Fernando Rodriguez v. State of Wyoming, ex rel. Department of Workforce Services, Workers' Compensation Division , 2022 WY 166 ( 2022 )


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  •                 IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING
    
    2022 WY 166
    OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2022
    December 30, 2022
    FERNANDO RODRIGUEZ,
    Appellant
    (Petitioner),
    v.
    S-22-0131
    STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel.
    DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE
    SERVICES, WORKERS’
    COMPENSATION DIVISION,
    Appellee
    (Respondent).
    Appeal from the District Court of Carbon County
    The Honorable Tori R.A. Kricken, Judge
    Representing Appellant:
    Herbert K. Doby, Torrington, Wyoming.
    Representing Appellee:
    Bridget Hill, Wyoming Attorney General; Mark Klaassen, Deputy Attorney
    General; Peter Howard, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Holli J. Welch, Senior
    Assistant Attorney General.
    Before FOX, C.J., and KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, GRAY, and FENN, JJ.
    NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are
    requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of
    any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the
    permanent volume.
    FOX, Chief Justice.
    [¶1] Fernando Rodriguez suffered a left wrist and right knee injury after falling from a
    truck in a 2007 work accident. After years of treatment, he claimed his pain persisted and
    spread throughout his body, leaving him unable to work. He applied for permanent total
    disability benefits under the odd-lot doctrine in 2019, which the Department of Workforce
    Services denied. After a contested case hearing, the Medical Commission upheld the
    denial, finding Mr. Rodriguez did not meet his burden to prove a degree of obvious physical
    impairment. The district court affirmed as do we.
    ISSUES
    [¶2]   Mr. Rodriguez argues two issues on appeal which we rephrase:
    1. Was there substantial evidence to support the
    Commission’s determination that Mr. Rodriguez failed to
    show his degree of obvious physical impairment, coupled
    with other facts, qualified him for odd-lot treatment?
    2. Were the Commission’s           credibility   determinations
    arbitrary and capricious?
    FACTS
    [¶3] Mr. Rodriguez injured his left wrist, left shoulder, and right knee after falling out of
    a truck bed while employed at Gregory & Cook Construction in 2007. Mr. Rodriguez had
    two wrist surgeries, but was released to light-duty work within a few days of his first
    surgery, with lifting restrictions on his left wrist. Mr. Rodriguez did not return to work
    despite his employer’s accommodations and was terminated weeks later.
    [¶4] Mr. Rodriguez applied for temporary disability benefits and underwent two
    impairment ratings for his injuries, which assigned him a two- to three-percent impairment
    rating. He was awarded temporary partial disability and temporary total disability benefits
    between November 2007 and April 2008 for injuries to his left wrist, left shoulder, and
    right knee. The Medical Commission (Commission) determined his other complaints;
    injuries to his head, neck, face, back, and heart, were unrelated to his workplace injury and
    therefore not compensable.
    [¶5] In the following months and years, Mr. Rodriguez continued to report pain
    throughout his body. He has not worked since the accident and has not looked for work.
    He has consistently seen Dr. Harlan Ribnik, a pain specialist, for pain management. Despite
    extensive testing, no objective medical evidence of injury was found to support Mr.
    Rodriguez’s complaints of pain.
    1
    [¶6] In August of 2019, Mr. Rodriguez applied for permanent total disability (PTD)
    benefits under the odd-lot doctrine. In his application, he reported he was unable to work
    because standing, sitting, or walking caused him extensive pain and he could not lift, bend
    over, or concentrate. Mr. Rodriguez is a fifty-three-year-old Mexican immigrant who lives
    in Rawlins, Wyoming. He speaks limited English, has a sixth-grade education, and has
    worked full-time in labor-intensive jobs since he was fifteen years old. Mr. Rodriguez
    asserts, due to his injury and limited qualifications, he is unable to work in the Rawlins
    community and thus qualified for odd-lot treatment.
    [¶7] The Department of Workforce Services, Workers’ Compensation Division
    (Division) denied Mr. Rodriguez’s PTD application. He requested a hearing before the
    Medical Commission which upheld the denial. The Commission concluded Mr. Rodriguez
    “failed to show by a preponderance of evidence that ‘the degree of obvious physical
    impairment, coupled with other facts, such as mental capacity, education, training, or age’
    qualify him for odd-lot treatment.” He appealed the ruling to the district court which also
    affirmed the Commission’s denial. Mr. Rodriguez now appeals to this Court.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [¶8] We review the appeal of an administrative action without deference to the district
    court’s conclusions. Ross v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Workforce Servs., 
    2022 WY 11
    , ¶ 8, 
    503 P.3d 23
    , 27 (Wyo. 2022) (citing Mirich v. State ex rel. Bd. of Trs. of Laramie Cnty. Sch.
