Everett Frazier, Commissioner, West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles v. Douglas H. Null ( 2022 )


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  •           IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
    January 2022 Term                     FILED
    _______________                 April 15, 2022
    released at 3:00 p.m.
    No. 20-0225                  EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
    SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    _______________                     OF WEST VIRGINIA
    _______________
    EVERETT FRAZIER, COMMISSIONER,
    WEST VIRGINIA DIVISION OF
    MOTOR VEHICLES,
    Petitioner Below, Petitioner
    v.
    DOUGLAS H. NULL,
    Respondent Below, Respondent
    ____________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kanawha County
    The Honorable Jennifer F. Bailey, Judge
    Civil Action No. 19-AA-106
    REVERSED AND REMANDED
    ____________________________________________________________
    Submitted: January 7, 2022
    Filed: April 15, 2022
    Patrick Morrisey, Esq.                        David Pence, Esq.
    West Virginia Attorney General                Charleston, West Virginia
    Elaine L. Skorich, Esq.                       Counsel for Respondent
    Assistant Attorney General
    Charleston, West Virginia
    Counsel for Petitioner
    JUSTICE ARMSTEAD delivered the Opinion of the Court.
    JUSTICE WOOTON dissents and reserves the right to file a separate Opinion.
    JUSTICE ALAN D. MOATS, sitting by temporary assignment, not participating.
    SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
    1.     “On appeal of an administrative order from a circuit court, this Court
    is bound by the statutory standards contained in W.Va.Code § 29A–5–4[(g) (eff. 2021)]
    and reviews questions of law presented de novo; findings of fact by the administrative
    officer are accorded deference unless the reviewing court believes the findings to be clearly
    wrong.” Syl. Pt. 1, Muscatell v. Cline, 
    196 W. Va. 588
    , 
    474 S.E.2d 518
     (1996).
    2.     “There are no provisions in either W.Va.Code, 17C–5–1, et seq., or
    W.Va.Code, 17C–5A–1, et seq., that require the administration of a chemical sobriety test
    in order to prove that a motorist was driving under the influence of alcohol, controlled
    substances or drugs for purposes of making an administrative revocation of his or her
    driver’s license.” Syl. Pt. 4, Coll v. Cline, 
    202 W. Va. 599
    , 
    505 S.E.2d 662
     (1998).
    3.     “‘“Where there is evidence reflecting that [1] a driver was operating
    a motor vehicle upon a public street or highway, [2] exhibited symptoms of intoxication,
    and [3] had consumed alcoholic beverages, this is sufficient proof under a preponderance
    of the evidence standard to warrant the administrative revocation of his driver’s license for
    driving under the influence of alcohol.” Syl. Pt. 2, Albrecht v. State, 
    173 W.Va. 268
    , 
    314 S.E.2d 859
     (1984).’ Syl. Pt. 5, Reed v. Hill, 
    235 W. Va. 1
    , 
    770 S.E.2d 501
     (2015).” Syl.
    Pt. 6, Frazier v. Bragg, 
    244 W. Va. 40
    , 
    851 S.E.2d 486
     (2020).
    i
    Armstead, Justice:
    Respondent, Douglas H. Null, was arrested for driving a motor vehicle while
    under the influence of alcohol, controlled substances, or drugs (“DUI”), and a sample of
    his blood was drawn for testing. The West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”)
    revoked Mr. Null’s driving privileges, but when Mr. Null appealed the revocation to the
    Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”), 1 DMV advised that the blood sample had
    been destroyed without testing. In light of this information, OAH reinstated Mr. Null’s
    driving privileges, finding that the destruction of the blood sample, without testing,
    deprived him of potentially exculpatory evidence and violated his right to due process. On
    appeal, the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, West Virginia, agreed with OAH, and
    Petitioner, Everett J. Frazier, Commissioner of the Division of Motor Vehicles, (the
    “Commissioner”) filed this appeal.
