In Re: E.M. ( 2017 )


Menu:
  •                             STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
    SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    FILED
    In re: E.M.
    November 22, 2017
    No. 17-0649 (Marion County 15-JA-74)                                         EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
    SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    OF WEST VIRGINIA
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Petitioner Mother D.M., by counsel Scott A. Shough, appeals the Circuit Court of Marion
    County’s June 22, 2017, order terminating her parental rights to E.M.1 The West Virginia
    Department of Health and Human Resources (“DHHR”), by counsel S.L. Evans, filed a response
    in support of the circuit court’s order. The guardian ad litem (“guardian”), Terri L. Tichenor,
    filed a response on behalf of the child also in support of the circuit court’s order. On appeal,
    petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in terminating her parental rights.
    This Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal
    arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided
    by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record
    presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these
    reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate under Rule 21
    of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    In July of 2016, the DHHR filed an abuse and neglect petition against petitioner alleging
    that she abused alcohol and drugs and that her substance abuse interfered with her ability to
    parent the child. According to the petition, on one occasion, petitioner ingested a combination of
    alcohol, amphetamines, and opiates while she was caring for the child. The child found petitioner
    unresponsive and believed that she was deceased. The child sought help from a neighbor and
    petitioner was transported by ambulance to Fairmont General Hospital for medical treatment.
    In September of 2016, the circuit court held an adjudicatory hearing at which petitioner
    stipulated to a history of drug and alcohol abuse and that she abused substances to the point of
    unconsciousness, which placed the child in imminent danger. Based on her stipulations, the
    circuit court adjudicated petitioner as an abusing parent.
    1
    Consistent with our long-standing practice in cases with sensitive facts, we use initials
    where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case. See In re K.H., 
    235 W.Va. 254
    , 
    773 S.E.2d 20
     (2015); Melinda H. v. William R. II, 
    230 W.Va. 731
    , 
    742 S.E.2d 419
     (2013);
    State v. Brandon B., 
    218 W.Va. 324
    , 
    624 S.E.2d 761
     (2005); State v. Edward Charles L., 
    183 W.Va. 641
    , 
    398 S.E.2d 123
     (1990).
    1
    In May of 2017, the circuit court held a dispositional hearing wherein petitioner did not
    appear but was represented by counsel. According to petitioner’s counsel, one week before the
    dispositional hearing, petitioner entered into a long-term substance abuse treatment program.2 A
    DHHR caseworker then presented the court with an updated court summary, which indicated that
    the DHHR has received approximately twenty-seven referrals involving petitioner and her family
    from 1998 through 2016. According to the summary, the DHHR received approximately one
    referral per year from 1998 through 2016, and the referrals were based on incidents involving
    substance abuse and/or domestic violence between petitioner and the child’s father. Additionally,
    due to multiple removals, the child has been in numerous placements throughout her life.
    According to the DHHR, petitioner has over these many years participated in individual
    counseling, in-home family crisis services, out-patient substance abuse treatment, parenting
    classes, psychological evaluations, in-patient substance abuse treatment, Alcoholics Anonymous
    meetings, New Beginnings After Care (an early intervention program), supervised visitation,
    random drug and alcohol screenings, life skills counseling, and home safety services. Based on
    the evidence presented, the circuit court found that, while petitioner admits her substance abuse
    issues and makes attempts to remedy those issues, “she remains unable to do so for the long
    term.” The circuit court also found that there was no reasonable likelihood that petitioner could
    substantially correct the conditions of abuse and neglect in the near future, noting her long
    history of substance abuse and the child’s continued exposure to substance abuse and domestic
    violence. The circuit court also found that because of the “extent of her recurring relapses, [there
    was] no guarantee that the current [long-term] treatment sought will be completed or be any
    more effective than treatment previously sought.” On June 22, 2017, the circuit court entered an
    order terminating her parental rights to the child.3
    The Court has previously established the following standard of review:
    “Although conclusions of law reached by a circuit court are subject to de
    novo review, when an action, such as an abuse and neglect case, is tried upon the
    facts without a jury, the circuit court shall make a determination based upon the
    evidence and shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether
    such child is abused or neglected. These findings shall not be set aside by a
    reviewing court unless clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous when,
    although there is evidence to support the finding, the reviewing court on the entire
    evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
    committed. However, a reviewing court may not overturn a finding simply
    because it would have decided the case differently, and it must affirm a finding if
    the circuit court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record
    viewed in its entirety.” Syl. Pt. 1, In Interest of Tiffany Marie S., 
    196 W.Va. 223
    ,
    
    470 S.E.2d 177
     (1996).
    2
    According to the record, petitioner was unable to complete substance abuse treatment
    due to unexplained medical issues.
    3
    Petitioner’s parental rights to the child were terminated below. The parental rights of the
    child’s biological father were also terminated below. According to the guardian, the child was
    placed in a foster home and the permanency plan is adoption into that home.
    2
    Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T., 
    228 W.Va. 89
    , 
    717 S.E.2d 873
     (2011). Upon our review, the Court finds
    no error in the circuit court’s order terminating petitioner’s parental rights.
    On appeal, petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in terminating her parental rights
    to the child because she “has had extensive periods of sobriety” and “is committed to
    controlling” her history of substance abuse. We disagree. West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(b)(6)
    directs circuit courts to terminate parental rights upon findings that there is “no reasonable
    likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected in the near
    future” and that termination is necessary for the child’s welfare. West Virginia Code § 49-4­
    604(c)(3) provides that “no reasonable likelihood that conditions of neglect or abuse can be
    substantially corrected” exists when “[t]he abusing parent . . . ha[s] not responded to or followed
    through with a reasonable family case plan or other rehabilitative efforts[.]”
    In this case, the circuit court specifically found that petitioner was unable to maintain her
    sobriety for the long term. The circuit court was presented with evidence that, despite the
    extensive list of services offered to petitioner, she continued to relapse and abuse drugs and
    alcohol. Given that petitioner failed to complete long-term treatment or remedy her substance
    abuse issues, we find no error in the circuit court’s termination order. The circuit court properly
    found that petitioner was not reasonably likely to substantially correct the conditions of abuse
    and neglect in the near future, and it is clear from the record that the child’s welfare necessitated
    the termination of petitioner’s parental rights.
    For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the decision of the circuit court, and its
    June 22, 2017, order is hereby affirmed.
    Affirmed.
    ISSUED: November 22, 2017
    CONCURRED IN BY:
    Chief Justice Allen H. Loughry II
    Justice Robin Jean Davis
    Justice Margaret L. Workman
    Justice Menis E. Ketchum
    Justice Elizabeth D. Walker
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 17-0649

Filed Date: 11/22/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/22/2017