City of Wheeling v. The Public Service Commission of West Virginia and the City of Benwood ( 2023 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
FILED
January 2023 Term
April 24, 2023
____________ released at 3:00 p.m.
EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
No. 21-1001
OF WEST VIRGINIA
____________
CITY OF WHEELING,
Defendant Below, Petitioner
v.
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF WEST VIRGINIA
and THE CITY OF BENWOOD,
Respondents.
______________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Public Service Commission of West Virginia
Case No. 21-0372-S-WI
VACATED
________________________________________________________________________
Rehearing Granted September 20, 2022.
Submitted Upon Rehearing January 10, 2023.
Filed April 24, 2023.
Robert R. Rodecker, Esq. Jessica M. Lane, Esq.
John R. McGhee, Esq. Jeffrey A. Foster, Esq.
KAY CASTO & CHANEY PLLC Natalie E. Thomas, Esq.
Charleston, West Virginia Public Service Commission of West
Counsel for Petitioner Virginia
Charleston, West Virginia
Rosemary Humway-Warmuth, Esq. Counsel for Respondent
Office of City Solicitor
City of Wheeling
Wheeling, West Virginia
Counsel for Petitioner
CHIEF JUSTICE WALKER delivered the Opinion of the Court.
JUSTICE ARMSTEAD and JUSTICE HUTCHISON dissent and reserve their rights to
file separate opinions.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. “In reviewing a Public Service Commission order, we will first
determine whether the Commission’s order, viewed in light of the relevant facts and of the
Commission’s broad regulatory duties, abused or exceeded its authority. We will examine
the manner in which the Commission has employed the methods of regulation which it has
itself selected, and must decide whether each of the order’s essential elements is supported
by substantial evidence. Finally, we will determine whether the order may reasonably be
expected to maintain financial integrity, attract necessary capital, and fairly compensate
investors for the risks they have assumed, and yet provide appropriate protection to the
relevant public interests, both existing and foreseeable. The court’s responsibility is not to
supplant the Commission’s balance of these interests with one more nearly to its liking, but
instead to assure itself that the Commission has given reasoned consideration to each of
the pertinent factors.” Syllabus Point 2, Monongahela Power Co. v. Public Service
Commission of West Virginia, 166 W. Va. 423, 276 S.E.2d 179 (1981).
2. “The detailed standard for our review of an order of the Public Service
Commission contained in Syllabus Point 2 of Monongahela Power Co. v. Public Service
Commission, 166 W.Va. 423, 276 S.E.2d 179 (1981), may be summarized as follows: (1)
whether the Commission exceeded its statutory jurisdiction and powers; (2) whether there
is adequate evidence to support the Commission’s findings; and, (3) whether the
substantive result of the Commission’s order is proper.” Syllabus Point 1, Central West
i
Virginia Refuse, Inc. v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia, 190 W. Va. 416, 438
S.E.2d 596 (1993).
3. “‘In the absence of any specific indication to the contrary, words used
in a statute will be given their common, ordinary and accepted meaning.’ Syl. pt. 1, Tug
Valley v. Mingo Cty. Comm’n, 164 W.Va. 94, 261 S.E.2d 165 (1979).” Syllabus Point 7,
Wheeling Park Commission v. Dattoli, 237 W. Va. 275, 787 S.E.2d 546 (2016).
4. “It is well established that the word ‘shall,’ in the absence of language
in the statute showing a contrary intent on the part of the Legislature, should be afforded a
mandatory connotation.” Syllabus Point 1, Nelson v. West Virginia Public Employees
Service Board, 171 W. Va. 445, 300 S.E.2d 86 (1982).