    Based on the record before us, the arguments of the parties, and the
    applicable law, we find that OAH’s application of the law to its factual findings was
    incorrect and that OAH incorrectly reversed the revocation of Mr. Null’s driving privileges;
    therefore, we reverse.
    I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    On May 26, 2014, a West Virginia State Trooper stopped Mr. Null for
    speeding. According to the DUI Information Sheet, Mr. Null’s speech and departure from
    1
    We note that OAH ceased to exist on July 1, 2021. W. Va. Code § 17C-
    5C-1a(d) (eff. 2020).
    1
    the vehicle were normal, but his eyes were bloodshot, and he was unsteady walking and
    standing. A marijuana bowl with residue was found in the car, and Mr. Null admitted to
    smoking a bowl of marijuana. When the trooper performed field sobriety tests, Mr. Null
    failed the horizontal nystagmus test, the walk-and-turn test, and the one-leg-stand test. The
    trooper took Mr. Null to a hospital for his blood to be drawn. Though a sample was taken,
    it was not analyzed and was later destroyed.
    The DMV sent Mr. Null a revocation order, and he requested a hearing before
    OAH. After various continuances, OAH held an evidentiary hearing in March 2016. The
    trooper did not appear for the hearing because he was no longer employed by the State
    Police and DMV could not subpoena him. Accordingly, and over Mr. Null’s objection,
    DMV proceeded against Mr. Null based on the DUI Information Sheet. 2
    2
    We have held that
    In an administrative hearing conducted by the Division
    of Motor Vehicles, a statement of an arresting officer, as
    described in W. Va.Code § 17C–5A–1(b) (2004)
    (Repl.Vol.2004), that is in the possession of the Division and
    is offered into evidence on behalf of the Division, is admissible
    pursuant to W. Va.Code § 29A–5–2(b) (1964)
    (Repl.Vol.2002).
    Syl. Pt. 7, in part, Dale v. Odum, 
    233 W. Va. 601
    , 
    760 S.E.2d 415
     (2014) (per curiam).
    West Virginia Code § 29A-5-2(b) (eff. 1964) provides that
    All evidence, including papers, records, agency staff
    memoranda and documents in the possession of the agency, of
    which it desires to avail itself, shall be offered and made a part
    of the record in the case, and no other factual information or
    (continued . . .)
    2
    Mr. Null testified in his own defense. According to him, he had not been
    smoking marijuana just before the stop, and he was the one who requested a blood test. On
    cross-examination, he testified that both the possession and the DUI charges had been
    dismissed. He also admitted that he told the trooper that he had smoked marijuana. He
    claimed, however, that he said this because he did not think the trooper would believe
    anything else—which is why he “absolutely wanted a blood test . . . to prove that [he]
    hadn’t smoked[] or . . . wasn’t intoxicated at the time.” He blamed the failed field sobriety
    tests on uneven pavement, his weight, lack of balance, and nervousness, though he admitted
    that his “weight issue” would not have affected his eyes. He also admitted that he signed
    the DUI Information Statement—which included an admission that he had been under the
    influence of marijuana—but he claimed that he had not written those remarks, that he did
    not read them, and that he had only “30 seconds to read” the interview section. According
    to him, the bowl was not his but, rather, belonged to a prior passenger who had smoked
    marijuana in his vehicle. Mr. Null testified: “I guess whenever he got out of the car, it
    come out of his pocket or something.” However, there was no testimony or evidence that
    he requested the results of his blood test or requested an opportunity to perform his own
    test on the blood sample. Rather, he merely checked a box saying that he wanted to
    challenge them.
    evidence shall be considered in the determination of the case.
    Documentary evidence may be received in the form of copies
    or excerpts or by incorporation by reference.
    3
    In August 2019, OAH entered a final order reversing the revocation.
