The West Virginia State Police, Department of Military Affairs v. J.H., a Minor, by and through His Parent and Next Friend, L.D. ( 2021 )

No. 19-0741 – The West Virginia State Police, Department of Military Affairs and Public
Safety v. J.H., a minor, by and through his parent and next friend, L.D.
FILED
March 29, 2021
Wooton, Justice, dissenting: EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
OF WEST VIRGINIA
In this case, despite the conclusion of an experienced trial judge that the issue
of qualified immunity cannot be fairly determined until after some development of the
evidentiary record has taken place, the majority has elected to summarily resolve the issue
without giving the plaintiff/respondent a chance to develop one single fact in support of
the allegations in his first amended complaint. The majority’s opinion effectively
establishes a new rule and applies it retroactively to plaintiff/respondent: in an excessive
force case brought against a governmental actor, a litigant must establish in his or her
complaint -- in excruciating detail, and before the defendant even files a pleading asserting
a defense of qualified immunity -- that the circumstances of his arrest did not justify four
arresting officers, “acting together as a mob under color of law, brutally and severely
beat[ing] and hit[ting] . . . J. H., a minor.” I am hard pressed to envision an arrest which
would ever justify such action by law enforcement.
To see how this rule played out in the case at bar, we first look at paragraph
seven of the complaint, which states:
On or about November 19, 2018 in Berkeley County, West
Virginia, Defendants Kennedy, Walker, Merson and Ennis,
individually and acting together as a mob under color of law,
brutally and severely beat and hit the Plaintiff, J.H., a minor, in
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and about the head and body, causing him injuries along with
bodily damage, pain and suffering. 1
Further on in paragraph 10(a) - (d), the complaint alleges that the petitioner was negligent
and/or reckless in four particulars: failure to properly train officers and members; willful
blindness to incidents of excessive force in flight situations, and failure to discipline when
such incidents occur; failure to exercise field supervision; and other particulars to be
revealed during the course of discovery. Finally, in paragraph 12(a) – (j), the complaint
alleges that the alleged brutal mob beating described in paragraph 7 violated ten different
statutes, seven of them criminal. The majority deems these allegations insufficient to
withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil
Procedure; in short, assuming the allegations of the complaint to be true, 2 the brutal beating
of an arrestee -- a minor -- by law enforcement officers, acting as a mob and with the
longstanding tacit support of the Department of Military Affairs and Public Safety, is
insufficient as a matter of law to overcome a claim of qualified immunity. I cannot agree
that in a country where the citizens enjoy both state and federal constitutional rights and
1
At the time of the incidents alleged in the complaint, defendants Kennedy and
Walker were State troopers; defendants Merson and Ennis were Berkeley County, West
Virginia, Sheriff’s Deputies.
2
See, e.g., Mountaineer Fire & Rescue Equip., LLC v. City Nat’l Bank of W. Va., __
W. Va. __, __ S.E.2d __, 2020 WL 7223357, at *2 (2020) (“‘Since the preference is to
decide cases on their merits, courts presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, taking all
allegations as true.’ Sedlock v. Moyle, 222 W. Va. 547, 550, 668 S.E.2d 176, 179 (2008)
(citing John W. Lodge Distrib. Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 161 W. Va. 603, 605, 245 S.E.2d 157,
158 (1978)).”).
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protections, the bar for law enforcement should be set this low. In its opinion, the majority
has effectively turned the doctrine of qualified immunity into “an impenetrable shield that
requires toleration of all manner of constitutional and statutory violations by public
officials.” Hutchison v. City of Huntington, 198 W. Va. 139, 148, 479 S.E.2d 649, 658
(1996).
At the outset, I would have voted to deny the petitioner’s appeal as
interlocutory. In this regard, it is well established in this Court’s precedents that “[a]circuit
court’s denial of a motion to dismiss that is predicated on qualified immunity is an
interlocutory ruling which is subject to immediate appeal under the ‘collateral order’
doctrine[,]” Syl. Pt. 1, W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Marple, 236 W. Va. 654, 783 S.E.2d 75,
(2015); Syl. Pt. 1, W. Va. Reg’l Jail & Corr. Fac. Auth. v. Estate of Grove, __ W. Va. __,
852 S.E.2d 773 (2020); see also W. Va. Bd. of Ed. v. Croaff, No. 16-0532, 2017 WL
2172009, at *2 (W. Va. May 27, 2017) (memorandum opinion). The instant case does not
fall within this paradigm, as the court below made no finding at all with respect to the
applicability of qualified immunity to the facts at bar; rather, the court concluded that the
case required some evidentiary development on this limited issue. See Hutchison, 198 W.