5. The 120-day dispute resolution period set forth in West Virginia Code
§ 24-2-1(b)(6) (2021) commences on the date a request for investigation is filed with the
Public Service Commission pursuant to that statute.
ii
WALKER, Chief Justice:
The City of Wheeling sells wholesale sewage treatment service to the City
of Benwood. In April 2021, Wheeling increased the wholesale rate it charges to Benwood
by 45%. Benwood complained to the Public Service Commission about the rate hike in
May 2021 under West Virginia Code § 24-2-1(b)(6) (2021). That statute requires the
Commission to resolve complaints like Benwood’s “within 120 days of filing,” although
that period may be tolled to permit the Commission to gather information. The
Commission entered the final order resolving Benwood’s complaint in November 2021,
after issuing three tolling orders the prior June, July, and October. Wheeling now asks us
to vacate that final order, arguing that the Commission exceeded its statutory authority by
entering that final order more than 120 days after Benwood filed its complaint. We agree
based on the plain language of the statute and so vacate the Commission’s order of
November 12, 2021. 1
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Wheeling contests the November 2021 final order of the Commission on
jurisdictional grounds. Wheeling doesn’t challenge the substance of that order in this
1
Wheeling petitioned the Commission to reconsider its November 12, 2021 order
and to stay that order pending appeal. The Commission denied that petition by order
entered December 1, 2021. That order is vacated as well for the reasons discussed below.
1
appeal, so the following discussion is limited. We first outline the context of this dispute,
then detail pertinent procedural events before the Commission.
Wheeling is what is known as a “locally rate-regulated” utility (LRR). LRRs
are “political subdivisions of this state providing separate or combined water and/or sewer
services and having at least 4,500 customers and annual combined gross revenues of $3
million . . . .” 2 In 2015, the Legislature circumscribed the Commission’s jurisdiction over
LRRs, specifically finding that they “are most fairly and effectively regulated by the local
governing body with respect to rates, borrowing and capital projects.” 3 The Legislature
detailed the Commission’s jurisdiction over LRRs in West Virginia Code § 24-2-1. In this
case, we are concerned with § 24-2-1(b)(6) (2021), which we discuss in detail, below.
Wheeling sells sewer service to Benwood. On April 6, 2021, Wheeling
raised the rate charged to Benwood for that service by 45%, effective May 21, 2021.
Wheeling filed that ordinance with the Commission on April 14, 2021. On May 3, 2021,
Benwood filed a complaint with the Commission under § 24-2-1(b)(6). Benwood asserted
that the increased rate was “unfair, unreasonable, [and] discriminatory . . . .” 4 Benwood
2
W. Va. Code § 24-2-1(b) (2021).
3
W. Va. Code § 24-1-1(j) (2015).
4
Benwood labelled its initial filing as a “Formal Complaint,” although
§ 24-2-1(b)(6) refers to a “request for an investigation” as the filing that kicks off a
proceeding under that statute. The parties appear to agree that Benwood’s Formal
2
also alleged that the increased rate—adopted by Wheeling to fund capital projects—was
not based on Benwood’s proportionate share of the project’s scope of work.
Wheeling sent a letter to the Commission on May 27, 2021 (24 days after
Benwood filed its complaint). In that letter, Wheeling acknowledged Benwood’s
complaint and suggested that, as of May 27, the Commission had issued neither an order
to investigate Benwood’s complaint nor an order requiring Wheeling to answer the
complaint. 5 Wheeling included its answer to Benwood’s complaint with the May 27 letter.
The Commission entered an order noting Wheeling’s May 27 answer on June 2, 2021 (30
days after Benwood filed its complaint). There, the Commission concluded that Wheeling
“ha[s] not filed sufficient support for the rates, fees and charges in its municipal ordinance
to facilitate Commission evaluation” of Benwood’s complaint. The Commission
concluded that § 24-2-1(b)(6) empowered it to “toll the running of the statutory period for
resolution of Benwood’s complaint pending the filing of necessary supporting information
of a municipal ordinance.” It then ordered Wheeling to file the requested information—
including a class cost of study (CCOS)—no later than 30 days from the order date. The
Commission then tolled the “running of the statutory period of resolution of the complaint
Complaint equates to a request for investigation under § 24-2-1(b)(6), so we use the terms
interchangeably in this Opinion.
5
Cf. W. Va. Code R. § 150-1-6.2.5 (2019) (“Upon the filing of a formal complaint
and the issuance of an order to investigate, the Commission will require that a copy of the
complaint be served on each defendant, together with a copy of an order requiring each
defendant to satisfy or answer the complaint within ten (10) days.”).
3
for a period of 45 days, resulting in a statutory decision due date of Friday, October 15,
2021.”