    Dist. Two, 
    2021 WY 32
    , ¶ 15, 
    481 P.3d 627
    , 632 (Wyo. 2021)). An agency action may be
    set aside under certain circumstances:
    (c) To the extent necessary to make a decision and when
    presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant
    questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory
    provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the
    terms of an agency action. In making the following
    determinations, the court shall review the whole record or
    those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken
    of the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court shall:
    ...
    (ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
    findings and conclusions found to be:
    (A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion
    or otherwise not in accordance with law;
    (B) Contrary to constitutional right, power,
    privilege or immunity;
    2
    (C) In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority
    or limitations or lacking statutory right;
    (D) Without observance of procedure required
    by law; or
    (E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a
    case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing
    provided by statute.
    
    Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114
    (c) (LexisNexis 2021).
    [¶9] A worker’s compensation claimant has the burden to prove all essential elements of
    a claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Ross, 
    2022 WY 11
    , ¶ 9, 503 P.3d at 28 (citing
    Matter of Worker’s Comp. Claim of Vinson, 
    2020 WY 126
    , ¶ 28, 
    473 P.3d 299
    , 309 (Wyo.
    2020)). When both parties submit evidence, we apply the substantial evidence test to
    factual findings, which requires this Court to examine the entire record for “relevant
    evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency’s conclusions.”
    
    Id.
     (quoting Camacho v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Workforce Servs., Workers’ Comp. Div.,
    
    2019 WY 92
    , ¶ 23, 
    448 P.3d 834
    , 843 (Wyo. 2019)). The agency may disregard certain
    evidence if it explains its reasons for doing so based on credibility determinations. Boylen
    v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Workforce Servs., Workers’ Comp. Div., 
    2022 WY 39
    , ¶ 8, 
    506 P.3d 765
    , 769 (Wyo. 2022) (citing Hood v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Workforce Servs.,
    Workers’ Comp. Div., 
    2016 WY 104
    , ¶ 14, 
    382 P.3d 772
    , 776 (Wyo. 2016)).
    [¶10] This Court will not substitute the agency’s judgment with its own unless the
    agency’s decision is “contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence on record.”
    Watkins v. State ex rel. Wyo. Med. Comm’n, 
    2011 WY 49
    , ¶ 16, 
    250 P.3d 1082
    , 1086 (Wyo.
    2011). We also review an agency decision under the arbitrary and capricious standard to
    catch “potential mistakes such as inconsistent or incomplete findings of fact[.]” In re
    Pickens, 
    2006 WY 54
    , ¶ 11, 
    134 P.3d 1231
    , 1235 (Wyo. 2006) (quoting Padilla v. State ex
    rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 
    2004 WY 10
    , ¶ 6, 
    84 P.3d 960
    , 962 (Wyo. 2004)).
    [¶11] We review an agency’s conclusions of law de novo. Ross, 
    2022 WY 11
    , ¶ 11, 
    503 P.3d 23
    , 29 (citing Triplett v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 
    2021 WY 118
    , ¶ 35, 
    497 P.3d 903
    , 911 (Wyo. 2021)).
    DISCUSSION
    [¶12] Mr. Rodriguez argues he is entitled to PTD benefits under the odd-lot doctrine. The
    doctrine allows a claimant who is not totally incapacitated but is so handicapped he “will
    not be employed regularly in any well[-]known branch of the labor market” to receive PTD
    benefits. Ross, 
    2022 WY 11
    , ¶ 20, 503 P.3d at 30 (quoting Schepanovich v. U.S. Steel
    Corp., 
    669 P.2d 522
    , 525 (Wyo. 1983)). However, the claimant must demonstrate he is
    incapacitated “from performing work at any gainful occupation for which [he] is
    3
    reasonably suited by experience or training.” 
    Id.
     The claimant must make a prima facie
    showing: 1) he was disabled by a work-related injury and is now unable to work at his
    previous job; and 2) “‘the degree of obvious physical impairment, coupled with other facts,
    such as mental capacity, education, training, or age’ qualify him for odd[-]lot treatment.”
