Darold M. Brown v. Tana J. Brown, n/k/a Tana J. Bennett ( 2016 )


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  •                 IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING
    
    2016 WY 120
    OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2016
    December 14, 2016
    DAROLD M. BROWN,
    Appellant
    (Defendant),
    v.                                                                       S-16-0154
    TANA J. BROWN, n/k/a TANA J. BENNETT,
    Appellee
    (Plaintiff).
    Appeal from the District Court of Park County
    The Honorable Steven R. Cranfill, Judge
    Representing Appellant:
    Donna D. Domonkos, Domonkos Law Office, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.
    Representing Appellee:
    George L. Simonton, Attorney at Law, Cody, Wyoming.
    Before BURKE, C.J., and HILL, DAVIS, FOX, and KAUTZ, JJ.
    NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers
    are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming
    82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in
    the permanent volume.
    BURKE, Chief Justice.
    [¶1] Appellant, Darold M. Brown, failed to designate witnesses and exhibits in
    accordance with a pretrial scheduling order in this divorce proceeding. As a result, the
    district court imposed sanctions. It ruled that Mr. Brown could not present witnesses or
    exhibits at trial. Mr. Brown challenges that ruling in this appeal. We affirm.
    ISSUES
    [¶2] Mr. Brown presents one issue: Did the district court abuse its discretion when it
    sanctioned him for discovery violations when Ms. Brown’s counsel and the district court
    did not follow W.R.C.P. 37? Ms. Brown states three issues:
    1.      Is the issue set forth by Mr. Brown consistent with the
    district court’s decision and the record?
    2.     Did the district court abuse its discretion in restricting
    Mr. Brown from producing witnesses and evidence for failure
    to follow the Scheduling Order under Rule 16 of the
    Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure?
    3.     Is the appeal filed by Mr. Brown frivolous such that
    attorney fees and costs should be awarded to Appellee?
    FACTS
    [¶3] Mr. and Ms. Brown were married in 2009. They had a child in 2010 and another
    in 2012. On October 3, 2014, Ms. Brown filed a Complaint seeking a divorce from
    Mr. Brown. Shortly thereafter, the district court was presented with a stipulated “Decree
    of Divorce with Minor Children” signed by both parties. Neither party was represented
    by counsel. The district court signed the proposed decree, and entered it six days after
    the Complaint had been filed. The stipulated terms of the decree provided for joint legal
    and physical custody of the children and a division of specified property.
    [¶4] Approximately ten months later, on August 5, 2015, Ms. Brown, acting through
    counsel, filed a motion to vacate or modify the divorce decree. In her motion, she alleged
    that the divorce decree had been entered less than twenty days after the complaint was
    filed, contrary to 
    Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-1081
     (LexisNexis 2013). She also contended
    1
    That statute provides, in relevant part, that “a divorce decree shall not be entered less than twenty (20)
    days from the date the complaint is filed.”
    1
    that the decree did not distribute all assets and debts, and that the agreed-upon joint
    custody was no longer in the children’s best interests. Mr. Brown, also acting through
    counsel, filed a “Response to Plaintiff’s Motion and Counterclaim” on August 25. The
    motion was originally scheduled to be heard on September 21. Mr. Brown sought a
    continuance and the motion was granted. Trial was rescheduled for October 27.
    [¶5] On October 21, 2015, Ms. Brown filed a motion for sanctions. She alleged that
    the parties had agreed to exchange discovery on an informal basis and to exchange
    witness and exhibit lists. She asserted that her counsel had prepared an order
    incorporating these agreements and sent it to counsel for Mr. Brown, but had received no
    response. She also claimed that Mr. Brown had not abided by the agreement to provide
    witness and exhibit lists. On this basis, Ms. Brown asked the court to impose unspecified
    sanctions against Mr. Brown. She also asked that the trial be rescheduled and sought a
    scheduling order.
    [¶6] A scheduling conference was held on October 28, and resulted in the entry of a
    “Scheduling Order.” The order set a trial date and required the parties to exchange
    exhibits and a witness list by November 13, 2015. The order noted that the schedule was
    being set “with the consent and agreement of counsel for the parties.”
    [¶7] On November 18, 2015, Ms. Brown filed another motion for sanctions. She
    asserted that Mr. Brown had not complied with the November 13, 2015, deadline for
    exchanging exhibits and witness lists. This motion asked the court to sanction
    Mr. Brown by prohibiting him from offering exhibits or witness testimony at trial.
    [¶8] The district court held a hearing on the motions for sanctions on December 2,
    2015. Later that day, it issued a decision letter. The district court denied Ms. Brown’s
    first motion for sanctions, but granted the later one, imposing the requested sanction of
    prohibiting Mr. Brown from presenting witness testimony or exhibits at trial.
    [¶9] The trial was held over the course of two afternoons. Mr. Brown testified at the
    trial. Apparently, in accordance with the sanction order, he was not permitted to call
    additional witnesses or introduce exhibits.2
    [¶10] The district court took the matter under advisement, and entered its decision letter
    on January 15, 2016, granting physical custody of the children to Ms. Brown, and
    establishing a visitation schedule for Mr. Brown. It noted that the Browns had agreed on
    the distribution of most of the property, and divided the remaining property and debt
    2
    The trial transcript was not included in the record on appeal. The district court’s decision letter indicates
    that Mr. Brown testified.
    2
    between the two. An order in conformance with the decision letter was entered on
    February 17, 2016. Mr. Brown filed an appeal from that order. We dismissed the appeal,
    finding that the order was not a final appealable order because it did not establish child
    support. The district court entered a “Stipulated Order on Child Support and Visitation”
    on May 31, 2016, and Mr. Brown filed this timely appeal.
    DISCUSSION
    [¶11] Mr. Brown challenges the district court’s decision imposing sanctions that
    prohibited him from presenting witnesses or exhibits at trial. “[T]he law is clear that
    district courts have broad discretion to impose sanctions under the Wyoming Rules of
    Civil Procedure. See In re Guardianship of Bratton, 
    2014 WY 87
    , ¶ 22, 
    330 P.3d 248
    ,
    253 (Wyo. 2014). Thus, ‘[w]e review decisions imposing sanctions for abuse of
    discretion.’ Id.” Goforth v. Fifield, 
    2015 WY 82
    , ¶ 21, 
    352 P.3d 242
    , 247 (Wyo. 2015).
    [¶12] Mr. Brown concedes that he failed to comply with the November 13, 2015,
    deadline for providing exhibits and witness lists to Ms. Brown. He claims, however, that
    it was improper to impose sanctions because Ms. Brown had never filed a motion to
    compel discovery. Such a motion is provided for in W.R.C.P. 37(a)(2)(A), which
    provides that when a party fails to make a required disclosure, “any other party may
    move to compel disclosure and for appropriate sanctions.” (Emphasis added.) Based on
    the rule’s use of the word “and,” Mr. Brown contends that a court may properly compel
    discovery and impose sanctions, but it may not impose sanctions without an order
    compelling discovery.
    [¶13] The record reflects, however, that the district court did not impose sanctions for
    Mr. Brown’s failure to comply with discovery requirements. It imposed sanctions
    because Mr. Brown violated the district court’s scheduling order. In its decision letter,
    the district court indicated that Ms. Brown’s first motion for sanctions alleged that
    Mr. Brown “did not comply with the informal discovery agreement.” However, it
    explained, the “informal agreement was not ordered by the Court and that Motion for
    Sanctions is denied.” The district court granted Ms. Brown’s later motion for sanctions,
    which was “based upon a violation of the [Court’s] Scheduling Order.” The district court
    determined that “the Scheduling Order was approved by [Mr. Brown], and not followed.”
    The district court imposed sanctions based on a violation of the scheduling order, not on a
    failure to comply with discovery requirements.
    [¶14] W.R.C.P. 16(f) provides that, “If a party or a party’s attorney fails to obey a
    scheduling or pretrial order . . . the judge, upon motion or the judge’s own initiative, may
    make such orders with regard thereto as are just, and among others any of the orders
    provided in Rule 37(b)(2)(B), (C) and (D).” In turn, Rule 37(b)(2)(B) authorizes “An
    order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or
    defenses, or prohibiting the disobedient party from introducing designated matters in
    3
    evidence.” Nothing in the language of Rule 16 or Rule 37 indicates that a motion to
    compel discovery is a prerequisite for sanctions imposed for failure to comply with a
    scheduling order.
    [¶15] As the second prong of his appeal, Mr. Brown also contends that the district
    court’s decision to impose sanctions was unreasonable, and an abuse of discretion,
    “considering the short amount of time [he] was given to comply with discovery.” He
    points out that the Scheduling Order he violated was the result of a hearing held on
    October 28, 2015, and it required the exchange of exhibits and witness lists by November
    13, 2015 – “[a] mere fifteen days.” He further asserts that the result of the district court’s
    imposition of sanctions was that the court was unable to consider all of the relevant
    evidence regarding the best interests of the children.
    [¶16] We may agree with Mr. Brown’s contention that the Scheduling Order moved this
    case along very quickly. The district court observed in its decision letter on sanctions
    that it did not “understand why this matter is being ‘fast-tracked.’” Nevertheless, the
    tight deadlines imposed in the Scheduling Order were those agreed to by the parties at the
    scheduling conference. Mr. Brown agreed to the schedule below, but contends now that
    the schedule was unreasonable. As we have often explained, “we generally decline to
    review issues raised for the first time on appeal.” Kordus v. Montes, 
    2014 WY 146
    , ¶ 10,
    
