William H. Cecil, III v. Jonathan Frame, Superintendent, Mt. Olive Correctional Complex ( 2024 )

FILED
November 26, 2024
C. CASEY FORBES, CLERK
SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
OF WEST VIRGINIA
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
William H. Cecil, III,
Petitioner Below, Petitioner
v.) No. 23-55 (Greenbrier County CC-13-2007-C-107)
Jonathan Frame, Superintendent,
Mt. Olive Correctional Complex,
Respondent Below, Respondent
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Petitioner William H. Cecil, III, appeals the Circuit Court of Greenbrier County’s
December 30, 2022, order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.1 Here, the petitioner
argues that the habeas court (1) erred in finding that his trial counsel did not provide ineffective
assistance; (2) erred in finding that that the trial court had a sufficient factual basis to accept the
petitioner’s guilty pleas; (3) demonstrated partiality by making an offhand comment during the
omnibus hearing; and (4) improperly denied his motion for DNA testing. Upon our review, finding
no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error, we determine oral argument is unnecessary
and that a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court order is appropriate. See W. Va. R.
App. P. 21(c).
On the evening of August 30, 1981, three-year-old M.J.R. was reported missing. At that
time, the petitioner rented a room in a mobile home owned by Kenard R. and Vicky R., which was
located across the street from M.J.R.’s home. The day after the child went missing, the petitioner’s
father called law enforcement to report that the petitioner had told him that M.J.R. had fallen off a
wall and that the petitioner had unsuccessfully tried to revive the child. According to the
petitioner’s father, the petitioner had informed him that he stuffed the child’s body in a garbage
bag and hid her under his bed. Officers responded to the call and located the petitioner near the
home and placed him under arrest for public intoxication, as he was “causing a ruckus.” The
officers then entered the home and located M.J.R. in a garbage bag beneath the petitioner’s bed.
Officers attempted to bring the petitioner before a magistrate that same evening but because
of his intoxication, the magistrate determined that the petitioner could not understand the
1
The petitioner appears by counsel Joshua L. Edwards and Taylor Runquist. The
respondent appears by Attorney General Patrick Morrisey and Deputy Attorney General Andrea
Nease Proper. Initials are used where necessary to protect the identity of the child. See W. Va. R.
App. P. 40(e).
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proceedings and could not waive his Miranda rights at that time.2 The petitioner was brought back
before the magistrate sometime between 11:00 a.m. and 12:30 p.m. the next day. The petitioner
subsequently penned three written confessions dated September 1, 1981; September 13, 1981; and
September 16, 1981. In the first confession, the petitioner claimed that he acted alone in sexually
assaulting and smothering M.J.R. In the second and third confessions, the petitioner claimed that
he and a man named Ralph Lawson Justice both participated in sexually assaulting and smothering
the child.
In November 1981, the petitioner was indicted for one count of first-degree murder and
one count of first-degree sexual assault. Before trial, the petitioner underwent psychiatric and
psychological evaluations. The psychiatric evaluation report revealed no evidence that the
petitioner suffered from a thought or mood disorder, and concluded he was competent to stand
trial and assist with his defense. Likewise, the psychological report noted that while the petitioner
had a mild intellectual disability, he was competent to stand trial and assist with his defense so
long as his counsel explained everything to him in simple and concrete terms. The trial court also
held a pretrial hearing on the petitioner’s confessions and ruled they were voluntary and
admissible.
The petitioner’s trial commenced on June 29, 1982. The State introduced all three of the
petitioner’s confessions, presented the testimony of an officer who overheard the petitioner tell his
father that he had killed M.J.R., and presented testimony of an analyst who analyzed a hair found
on M.J.R.’s body and found it to be consistent with the petitioner’s hair. After the State rested its
case, the petitioner pled guilty to first-degree sexual abuse outside the presence of the jury. The
trial resumed on the count of first-degree murder, and the petitioner presented the testimony of his
father, who claimed that officers threatened the petitioner with violence unless he confessed to the
crimes. Following the father’s testimony, the petitioner also pled guilty to first-degree murder
outside the presence of the jury. The petitioner waived his right to a presentence investigation
report (“PSR”) and requested to proceed directly to sentencing. Trial counsel requested that the
trial court sentence the petitioner to life with mercy given the petitioner’s young age, as he had
just turned eighteen years old at the time of the crime. Ultimately, the court sentenced the petitioner
to consecutive terms of life imprisonment without mercy upon his conviction for first-degree
murder and one to five years of imprisonment upon his conviction of first-degree sexual abuse.