Wheeling filed the information requested by the Commission in the June 2
order, including the CCOS, on July 2, 2021. On July 14, Commission staff notified
Wheeling of an error in the CCOS. Wheeling submitted a revised CCOS the next day, July
15. On July 19, Commission staff moved the Commission to “exercise its statutory
authority under Code §24-2-1(b)(6) and toll [the Benwood-Wheeling dispute] for an
additional thirteen (13) days from October 15, 2021, or until October 28, 2021” to put staff
“in the posture that [they] should have been in on July 2, 2021, but for the flawed [s]tudy
filed by Wheeling.” The Commission granted that motion on July 22, finding that (1) the
then-current statutory deadline was October 15, 2021, (2) it was “reasonable to toll the
running of the statutory deadline . . . and Staff Report due dates for 13 days,” and (3)
“ORDERED that the running of the statutory deadline is tolled until September 28, 2021.”
The administrative law judge issued a recommended decision on September
13, 2021, in which he recommended that the Commission adopt the rate passed by
Wheeling the prior April. Benwood and Commission staff filed exceptions to the
4
recommended decision in late September. 6 Wheeling replied to Benwood and the
Commission in early October.
The Commission filed a third order tolling the statutory, 120-day deadline to
resolve the Benwood-Wheeling dispute on October 26. In that order, the Commission
stated that
[g]iven the complexity of this case and need for
additional time for Commission consideration and review, the
Commission will invoke its authority under W. Va. Code § 24-
2-1(b)(6) to toll the statutory period 120 days from the date
Wheeling filed a Revised [CCOS], being July 15, 2021. The
statutory deadline in this case should be extended to November
12, 2021.
....
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the running of the
statutory period for resolution of this matter is tolled 120 days
from July 15, 2021, resulting in a statutory decision due date
of Friday, November 12, 2021.
The Commission entered its final decision on November 12, 2021, declining
to adopt the administrative law judge’s recommended decision. 7 Ten days later, Wheeling
petitioned the Commission to reconsider its November 12 order. Wheeling contended that
6
The West Virginia Water Development Authority (WDA) participated in the
proceedings before the Commission as amicus curiae. The WDA responded to
Commission staff’s exceptions and advocated adoption of the administrative law judge’s
proposed order.
7
The Commission ordered Wheeling to adopt a recalculated wholesale sewer rate
effective that day.
5
the Commission had exceeded its authority under the plain and unambiguous language of
§ 24-2-1(b)(6) when, in its October 26 order, it restarted the 120-day dispute resolution
clock from July 15, 2021 to allow it additional time to consider the Wheeling-Benwood
dispute. 8 Wheeling argued that, because the October 26 order was issued outside the
Commission’s authority, the dispute resolution deadline remained October 28, 2021, i.e.,
the recalculated deadline set in the tolling order of July 22. Wheeling also argued that the
October 26 order was erroneous because it calculated the 120-day resolution deadline from
the date it provided the revised CCOS (July 15) rather than the date Benwood filed its
complaint (May 3). 9
The Commission denied Wheeling’s petition for reconsideration on
December 1, 2021. The Commission reasoned that, “W. Va. Code § 24-2-1(b)(6)
authorizes the Commission to toll the 120-day period for resolution of rate disputes
between a[n LLR] and its customer until the necessary information showing the basis of
the rates, fees, and charges or other information the Commission deems necessary is filed.”
8
Wheeling did not object to the dispute resolution deadline set by the Commission
in the October 26, 2021 order at the time of its entry. Instead, it waited to raise the issue
until after the Commission issued a final order adverse to Wheeling’s interests. While “the
issue of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time,” State ex rel. Universal
Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 239 W. Va. 338, 345, 801 S.E.2d 216, 223 (2017), that
principle is not an invitation to gamesmanship. We strongly encourage litigants to raise
credible concerns with subject matter jurisdiction as early as possible in a proceeding.
9
Wheeling also moved the Commission to stay the November 12, 2021 order
pending its appeal. In its December 1, 2021 order, the Commission denied Wheeling’s
motion to stay the November 12 order.