    Pickens, 
    2006 WY 54
    , ¶ 14, 134 P.3d at 1236 (quoting City of Casper v. Bowdish, 
    713 P.2d 763
    , 765 (Wyo. 1986)).
    I.     Substantial evidence supported the Commission’s denial.
    [¶13] It is undisputed Mr. Rodriguez was unable to return to his previous heavy-labor job
    and therefore the first prong is met. The dispositive issue then, is whether substantial
    evidence supported the Commission’s determination that Mr. Rodriguez was not eligible
    for odd-lot treatment because he failed to show an ascertainable degree of obvious physical
    impairment. To satisfy this prong, a claimant must show: 1) he has a degree of obvious
    physical impairment; and 2) that degree of obvious physical impairment, coupled with
    other factors, make him de facto unemployable. See Stallman v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’
    Safety & Comp. Div., 
    2013 WY 28
    , ¶ 39, 
    297 P.3d 82
    , 93 (Wyo. 2013).
    A.     The Commission’s Factual Findings.
    [¶14] After an extensive review of medical testimony, records, and reports, the
    Commission concluded “that there is no objective evidence by which to determine the
    ‘degree of obvious physical impairment.’” We review the record as a whole for substantial
    evidence to support that conclusion.
    1.     Three IMEs find two- to three-percent impairment rating.
    [¶15] Mr. Rodriguez had three Independent Medical Evaluations (IMEs) that determined
    his impairment rating was between two and three percent and he could return to the
    workforce in some capacity.
    Dr. Kaplan
    [¶16] Dr. Michael Kaplan conducted the first IME in April of 2008, approximately six
    months after Mr. Rodriguez’s injury. He reviewed all of Mr. Rodriguez’s medical history
    including his complaints of pain in his wrist, knee, neck, back, and shoulder, as well as
    headaches and nosebleeds. Dr. Kaplan found no objective evidence to support his neck,
    back, and shoulder pain, or his headaches and nosebleeds, and found little objective
    evidence to substantiate he was unable to work in any capacity. He gave Mr. Rodriguez a
    three-percent whole body impairment rating for the injuries sustained to his left wrist, left
    shoulder, and right knee. Dr. Kaplan cleared Mr. Rodriguez to return to light or medium
    work capacity.
    4
    Dr. MacGuire
    [¶17] Dr. Anne MacGuire performed a second IME on June 2, 2008, where she found no
    evidence of a right knee or left shoulder injury but assigned a two-percent whole body
    impairment because of his left wrist injury. Dr. MacGuire also found significant symptom
    magnification and exaggeration in Mr. Rodriguez’s pain evaluations. She released Mr.
    Rodriguez to work without restriction.
    Dr. Shay
    [¶18] Dr. Jed Shay performed a third IME on July 8, 2020, shortly after Mr. Rodriguez
    applied for PTD benefits. He extensively reviewed Mr. Rodriguez’s medical history dating
    back to the injury. Dr. Shay’s findings mirrored Dr. MacGuire’s and Dr. Kaplan’s; medical
    evidence did not support a degree of physical impairment or Mr. Rodriguez’s complaints
    of pain. Mr. Rodriguez also showed signs of symptom magnification in testing. Dr. Shay
    released him to work without restriction. The Commission gave weight to Dr. Shay’s
    medical opinion because he reviewed Mr. Rodriguez entire medical history, conducted a
    physical examination, and his opinion was supported by Dr. Kaplan and Dr. MacGuire,
    both of whom offered credible findings.
    2.       Five failed FCEs for lack of effort.
    [¶19] Mr. Rodriguez was asked to perform five different Functional Capacity Evaluations
    (FCEs), each of which was invalidated. The first two FCEs were invalidated due to
    purposeful amplification of symptoms and a manipulated effort to influence the
    evaluation’s results. The remaining FCEs were invalidated due to Mr. Rodriguez’s lack of
    effort or his terminating the test prior to completion.
    Dr. Jeffres
    [¶20] Mr. Rodriguez saw Dr. Mary Jo Jeffres, a clinical psychologist, on December 18,
    2013. Dr. Jeffres conducted a Psychological Evaluation as part of Mr. Rodriguez’s
    application for Social Security benefits. Mr. Rodriguez once again terminated the
    evaluation early. Nevertheless, Dr. Jeffres diagnosed Mr. Rodriguez with a mild
    neurocognitive disorder due to traumatic brain injury (TBI) without reviewing his medical
    history or Mr. Rodriguez’s previous MRI. No other medical doctor supported the TBI
    diagnosis and nothing in the record supports such a finding.