Va. at 149, 479 S.E.2d at 659 (“unless there is a bona fide dispute as to the foundational or
historical facts that underlie the immunity determination, the ultimate questions of statutory
or qualified immunity are ripe for summary disposition.”). What today’s decision does is
to expand the reach of the collateral order doctrine to any case in which a defense of
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qualified immunity is raised in the initial pleadings: as soon as the circuit court rules on the
immunity issue -- whether the court grants it, denies it, or defers it -- the disappointed
litigant has a guaranteed right to immediate appellate review.
Although I acknowledge that “[a]n assertion of qualified . . . immunity should
be heard and resolved prior to any trial because, if the claim of immunity is proper and
valid, the very thing from which the defendant is immune – a trial – will absent a pretrial
ruling occur and cannot be remedied by a later appeal[,]” Hutchison, 198 W. Va. at 149
n.13, 479 S.E.2d at 659 n.13, I disagree that the general rule applies here. Nothing in the
circuit court’s order makes a trial the inevitable outcome; indeed, following the limited
discovery sanctioned by the court, the petitioner will have the opportunity to move for
summary disposition on the immunity issue and, in the event of a loss, appeal to this Court.
Thus, I do not believe that this case meets the test of Hoover v. Berger, 199 W. Va. 12, 483
S.E.2d 12 (1997): 3 the petitioner has other adequate means, specifically, motion for
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“In determining whether to entertain and issue the writ of prohibition for cases not
involving an absence of jurisdiction but only where it is claimed that the lower tribunal
exceeded its legitimate powers, this Court will examine five factors: (1) whether the party
seeking the writ has no other adequate means, such as direct appeal, to obtain the desired
relief; (2) whether the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way that is not
correctable on appeal; (3) whether the lower tribunal’s order is clearly erroneous as a matter
of law; (4) whether the lower tribunal’s order is an oft repeated error or manifests persistent
disregard for either procedural or substantive law; and (5) whether the lower tribunal’s
order raises new and important problems or issues of law of first impression. These factors
are general guidelines that serve as a useful starting point for determining whether a
discretionary writ of prohibition should issue. Although all five factors need not be
satisfied, it is clear that the third factor, the existence of clear error as a matter of law,
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summary judgment, to obtain the desired result; the only prejudice suffered by the
petitioner is the inconvenience of limited discovery; the circuit court’s order is not clearly
erroneous as a matter of law, as the respondent’s complaint states at the very least a viable
claim for battery; the circuit court’s ruling is not an oft-repeated error; and the question of
whether denial of qualified immunity at the 12(b)(6) stage is reviewable is not an issue of
first impression.
The majority devotes an inordinate amount of its opinion to petitioner’s
complaint that the circuit court erred by considering matters outside the pleadings,
specifically, a video of the beating which is at the heart of this lawsuit, in denying
petitioner’s motion to dismiss and deferring resolution of the qualified immunity issue. In
light of the majority’s determination that the complaint is insufficient on its face to
overcome a qualified immunity defense, this discussion is of academic interest only –
although ten pages of dicta will certainly alert West Virginia attorneys of the need to load
down their complaints with references to any known physical evidence, lest their
descriptive words and phrases be deemed insufficient to overcome defenses that haven’t
even been raised yet. Additionally, the majority’s resolution of this non-issue exalts form
over substance, doggedly insisting that the sufficiency of the pleading is all that matters,
should be given substantial weight.” Hoover, 199 W. Va. at 14-15, 483 S.E.2d at 14-15,
Syl. Pt. 4.
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notwithstanding what the circuit court termed an “unusual opportunity [we have] here to
know what happened because we actually have a picture of it[.]” (Emphasis added.) In
this regard, the majority claims that the video “was not so intrinsic or integral to the
amended complaint that the circuit court could consider it[,]” a statement I am at a loss to
understand. Whether or not the existence of the video was mentioned in the first amended
complaint, “the [video] is integral to the pleading’s allegations,” Syl. Pt. 6, in part,
Mountaineer Fire & Rescue Equip., LLC v. City Nat’l Bank of W. Va., __ W. Va. __, __
S.E.2d __ (2020), and at least so far as we know, “no party questions [its] authenticity[.]”