6
Because Wheeling had not filed the revised CCOS until July 15, the Commission
concluded that § 24-2-1(b)(6) authorized it to “toll” the 120-day dispute resolution period
from that date. As to its earlier calculations of the dispute resolution deadline, the
Commission stated that it had not
invoke[d] its full authority to toll the decision due date by 120
days from the date Wheeling filed its Revised [CCOS].
Instead, [it] granted Staff’s request to toll the decision due date
only 13 days from the then-established statutory decision due
date of October 15, 2021. The Commission recognized and
corrected this oversight when it issued its October 26, 2021,
Order that tolled the decision due date of this dispute 120 days
from July 15, 2021.
The Commission did not address Wheeling’s argument that it lacked
jurisdiction under § 24-2-1(b)(6) to toll the dispute resolution deadline to allow it more
time to consider complex cases.
Wheeling appealed the Commission’s orders of November 12 and December
1. This Court affirmed those orders in an Opinion issued on April 26, 2022. We then
granted Wheeling’s petition to reconsider that decision. The matter was submitted to the
Court again following oral argument on January 10, 2023. This Opinion follows.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Well-established standards govern our review of the Commission’s orders of
November 12, 2021, and December 1, 2021. Over forty years ago, this Court held that,
7
In reviewing a Public Service Commission order, we
will first determine whether the Commission’s order, viewed
in light of the relevant facts and of the Commission’s broad
regulatory duties, abused or exceeded its authority. We will
examine the manner in which the Commission has employed
the methods of regulation which it has itself selected, and must
decide whether each of the order’s essential elements is
supported by substantial evidence. Finally, we will determine
whether the order may reasonably be expected to maintain
financial integrity, attract necessary capital, and fairly
compensate investors for the risks they have assumed, and yet
provide appropriate protection to the relevant public interests,
both existing and foreseeable. The court’s responsibility is not
to supplant the Commission’s balance of these interests with
one more nearly to its liking, but instead to assure itself that the
Commission has given reasoned consideration to each of the
pertinent factors.[10]
We restated that standard more succinctly in 1993:
The detailed standard for our review of an order of the
Public Service Commission contained in Syllabus Point 2 of
Monongahela Power Co. v. Public Service Commission, 166
W.Va. 423, 276 S.E.2d 179 (1981), may be summarized as
follows: (1) whether the Commission exceeded its statutory
jurisdiction and powers; (2) whether there is adequate evidence
to support the Commission’s findings; and, (3) whether the
substantive result of the Commission’s order is proper.[11]
10
Syl. Pt. 2, Monongahela Power Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W. Va., 166 W. Va.
423, 276 S.E.2d 179 (1981).
11
Syl. Pt. 1, Cent. W. Va. Refuse, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W. Va., 190 W. Va.
416, 438 S.E.2d 596 (1993).
8
We are concerned in this case with (1): “whether the Commission exceeded
its statutory jurisdiction and powers.” 12 To resolve this dispute, we are called upon to
examine the language of § 24-2-1(b)(6), raising a question of law which this Court reviews
de novo. 13
III. ANALYSIS
The substance of the Commission’s November 12, 2021 order is not the issue
in this case. Rather, we decide whether the Commission acted within its statutory authority
when it elected to start the jurisdictional, 120-day clock on the date it contends it received
sufficient information from Wheeling to resolve the Benwood-Wheeling dispute—July 15,
2021. The plain language of § 24-2-1(b)(6) controls that decision.
West Virginia Code § 24-2-1(b)(6) states that:
12
Id.
13
See Syl. Pt. 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W. Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415(1995) (“Where the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or
involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review.”). The
Commission suggests that its interpretation of § 24-2-1(b)(6) is entitled to deference under
Syllabus Point 1 of Appalachian Power Co. v. State Tax Department as a permissible
construction of an ambiguous statute. Id., 195 W. Va. 573, 466 S.E.2d 424 (1995). As we
conclude below, the operative language of § 24-2-1(b)(6) is plain and the Commission’s
position is contrary to that statute. So, if Syllabus Point 1 of Appalachian Power is relevant
here, it does not require this Court to afford deference to the Commission’s view of
§ 24-2-1(b)(6) because where “the intention of the Legislature is clear, that is the end of
the matter . . . .” Syl. Pt. 3, in part, Appalachian Power Co., 195 W. Va. at 573, 466 S.E.2d
at 424.
