously has recognized that
“attorney disciplinary proceedings are primarily designed to protect the public, to reassure
it as to the reliability and integrity of attorneys and to safeguard its interest in the
administration of justice[.]” Comm. on Legal Ethics v. Keenan, 192 W. Va. 90, 94, 450
S.E.2d 787, 791 (1994). Here, the record overwhelmingly illustrates that Mr. Morgan
violated duties to his clients, the public, and the legal profession. Specifically, the sheer
number of complaints against Mr. Morgan demonstrates that he breached his duty to his
clients by repeatedly failing to protect his clients’ funds, by failing to keep his clients
informed, by failing to communicate with his clients, and by failing to provide competent
representation. Further, while Mr. Morgan contends that he had good intentions, he
acknowledges that the record demonstrates—by clear and convincing evidence—that he
violated his duties and failed to do some of the basic things required of all lawyers.
35
Due to the lengthy and detailed record, and the acknowledgement of Mr.
Morgan, we find no reason to disturb the parties’ contentions regarding the underlying
facts, and, as such, we agree that Mr. Morgan’s actions violated duties he owed to the
public, the legal system, and the legal profession.
B. Intentional, Knowing, or Negligent Actions
Relating to the second Jordan factor, we must examine Mr. Morgan’s mental
state at the time of his rule violations. In particular, the second Jordan factor asks us to
determine “whether the lawyer acted intentionally, knowingly, or negligently.” Syl. pt. 4,
in part, Jordan, 204 W. Va. 495, 513 S.E.2d 722. The American Bar Association defines
“intent” as the “conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result.”
Annotated ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Definition (2015).
“Knowledge” is defined as the “conscious awareness of the nature or attendant
circumstances of the conduct but without the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish
a particular result.” Id. Moreover, “negligent” conduct is defined as “the failure of a lawyer
to heed a substantial risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, which failure
is a deviation from the standard care that a reasonable lawyer would exercise in the
situation.” Id.
The HPS found that Mr. Morgan acted both intentionally and knowingly over
the course of committing his violations. He failed to properly supervise his staff,
mishandled client finds, and repeatedly ignored correspondence from the ODC. Mr.
36
Morgan argues that his actions were not done intentionally or knowingly. While he admits
that his shortcomings were exacerbated by a combination of medical problems and an
overreliance on his staff, he asserts that the description of his actions rise only to the level
of negligence.
In the case sub judice, the HPS found, and we agree, that Mr. Morgan acted
intentionally and knowingly. Mr. Morgan was responsible for his law firm and failed to
manage his staff in client matters including communication, depositing client funds into
the correct accounts, and reviewing vouchers submitted to the Public Defender for
payment, among other things. The record in this case shows that not only did Mr. Morgan
commit a multitude of violations, but that Mr. Morgan continued to commit misconduct
after ethics complaints had been filed against him. Moreover, Mr. Morgan’s most
important responsibility was the safekeeping of client funds—which he did not do. He
failed to review bank statements and was unaware of his IOLTA account’s negative
balance until Disciplinary Counsel informed him of such. This can be characterized as
nothing but intentional behavior. Regardless of Mr. Morgan’s contentions and attempts to
blame his misconduct on a rogue employee, the fact remains that it is Mr. Morgan who was
responsible for his office, and it is his law license that clients relied on to protect their
interests.
Furthermore, the fact that Mr. Morgan’s actions amounted to a disturbing
and extensive pattern of misconduct leads us to the conclusion that Mr. Morgan’s mental
37
status could not be characterized as mere negligence—this is clearly a case where the
attorney knew of his wrongdoings. Therefore, we find that the record is clear that Mr.
Morgan acted intentionally and knowingly, and we find nothing in the evidence that would
excuse this behavior.