    337 P.3d 1138
    , 1141 (Wyo. 2014) (citing In re Lankford, 
    2013 WY 65
    , ¶ 28, 
    301 P.3d 1092
    , 1101 (Wyo. 2013) and Jones v. State, 
    2006 WY 40
    , ¶ 7, 
    132 P.3d 162
    , 164 (Wyo.
    2006)). Mr. Brown has provided no justification that would warrant our departure from
    that rule.3 We find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to impose
    sanctions.
    [¶17] Finally, we turn to Ms. Brown’s claim that there was no reasonable cause for this
    appeal, and that we should award her attorney fees and costs pursuant to W.R.A.P. 10.05.
    That rule provides that we may sanction an appellant by awarding attorney fees and costs
    to the appellee if we certify that there was no reasonable cause for the appeal. However,
    what we said in Hoffman v. Hoffman, 
    2004 WY 68
    , ¶ 17, 
    91 P.3d 922
    , 927 (Wyo. 2004)
    applies equally in this case: “Such sanctions are rare, and we cannot say that this appeal
    is so lacking in merit as to qualify for sanctions, especially since it challenged a
    discretionary decision by the trial court.”
    [¶18] Affirmed.
    3
    Mr. Brown also failed to provide a transcript of the trial. He has not referenced any offer of proof that
    he made below, and has failed to identify any witnesses he would have called to testify at trial or exhibits
    that he would have introduced.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: S-16-0154

Judges: Burke, Hill, Davis, Fox, Kautz

Filed Date: 12/14/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/13/2024