9
(b) The jurisdiction of the commission over political
subdivisions of this state providing separate or combined water
and/or sewer services and having at least 4,500 customers and
annual combined gross revenues of $3 million or more that are
political subdivisions of the state is limited to:
....
(6) Investigation and resolution of disputes between
a political subdivision of the state providing wholesale water
and/or wastewater treatment or other services, whether by
contract or through a tariff, and its customer or customers,
including, but not limited to, rates, fees, and charges, service
areas and contested utility combinations: Provided, That any
request for an investigation related to such a dispute that is
based on the act or omission of the political subdivision shall
be filed within 30 days of the act or omission of the political
subdivision and the commission shall resolve the dispute
within 120 days of filing. The 120-day period for resolution of
the dispute may be tolled by the commission until the
necessary information showing the basis of the rates, fees, and
charges or other information required by the commission is
filed: Provided, however, That the disputed rates, fees, and
charges fixed by the political subdivision providing separate or
combined water and/or sewer services shall remain in full force
and effect until set aside, altered or, amended by the
commission in an order to be followed in the future.[14]
Wheeling posits that the italicized language starts the 120-day clock on the
date the customer of an LRR files a complaint under § 24-2-1(b)(6). In this case, that is
May 3, 2021. According to the Commission, the “‘may be tolled’ proviso of [§ 24-2-
1(b)(6)] means that if [it] does not have all the necessary information before it at [filing]
then [it] has authority to determine that the 120-day review period begins on the date the
14
W. Va. Code § 24-2-1(b)(6) (emphases added).
10
utility files the necessary information.” In other words, Wheeling relies on the italicized
language above, while the Commission’s argument hangs on the underlined language.
“Generally the words of a statute are to be given their ordinary and familiar
significance and meaning, and regard is to be had for their general and proper use.” 15
Likewise, “‘[i]n the absence of any specific indication to the contrary, words used in a
statute will be given their common, ordinary and accepted meaning.’” 16 Those principles
direct us to the common, ordinary meaning of the verb “toll”: “to stop the running of; to
abate.” 17 Similarly, a “tolling statute” is defined as “[a] law that interrupts the running of
a statute of limitations in certain situations . . . .” 18 Courts have recognized that tolling
“operates to suspend or interrupt [a statute of limitation’s] running while certain activity
Syl. Pt. 4, State v. Gen. Daniel Morgan Post No. 548, Veterans of Foreign Wars,
15
144 W. Va. 137, 107 S.E.2d 353 (1959).
16
Syl. Pt. 7, Wheeling Park Comm’n v. Dattoli, 237 W. Va. 275, 787 S.E.2d 546(2016) (quoting Syl. Pt. 1, Tug Valley Recovery Ctr., Inc. v. Mingo Cnty. Comm’n, 164 W.
Va. 94, 261 S.E.2d 165 (1979)); see also Syl. Pt. 4, W. Va. Consol. Pub. Ret. Bd. v. Weaver,
222 W. Va. 668, 671 S.E.2d 673 (2008) (“‘In the absence of any definition of the intended
meaning of words or terms used in a legislative enactment, they will, in the interpretation
of the act, be given their common, ordinary and accepted meaning in the connection in
which they are used.’ Syllabus point 1, Miners in General Group v. Hix, 123 W.Va. 637,
17 S.E.2d 810 (1941), overruled on other grounds by Lee–Norse Co. v. Rutledge, 170
W.Va. 162, 291 S.E.2d 477 (1982).”).
17
Toll, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1791 (11th ed. 2019).
18
Tolling statute, id. (emphasis added).
11
takes place.” 19 And in the context of equitable tolling, the Supreme Court of the United
States has commented that “[p]rinciples of equitable tolling usually dictate that when a
time bar has been suspended and then begins to run again upon a later event, the time
remaining on the clock is calculated by subtracting from the full limitations period
whatever time ran before the clock was stopped.” 20 While § 24-2-1(b)(6) is not a statute
of limitations per se, the operative concept of the definition of a “tolling statute” is readily
transferable to § 24-2-1(b)(6): the Commission may suspend or interrupt the running of
the 120-day clock once it has begun, but it may not postpone its commencement.