C. Actual or Potential Injury
Under the third Jordan factor, we are required to consider “the amount of the
actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct.” Syl. pt. 4, in part, Jordan,
204 W. Va. 495, 513 S.E.2d 722. Here, the parties agree that there was injury caused by
Mr. Morgan’s actions. In particular, the LDB noted that “[e]very witness called by
Disciplinary Counsel testified that their opinion of lawyers was affected in a negative way
by [Mr. Morgan’s] misconduct.” Client funds still have not been returned, justice was
delayed or denied completely, and the public has paid for Mr. Morgan’s overbilling of the
Public Defender Services. Due to the statements of both parties, and the evidence
presented in the record, we agree that there has been clear injury to Mr. Morgan’s clients,
the general public, and the legal system in this matter.
D. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
Finally, under the fourth Jordan factor, we are required to consider “the
existence of any aggravating or mitigating factors.” Syl. pt. 4, in part, Jordan, 204 W. Va.
495, 513 S.E.2d 722. We will address both sets of factors in turn.
38
1. Aggravating Factors. In Syllabus point 4 of Lawyer Disciplinary
Board v. Scott, 213 W. Va. 209, 579 S.E.2d 550 (2003), this Court held that “[a]ggravating
factors in a lawyer disciplinary proceeding are any considerations or factors that may
justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed.” Here, the HPS identified six
aggravating factors: (1) prior discipline; 28 (2) dishonesty; (3) pattern of misconduct;
(4) multiple offenses; (5) substantial experience in the practice of law; and (6) illegal
conduct.
2. Mitigating Factors. In addition to adopting aggravating factors in
Scott, this Court also adopted mitigating factors to examine when determining the
appropriateness of sanctions.
Mitigating factors which may be considered in
determining the appropriate sanction to be imposed against a
lawyer for violating the Rules of Professional Conduct include:
(1) absence of a prior disciplinary record; (2) absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive; (3) personal or emotional
problems; (4) timely good faith effort to make restitution or to
rectify consequences of misconduct; (5) full and free
disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward
proceedings; (6) inexperience in the practice of law; (7)
character or reputation; (8) physical or mental disability or
impairment; (9) delay in disciplinary proceedings; (10) interim
rehabilitation; (11) imposition of other penalties or sanctions;
(12) remorse; and (13) remoteness of prior offenses.
28
Mr. Morgan was admonished by the Investigative Panel on January 21,
2018, for violation of Rule 1.4 (failure to communicate); and Rule 1.5 (failure to obtain a
fee agreement in writing).
39
Syl. pt. 3, id. Here, the HPS identified two mitigating factors: (1) physical illness related
to his medical issues which required surgery in 2018 and (2) remorse.
Having considered all the factors set out in Jordan, the final step is to decide
the appropriate sanction in light of those factors.
E. Sanctions
This Court frequently has recognized that “[t]he principle purpose of attorney
disciplinary proceedings is to safeguard the public’s interest in the administration of
justice.” Syl. pt. 3, Daily Gazette Co. v. Comm. on Legal Ethics, 174 W. Va. 359, 326
S.E.2d 705 (1984). Additionally, sanctions must be designed to “serve as a deterrent to
other attorneys.” McCorkle, 192 W. Va. at 291, 452 S.E.2d at 382. Under Rule 3.15 of
the Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedure, the following are recognized as permissible
types of sanctions:
(1) probation; (2) restitution; (3) limitation on the nature or
extent of future practice; (4) supervised practice;
(5) community service; (6) admonishment; (7) reprimand;
(8) suspension; or (9) annulment. When a sanction is imposed,
the Hearing Panel Subcommittee or the Court shall order the
lawyer to reimburse the Lawyer Disciplinary Board for the
costs of the disciplinary proceeding unless the panel or the
Court finds the reimbursement will pose an undue hardship on
the lawyer. Willful failure to reimburse the Board may be
punished as contempt of the Court.
Further, this Court has explained that
[i]n deciding on the appropriate disciplinary action for ethical
violations, this Court must consider not only what steps would
40
appropriately punish the respondent attorney, but also whether
the discipline imposed is adequate to serve as an effective
deterrent to other members of the Bar and at the same time
restore public confidence in the ethical standards of the legal
profession.