    According to the order, the trooper “had reasonable grounds to believe that . . . [Mr. Null]”
    was DUI because he had bloodshot eyes, he was unsteady while walking and standing, he
    admitted to smoking a bowl of marijuana, he had a bowl (with residue) in the car, and he
    failed field sobriety tests. OAH also found that there was “evidence” that Mr. Null had
    used drugs and that he was “lawfully arrested” for DUI. OAH further found that the trooper
    “requested . . . [Mr. Null] submit to a blood draw” and that Mr. Null “agreed” and “did not
    initiate the blood draw . . . .” Nevertheless, OAH reversed the revocation, reasoning, based
    4
    on our holdings in Reed v. Hall 3 and Reed v. Divita, 4 that the State violated Mr. Null’s due
    process rights under West Virginia Code § 17C-5-9 (eff. 2013) when it deprived him of the
    opportunity to present potentially exculpatory evidence as a result of his blood sample.
    3
    
    235 W. Va. 322
    , 
    773 S.E.2d 666
     (2015), abrogated by Frazier v. Talbert,
    
    245 W. Va. 293
    , 
    858 S.E.2d 918
     (2021). In Hall, we found that a driver “was denied . . .
    statutory and due process rights, under West Virginia Code § 17C–5–9,” when the police
    obtained a blood sample at the driver’s request but failed to have it tested. Id. at 332-33,
    773 S.E.2d at 676-77. We have since determined, however, that Hall was “incorrectly
    decided[.]” Talbert at ___, 858 S.E.2d at 927. In Talbert, the driver requested a blood test
    three times, but the investigating officer refused these requests due to a mistaken belief that
    blood tests were not permitted when the driver was accused of driving under the influence
    of alcohol (as opposed to controlled substances or drugs). Id. at ___, 858 S.E.2d at 921-
    22. There was, however, abundant evidence of intoxication that OAH refused to consider
    and, based on Hall, the OAH reversed the revocation and the circuit court affirmed. Id. at
    ___, 858 S.E.2d at 920-22. On appeal, we found that OAH and the circuit court erred by
    not “considering the other evidence that [the driver] was driving while under the influence
    of alcohol” and the fact that the investigating officer “acted under a misapprehension of
    the law and not in bad faith.” Id. at ___, 858 S.E.2d at 927. We identified three factors
    that a trier of fact “must consider” when “a driver demands a blood test pursuant to West
    Virginia Code § 17C-5-9, but the [blood] test is never given, a chemical analysis of the
    blood that is withdrawn is never completed, or the blood test results are lost.” Id. at ___,
    858 S.E.2d at 929. We identified these factors to guide the trier of fact “in determining
    what consequences should flow from the absence of the blood test evidence under the
    particular facts of the case.” Id. at ___, 858 S.E.2d at 929-30. Thus, an investigating
    officer’s failure to obtain the results of a blood test requested by a driver pursuant to W.
    Va. Code § 17C-5-9 no longer leads automatically to a conclusion that the driver’s license
    revocation must be reversed. Id. at ___, 858 S.E.2d at 927-28.
    4
    No. 14-1018, 
    2015 WL 5514209
     (W. Va. Sept. 18, 2015) (memorandum
    decision), abrogated by Frazier v. Talbert, 
    245 W. Va. 293
    , 
    858 S.E.2d 918
     (2021). In
    Divita, we found that an “investigating officer [who had a driver’s blood sample destroyed]
    imposed a significant impediment to [the driver]’s ability to test the blood sample and
    violated her statutory and due process rights.” Id. at *3-4. Divita applied West Virginia
    Code § 17C-5-9, noting that both the “respondent [driver] and the investigating officer
    requested a blood test . . . .” Id. at *3. Talbert found that Divita, like Hall, was “incorrectly
    decided[.]” Talbert at ___, 858 S.E.2d at 927; see supra note 3.