    Dr. Poyer
    [¶21] Dr. Melinda Poyer, a family practice physician, examined Mr. Rodriguez on
    December 18, 2013, to address pain complaints in his upper extremities, and neck, as well
    as headaches. Dr. Poyer was able to review portions of Mr. Rodriguez’s medical history,
    5
    including Dr. Ribnik’s records and records from an eye doctor and a physical therapist, but
    she was not privy to records from Dr. Kaplan or Dr. MacGuire, nor the MRI of Mr.
    Rodriguez’s brain. Dr. Poyer diagnosed injuries to the upper extremities, but these injuries
    were previously determined unrelated to the workplace injury.
    Ms. Canada
    [¶22] Ms. Charlene Canada is a certified rehabilitation counselor who conducted Mr.
    Rodriguez’s vocational assessment on May 22, 2021. Her assessment concluded Mr.
    Rodriguez was unable to work in the Rawlins area because of his TBI diagnosis and his
    generalized pain, therefore making him eligible for odd-lot treatment. However, the
    Commission’s conclusion rested on Mr. Rodriguez’s failure to prove a degree of obvious
    physical impairment which made Ms. Canada’s testimony carry little weight because the
    Commission did not reach the question whether Mr. Rodriguez was employable.
    Dr. Ribnik
    [¶23] Dr. Ribnik, a pain specialist, has been Mr. Rodriguez’s primary doctor for the last
    decade and has had recurring visits with Mr. Rodriguez to manage pain. Mr. Rodriguez
    was insistent that Dr. Ribnik sign off on his PTD application, yet Dr. Ribnik repeatedly
    refused until Mr. Rodriguez completed a valid FCE. Although Mr. Rodriguez never did
    complete a valid FCE, Dr. Ribnik acquiesced in 2019 because he felt “bullied” into
    certifying Mr. Rodriguez as permanently and totally disabled. Dr. Ribnik testified “It was
    put under my nose. And basically, Mr. Rodriguez insisted that I sign it off. So I acceded to
    his insistence.” When asked whether Dr. Ribnik believed Mr. Rodriguez was permanently
    and totally disabled, Dr. Ribnik testified “I have to recant, to the extent that I think he could
    do something. . . . I have no idea what he could do.” In sum, Dr. Ribnik testified he was
    unsure of what Mr. Rodriguez’s physical impairment was, what he could do physically,
    and the validity of his subjective complaints.
    B. Substantial evidence supported the Commission finding Mr. Rodriguez did not
    have a degree of obvious physical impairment.
    [¶24] The Commission’s twenty-eight-page decision detailed the evidence presented,
    findings of fact, conclusions of law, and ultimate determination. This Court must accept
    the Commission’s decision if there is “relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
    accept in support of its conclusions.” Pickens, 
    2006 WY 54
    , ¶ 21, 134 P.3d at 1238 (citing
    Cramer v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 
    2005 WY 124
    , ¶ 10, 
    120 P.3d 668
    , 671 (Wyo. 2005)). Even if evidence can be interpreted differently, under the
    substantial evidence test this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the
    Commission. Id.
    6
    [¶25] The Commission relied heavily on Dr. Shay who reinforced the positions of Dr.
    Kaplan and Dr. MacGuire that little objective medical evidence showed Mr. Rodriguez had
    a degree of obvious physical impairment caused by his work accident. It also relied on his
    five invalid FCE results, two of which found he purposefully amplified symptoms, to
    further support its conclusion Mr. Rodriguez’s subjective complaints lacked credibility.
    Dr. Ribnik, his treating doctor, refused to certify Mr. Rodriguez’s PTD application on
    several occasions but finally acquiesced because of consistent pressure from Mr.
    Rodriguez, despite his physical condition being unchanged from the time Dr. Ribnik first
    declined the certification. He also stated he was unsure of Mr. Rodriguez’s physical
    limitations and whether Mr. Rodriguez’s complaints were legitimate. Multiple doctors
    were unable to identify an injury and those that did were not offered the benefit of a
    complete medical record review and had to rely on subjective patient complaints rather
    than medical evidence. Based on this evidence, the Commission found that Mr. Rodriguez
    failed to show a degree of obvious physical impairment. A reasonable mind could accept
    this evidence to support the Commission’s conclusion; therefore, there was substantial
    evidence to support the Commission’s findings.