Syl. pt. 3, Comm. on Legal Ethics v. Walker, 178 W. Va. 150, 358 S.E.2d 234 (1987).
Accord Syl. pt. 4, McCorkle, 192 W. Va. 286, 452 S.E.2d 377; Syl. pt. 2, Comm. on Legal
Ethics v. White, 189 W. Va. 135, 428 S.E.2d 556 (1993); Syl. pt. 5, Comm. on Legal Ethics
v. Roark, 181 W. Va. 260, 382 S.E.2d 313 (1989).
Based upon its consideration of the Jordan factors and this Court’s
precedent, the HPS recommended (1) that Mr. Morgan’s license to practice law be
annulled; (2) that he refund specified clients; (3) that he comply with the mandates of Rule
3.28 of the Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedure; and (4) that Mr. Morgan pay the costs
of the proceedings pursuant to Rule 3.15.
When taking into account all of the factors to be considered in imposing
sanctions, we agree with the ODC that the recommended types of sanctions submitted are
appropriate for the egregious behavior exhibited by Mr. Morgan. Our review of this case
reveals that Mr. Morgan committed violations of all of the Jordan factors. As noted by
this Court in Mr. Morgan’s suspension case from earlier this year, “[t]here are multiple
allegations of failing to act diligently, failing to adequately communicate with his clients,
exhibiting a lack of candor and outright dishonesty, and failing to ensure that his employees
acted in a manner consistent with the respondent’s ethical obligations.” Morgan, 242 W.
41
Va. at ___, 839 S.E.2d at 155. In particular, “the allegations that are particularly worrisome
to this Court are the claims that the respondent mishandled and misappropriated client
money.” Id. By his own admission, Mr. Morgan testified at his hearing that a “lack of
communication, lack of diligence, lack of written fee arrangement[s], lack of settlement
statements, commingling of money, [and the] improper use of the escrow trust account”
were issues for him. He further admitted to not having time records or an office
management system and acknowledged his failure to maintain proper review of his bank
accounts.
In an attempt to excuse his behavior, Mr. Morgan states that a former
paralegal embezzled money from his clients and his law firm. While this may be true, we
reject it as a defense to the numerous, inexcusable violations committed by Mr. Morgan,
himself. In his brief to this Court, Mr. Morgan acknowledged that he knew of the
paralegal’s criminal past, yet he “decided to give him a chance” and delegated critical
office functions and responsibilities to him. Mr. Morgan reported the paralegal “to the
police in January 2018—yet, even after that date, [Mr. Morgan] failed to review the bank
statements for his client trust account. He apparently only became aware of the negative
balance in the account during his sworn statement given to the ODC in November 2018.”
Id. at ___, 839 S.E.2d at 156.
42
Mr. Morgan also contends that a medical condition prevented him from
working for several months—primarily from November of 2017 through July of 2018. He
alleges that during this time, while in the hospital, he learned that his paralegal had been
arrested in Virginia for an outstanding warrant from Pennsylvania. Once the paralegal was
arrested, Mr. Morgan’s office was completely unstaffed. However, despite these alleged
setbacks, the bank statement submitted by the ODC demonstrates that Mr. Morgan’s client
trust account had a negative balance well before the aforementioned timeframe.
The conversion and comingling of client funds—as shown by Mr. Morgan’s
own admissions and the introduction of his bank statements into the record—is a serious
violation that undermines not only the public’s confidence in Mr. Morgan, but also in the
legal community as a whole. Due to the gravity of these violations, we find that Mr.
Morgan has not presented any compelling extenuating circumstances that would excuse
his careless behavior. In this case, Mr. Morgan chose not to review the bank statements at
any point, and he only reported his paralegal to the police once he became aware of the
negative balance of his IOLTA client trust account. These are deliberate choices made by
Mr. Morgan that show he had no concern for the client funds entrusted to him, no concern
for the caretaking of his law firm, and no concern for the welfare of his clients.
