Coleman v. Strohman ( 1991 )

CARDINE, Justice.

Appellant James Coleman sued to recover damages for personal injuries he suffered when appellee Robert Strohman punched him. The jury found Strohman acted in self-defense when he committed the battery and denied recovery. Coleman appeals the jury’s verdict.

The controlling issue here is whether the district court erred in not instructing the jury on Coleman’s alternative theory of recovery, which was that Strohman acted negligently in his use of self-defense.

We affirm.

Strohman’s seventeen-year-old son rode his motorcycle through the intersection in front of Coleman’s house without coming to a complete stop at the stop sign. After first yelling at him, Coleman jumped in his car and chased the young Strohman, who escaped by driving his motorcycle down a ravine. On arriving home, he informed his father (Strohman) of the incident.

About two hours later, a co-worker, who lived across the intersection from Coleman, asked Strohman to come over and work on his wife’s car. On his way to the co-worker’s house, Strohman, riding a bicycle, noticed Coleman in his front yard. Strohman rode over, laid his bicycle down, and while standing on the sidewalk, asked Coleman if “he was the man [who] was chasing a young fellow on the motorcycle awhile ago.”

At this point, Coleman and Strohman provided conflicting testimony of the events leading to the altercation. Coleman testified that Strohman hit him without verbal or physical provocation and without warning. Strohman testified that Coleman dropped his shoulder, attempted to hit him, he blocked the swing, and struck Coleman on the left cheek, knocking him to the ground.

The trial court refused to instruct the jury on Coleman’s alternative claim that Strohman was negligent in using excessive force to defend himself. The trial court instead gave the following instruction:

“The Defendant, will not be liable to the Plaintiff on his claim of battery if the affirmative defense of self-defense is established. This defense is established if you find both of the following:

“1. The Defendant honestly and reasonably believed (although perhaps mistakenly) that under the circumstances it was necessary for him to use force to protect himself against an actual or apparent threatened harmful contact; and

“2. The Defendant used no more force than a reasonably prudent person would have used under the same or similar circumstances to protect himself against the actual or apparent threatened attack.”

The jury observed the witnesses, heard the evidence, deliberated, and returned a verdict finding that Strohman acted in self-defense when he punched Coleman. The jury, in other words, believed Strohman’s version of the incident.

Coleman admits that the jury’s finding of self-defense bars his claim for battery. Coleman maintains, however, that the trial court should have instructed the jury that “the Defendant negligently used excessive force to repel a perceived attack.”

In Tatman v. Cordingly, 672 P.2d 1286, 1289 (Wyo.1983), we stated that the following instruction accurately stated the law of self-defense in Wyoming and its limits:

“Thus, even acting in self-defense, a person may be liable for injury inflicted upon the aggressor. This is the case when the defendant is not justified in his belief that he was in danger, or when the defendant uses excessive force, or when the defender continues to exert force after the aggressor is rendered disarmed or helpless.”

We explained in Tatman that a claim of self-defense “must be based upon reasonable grounds.” 672 P.2d at 1290. The jury is, therefore, required to apply an objective standard in deciding whether an individual’s belief that it was necessary to defend himself was reasonable.

Coleman’s theory of negligence depended upon the jury finding that Strohman failed to act reasonably in defending himself and that he used excessive force. The self-defense instruction given required the jury to find that Strohman’s use of self-defense was both reasonable and without excessive force. We stated in Weaver v. Mitchell, 715 P.2d 1361, 1363-64 (Wyo.1986), that “[t]he trial court is not obligated to give instructions in the language of their proponent and may refuse proposed instructions, though correct, if the principles embodied in the requested instructions are covered by other instructions.”

Appellant claims the court should have instructed the jury that appellant could recover if appellee “negligently used excessive force.” Negligence is a failure to act as a reasonable, prudent person in the same or similar circumstances. The instruction given by the court required, to establish self-defense, that appellee must have “honestly and reasonably believed * * * it was necessary for him to use force * * * [and that he] used no more force than a reasonably prudent person would have u^ed under the same or similar circumstances * * Although the term negligence is not employed in this type case, the principle for which appellant contends is clearly embodied in the instruction given. Thus, the principle that an individual’s use of self-defense must be no more force than a reasonably prudent person would use under the same or similar circumstances was before the jury when it decided the issues presented in this case. It was not error to refuse appellant’s instruction on negligence.

The verdict of the jury and the judgment entered thereon are affirmed.