Jamie Stuart Snyder v. The State of Wyoming ( 2021 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING
2021 WY 108OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2021
October 12, 2021
JAMIE STUART SNYDER,
Appellant
(Defendant),
v. S-20-0245
THE STATE OF WYOMING,
Appellee
(Plaintiff).
Appeal from the District Court of Goshen County
The Honorable Patrick W. Korell, Judge
Representing Appellant:
Office of the State Public Defender: Diane Lozano, State Public Defender; Kirk A.
Morgan, Chief Appellate Counsel; Lauren McLane, Faculty Director, Matthew
Klein, Student Director, Nathan Yanchek, Student Attorney, Thomas C. Fogle,
Student Attorney, of the University of Wyoming Law Defender Aid Clinic.
Argument by Mr. Klein.
Representing Appellee:
Bridget Hill, Wyoming Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Deputy Attorney
General; Joshua C. Eames, Senior Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Mr.
Eames.
Before FOX, C.J., and DAVIS*, KAUTZ, and GRAY, JJ., and FROELICHER, D.J.
* Chief Justice at time of oral argument.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.
Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne,
Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before
final publication in the permanent volume.
FROELICHER, District Judge.
[¶1] Jamie S. Snyder appeals from his conviction for the first-degree murder of Wade
Erschabek following a jury trial. Mr. Snyder raises three issues on appeal. First, Mr.
Snyder challenges a circuit court decision that he was competent and fit to proceed.
Second, he contends the district court erred in deciding that Mr. Snyder’s statements to law
enforcement were voluntary. Finally, Mr. Snyder argues there was insufficient evidence
of premeditation for the jury to convict him of first-degree murder. We affirm.
ISSUES
[¶2] We restate the issues as:
1. Did the circuit court err when it determined that Mr.
Snyder was competent and fit to proceed?
2. Did the district court err when it determined Mr.
Snyder’s statements to law enforcement were voluntarily
made?
3. Was there sufficient evidence of premeditation for a
jury to convict Mr. Snyder of first-degree murder?
FACTS
[¶3] Mr. Snyder has a history of mental health issues, including commitments to mental
health facilities. In June and July of 2012, Mr. Snyder was hospitalized two times due to
paranoid and psychotic symptoms, as well as homicidal ideation. In 2014, he was again
hospitalized and diagnosed with depression, a personality disorder, and substance abuse
disorder.
[¶4] On May 23, 2018, Mr. Snyder reported a burglary at his home. Mr. Snyder believed
the title to his truck and his social security card were stolen. Mr. Snyder suspected Mr.
Erschabek of having committed the burglary. He told several acquaintances about his
suspicions, and stated that Mr. Erschabek “needed to die.”
[¶5] Sometime during the afternoon of May 23, Mr. Snyder called his mother and was
upset about the burglary. Concerned about Mr. Snyder’s behavior, his mother called in a
welfare check. The following morning, on May 24, 2018, Goshen County Sheriff’s
1
Department Sergeant Kory Fleenor1 went to Mr. Snyder’s home to investigate the burglary.
He also went to perform a welfare check on Mr. Snyder. Sergeant Fleenor observed that
Mr. Snyder appeared pretty upset and concerned about the alleged burglary. During the
welfare check he observed that Mr. Snyder was “very pleasant” and “was the clearest” he
had seen Mr. Snyder. Sergeant Fleenor testified that he did not have any concern about
Mr. Snyder harming himself or about his mental health.
[¶6] Later in the afternoon, Mr. Erschabek and his friend Justin Ellis were driving
through Fort Laramie to pick up a mattress and stopped at Gavin Martin’s residence. On
their way to Mr. Martin’s home, Mr. Ellis saw Mr. Snyder pass them in his truck traveling
in the opposite direction. Mr. Snyder, after passing Mr. Ellis and Mr. Erschabek,
immediately turned his vehicle around and followed Mr. Ellis to Mr. Martin’s home and
parked within two feet of Mr. Ellis’ vehicle.
[¶7] After parking, Mr. Ellis stayed in his vehicle while Mr. Erschabek exited and walked
to the passenger side of Mr. Snyder’s truck. Mr. Erschabek began speaking to Mr. Snyder
through the passenger side window. Mr. Ellis testified that the conversation seemed to be
one-sided as Mr. Snyder did not appear to be talking. Mr. Ellis then exited his vehicle, and
Mr. Snyder exited his truck holding a large black knife. Mr. Snyder moved between the
vehicles, lunged at Mr. Erschabek and stabbed him in the chest with the knife. At that
point, Mr. Ellis tried to call 911, but Mr. Snyder pointed his knife at Mr. Ellis and told him
to “put the phone down.” Mr. Ellis complied, and Mr. Snyder got into his truck and left.