    5
    The Commissioner 5 appealed to circuit court, and the circuit court affirmed
    OAH’s decision. The circuit court stated that it was “hesitant to disregard the live
    testimony of an individual placed under oath in favor of a piece of paper[,]” and so the
    circuit court credited Mr. Null’s testimony. However, the circuit court found that it did not
    matter who requested the blood test because our holding in Divita was not limited “to a
    mere determination regarding who requested the blood test.” The circuit court reasoned
    that an investigating officer’s request for a blood sample removes a driver’s “impetus . . .
    to . . . request a blood draw” and assures the driver “that a blood draw will occur if [the
    driver] acquiesce[s].” The circuit court “decline[d] to hold that [a] driver’s due process
    rights are contingent upon a race between the driver and the police officer to first request
    a blood draw and/or an analysis thereof.” Accordingly, the circuit court agreed that Mr.
    Null’s statutory and due process rights under West Virginia Code § 17C-5-9 were violated
    and found that the State’s failure to test the blood sample (or make the sample available to
    Mr. Null for testing) “foreclosed” consideration of evidence that Mr. Null committed DUI.
    The Commissioner appeals from the circuit court’s February 14, 2020 order.
    II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    In this appeal, the Commissioner challenges a circuit court order that affirms
    an administrative decision. We have held that
    [o]n appeal of an administrative order from a circuit
    court, this Court is bound by the statutory standards contained
    5
    Adam Holley was Acting Commissioner in September 2019 when DMV’s
    petition for judicial review was filed in circuit court.
    6
    in W.Va.Code § 29A–5–4[(g) (eff. 2021)] and reviews
    questions of law presented de novo; findings of fact by the
    administrative officer are accorded deference unless the
    reviewing court believes the findings to be clearly wrong.
    Syl. Pt. 1, Muscatell v. Cline, 
    196 W. Va. 588
    , 
    474 S.E.2d 518
     (1996). West Virginia Code
    § 29A-5-4(g) (eff. 2021) 6 requires a court to reverse, vacate, or modify an administrative
    agency’s order or decision if a petitioner’s substantial rights have been prejudiced because
    the agency’s findings, inferences, conclusions, decision, or order (1) violates constitutional
    or statutory provisions; (2) exceeds the agency’s statutory authority or jurisdiction; (3) was
    made upon unlawful procedures; (4) is affected by other error of law; (5) is clearly wrong
    in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) is
    arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted
    exercise of discretion. See also Syl. Pt. 2, Shepherdstown Volunteer Fire Dep’t v. State ex
    rel. State of W. Va. Hum. Rts. Comm’n, 
    172 W. Va. 627
    , 
    309 S.E.2d 342
     (1983). With
    these standards of review in mind, we will consider the Commissioner’s appeal.
    III. ANALYSIS
    In this appeal, the Commissioner objects that the circuit court substituted its
    judgment for that of the factfinder, and showed an improper preference for testimonial
    evidence over documentary evidence, when it found that Mr. Null was the one who
    requested the blood test. According to the Commissioner, West Virginia Code § 17C-5-
    6
    The Legislature amended West Virginia Code § 29A-5-4 after the circuit
    court issued its decision below, but the amendments made only stylistic changes to the
    portions of the statute that are relevant to this appeal.
    7
    9—which both OAH and the circuit court invoked in support of their decisions—does not
    apply unless the driver demands that his or her blood be drawn for testing. 7 Mr. Null
    responds, however, that there is no practical difference between requesting a blood test and
    agreeing to a blood test and argues that a citizen’s due process right should not “hinge on
    who won the race to ask for a blood test first.” We agree with the Commissioner.