The petitioner filed a direct appeal with this Court in which, relevant to this appeal, he
argued that (1) his convictions resulted from ineffective assistance of counsel and (2) his plea to
first-degree murder was not voluntary. See State v. Cecil, 173 W. Va. 27, 311 S.E.2d 144 (1983).
Upon review, this Court held that there was no ineffective assistance of counsel, no error in the
admission of the confessions into evidence and, furthermore, determined that the record was
sufficient to uphold the trial court’s determination that the petitioner’s guilty pleas were voluntarily
and intelligently made. Id. at 34-35, 311 S.E.2d 152-53.
On April 30, 2007, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, “challeng[ing
his] conviction” pursuant to In re Renewed Investigation of State Police Crime Laboratory, 219
2
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2
W. Va. 408, 633 S.E.2d 762 (2006) (“Zain III”).3 The habeas court appointed counsel, who filed
an amended petition in March 2013, and a second amended petition in July 2017, raising other
grounds for relief. Also in 2017, the petitioner filed a motion for DNA testing pursuant to Zain III.
An omnibus hearing was held on January 19, 2018, during which the petitioner testified that his
trial counsel failed to properly advise him regarding his pleas. According to the petitioner, trial
counsel never explained the difference between the charges and their lesser-included offenses,
never explained the pros and cons of pleading guilty, and did not recommend whether he should
plead guilty. During his testimony, the petitioner interrupted his counsel a few times, prompting
the habeas court to state “Mr. Cecil, your testimony will be more convincing if you’ve heard the
question before you answer it.”
On cross-examination, the petitioner admitted that he understood the charges brought
against him, that he initiated the pleas during the trial, and that his counsel did not recommend that
he plead guilty to first-degree murder—rather, he “just left it in [the petitioner’s] hands as to
whether to plead to the murder charge.” The petitioner also admitted that the trial court had
questioned him regarding his understanding of the plea and explained the various elements of the
charges and their lesser-included offenses, but stated that he told the trial court he understood
everything “just to get the plea over.”
By order entered on December 30, 2022, the habeas court denied the petitioner’s petition
for a writ of habeas corpus. Relevant to this appeal, the habeas court addressed the petitioner’s
claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the trial court erred in accepting
his plea without a factual basis.
The habeas court first disregarded several of the petitioner’s claims as they had been
previously addressed by this Court on the petitioner’s direct appeal and, thus, were barred by res
judicata. The habeas court then addressed the remaining arguments presented by the petitioner and,
ultimately, found that trial counsel provided effective assistance. Specifically, the habeas court
found no merit to the petitioner’s arguments that his counsel was ineffective for failing to advise
the petitioner to seek a PSR or make any meaningful effort to mitigate the offenses at sentencing.
The court found that the record demonstrated that the trial court had informed the petitioner that it
would order a PSR if he so desired but that after taking a recess to speak with trial counsel, the
petitioner indicated his desire to waive his right to a PSR and proceed directly to sentencing. The
court further concluded that even if the petitioner had demonstrated that trial counsel was involved
in the waiver of his PSR, this was a strategic decision, and the petitioner failed to demonstrate that
no reasonably qualified defense attorney would have waived the preparation of a PSR, and he
failed to demonstrate what evidence he would have presented to the trial court had a presentence
investigation been conducted. Lastly, the habeas court found that the petitioner failed to establish
that trial counsel’s argument for life with mercy was objectively unreasonable and failed to
demonstrate what other argument or evidence trial counsel should have offered to mitigate
punishment at sentencing. As such, the habeas court determined that the petitioner was entitled to
no relief in that regard and denied the petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
3
The petitioner previously filed petitions for a writ of habeas corpus in case numbers 87-
C-27(J) and 96-C-32(J), though it appears that no evidentiary hearings were held in either matter.