When emergency medical personnel arrived at the home, Mr. Erschabek was dead. The
stab wound to Mr. Erschabek’s chest was over five inches deep, cut three ribs, and
penetrated his heart. Sergeant Fleenor located a black fixed-blade knife amongst some
trees in the front yard of Mr. Martin’s residence.
[¶8] Mr. Snyder was arrested at his home later that day. When law enforcement arrived,
Mr. Snyder had just taken a shower. After obtaining a search warrant, deputies searched
Mr. Snyder’s home and noticed that the towel in the bathroom was wet and there were
fresh shavings in the sink.
[¶9] In the early morning hours of May 25, 2018, at approximately 1:30 a.m., Deputy
Edwin Ochoa drove Mr. Snyder to the area where he indicated that he dumped the clothing
he was wearing at the time of the murder. Before Deputy Ochoa and Mr. Snyder arrived
at the location, Deputy James Kuhns had already recovered the items. Deputy Kuhns found
“some clothes, a vest, boots . . . [and] a knife holder – a sheath – that wraps around your
leg” in a ditch off the roadway near the location that Mr. Snyder stated he dumped his
1
Kory Fleenor was sworn in as the Goshen County Sheriff on January 7, 2019, but at the time of the murder
was a sergeant with the Goshen County Sheriff’s Department. Throughout this opinion, we will refer to
Kory Fleenor as Sergeant Fleenor.
2
clothes. The deputy testified that he recognized the boots as belonging to Mr. Snyder based
on previous encounters.
[¶10] Beginning at around 9:45 p.m. on May 24, 2018, Sergeant Fleenor and Investigator
Rick Scott interviewed Mr. Snyder for approximately four hours at the jail. During the
interview, Mr. Snyder provided several different stories about what had happened that day.
Eventually, Mr. Snyder claimed he stabbed Mr. Erschabek in self-defense and that Mr.
Erschabek lunged at him and impaled himself.
[¶11] The State charged Mr. Snyder with first-degree murder on May 25, 2018. On May
29, 2018, before the preliminary hearing, Mr. Snyder’s counsel challenged Mr. Snyder’s
competency and filed a motion pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-303, requesting that
Mr. Snyder be examined to determine his fitness to proceed. The circuit court issued an
order suspending the proceedings and ordered the Wyoming State Hospital (WSH) to
examine Mr. Snyder’s competency.
[¶12] In her first forensic report dated July 30, 2018, Dr. Katherine Mahaffey concluded
Mr. Snyder was not competent and recommended that he be transferred to WSH for
restoration of his competence. On September 14, 2018, the circuit court issued a written
order suspending the proceedings and, in accordance with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-303(e),
committed Mr. Snyder to WSH, and directed WSH to determine whether there was a
substantial probability Mr. Snyder would regain his fitness to proceed.
[¶13] On January 28, 2019, Dr. Mahaffey completed her restoration evaluation and
concluded that Mr. Snyder was competent. Mr. Snyder’s counsel requested a hearing
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-303(g) to contest Dr. Mahaffey’s conclusion. The
circuit court held an evidentiary hearing on February 19, 2019. Dr. Mahaffey and Dr.
Maximillian Wachtel, a forensic psychologist, testified.2 Dr. Mahaffey testified
consistently with her report that Mr. Snyder has the level of capacity related to fitness to
proceed and there is no additional time necessary to achieve competency. Dr. Wachtel
testified that he only met with Mr. Snyder one time and he did not have enough “experience
yet with Mr. Snyder to come up with an opinion that would override . . . the evaluation
done by [WSH] in terms of their diagnosis.” He further testified that Dr. Mahaffey did a
good job on her report and though he had concerns, he did not have enough information to
contest her conclusions on Mr. Snyder’s competency and fitness to proceed. The circuit
2
The competency hearing was recorded by the circuit court’s digital electronic recording system and then
transcribed by a transcriptionist. The transcript included 32 separate instances where the testimony was
transcribed as either “unintelligible” or “inaudible.” Although neither party raised the quality of the
recording as an issue, we take this opportunity to stress the importance of having high quality verbatim
transcripts of important hearings.