The Commission asserts that this phrase—“[t]he 120-day period for
resolution of the dispute may be tolled by the commission”—empowers it to determine
when the 120-day jurisdictional clock begins to run. But the language that precedes that
phrase— “shall” and “of filing”—belies the Commission’s argument. Regarding “shall,”
“[i]t is well established that the word ‘shall,’ in the absence of language in the statute
showing a contrary intent on the part of the Legislature, should be afforded a mandatory
connotation.” 21 In the context of § 24-2-1(b)(6), the combination of “shall” and “of filing”
19
Flannery v. Singer Asset Fin. Co., LLC, 94 A.3d 553, 569 (Conn. 2014) (citations
omitted).
20
United States v. Ibarra, 502 U.S. 1, 4 n.2 (1991) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
21
Syl. Pt. 1, Nelson v. W. Va. Pub. Emps. Ins. Bd., 171 W. Va. 445, 300 S.E.2d 86(1982). We see no indication in § 24-2-1(b)(6) that the Legislature intended “shall” to be
anything less than mandatory.
12
communicates the Legislature’s clear intent to start the 120-day clock to resolve disputes
under § 24-2-1(b)(6) when an LLR customer files its complaint. Had the Legislature
intended to empower the Commission to delay the commencement of the 120-day clock as
it did in this case, the Legislature would have said that the Commission must resolve a
request for investigation filed under § 24-2-1(b)(6) within 120 days of the filing of
“information showing the basis of the rates, fees, and charges or other information required
by the commission with the Commission.” In view of the plain language of the statute, we
now hold that the 120-day dispute resolution period set forth in West Virginia Code § 24-
2-1(b)(6) (2021) commences on the date a request for investigation is filed with the Public
Service Commission pursuant to that statute. 22
Applying that holding to the facts of this case, we conclude that the
Commission erroneously commenced the 120-day dispute resolution period on July 15,
2021, rather than the date Benwood filed its complaint, May 3, 2021. Due to that error, the
Commission erroneously calculated the deadline to resolve the Benwood-Wheeling dispute
as November 12, 2021. Section 24-2-1(b)(6) required the Commission to resolve the
22
We note the Commission’s argument that the Legislature cannot have intended
the 120-day clock to start before the Commission has received the information necessary
to resolve a dispute filed under § 24-2-1(b)(6). According to the Commission, that reading
of § 24-2-1(b)(6) puts the LLR in “control over when it provides the Commission with
necessary information.” But § 24-2-1(b)(6) empowers the Commission to toll the running
of the 120-day period once it commences. Practically, the Commission imposed deadlines
on Wheeling to respond to the Commission’s information requests which, presumably, the
Commission would have enforced had Wheeling failed to supply information requested by
the Commission on time.
13
Benwood-Wheeling dispute on or before October 28, 2021, that is May 3, 2021 + 120 days
+ 45 days (June 2 order) + 13 days (July 22 order). 23 The final order in this case (as well
as the order denying Wheeling’s motion to reconsider) was entered after October 28, 2021.
Because the Commission did not have jurisdiction over the Benwood-Wheeling dispute
after October 28, 2021, its November 12 and December 1, 2021 orders are void and we
now vacate them. 24
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Commission lacked jurisdiction over
this matter when it entered its orders of November 12 and December 1, 2021. Accordingly,
we now vacate those orders.
Vacated.
23
As noted in section I., in its June 2, 2021, order, the Commission directed
Wheeling to file the requested information within 30 days of the order. Yet, the
Commission tolled the 120-day dispute resolution period by 45 days, without explanation.
The July 22 order is similarly flawed. There, the Commission tolled the 120-day period
by 13 days to “put staff in the posture that [they] would have been in on July 2, 2021, but
for the flawed [CCOS] filed by Wheeling,” rather than to allow Wheeling to file additional
information requested by the Commission. That said, we utilize 45 days and 13 days to
calculate the various dispute resolution dates for the sake of simplicity and because their
use does not affect the outcome of Wheeling’s appeal.
24
Because we have vacated the Commission’s orders of November 12, 2021 and
December 1, 2021, it is not necessary to address Wheeling’s challenge to the Commission’s
denial of its motion to stay those orders.
14