In the Matter of the Name Change of: SGN, a minor child, Corrie Lynn Lamb v. Noah M. Newman ( 2022 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING
2022 WY 38OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2021
March 21, 2022
IN THE MATTER OF THE NAME
CHANGE OF: SGN, a minor child,
CORRIE LYNN LAMB,
Appellant
(Petitioner),
S-21-0186
v.
NOAH M. NEWMAN,
Appellee
(Respondent).
Appeal from the District Court of Campbell County
The Honorable William J. Edelman, Judge
Representing Appellant:
Corrie Lynn Lamb, pro se.
Representing Appellee:
Alex Berger, 307 Law Office, Gillette, Wyoming.
Before FOX, C.J., and DAVIS*, KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.
*Justice Davis retired from judicial office effective January 16, 2022, and, pursuant to Article 5, § 5 of the
Wyoming Constitution and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-1-106(f) (LexisNexis 2021), he was reassigned to act on
this matter on January 18, 2022.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are
requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of
any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the
permanent volume.
GRAY, Justice.
[¶1] Corrie Lynn Lamb (Mother) filed a petition on behalf of her minor child, SGN, for
a change of surname. Noah Newman (Father) objected, and the district court denied the
name change petition. Mother appeals arguing that the district court abused its discretion
by refusing to settle the record pursuant to her statement of the evidence under W.R.A.P.
3.03 and by denying the petition. We affirm.
ISSUES
[¶2] Mother presents three issues, which we restate as two:
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it refused
to approve Mother’s statement of the evidence under
W.R.A.P. 3.03?
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied
Mother’s petition to change minor child’s surname?
FACTS
[¶3] The record is sparse but reveals the following facts. Mother and Father were
married, and while married, they had a child, SGN. They separated in 2017 and divorced
about a year later. Since that time, SGN has split time between Mother in Gillette and
Father in Rock Springs, Wyoming. After the divorce, Mother married Mr. Lamb and took
his surname. She and Mr. Lamb had a child together. In March 2021, Mother filed a
verified petition in the district court to change SGN’s surname to Lamb-Newman because
SGN was starting school in August, Mother would be the primary custodian, and Mother
wanted SGN to share her surname and that of her half sibling. Father objected.
[¶4] The district court held an unreported hearing on the petition on May 13, 2021. It
entered an order denying the petition finding the name change was not in the best interest
of SGN and that it was detrimental to Father’s interests. Mother timely filed this appeal.
[¶5] Because there was no transcript of the hearing, Mother prepared a statement of the
evidence as allowed under W.R.A.P. 3.03. Father filed his objection to Mother’s rendition
of the proceedings. The statement and objection were submitted to the district court for
review. The district court did not approve Mother’s W.R.A.P. 3.03 statement of the
evidence. Contrary to her statement that sworn testimony was given, the district court
found there was no sworn testimony at the hearing.
DISCUSSION
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I. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it refused to approve Mother’s
statement of the evidence under W.R.A.P. 3.03?
A. Standard of Review
[¶6] “It is within the district court’s discretion whether to approve a statement pursuant
to W.R.A.P. 3.03.” Bolding v. Kindel Concrete, LLC, 2014 WY 132, ¶ 13, 336 P.3d 144,
147 (Wyo. 2014) (quoting Jacobs v. Jacobs, 895 P.2d 441, 444 (Wyo. 1995)). “[W]e
review the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion.” Nw. Bldg. Co. v. Nw. Distrib.
Co., 2012 WY 113, ¶ 30, 285 P.3d 239, 247 (Wyo. 2012). “Judicial discretion is a
composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it
means exercising sound judgment with regard to what is right under the circumstances and
without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.” Brown v. Jerding, 2020 WY 123, ¶ 11, 472
P.3d 1038, 1041 (Wyo. 2020) (quoting Ianelli v. Camino, 2019 WY 67, ¶ 20, 444 P.3d 61,
66 (Wyo. 2019)). “A court abuses its discretion when it acts in a manner which exceeds
the bounds of reason under the circumstances.” Heimer v. Heimer, 2021 WY 97, ¶ 34, 494
P.3d 472, 481 (Wyo. 2021) (quoting Meiners v. Meiners, 2019 WY 39, ¶ 9, 438 P.3d 1260,
1266 (Wyo. 2019)).
B. Analysis
[¶7] Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by not approving her
statement of the evidence under W.R.A.P. 3.03 and by failing to settle the record for appeal.