3
By order entered on the same date, the habeas court also denied the petitioner’s motion for
DNA testing pursuant to Zain III. The habeas court determined that even if the petitioner would
not have pled guilty had DNA testing of the hair found on M.J.R.’s body been available to him at
the time of trial, the result of the proceedings was likely to have been the same. The habeas court
noted that although the petitioner pled guilty, he did not enter his guilty pleas until the State had
already presented its evidence, which overwhelmingly established the petitioner’s guilt. Moreover,
even if the hair belonged to Mr. Justice, as the petitioner contends, such results would only tend to
corroborate the petitioner’s third written confession that he and Mr. Justice took turns smothering
and sexually assaulting M.J.R. The court concluded that, therefore, any results from the DNA
testing would be unlikely to result in the petitioner’s acquittal or conviction of a lesser charge or
that the results would have benefited him at sentencing.
The petitioner now appeals from the circuit court’s order denying him habeas relief, and in
our review of that order, “[w]e review the final order and the ultimate disposition under an abuse
of discretion standard; the underlying factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard; and
questions of law are subject to a de novo review.” Syl. Pt. 1, in part, Mathena v. Haines, 219 W. Va.
417, 633 S.E.2d 771 (2006).
In his first assignment of error, the petitioner argues that the habeas court erred in
determining that his trial counsel was effective. According to the petitioner, trial counsel was
ineffective for several reasons, including: 1) failing to use the medical examiner’s findings to
contradict the petitioner’s confession; 2) failing to suppress the search of the petitioner’s room on
the basis that he had a separate, distinct privacy interest apart from Kenard and Vicky R.; 3) failing
to suppress the petitioner’s confession based on a violation of the prompt presentment rule; 4)
allowing the jury to know that the petitioner had taken a polygraph test; 5) failing to adequately
advise the petitioner regarding the possible advantage of continuing on with his trial; and 6) failing
to encourage the petitioner to obtain a PSR prior to sentencing and failing to make any meaningful
argument to mitigate his sentence. The petitioner also alleges that these failures by trial counsel
amount to cumulative error.
“[T]his Court’s adherence to principles of finality in habeas proceedings is well
established.” Lee v. Searls, No. 22-931, 2024 WL 2946665, at *2 (W. Va. June 10, 2024)
(memorandum decision). Habeas petitioners may not assert grounds that have been “previously
and finally adjudicated or waived in . . . any other proceeding or proceedings which the petitioner
has instituted to secure relief from such conviction or sentence.” W. Va. Code § 53-4A-1(a). We
have cited to West Virginia Code § 53-4A-1 as a basis to decline to re-address claims in habeas
proceedings that were asserted on direct appeal. See State ex rel. Waldron v. Scott, 222 W. Va.
122, 663 S.E.2d 576 (2008); Heavener v. Pszczolkowski, No. 15-0241, 2016 WL 5210797 (W. Va.
Sept. 16, 2016) (memorandum decision). We have also relied on prior case law in declining to
reconsider issues on appeal from a habeas proceeding that were considered on direct appeal. See
State ex rel. Daniel v. Legursky, 195 W. Va. 314, 317 n.1, 465 S.E.2d 416, 419 n.1 (1995).
Regarding ineffective assistance of counsel in particular, we cautioned in Daniel that
[t]raditionally, ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not cognizable on direct
appeal. We have urged counsel repeatedly to think of the consequences of raising
this issue on direct appeal. Claims that an attorney was ineffective involve inquiries
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into motivation behind an attorney’s trial strategies. See State v. Miller, 194 W.Va.
3, 459 S.E.2d 114 (1995). Without such facts trial counsel’s alleged lapses or errors
will be presumed tactical moves, flawed only in hindsight. What is more, in the
event a defendant pursues his claim on direct appeal and it is rejected, our decision
will be binding on the circuit court through the law of the case doctrine, “leaving
[defendant] with the unenviable task of convincing the [circuit court] judge that he
should disregard our previous ruling.” U.S. v. South, 28 F.3d 619, 629 (7th
Cir.1994). That is why in Miller we suggested that a defendant who presents an
ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal has little to gain and everything to
lose.
Id. (Emphasis added).
As noted above, the petitioner filed a direct appeal with this court and raised claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel, which this Court addressed on the merits. Specifically, the
petitioner argued that the search and seizure of his home was warrantless and unreasonable and
that, to the extent his counsel “did not pursue an issue concerning that search and seizure, his
counsel was ineffective.” Cecil, 173 W. Va. at 31, 311 S.E.2d at 149. Included in this argument
was the fact that the petitioner “may have been paying ‘board’ to the owners.” Id. The petitioner
further argued that “his counsel at trial was ineffective in not more aggressively seeking the
exclusion from evidence of the [petitioner’s] written confessions,” that “his counsel did not
properly advise him concerning his plea of guilty to murder of the first degree,” and that “his
counsel was ineffective because he gave the appellant no recommendation concerning the
[petitioner’s] plea of guilty to murder in the first degree.” Id. at 34-35, 311 S.E.2d at 152-53.