    A. OAH’s findings of fact are entitled to deference.
    As we have consistently held, “findings of fact by the administrative officer
    are accorded deference unless the reviewing court believes the findings to be clearly
    wrong.” Muscatell at 590, 
    474 S.E.2d at 520
    , syl. pt. 1, in part. This rule flows logically
    from the statute, which provides that appeals in contested cases are to be decided “upon
    the record made before the agency” and that a circuit court may not receive testimony
    “except . . . in cases of alleged irregularities in procedure before the agency[] not shown in
    the record . . . .” W. Va. Code § 29A-5-4(f). Indeed, by statute, a reviewing court may not
    reverse “administrative findings” unless they are “[c]learly wrong in view of the reliable,
    probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record[.]” W. Va. Code § 29A-5-4(g)(5);
    Syl. Pt. 1, in part, Antero Res. Corp. v. Steager, 
    244 W. Va. 81
    , 
    851 S.E.2d 527
     (2020)
    (quoting Syl. Pt. 1, in part, Griffith v. ConAgra Brands, Inc., 
    229 W. Va. 190
    , 
    728 S.E.2d 7
    In an additional assignment of error, the Commissioner asks us to reverse
    our holdings in Hall and Divita, arguing that our “judicially created remedy” for violations
    of West Virginia Code § 17C-5-9 “thwarts the purpose of the administrative sanctions for
    DUI and lets impaired drivers avoid license revocations by excluding all relevant evidence
    of DUI.” However, we have already determined that “Hall and Divita were incorrectly
    decided[.]” Talbert, 245 W. Va. at ___, 858 S.E.2d at 927.
    8
    74 (2012)) (stating that “[f]indings of fact of the administrative law judge will not be set
    aside or vacated unless clearly wrong”).
    In this case, OAH found that the trooper, not Mr. Null, requested the blood
    test, yet the circuit court accorded no deference to this finding. Rather, the circuit court
    observed that Mr. Null testified that he requested the blood draw, not the trooper, and the
    circuit court professed that it was “hesitant to disregard the live testimony of an individual
    placed under oath in favor of a piece of paper.” Based upon this hesitation, the circuit court
    concluded that our decision in Hall—a case in which it was undisputed that the driver
    demanded the blood test 8—“is directly on point” and that Mr. Null’s “due process rights
    under W. Va. Code § 17C-5-9” were denied. We disagree with the circuit court.
    Hesitation is not the same thing as a determination that OAH’s finding was
    “[c]learly wrong in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole
    record” as the statute and our caselaw require before a circuit court may reject an
    administrative finding of fact. W. Va. Code § 29A-5-4(g)(5); Muscatell at 590, 
    474 S.E.2d at 520
    , syl. pt. 1, in part. Furthermore, we agree that the circuit court’s “hesitation”
    stemmed from an improper “preference for testimonial evidence over documentary
    evidence.” Groves v. Cicchirillo, 
    225 W. Va. 474
    , 481, 
    694 S.E.2d 639
    , 646 (2010) (per
    8
    See Hall at 332, 773 S.E.2d at 676 (“The DMV contends that the burden of
    proceeding from blood sample to blood test is upon Mr. Hall because he requested the
    blood test. On the contrary, Mr. Hall argues that the statute creates a due process right to
    both demand and receive a blood test . . . .” (italics removed)). Even if Mr. Null had
    requested the blood test, which is contrary to the OAH findings, the circuit court’s reliance
    on Hall is misplaced. As we have noted herein, this Court has determined that Hall was
    incorrectly decided. Talbert, 245 W. Va. at ___, 858 S.E.2d at 927.
    9
    curiam). As we have clearly held, the “law recognizes no such distinction in the context
    of drivers’ license revocation proceedings.” Ibid. Indeed, unlike the circuit court, OAH
    had an opportunity to observe Mr. Null when he was testifying and evidently determined
    that his testimony on this issue—which directly contradicted the DUI Information Sheet—
    was less credible. As trier of fact, OAH had “exclusive” authority to determine Mr. Null’s
    credibility, and the circuit court had no authority to review that credibility determination.
    State v. Guthrie, 
    194 W. Va. 657
    , 669 n.9, 
    461 S.E.2d 163
    , 175 n.9 (1995) (“An appellate
    court may not decide the credibility of witnesses or weigh evidence as that is the exclusive
    function and task of the trier of fact.”). Accordingly, we find that the circuit court erred
    when it rejected OAH’s finding that the trooper, and not Mr. Null, requested that Mr. Null’s
    blood be drawn for testing. In addition, because we are bound by the standard of review
    set forth in West Virginia Code § 29A-5-4(g), and because we do not believe that OAH’s
    finding that the trooper requested the blood test was clearly wrong, we assume that OAH’s
    finding on this point is correct. Muscatell at 590, 
    474 S.E.2d at 520
    , syl. pt. 1, in part (“On
    appeal of an administrative order from a circuit court, this Court is bound by the statutory
    standards contained in W.Va.Code § 29A–5–4[(g)] . . . .”).
