Tricia Jackson and Jennifer Krouse v. Matthew L. Harvey ( 2024 )

FILED
October 31, 2024
released at 3:00 p.m.
No. 24-387, Tricia Jackson and Jennifer Krouse v. Matthew L. Harvey C. CASEY FORBES, CLERK
SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
OF WEST VIRGINIA
ARMSTEAD, Chief Justice, concurring in the result:
In this case involving an appeal from an order issued by a three-judge court
pursuant to West Virginia Code § 6-6-7(g), we have determined that such appeals are
properly within our jurisdiction rather than the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Court of
Appeals. While I agree with the majority opinion’s new syllabus point that this Court, not
the Intermediate Court of Appeals, is the proper jurisdiction for appeals of orders issued
by three-judge courts pursuant to West Virginia Code § 6-6-7(h), I reach this conclusion
based on a different principle of statutory construction than that relied upon by the majority.
The majority opinion correctly noted that, “[t]he primary object in construing
a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.” Syl. Pt. 1, Smith v.
State Workmen’s Comp. Comm’r, 159 W. Va. 108, 219 S.E.2d 361 (1975). In making this
determination, the majority opinion noted that “[i]t is a settled principle of statutory
construction that courts presume the Legislature drafts and passes statutes with full
knowledge of existing law.” Syl. Pt. 1, Duff v. Kanawha Cnty. Comm’n, ___ W. Va. ___,
905 S.E.2d 528 (W. Va. 2024). While this premise is certainly true, I believe it is applicable
only where differing statutory provisions relating to the same subject matter are
“consistent” and can be harmonized.
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This principle was outlined by this Court to mean:
“A statute should be so read and applied as to make it
accord with the spirit, purposes and objects of the general
system of law of which it is intended to form a part; it being
presumed that the legislators who drafted and passed it were
familiar with all existing law, applicable to the subject matter,
whether constitutional, statutory or common, and intended the
statute to harmonize completely with the same and aid in the
effectuation of the general purpose and design thereof, if its
terms are consistent therewith.” [Syl. Pt.] 5, State v. Snyder, 64
W.Va. 659, 63 S.E. 385 (1908). Syl. Pt. 5, Community Antenna
Serv., Inc. v. Charter Commc’ns VI, LLC, 227 W.Va. 595, 712
S.E.2d 504 (2011).
Syl. Pt. 2, State ex rel. Barrat v. Dalby, 236 W.Va. 316, 779 S.E.2d 584 (2015) (emphasis
added).
The two statutes at issue here are directly inconsistent in terms of the question
as to which court has jurisdiction over appeals from three-judge court decisions. Therefore,
I do not believe we can say that simply because the Legislature is assumed to have known
that West Virginia Code § 6-6-7(h) existed when it adopted West Virginia Code § 51-11-
4(b)(1) creating the Intermediate Court of Appeals, it therefore intended such jurisdiction
to remain with this Court. Such a finding is inconsistent with the well-established
principle, as outlined in Wiley v. Toppings, 210 W.Va. 173, 556 S.E.2d 818 (2001), that:
When faced with two conflicting enactments, this Court
and courts generally follow the black-letter principle that
“effect should always be given to the latest . . . expression of
the legislative will. . . .” Joseph Speidel Grocery Co. v. Warder,
56 W.Va. 602, 608, 49 S.E. 534, 536 (1904). “[T]he statute
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which is the more recent . . . prevails. . . . This rule applies
even where the two statutes were enacted to be effective on the
same date.” Doe v. Attorney General, 425 Mass. 210, 216-217,
680 N.E.2d 92, 96 (1997).
Wiley, 210 W. Va. at 175, 556 S.E.2d at 820 (bracket in original) (footnote omitted).
Indeed, if we were to consider only the question of the effective dates of the
two conflicting statutes, such an analysis would support a finding that the Intermediate
Court of Appeals, rather than this Court, maintains jurisdiction over appeals from three-
judge courts since West Virginia Code § 51-11-4(b)(1) was adopted after West Virginia
Code § 6-6-7(h). However, I believe that another rule of statutory construction applies in
this case and supports the finding that this Court maintains jurisdiction to consider the
present appeal. “As a rule, when both a specific and a general statute apply to a given case,
the specific statute governs.” Ancient Energy, Ltd. v. Ferguson, 239 W. Va. 723, 726, 806
S.E.2d 154, 157 (2017) (emphasis in original) (citations and quotations omitted). “The
general rule of statutory construction requires that a specific statute be given precedence
over a general statute relating to the same subject matter where the two cannot be
reconciled.” Syl. Pt. 1, UMWA by Trumka v. Kingdon, 174 W.Va. 330, 325 S.E.2d 120(1984).
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The Legislature, in West Virginia Code § 6-6-7(h), the statute exclusively
governing actions related to removal of public officials from office, has specifically
provided for appeals from three-judge courts’ decisions to be considered by this Court:
An appeal from an order of such three-judge court
removing or refusing to remove any person from office
pursuant to this section may be taken to the Supreme Court of
Appeals within thirty days from the date of entry of the order
from which the appeal is taken. The Supreme Court of Appeals
shall consider and decide the appeal upon the original papers
and documents, without requiring the same to be printed and
shall enforce its findings by proper writ.
W. Va. Code § 6-6-7(h). The statute that confers jurisdiction to the Intermediate Court of
Appeals provides, in a general and comprehensive manner, that the Intermediate Court
maintains “appellate jurisdiction over . . . [f]inal judgments or orders of a circuit court in
all civil cases . . . entered after June 30, 2022.” W. Va. Code § 51-11-4(b)(1).
A removal petition is a clearly a “civil case” and thus would generally fall
within the broad scope of West Virginia Code § 51-11-4(b)(1). However, West Virginia
Code § 6-6-7(h) specifically grants jurisdiction to this Court, and only to this Court, of
appeals from the determinations of three-judge courts. Accordingly, I believe the specific
jurisdictional statute, West Virginia Code § 6-6-7(h), confers jurisdiction to this Court,
rather than the general jurisdictional provisions for the Intermediate Court of Appeals,
found in West Virginia Code § 51-11-4(b)(1).
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Therefore, I concur in the holding of the majority opinion affirming the May
1, 2024, order of the Circuit Court of Jefferson County removing Ms. Jackson and Ms.
Krouse from office. I further concur in the majority’s ultimate conclusion that this Court,
rather than the Intermediate Court of Appeals, has jurisdiction to consider and rule on this
appeal, but differ from the majority’s reasoning and reach this conclusion for the reasons
set forth above.
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