In our review of the petitioner’s direct appeal, we found his arguments to be completely
without merit. We found that officers properly searched the petitioner’s room and, thus, “reject[ed
the petitioner’s] assertions of error with respect to the finding of the body of [M.J.R.]” Id. at 34,
311 S.E.2d at 153. We further found “no error with respect to the admission [of the three
confessions] into evidence” and, importantly, found “no evidence of ineffective assistance of
counsel concerning the [petitioner’s] confessions.” Moreover, we concluded that “[t]he record in
this case is sufficient to sustain the determination of the trial court that the [petitioner’s] pleas of
guilty to both sexual abuse in the first degree and murder of the first degree were voluntarily and
intelligently made” and found “no evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel[.]” Id. at 35, 311
S.E.2d at 153.
Most critically, however, we summed up our review of the petitioner’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim by reiterating that “[b]ased upon the record in this case, we conclude
that the [petitioner] has not established that his convictions resulted from ineffective assistance of
counsel.” Id. Given the forgoing, we refuse to consider the petitioner’s habeas claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel, as we have already reviewed the record and concluded that there was no
ineffective assistance of counsel. We see no reason to disturb our prior holding.4
4
We further note that in his brief in this appeal, the petitioner fails to cite to, acknowledge,
or discuss the applicable test for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel. See Syl. Pt. 5, in
part, State v. Miller, 194 W. Va. 3, 459 S.E.2d 114 (1995) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 446
5
In his second assignment of error, the petitioner contends that the habeas court erred in
finding that the trial court did not err in accepting the petitioner’s pleas without a factual basis.
Rather than asking the petitioner to set forth the factual basis for his plea, the trial court merely
stated the elements of the crimes charged and their lesser included offenses and asked the petitioner
whether he murdered M.J.R. The petitioner argues that this was not a satisfactory basis for
accepting his plea, especially considering that the trial court used legal jargon when the petitioner
had a learning disability and needed everything explained in simple, concrete terms. In sum, the
petitioner argues that the habeas court erred in finding that the trial court carefully explained the
petitioner’s rights to him and that the potential consequences of his plea when the trial court’s
explanation was “most likely . . . not understood by the Petitioner.”
However, these claims, too, are barred from our consideration. While the petitioner
attempts to reframe the issue as whether the trial court lacked an adequate factual basis to accept
the plea, he is actually relitigating whether he knowingly and intelligently entered his plea. This
issue is barred by res judicata, as we also addressed this issue in the petitioner’s direct appeal. We
have previously held that “[t]he general rule is that when a question has been definitively
determined by this Court its decision is conclusive on parties, privies and courts, including this
Court, upon a second appeal or writ of error and it is regarded as the law of the case.” Syl. Pt. 1,
Mullins v. Green, 145 W. Va. 469, 115 S.E.2d 320 (1960). The doctrine “generally prohibits
reconsideration of issues which have been decided in a prior appeal in the same case, provided that
there has been no material changes in the facts since the prior appeal[.]” State ex rel. Frazier &
Oxley, L.C. v. Cummings, 214 W. Va. 802, 808, 591 S.E.2d 728, 734 (2003) (quoting 5 Am. Jur.
2d Appellate Review § 605 (1995)); see also Medley v. Ames, No. 21-0113, 2022 WL 856611(W. Va. Mar. 23, 2022) (memorandum decision) (concluding that the law of the case doctrine
prohibited the habeas petitioner from relitigating claims raised on direct appeal). In the petitioner’s
direct appeal, we specifically found that “[t]he record in this case is sufficient to sustain the
determination of the trial court that the [petitioner’s] pleas of guilty to both sexual abuse in the
first degree and murder of the first degree were voluntarily and intelligently made.” Cecil, 173 W.
Va. at 35, 311 S.E.2d at 153 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the petitioner is prohibited from
relitigating this claim.