    B. Both OAH and the circuit court applied the wrong law.
    Although we defer to OAH’s finding that it was the trooper, and not Mr. Null,
    who requested the blood draw, we do not accord such deference to OAH’s or the circuit
    court’s conclusions of law, and we take particular exception to the circuit court’s
    10
    conclusion that it does not matter who requested the blood test. Muscatell at 590, 
    474 S.E.2d at 520
    , syl. pt. 1, in part.
    West Virginia Code § 17C-5-6 (eff. 2013) provides that certain medical
    professionals, “acting at the request and direction of the law-enforcement officer, may
    withdraw blood to determine . . . the concentration in the blood of a controlled substance,
    drug, or any combination thereof” and provides for an additional “chemical test” at the
    driver’s expense and by a medical professional of his or her choice, if the driver so wishes.
    W. Va. Code § 17C-5-6 (emphasis added). By contrast, West Virginia Code § 17C-5-9
    provides that “[a]ny person lawfully arrested for driving a motor vehicle in this state while
    under the influence of . . . controlled substances or drugs” has a “right to demand that . . .
    a sample or specimen of his or her blood or breath [be taken] to determine the controlled
    substance or drug content of his or her blood . . . and that a chemical test thereof be made.”
    W. Va. Code § 17C-5-9 (emphasis added). Thus, Section 6 pertains to blood samples
    requested, in the first instance, by an investigating officer; Section 9 pertains to blood
    samples requested by a driver. Accordingly, we have held that when a “blood draw was
    performed at the request of law enforcement officers, the provisions of West Virginia Code
    § 17C-5-6 (2013), rather than West Virginia Code § 17C-5-9, apply.” Frazier v. Bragg,
    
    244 W. Va. 40
    , 46, 
    851 S.E.2d 486
    , 492 (2020).
    As noted above, we defer to OAH’s finding that the trooper, and not Mr.
    Null, requested the blood draw; therefore, we agree that both OAH and the circuit court
    erred when they concluded that the destruction of Mr. Null’s blood, without testing,
    11
    violated his rights under West Virginia Code § 17C-5-9. Indeed, as we stated in Bragg,
    “[b]ecause West Virginia Code § 17C-5-6 clearly applies to the facts of this case, the OAH
    and circuit court’s reliance on West Virginia Code § 17C-5-9 and the caselaw construing
    it, was misplaced and . . . unnecessarily complicated the question of whether the officer[’s]
    failure to test Mr. [Null]’s blood sample or make it available to him to conduct additional
    testing violated Mr. [Null]’s rights and warranted reversal of the revocation order.” Id. at
    46, 851 S.E.2d at 492.
    Had the circuit court correctly applied the provisions of West Virginia Code
    § 17C-5-6, it is clear that such statute affords no relief to Mr. Null. The statute provides
    that “[u]pon the request of the person who is tested, full information concerning the test
    taken at the direction of the law-enforcement officer shall be made available to him or her.”
    Ibid. (emphasis added). As noted above, the statute also authorizes certain medical
    professionals to “administer” a second “chemical test” at the driver’s expense. Ibid.
    However, there is no evidence that Mr. Null ever requested any information regarding the
    test to be performed on his blood sample and no evidence that he ever requested an
    opportunity to perform his own test. See Bragg at 48, 851 S.E.2d at 494 (“Aside from
    marking the box on the hearing request form that he ‘wish[ed] to challenge the results of
    the secondary chemical test of the blood, breath or urine[,]’ it is undisputed that at no time
    did Mr. Bragg request any information concerning the blood withdrawn at the direction of
    Troopers Miller and Williamson either for the purpose of having the sample independently
    tested . . . or for use otherwise at the administrative hearing.”). Without such requests,
    12
    “[t]he absence of blood evidence, while acknowledged and explained at the administrative
    hearing, was simply not at issue in this case[,]” ibid., and it was error for OAH and the
    circuit court to conclude otherwise and find that the destruction of his blood sample,
    without testing, violated his right to due process.