Id. Under the unique facts and circumstances of this case, if we insist on adherence to the
third prong of the Mountaineer Fire test, that “the pleading implicitly or explicitly refers
to the [video],” then the remedy should be a remand for the circuit court to allow petitioner
“reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to [a summary judgment]
motion by Rule 56.” See W. Va. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7). 4
4
Rule 12(b)(7) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedures provides, in
relevant part, that
[i]f, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss
for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and
not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one
for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56,
and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present
all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
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In short, as set forth in Rule 12(b)(7), see supra at note 4, the circuit court had
the discretion to consider that video; its error was in not affording petitioners the
opportunity to present material in opposition. The majority’s mandate – reversal and
remand with directions to dismiss respondent’s claims against petitioner -- is both unduly
harsh and patently unjust. Further, I cannot accede to the majority’s view that our
precedents required the circuit judge to ignore the evidence before his eyes and focus solely
on the stylistic inadequacies of the respondent’s initial pleading. In this regard, the
majority fails to acknowledge, must less follow or even attempt to distinguish, our holding
in Hutchison, 198 W. Va. at 150, 479 S.E.2d at 660:
A plaintiff is not required to anticipate the defense of immunity
in his complaint, Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100
S.Ct. 1920, 1923–24, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980), and, under the
West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff is
required to file a reply to a defendant's answer only if the circuit
court exercises its authority under Rule 7(a) to order one. We
believe, in cases of qualified or statutory immunity, court
ordered replies and motions for a more definite statement under
Rule 12(e) can speed the judicial process. Therefore, the trial
court should first demand that a plaintiff file a “a short and
plain statement of his complaint, a complaint that rests on more
than conclusion alone.” Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d at 1433.
Next, the court may, on its own discretion, insist that the
plaintiff file a reply tailored to an answer pleading the defense
of statutory or qualified immunity. The court's discretion not to
order such a reply ought to be narrow; where the defendant
demonstrates that greater detail might assist an early resolution
of the dispute, the order to reply should be made. Of course, if
the individual circumstances of the case indicate that the
plaintiff has pleaded his or her best case, there is no need to
order more detailed pleadings. If the information contained in
the pleadings is sufficient to justify the case proceeding further,
the early motion to dismiss should be denied.
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(Emphasis added). Instead of following the clear mandate set forth in Hutchison, a
unanimous opinion of this Court, the majority has kicked the case into the gutter; indeed,
it could be argued that the majority has sub silentio overruled it. Hutchison recognized that
heightened pleadings are important when qualified immunity is an issue, and that a
deficient pleading does not require automatic dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint. Rather,
Hutchison instructs that a circuit court should require the plaintiff to file a more definite
statement, or to file a reply to the defendant’s answer. The court could also require the
plaintiff to file an amended complaint, see Doe v. Logan of Bd. of Educ., 242 W. Va. 45,
50, 829 S.E.2d 45, 50 (2019) (recognizing that a variety of options are available to remedy
a deficient complaint “instead of mandating dismissal[.]”). In this case, based on the facts
and circumstances presented and in adherence to the principles set forth in Hutchison and
Doe, a just result would be a remand for the circuit court to require a heightened pleading
from respondent, one responsive to the defense of qualified immunity raised in the
petitioner’s motion to dismiss.
A just result in this case would also allow respondent the opportunity to
engage in discovery, even if such discovery is limited to issues involving qualified
immunity. In Doe, this Court recognized that a plaintiff may need to perform discovery in
order to oppose a motion to dismiss that is based on qualified immunity. Id., 242 W. Va.
at 50, 829 S.E.2d at 50. Here, respondent alleges that he was brutally and severely beaten
by two state troopers, as a result, at least in part, of petitioner’s failure to train and supervise
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them. In order not only to prove this claim, but also to satisfy the requirement of heightened
pleadings, respondent needs access to information that is solely in petitioner’s control.
Without some discovery, respondent has no way to know how the defendant troopers were
trained, how they were supervised, or whether they had a history of using excessive force
against arrestees that should have alerted petitioner to the need for improved training and
supervision. The majority’s opinion ignores this real-life litigation problem and orders
that respondent’s complaint be dismissed based on his failure to allege facts to which he
simply does not have access at the pleading stage of the case.
Finally, although I am not persuaded by respondent’s argument that the
petitioner lacks standing to appeal the circuit court’s order denying its motion to dismiss, I
am troubled by the fact that the petitioner’s claim to qualified immunity as a matter of law
on the vicarious liability claims rises or falls on defendants Kennedy’s and Walker’s claim
to immunity – an issue they lost below 5 and did not appeal. This sets up an odd situation
whereby this Court will have dismissed petitioner from the lawsuit in advance of discovery
in Kennedy’s and Walker’s case that might very well establish, either directly or by
necessary implication, that the petitioner was not in fact entitled to immunity. All of this
points to the error of this Court’s decision to issue a rule to show cause in a case where the
5
To clarify, defendants Kennedy and Walker lost on their claim that the
respondent’s first amended complaint was insufficient as a matter of law to overcome their
assertion of qualified immunity.
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circuit court did not resolve any immunity issues, but rather deferred them for limited
evidentiary development.
There is an old adage, one familiar to every first-year law student, that “hard
cases make bad law.” Because I believe that the majority’s opinion in this case aptly
illustrates the truth of that adage, I respectfully dissent. I am authorized to state that Justice
Hutchison joins in this dissenting opinion.
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