In the petitioner’s third assignment of error, he contends that the habeas court demonstrated
partiality and bias when it advised him that “your testimony will be more convincing if you’ve
heard the question before you answer it” after the petitioner interrupted a few questions asked by
his habeas counsel. The petitioner avers that this comment clearly demonstrates that the habeas
court did not believe the petitioner’s testimony and had formed an opinion prior to the close of
evidence.
We disagree. While judges must “be extremely cautious not to intimate in any manner by
word, tone, or demeanor, [their] opinion upon any fact in issue,” State v. Thompson, 220 W. Va.
U.S. 668 (1984)) (holding that to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the
petitioner must prove: “(1) [c]ounsel’s performance was deficient under an objective standard of
reasonableness; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different.”).
6
398, 412, 647 S.E.2d 834, 848 (2007), they may nevertheless instruct a witness to abide by the
rules of the court. See State v. Delorenzo, 247 W. Va. 707, 718, 885 S.E.2d 645, 656 (2022) (citing
People v. Williams, 201 Ill.App.3d 207, 146 Ill.Dec. 924, 558 N.E.2d 1258, 1267 (1990)). The
petitioner cites to Thompson to support his assertion that the habeas court was not impartial or
neutral. However, in Thompson, the judge extensively questioned witnesses and made comments
that aided the prosecution. Id. at 411-12, 647 S.E2d at 847-48. In contrast, the habeas court below
made one comment that essentially instructed the petitioner to allow his counsel to finish his
question before answering. This scenario is much more akin to the comments made by the court
in Delorenzo. There, the court “instructed Mr. Delorenzo to follow its rules when he talked over
objections and failed to answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’ questions during cross-examination.” Id. at 717-18,
885 S.E.2d at 655-56. Upon reviewing these comments for impartiality, we held that “these
comments were within the court’s discretion ‘and were not attempts to discredit’ him or his
defense.” Id. at 718, 885 S.E.2d at 656 (quoting Williams, 558 N.E.2d at 1267). Such is the case
here. The transcript does not reveal that the habeas court was inappropriate, impartial, or
prejudicial in essentially warning the petitioner that it is best practice to allow his counsel to finish
asking the questions before responding.
Lastly, the petitioner assigns as error the habeas court’s denial of his motion for DNA
testing. The petitioner avers that, at trial, an analyst testified that a hair found on the victim’s body
shared a “strong association” with a known hair sample from the petitioner. According to the
petitioner, DNA testing would “more strongly confirm, or, in the same vein, dispel that the hair
belonged to the Petitioner” and, if shown to belong to someone else, would lend support to the
petitioner’s claim that another person killed M.J.R. Although not clear, the petitioner appears to
argue that should the hair belong to someone other than the petitioner, it would give him “a better
argument at sentencing.”
Before this Court, the petitioner failed to supply any rules or law in support of his argument
that the habeas court should have granted his motion for DNA testing. West Virginia Rule of
Appellate Procedure 10(c)(7) requires a petitioner to “clearly exhibit[] the points of fact and law
presented” and to “cit[e] the authorities relied on[.]” Citing to “some of the facts involved with an
issue” does not meet the requirements of Rule 10(c)(7). State v. Benny W., 242 W. Va. 618, 632
n.23, 837 S.E.2d 679, 693 n.23 (2019). The petitioner has not provided this Court with any
authority in support of his argument. Indeed, though his motion was based on Zain III below, in
his brief before this Court, the petitioner did not cite to, much less analyze, Zain III or any other
cases to show how he is legally entitled to DNA testing. As such, the petitioner’s argument is “[a]
skeletal ‘argument’, really nothing more than an assertion” and “does not preserve a claim.” See
State Dep’t of Health and Human Res. ex rel. Robert Michael B. v. Robert Morris N., 195 W. Va.
759, 765, 466 S.E.2d 827, 833 (1995) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Accordingly, the
petitioner’s limited argument has not preserved this claim, and we refuse to address his argument
that the habeas court erred by denying his motion for DNA testing.
For the reasons stated above, this Court affirms the December 30, 2022, final order of the
Circuit Court of Greenbrier County.
Affirmed.
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ISSUED: November 26, 2024
CONCURRED IN BY:
Justice Elizabeth D. Walker
Justice John A. Hutchison
Justice William R. Wooton
Justice C. Haley Bunn
DISQUALIFIED:
Chief Justice Tim Armstead
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