    [¶26] Mr. Rodriguez argues his three-percent impairment rating and his release to work
    with limitations shows his degree of physical impairment. We disagree. Dr. Shay found in
    2020 that Mr. Rodriguez had no physical impairment and could return to work, without
    restriction. Dr. MacGuire also released Mr. Rodriguez to work without restriction. The
    Commission determined his invalid FCEs and his impairment ratings showed an effort to
    affect the results of his examinations, and concluded his pain complaints were less reliable
    than objective medical findings. Because his accompanying medical records did not show
    a degree of obvious physical impairment, the Commission correctly concluded Mr.
    Rodriguez did not meet his burden to prove an objective medical injury.
    [¶27] While Mr. Rodriguez was deemed unable to return to his previous employment, he
    still carried a burden to prove his degree of obvious physical impairment. While
    impairment ratings offer valuable evidence of what a patient can and cannot do, Mr.
    Rodriguez cannot rely solely on his two-percent impairment rating, without work
    restriction, to prove his degree of obvious physical impairment. Pickens, 
    2006 WY 54
    ,
    ¶ 29, 134 P.3d at 1240 (holding it would be improper to grant PTD benefits to a claimant
    based on the claimant’s impairment rating); see also Stallman, 
    2013 WY 28
    , ¶ 34, 
    297 P.3d at 92
     (holding a claimant proved her degree of physical impairment by admitting a valid
    FCE, two impairment ratings, and medical records that support her claims of physical
    impairment). He failed to prove his degree of physical impairment because he did not
    present persuasive evidence of his degree of obvious physical impairment. He could not
    present a valid FCE, and his medical records did not support his alleged injuries and pain.
    Additionally, Mr. Rodriguez’s main complaints, his generalized pain, headaches, etc., are
    injuries not causally related to his workplace accident, and he is barred from recovery for
    those injuries under the odd-lot doctrine. Pickens, 
    2006 WY 54
    ,¶ 31, 134 P.3d at 1241.
    There is not overwhelming evidence in the record to refute the Commission’s finding that
    7
    Mr. Rodriguez failed to prove an ascertainable degree of physical impairment and therefore
    the finding will not be disturbed. Because Mr. Rodriguez failed to meet his burden to
    establish a degree of physical impairment, we need not consider whether his degree of
    physical impairment, coupled with other facts, makes him de facto unemployable.
    II.    The Commission’s credibility determinations were not arbitrary and capricious.
    [¶28] The only remaining consideration is whether the Commission’s weight and
    credibility decisions were arbitrary and capricious. We defer to an agency’s credibility
    determinations if they are based on a rational premise. McMasters v. State ex rel. Wyo.
    Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 
    2012 WY 32
    , ¶ 71, 
    271 P.3d 422
    , 439 (Wyo. 2012). If “the
    agency disregards certain evidence and explains its reasons for doing so based upon
    determinations of credibility . . . its decision will be sustainable under the substantial
    evidence test.” Boylen, 
    2022 WY 39
    , ¶ 8, 506 P.3d at 769 (quoting Hood, 
    2016 WY 104
    ,
    ¶ 14, 382 P.3d at 776). The Commission had a rational premise to disregard Mr.
    Rodriguez’s subjective complaints, Dr. Jeffres’ TBI diagnosis, and testimony from Dr.
    Poyer and Ms. Canada.
    [¶29] The Commission found Mr. Rodriguez was not a credible claimant because experts
    found he consistently manipulated testing, exaggerated symptoms, and the Commission
    witnessed behavior at hearings and on video inconsistent with his complaints. In
    McMasters, the Court addressed a similar situation regarding the claimant’s credibility.
    
    2012 WY 32
    , ¶ 71, 
    271 P.3d at 439
    . There, the claimant broke his back after falling while
    working on an HVAC system and was unable to return to work in any capacity due to his
    physical impairment and other factors. Id. at ¶¶ 1, 3, 
    271 P.3d at 424-25
    . The Commission
    found Mr. McMasters’ testimony lacked credibility because he made minimal efforts to
    return to work, provided inconsistent information to medical providers, and was observed
    sitting without distress for almost an hour longer than he claimed he could sit without pain.