Wyoming Rule of Appellate Procedure 3.03 provides procedures to establish a record
where no transcript of proceedings is available:
If no report of the evidence or proceedings at a hearing
or trial was made, or if a transcript is unavailable, appellant
may prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings from
the best available means including appellant’s recollection.
The statement shall be filed in the trial court and served on
appellee within 35 days of the filing of the notice of appeal.
Appellee may file and serve objections or propose amendments
within 15 days after service. The trial court shall, within 10
days, enter its order settling and approving the statement of
evidence, which shall be included by the clerk of the trial court
in the record on appeal. If the trial court is unable to settle the
record within 10 days, the judge shall notify the appellate court
clerk, trial court clerk, and the parties of the delay and
anticipated date of completion.
W.R.A.P. 3.03. “The purpose of the W.R.A.P. 3.03 procedure is to provide an accurate
record of the evidence presented in the district court.” Nw. Bldg. Co., ¶ 31, 285 P.3d at
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247 (citing White v. Table Mountain Ranches Owners Ass’n, 2006 WY 2, ¶ 8, 125 P.3d
1019, 1021 (Wyo. 2006)). Trial court approval is required before a statement of the
evidence can be “settled and become part of the record.” Martin v. DeWitt, 2014 WY 112,
¶ 4, 334 P.3d 123, 125 (Wyo. 2014) (quoting Nw. Bldg. Co., ¶ 31, 285 P.3d at 247); see
also W.R.A.P. 3.03.
[¶8] Mother’s statement of the evidence asserted that she testified during the hearing. In
its order regarding record, the district court found Mother’s statement inaccurate because
“neither party presented sworn testimony” at the hearing. The order stated:
1. [Mother] asserts that she testified during the hearing,
however neither party presented sworn testimony . . . .
2. [Mother] was afforded an opportunity to present her
case and chose to present argument only in support of her
petition.
3. [Father] was afforded the same opportunity and also
chose to present argument only.
4. Based upon the offered argument the court concluded
that [Mother] failed to meet her burden in establishing a basis
for the petition.
On appeal, Mother does not assert she presented sworn testimony—other than her verified
petition—at the name change hearing. Nonetheless, Mother’s Amended Statement of
Evidence and Proceedings recites that she “provided . . . rebuttal testimony” following
Father’s argument. The statement repeatedly frames Mother’s rebuttal argument as her
“testimony.”
It is within the trial court’s discretion whether to approve an
appellant’s statement of the evidence; it need not consent to a
narrative that is inaccurate, but may insist that the statement
reflects the actual proceedings. Where the trial court makes
specific findings of deficiencies, which are supported by the
record, it is not an abuse of discretion to refuse to settle the
statement to provide a record for appeal in civil matters;
without such findings, the trial court does abuse its discretion.
4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 603, at 577 (2019) (footnotes omitted).
[¶9] The district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to settle the record where
it found the statement of evidence to be inaccurate.
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[¶10] We do not address Mother’s argument that the court’s finding, in the order regarding
record, that the parties did not present sworn testimony conflicts with its findings regarding
evidence in the order denying name change. Mother had the burden to establish a record,
and she did not meet her burden. We need go no further.
II. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mother’s petition to
change minor child’s surname?
A. Standard of Review
[¶11] We have not established a standard of review for a petition to change a name under
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-25-101. Other states review a name change petition for an abuse of
discretion. See, e.g., In Re Doe, 484 P.3d 195, 199 (Idaho 2021); In re J.P.H., 2015 SD
43, ¶ 8, 865 N.W.2d 488, 490; Tucker v. Tucker, 2014 MT 115, ¶ 11, 326 P.3d 413, 415;
In re E.M.L., 19 A.3d 1068, 1069 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011); Hamman v. Cnty. Ct. In & For
Jefferson Cnty., 753 P.2d 743, 746 (Colo. 1988). Our jurisprudence is clear, “[d]ecisions
that involve custody, visitation and child support are committed to the sound discretion of
the district court.” IC v. DW, 2015 WY 135, ¶ 7, 360 P.3d 999, 1001 (Wyo. 2015) (citing
Wright v. Wright, 2015 WY 37, ¶ 16, 344 P.3d 267, 272 (Wyo. 2015)). In this case, where
the petition requests a name change for a minor child, consistent with our standard of
review for issues of custody, visitation, and support, we will apply an abuse of discretion
standard of review.