This Court has held that “[d]etaining money collected in a professional or
fiduciary capacity without [a] bona fide claim coupled with acts of dishonesty, fraud, deceit
or misrepresentation justify annulment of an attorney’s license to practice law.” Syl. pt. 5,
43
Comm. on Legal Ethics of W. Va. State Bar v. Pence, 161 W. Va. 240, 240 S.E.2d 668
(1977); see also Lawyer Disc. Bd. v. Kupec, 202 W. Va. 556, 569, 505 S.E.2d 619, 632
(1998) (collecting cases, including Comm. on Legal Ethics of the W. Va. State Bar v.
Lambert, 189 W. Va. 84, 428 S.E.2d 65 (1993) (per curiam) (annulling attorney’s license
when he converted property of two clients to his own personal use); Comm. on Legal Ethics
of the W. Va. State Bar v. Six, 181 W. Va. 52, 380 S.E.2d 219 (1989) (annulling attorney’s
license following conviction for embezzlement of client funds); Comm. on Legal Ethics of
W. Va. State Bar v. White, 176 W. Va. 753, 349 S.E.2d 919 (1986) (per curiam) (finding
conversion of client trust funds warranted disbarment); In re Hendricks, 155 W. Va. 516,
185 S.E.2d 336 (1971) (per curiam) (justifying annulment of attorney’s license based upon
detention of money collected in professional and fiduciary capacity without bona fide claim
and acts of fraud and deceit).
We find Mr. Morgan’s misconduct to be similar to the conduct displayed by
the attorney in Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Scotchel, 234 W. Va. 627, 768 S.E.2d 730
(2014). In Scotchel, Mr. Scotchel’s law license was annulled when he improperly retained
client funds, failed to provide full accountings, failed to communicate with his client, and
failed to have written contingent fee arrangements. Id. at 638-39, 768 S.E.2d at 741-42.
Like Mr. Morgan, the attorney in Scotchel also was a solo practitioner who had been
practicing law for more than two decades and who displayed multiple aggravating factors,
including having substantial experience in the practice of law. Id. at 631, 768 S.E.2d at
734. For this misconduct, Mr. Scotchel’s law license was annulled.
44
However, while Mr. Morgan’s misconduct is similar in nature to the conduct
punished in Scotchel, Mr. Morgan’s misconduct exceeds the conduct in Scotchel in both
numerosity and egregiousness. While Mr. Scotchel violated seven rules of the West
Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct, Mr. Morgan violated nineteen different rules. Mr.
Scotchel’s case was based on the complaints of one complainant. Mr. Morgan’s case is
based on twenty-two separate complaints filed by multiple complainants. Finally, Mr.
Scotchel had no prior discipline, whereas in the present case, Mr. Morgan does have prior
discipline.
When discussing the violation of misappropriating client funds, this Court
has recognized the following:
The term misappropriation can have various meanings. In fact,
the misuse of another’s funds is characterized as
misappropriation or conversion. Black’s defines
misappropriation as “[t]he unauthorized, improper, or unlawful
use of funds or other property for purposes other than that for
which intended . . . including not only stealing but also
unauthorized temporary use for [the] lawyer’s own purpose,
whether or not he derives any gain or benefit from therefrom.”
Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed.1990). See In re Wilson, 81
N.J. 451, 409 A.2d 1153, 1155 n. 1 (1979) (defining
misappropriation as “any unauthorized use by the lawyer of
client’s funds entrusted to him including not only stealing, but
also unauthorized temporary use for the lawyer’s own purpose,
whether or not he derives any personal gain or benefit
therefrom”).
Kupec, 202 W. Va. at 568, 505 S.E.2d at 631. Further,
[t]he American Bar Association Model Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions (hereinafter “ABA standards”) classify
45
misappropriation offenses according to the level of intent and
the level of the injury. The ABA standards are consistent with
the general rule in finding disbarment appropriate in cases of
knowing conversion with injury or potential injury to the
owner of entrusted funds. Where there is little or no actual or
potential injury to the owner of entrusted funds, and when the
lawyer knows or should know he/she is dealing improperly
with entrusted funds, the ABA standards suggest suspension.