    C. Reversing Mr. Null’s revocation was error.
    Because we find no due process violation, we turn to the question of whether
    the Commissioner proved that Mr. Null was driving under the influence of controlled
    substances or drugs when he was stopped for speeding. This was, after all, the “principal
    question at the hearing” before OAH, W. Va. Code § 17C-5A-2(e) (eff. 2015), and “[t]he
    absence of a chemical test does not foreclose proof by other means of intoxication as a
    ground for license revocation[,]” Boley v. Cline, 
    193 W. Va. 311
    , 314, 
    456 S.E.2d 38
    , 41
    (1995) (per curiam). Indeed, “[t]here are no provisions in either W.Va.Code, 17C–5–1, et
    seq., or W.Va.Code, 17C–5A–1, et seq., that require the administration of a chemical
    sobriety test in order to prove that a motorist was driving under the influence of alcohol,
    controlled substances or drugs for purposes of making an administrative revocation of his
    or her driver’s license.” Syl. Pt. 4, Coll v. Cline, 
    202 W. Va. 599
    , 
    505 S.E.2d 662
     (1998).
    On the contrary, we have held that
    “‘[w]here there is evidence reflecting that [1] a driver
    was operating a motor vehicle upon a public street or highway,
    [2] exhibited symptoms of intoxication, and [3] had consumed
    alcoholic beverages, this is sufficient proof under a
    preponderance of the evidence standard to warrant the
    administrative revocation of his driver’s license for driving
    under the influence of alcohol.’ Syl. Pt. 2, Albrecht v. State,
    13
    
    173 W.Va. 268
    , 
    314 S.E.2d 859
     (1984).” Syl. Pt. 5, Reed v.
    Hill, 
    235 W. Va. 1
    , 
    770 S.E.2d 501
     (2015).
    Bragg, 244 W. Va. at ___, 851 S.E.2d at 487, syl. pt. 6 (emphasis added). Clearly, OAH
    made express findings on each of these issues by a preponderance of the evidence. First,
    OAH found that “Petitioner was traveling ten (10) miles over the posted speed limit” on
    Route 60 in Kanawha County, West Virginia. Second, OAH found that Petitioner exhibited
    numerous signs of intoxication, including “bloodshot eyes,” an “unsteady” gait, and
    unsatisfactory performance on “the administered field sobriety tests.” 9 Third, OAH found
    that Mr. Null admitted to smoking a bowl of marijuana. In light of these findings, we
    conclude that Mr. Null was driving under the influence of controlled substances or drugs
    on May 26, 2014, and, accordingly, conclude that the circuit court erred in affirming
    OAH’s final order that overturned the Commissioner’s revocation order.
    9
    OAH made the following particular findings: (a) that during the horizontal
    gaze nystagmus test, Mr. Null’s eyes “showed a lack of smooth pursuit, exhibited distinct
    nystagmus at maximum deviation[,] and displayed the onset of nystagmus prior to an angle
    of forty-five (45) degrees”; (b) that during the walk-and-turn test, he “stepped off the line
    of walk, made an improper turn, raised his arms for balance, and took an incorrect number
    of steps”; and (c) that during the one-leg-stand test, Mr. Null “swayed, used his arms to
    balance, hopped, and was unable to keep his raised foot off the ground.”
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    IV. CONCLUSION
    Based on the foregoing, we reverse the circuit court’s February 14, 2020
    order and remand this case to the circuit court for reinstatement of the Commissioner’s
    order administratively revoking Mr. Null’s driver’s license.
    Reversed and Remanded
    with Directions.
    15