[¶12] “A court does not abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the
bounds of reason under the circumstances.” Gutierrez v. Bradley, 2021 WY 139, ¶ 15, 500
P.3d 984, 988 (Wyo. 2021) (quoting Kimzey v. Kimzey, 2020 WY 52, ¶ 27, 461 P.3d 1229,
1238 (Wyo. 2020)). “We ‘will not disturb an order . . . so long as the court could reasonably
conclude as it did.’” Taulo-Millar v. Hognason, 2022 WY 8, ¶ 14, 501 P.3d 1274, 1279
(Wyo. 2022) (quoting Paden v. Paden, 2017 WY 118, ¶ 6, 403 P.3d 135, 138 (Wyo. 2017)).
B. Analysis
[¶13] Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion when it found that a name
change was not in SGN’s best interest and that a name change was detrimental to Father’s
interests.
[¶14] “It is the appellant’s burden to bring a complete record to this Court.” Befumo v.
Johnson, 2005 WY 114, ¶ 16, 119 P.3d 936, 942–43 (Wyo. 2005) (quoting Beeman v.
Beeman, 2005 WY 45, ¶ 10, 109 P.3d 548, 551 (Wyo. 2005)). “Where a proper record is
not provided, an appeal may be dismissed or review may be limited to those issues not
requiring inspection of the record.” Id. (quoting Beeman, ¶ 10, 109 P.3d at 551). “In the
absence of anything to refute them, we will sustain the trial court’s findings, and we assume
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that the evidence presented was sufficient to support those findings.” Id. (quoting Beeman,
¶ 10, 109 P.3d at 551–52). See also Matter of Petition for ENH v. Hansley, 2016 WY 86,
¶ 10, 378 P.3d 296, 298 (Wyo. 2016). It is equally well established that “[i]t is the
appellant’s burden to bring to us a complete record on which to base a decision.” Sears v.
Sears, 2021 WY 20, ¶ 18, 479 P.3d 767, 773 (Wyo. 2021) (quoting Golden v. Guion, 2013
WY 45, ¶ 5, 299 P.3d 95, 96 (Wyo. 2013)).
[¶15] We turn to the district court’s order denying the petition to change SGN’s name.
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-25-101 1 governs name changes. It states that a district court shall
order the name change if “the desired change is proper and not detrimental to the interests
of any other person.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-25-101. The district court noted that the
language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-25-101 does not require the court to make findings on a
child’s best interest and that the Wyoming Supreme Court has not specifically addressed
this question. See ENH, ¶ 7, 378 P.3d at 298. The district court then recognized that both
parties made arguments related not only to their own interests but those of the minor child.
Consequently, it undertook a thorough analysis of whether the name change was in SGN’s
best interests. The court employed an eight-factor test—borrowed from other states’
jurisprudence—and determined that a name change would not be in SGN’s best interest. 2
The court went on to consider whether the name change would be detrimental to the interest
of any other person, specifically Father. It found Father presented evidence that changing
SGN’s name would be detrimental to his interest.
[¶16] Neither party raised the issue of whether the court was required to address SGN’s
best interests at the hearing or on appeal. Because the issue was not raised or briefed, we
1
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-25-101 states:
Every person desiring to change his name may petition the district
court of the county of the petitioner’s residence for the desired change.
The petition shall be verified by affidavit setting forth the petitioner’s full
name, the name desired, a concise statement of the reason for the desired
change, the place of his birth, his place of residence and the length of time
he has been an actual bona fide resident of the county in which the petition
is filed. If the court is satisfied that the desired change is proper and not
detrimental to the interests of any other person, it shall order the change to
be made, and record the proceedings in the records of the court. In the
event a confidentiality order has been entered pursuant to W.S. 35-21-112
or any other court order allowing a party to maintain confidentiality of
addresses, city or state of residence or other information identifying the
residence, the address, city or state of residence or other information
identifying the residence of the party shall remain confidential.
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-25-101 (LexisNexis 2021).
2
Some states use a factor test to determine whether a name change is in a child’s best interest. See generally
J.P.H., 865 N.W.2d 488; In re Leyna A., No. M2016-02548-COA-R3-JV, 2017 WL 4083644 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Sept. 15, 2017); Walden v. Jackson, 2016 Ark. App. 573, 506 S.W.3d 904; Werthwein v. Workman,
546 S.W.3d 749 (Tex. App. 2018); State on behalf of Connor H. v. Blake G., 856 N.W.2d 295 (Neb. 2014);
Hamman, 753 P.2d at 749.
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do not decide it. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the district court’s decision
to deny the name change was not an abuse of discretion. See Gutierrez, ¶ 15, 500 P.3d at
988. We affirm.
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