When the lawyer is merely negligent in dealing with entrusted
funds, the ABA standards suggest reprimand or
admonishment. See generally ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on
Professional Conduct § 01:801 (1992).
Kupec, 202 W. Va. at 569, 505 S.E.2d at 632.
In the case sub judice, Mr. Morgan testified that he has not billed the Public
Defender for his work in court-appointed cases since May of 2018; however, this does not
mitigate his admitted misconduct in overbilling or his conversion of the money he was
holding for such work. Moreover, the evidence is clear that Mr. Morgan repeatedly failed
to safekeep client funds and he never reviewed bank statements pertaining to his office and
client trust accounts.
This Court takes the misappropriation of client funds seriously, and it
has disbarred several lawyers due to misappropriation of client
funds. In Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Battistelli, 206 W. Va.
197, 523 S.E.2d 257 (1999), a lawyer was disbarred for, among
other misconduct, neglect of client affairs, repeatedly lying to
a client about the status of a case, and withholding too much
money from a client’s settlement and never sending this money
to either a provider or refunding it to the client. In Committee
on Legal Ethics v. Lambert, 189 W. Va. 84, 428 S.E.2d 65
(1993), a lawyer was disbarred for conversion of a client’s
money to his own personal use, causing a forged instrument to
46
be uttered, failure to pay over money received on behalf of a
client, and failure to inform the Disciplinary Committee of a
debt to a client during a reinstatement proceeding. In
Committee on Legal Ethics v. Pence, 161 W. Va. 240, 240
S.E.2d 668 (1977), a lawyer was disbarred for detaining money
collected in a professional or fiduciary capacity without bona
fide claim, coupled with acts of dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation. In Committee on Legal Ethics v. White, 176
W. Va. 753, 349 S.E.2d 919 (1986), a lawyer was disbarred for
conversion of client trust funds. In In re Hendricks, 155
W. Va. 516, 185 S.E.2d 336 (1971), another lawyer was
disbarred for detaining client money without a bona fide claim
and for acts of fraud and deceit.
In Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Coleman, 219 W. Va.
790, 639 S.E.2d 882 (2006), this Court stated that “we do not
take lightly those disciplinary cases in which a lawyer’s
misconduct involves the misappropriation of money. In such
instances, we have resolutely held that, unless the attorney
facing discipline can demonstrate otherwise, disbarment is the
only sanction befitting of such grievous misconduct.” Id. at
797, 639 S.E.2d at 889. In addition, “misappropriation of
funds by an attorney involves moral turpitude; it is an act
infected with deceit and dishonesty and will result in
disbarment in the absence of compelling extenuating
circumstances justifying a lesser sanction.” Kupec, 202 W. Va.
at 571, 505 S.E.2d at 634.
Scotchel, 234 W. Va. at 646, 768 S.E.2d at 749 (emphasis added).
While this Court finds that Mr. Morgan’s misappropriation of funds is
sufficient to warrant disbarment on its own, we would be remiss to ignore the numerosity
and severity of Mr. Morgan’s other instances of misconduct. Mr. Morgan violated nineteen
different rules of the Rules of Professional Conduct, with a total of 134 separate instances
of misconduct. Beyond his financial mishandlings, Mr. Morgan also committed violations
regarding his competency, his diligence, his communication with clients, his failure to
47
obtain written fee agreements, his failure to provide client files to clients when requested,
his failure to expedite litigation, his lack of candor and honesty, his failure to ensure
employees followed his ethical obligations, his failure to not mislead with the name of his
firm, his failure to respond to Disciplinary Counsel, his failure to supervise his employees,
and his engagement in conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice. This
is not a scenario involving a singular act of misconduct, but rather, this is a troubling pattern
of repeated, egregious behavior.