    Id. at ¶ 72, 
    271 P.3d at 439
    . We rejected this conclusion because the record did not support
    the Commission’s conclusions nor was its reasoning compelling, particularly because
    medical reports never questioned the validity of his complaints, and he had an “objectively
    verifiable physical injury” with pain “consistent with that injury.” Id. at ¶¶ 73-76, 
    271 P.3d at 440
    .
    [¶30] We also rejected the Commission’s credibility determinations in Moss based on its
    own assessment of Mr. Moss’ physical appearance at the hearing and his actions in a private
    investigator’s video. Moss v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 
    2010 WY 66
    , ¶¶ 30, 32-33, 
    232 P.3d 1
    , 9-10 (Wyo. 2010). We have previously cautioned the
    Commission against making medical diagnoses for multiple reasons. See, e.g., McMasters,
    at ¶ 77, 
    271 P.3d at 441
    ; Moss, 
    2010 WY 66
    , ¶ 33, 232 P.3d at 9-10 (finding a video of the
    claimant conducting certain tasks for short periods of time he previously claimed he was
    unable to do was not sufficient to disregard his testimony and subjective complaints). The
    8
    combination of reasons to discredit Mr. McMasters and Mr. Moss lacked a rational premise
    but that is not the case here.
    [¶31] Several doctors documented that Mr. Rodriguez exaggerated pain or amplified
    symptoms; he failed several FCEs due to lack of effort and intentional manipulation; and
    video evidence belied his claims he was unable to perform certain tasks. He also lacked a
    verifiable physical injury to explain his complaints of pain. Therefore, unlike McMasters,
    there was evidence to question his subjective complaints and his credibility.
    [¶32] The Commission did note that Mr. Rodriguez repeatedly turned his head at hearings
    and used both arms and he moved normally on video, counter to what he alleged he was
    capable of. We have cautioned the Commission against making “impromptu medical
    diagnoses and reminded [it] of its obligation to make its decision on the basis of the records
    and testimony entered into evidence.” McMasters, 
    2012 WY 32
    , ¶ 77, 
    271 P.3d at 441
    ;
    Moss, 
    2010 WY 66
    , ¶¶ 32-33, 232 P.3d at 9-10. However, although the Commission did
    make improper impromptu diagnoses based on reported behavior at past hearings and
    behavior on video, it did not solely rely on its own observations to make its credibility
    determinations. It considered doctors’ reports questioning the validity of Mr. Rodriguez’s
    subjective complaints, his invalid FCEs, and Dr. Ribnik’s testimony. There was evidence
    presented that supported a finding Mr. Rodriguez lacked credibility and, although a portion
    of the Commission’s reasoning was improper, ample evidence existed to support its
    credibility determination.
    [¶33] The Commission gave less weight to Dr. Poyer and Dr. Jeffres’ findings than the
    other doctors and disregarded some of their opinions. The agency may “disregard an expert
    opinion if . . . [it is] based upon an incomplete or inaccurate medical history provided by
    the claimant.” Boylen, 
    2022 WY 39
    , ¶ 17, 506 P.3d at 771. In this case, the Commission
    made its determinations based on the lack of medical records available to the two doctors.
    They were not afforded the opportunity to review Mr. Rodriguez’s entire medical history
    and were therefore unable to provide comprehensive diagnoses. The two gave credence to
    Mr. Rodriguez’s subjective complaints which only further undermined their credibility.
    [¶34] Finally, because Ms. Canada was not a medical doctor, the Commission was entitled
    to reject her testimony in determining whether Mr. Rodriguez met his burden of
    establishing his degree of physical impairment. See id. at ¶ 8, 506 P.3d at 769. The
    Commission’s credibility determinations were rooted in a rational premise and are not
    arbitrary and capricious. Those without the ability to review all medical records were given
    less weight in their testimony than doctors who fully reviewed Mr. Rodriguez’s medical
    history.
    9
    CONCLUSION
    [¶35] There was substantial evidence for the Commission to deny Mr. Rodriguez’s
    application for PTD for lack of an obvious physical impairment. The Commission pointed
    to specific facts to support its credibility determinations and did not act arbitrarily and
    capriciously. The Commission’s decision is affirmed.
    10
    

Document Info

Docket Number: S-22-0131

Citation Numbers: 2022 WY 166

Filed Date: 12/30/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/30/2022