State of West Virginia v. John William Robinette ( 2023 )

FILED
June 13, 2023
EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
State of West Virginia,
Plaintiff Below, Respondent
vs.) No. 22-0107 (Wayne County CC-50-2021-M-AP-2)
John William Robinette,
Defendant Below, Petitioner
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Petitioner John William Robinette appeals the January 10, 2022, order of the Circuit Court
of Wayne County memorializing his convictions for the offenses of obstructing a police officer
and battery on a government employee.1 Upon our review, we determine that oral argument is
unnecessary and that a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate.
See W. Va. R. App. Proc. 21.
A law enforcement officer stopped petitioner’s vehicle after petitioner drove past a patrol
conducted by the Wayne County Sheriff’s Department’s Drug Enforcement Unit with expired tags
and a burned-out license plate light. Petitioner also made an obscene hand gesture to the officers
prior to the stop. When a law enforcement officer approached petitioner’s vehicle, he observed a
firearm in plain view on the passenger seat and instructed petitioner to place his hands on the
steering wheel. Petitioner was verbally combative, refused to comply with instructions, and he was
ultimately detained and handcuffed. As a deputy sheriff attempted to get petitioner’s hands behind
his back, petitioner struck the deputy in the shoulder. Petitioner was thereafter charged with
misdemeanor obstructing a law enforcement officer, assault on a law enforcement officer, and
battery on a law enforcement officer.
Petitioner was convicted in the Magistrate Court of Wayne County of misdemeanor
obstruction and battery on a government employee (the deputy sheriff whom he struck). He
appealed those convictions to the circuit court. At a bench trial, petitioner moved to recuse the
circuit court judge, arguing that recusal was appropriate because the judge was lifelong friends
with the sheriff, the victim’s employer. Petitioner maintained that the circuit judge had previously
recused himself in a matter where one of the judge’s friends was involved. The judge, however,
noted that the case in which he had recused himself was distinguishable, because a magistrate that
1
Petitioner appears by counsel Matthew D. Brummond. Respondent State of West Virginia
appears by counsel Attorney General Patrick Morrisey and Assistant Attorney General Andrea
Nease Proper.
1
the circuit judge supervised was related to the victim in that earlier matter. Ultimately, the circuit
judge denied petitioner’s motion for recusal, finding there were no grounds to support it.
Following the bench trial, the circuit court affirmed both of petitioner’s convictions.
Petitioner was sentenced to sixty days for each, with the sentences suspended, and he was ordered
to report to a day report program. Petitioner now appeals, arguing that the circuit judge should
have recused himself and, further, that there was insufficient evidence to support his battery
conviction.
Initially, petitioner asserts that the circuit judge should have recused himself due to the
circuit court judge’s friendship with the Sheriff. Petitioner first raised the issue of disqualification
of the circuit judge in an oral motion on the day of trial, but failed to file a proper disqualification
motion in accordance with Rule 17.01 of the West Virginia Trial Court Rules.2 Even though the
motion did not comply with Trial Court Rule 17.01, the circuit court ruled on it.
2
Concerning recusals, Rule 2.11 of the West Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct provides
that “[a] judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s
impartiality might reasonably be questioned[.]” Rule 2.11 provides that disqualification or recusal
is required in, but is not limited to, the following circumstances:
(1) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party’s
lawyer, or personal knowledge[] of facts that are in dispute in the proceeding.
(2) The judge knows[] that the judge, the judge’s spouse or domestic
partner,[] or a person within the third degree of relationship[] to either of them, or
the spouse or domestic partner of such a person is: (a) a party to the proceeding, or
an officer, director, general partner, managing member, or trustee of a party; (b)
acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; (c) a person who has more than a de minimis[]
interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding; or (d) likely to be a
material witness in the proceeding.
(3) The judge knows that he or she, individually or as a fiduciary,[] or the
judge’s spouse, domestic partner, parent, or child, or any other member of the
judge’s family residing in the judge’s household,[] has an economic interest[] in the
subject matter in controversy or is a party to the proceeding.
(4) The judge, while a judge or a judicial candidate,[] has made a public
statement, other than in a court proceeding, judicial decision, or opinion, that
commits or appears to commit the judge to reach a particular result or rule in a
particular way in the proceeding or controversy.
(5) The judge: (a) served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or was
associated with a lawyer who participated substantially as a lawyer in the matter
during such association; (b) served in governmental employment, and in such
capacity participated personally and substantially as a lawyer or public official
concerning the proceeding, or has publicly expressed in such capacity an opinion
concerning the merits of the particular matter in controversy; (c) was a material
witness concerning the matter; or (d) previously presided as a judge over the matter
in another court.
2
We have considered petitioner’s arguments and thoroughly reviewed the appendix record on
appeal, and find no legal basis to question the judge’s impartiality or to find that he erred in failing
to recuse himself.
In his second assignment of error petitioner argues that he should have been acquitted of
battery because the State failed to present sufficient evidence of petitioner’s intent at the time that
he struck the officer.3 Notably, petitioner does not challenge that he struck the officer, nor does he
dispute the circuit court’s finding that he “made physical contact of an insulting or provoking
nature with a law enforcement officer . . . pushing said law enforcement officer during a lawful
traffic stop.” Instead, he merely argues that there was insufficient evidence of intent, alleging that
the contact was accidental.
We review the circuit court’s final order and ultimate disposition for an abuse of discretion,
the circuit court’s findings of fact for clear error, and questions of law de novo. See Syl. Pt. 1, State
v. Mechling, 219 W. Va. 366, 633 S.E.2d 311 (2006). After viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution,4 we find that a rational trier of fact could have found that the State
met its burden as to the element of intent. Specifically, the evidence presented at the bench trial
showed that, when stopped by the police, petitioner was erratic, uncooperative, refused to comply
with orders of the officers, and was swearing at the officers throughout the encounter. The officer
who was struck said he felt the blow when petitioner jerked away from handcuffs. Although the
officer testified that he was unaware of whether the contact was intentional, there is no indication
that the judge did not weigh all of the evidence and circumstances surrounding the stop. Based
upon the petitioner’s conduct throughout the traffic stop, there was sufficient evidence for the trier
of fact to conclude that petitioner intentionally struck the law enforcement officer. Accordingly,
we find that there was sufficient evidence to support his conviction for battery. Therefore, we
affirm.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
3
West Virginia Code § 61-2-10b(d) addressing battery provides, in pertinent part:
Any person who unlawfully, knowingly and intentionally makes physical contact
of an insulting or provoking nature with a . . . law-enforcement officer acting in his
or her official capacity and the person committing the battery knows or has reason
to know that the victim is acting in his or her official capacity, or unlawfully and
intentionally causes physical harm to that person acting in such capacity and the
person committing the battery knows or has reason to know that the victim is acting
in his or her official capacity, is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction
thereof, shall be fined not more than $500 or confined in jail not less than one month
nor more than twelve months or both fined and confined.
4
When reviewing a claim involving the sufficiency of the evidence, “the relevant inquiry
is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Syl. Pt. 1, in part, State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995).
3
Affirmed.
ISSUED: June 13, 2023
CONCURRED IN BY:
Chief Justice Elizabeth D. Walker
Justice Tim Armstead
Justice John A. Hutchison
Justice William R. Wooton
Justice C. Haley Bunn
4