Among the disciplinary cases in West Virginia, several support the sanction
of suspension for misconduct not relating to the misappropriation of client funds. See,
e.g., Lawyer Disc. Bd. v. Rossi, 234 W. Va. 675, 769 S.E.2d 464 (2015) (lawyer’s license
to practice law suspended for three years after committing multiple offenses of misconduct
including: lack of diligence, lack of communication, failure to properly terminate
representation, failure to expedite litigation, engaging in dishonest behavior, engaging in
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, and failure to respond to the
ODC); Lawyer Disc. Bd. v. Karl, 192 W. Va. 23, 449 S.E.2d 277 (1994) (license suspended
for three months for failure to act diligently and for failure to communicate); Lawyer Disc.
Bd. v. Keenan, 189 W. Va. 37, 427 S.E.2d 471 (1993) (lawyer’s license suspended
indefinitely for failure to provide competent representation, failure to act diligently, and
failure to communicate effectively).
48
However, in this instance, not only did Mr. Morgan commit the above-
referenced violations but he did so while also misappropriating client funds.
Unfortunately, this is not just one case of negligence by an attorney involving one
employee—but rather, this is a case involving twenty-two separate complaints involving
multiple clients who have been harmed and who have suffered real injury by Mr. Morgan’s
actions. As such, we agree that annulment is an appropriate punishment for Mr. Morgan’s
misconduct, which reflects both his deficient representation of clients and his
misappropriation of client funds.
When considering these severe facts, we agree with the Hearing Panel
Subcommittee that Mr. Morgan’s behavior violated the following rules: Rule 1.1 (8
violations); Rule 1.3 (13 violations); Rule 1.4(a) (13 violations); Rule 1.4(b) (13
violations); Rule 1.5(a) (1 violation); Rule 1.5(b) (5 violations); Rule 1.15(a) (14
violations); Rule 1.15(c) (10 violations); Rule 1.15(d) (1 violation); Rule 1.16(d) (8
violations); Rule 3.2 (3 violations); Rule 3.3(a) (1 violation); Rule 5.3 (7 violations); Rule
7.5 (1 violation); Rule 8.1(a) (6 violations); Rule 8.1(b) (15 violations); Rule 8.4(b) (1
violation); Rule 8.4(c) (7 violations); and Rule 8.4(d) (7 violations). Therefore, we find
that the sheer volume of these violations—in conjunction with their egregious nature—
warrants the annulment of Mr. Morgan’s law license.
49
IV.
CONCLUSION
We find that the following sanctions will accomplish the goals of our
disciplinary system by punishing Mr. Morgan, restoring public confidence in the ethical
standards of our profession, and serving as a deterrent to other members of the bar. See
Taylor, 192 W. Va. at 144, 451 S.E.2d at 445 (“Attorney disciplinary proceedings are not
designed solely to punish the attorney, but rather to protect the public, to reassure it as to
the reliability and integrity of attorneys and to safeguard its interest in the administration
of justice.”). For the reasons set forth above, we concur with the HPS’s recommended
sanctions. Therefore, we order that Mr. Morgan’s law license is annulled and that he
comply with the mandates of Rule 3.28 of the Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedure
unless he has submitted such as part of his immediate suspension in Case No. 19-0885.
We further order Mr. Morgan to issue the following refunds:
i. $1,192.50 to Public Defender Services;
ii. $7,500.00 to Valerie Norwood;
iii. $3,500.00 to W.T.;
iv. $3,500.00 to E.L.;
v. $9,000.00 to Todd Clutter;
vi. $1,250.00 to Lonnie Lilly;
vii. $3,000.00 to R.D.;
viii. $4,800.00 to T.R.;
ix. $3,050.00 to D.K.;
x. $1,300.00 to J.H.;
xi. Judgment plus interest to Elizabeth Good; and
xii. $3,500.00 to P.B.
Finally, we order Mr. Morgan to pay the costs of these proceedings pursuant to Rule 3.15
of the Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedure.
50
Law License Annulled and Other Sanctions Imposed.
51