3
court issued a written order concluding the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence
that Mr. Snyder was fit to proceed.3
[¶14] On April 3, 2019, Mr. Snyder pled not guilty and not guilty by reason of mental
illness (NGMI). The district court ordered Mr. Snyder undergo an NGMI evaluation
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-304. Dr. Mahaffey, on behalf of WSH, evaluated Mr.
Snyder. She concluded that at the time of Mr. Erschabek’s death, Mr. Snyder “did not
suffer from a mental illness or mental deficiency so severely abnormal as to have grossly
and demonstrably impaired his perception or understanding of reality.” In addition, she
determined Mr. Snyder had the “capacity . . . to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct
[and] to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.” On September 4, 2019, Mr.
Snyder requested a second evaluation to be completed by Dr. Wachtel pursuant to Wyo.
Stat. Ann. § 7-11-304(g). The district court conditionally granted the second evaluation,
but there is nothing in the record to suggest it was ever completed.
[¶15] On November 1, 2019, Mr. Snyder filed a motion to suppress the statements he
made to law enforcement during the four-hour interview on May 24 and 25, 2018. Mr.
Snyder’s motion asserted his statements were not voluntary in violation of the United States
and Wyoming Constitutions. Generally, Mr. Snyder argued his “serious mental illness”
affected the voluntariness of his statements when combined with the “coercive nature of
the custodial interrogation.” On December 3, 2019, the district court held an evidentiary
hearing. Following the hearing, the district court concluded Mr. Snyder’s statements were
voluntary and denied his motion to suppress.
[¶16] A jury convicted Mr. Snyder of first-degree murder following a four-day trial ending
on February 13, 2020. On June 2, 2020, the district court sentenced Mr. Snyder to life
imprisonment according to law. Mr. Snyder timely filed notice of appeal to this Court.
DISCUSSION
A. Competency
1. Standard of Review
[¶17] Currently, we review a trial court’s decision on a defendant’s competency by a two-
part standard. First, we determine whether the trial court evaluated the defendant’s
competency by the correct standard. Second, we apply a substantial evidence standard to
determine whether the decision is fairly supported by the record of the proceeding at which
the determination is made. Marshall v. State, 2016 WY 119, ¶ 12, 385 P.3d 304, 308 (Wyo.
2016); see also McLaren v. State, 2017 WY 154, ¶ 14, 407 P.3d 1200, 1203-04 (Wyo.
3
The circuit court held a preliminary hearing on the same day as the competency hearing and bound the
case over to district court.
4
2017); Schaeffer v. State, 2012 WY 9, ¶ 32 n.2, 268 P.3d 1045, 1058 n.2 (Wyo. 2012);
Fletcher v. State, 2010 WY 167, ¶ 12, 245 P.3d 327, 330-31 (Wyo. 2010)); deShazer v.
State, 2003 WY 98, ¶¶ 12-13, 74 P.3d 1240, 1244-45 (Wyo. 2003).4
[¶18] This standard of review originates from deShazer, where we said:
We turn to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals for an outline of
the standards that must be employed in the review of issues
relating to competency of a defendant as it pertains to the trial
process:
Although competence is a factual issue, that term, as
this case clearly demonstrates, is not self-defining.
Because competency to stand trial is an aspect of
substantive due process, . . . the legal standard by which
competency is to be evaluated is constitutionally
mandated. Accordingly, the components of that
standard, required as they are by the Constitution, do not
vary according to the views of a particular court. The
Constitution can require but one gauge against which to
determine whether, because of his mental condition, a
defendant’s due process rights are violated by requiring
him to stand trial. The content of the standard of
competency is therefore a question of law which we
review de novo.
Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546, 1550-56 (10th Cir. 1991)
(internal citations omitted); State v. Soares, 81 Hawai’i 332,
916 P.2d 1233, 1251 (App. 1996); Dusky v. United States, 362
U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960) (per curiam); and
see Hayes v. State, 599 P.2d 558, 562-63 (Wyo. 1979).
deShazer, ¶ 12, 74 P.3d at 1244-45. We continued:
Once the trial court has “evaluated a defendant’s competency
by the correct standard, the second inquiry on review is
whether the trial court’s determination of a defendant’s
competency is fairly supported by the record of the proceeding
at which the determination [is] made. . . . In other words, the
4
We recently applied the substantial evidence standard of review to a challenge to a district court’s decision
denying a criminal defendant a third competency evaluation. In that case, that parties agreed that we should
review the trial court’s decision under the substantial evidence standard. Merlak v. State, 2021 WY 95,
¶ 15, 493 P.3d 187, 192 (Wyo. 2021)
5
substantial evidence standard of review governs the second
inquiry.” Soares, 916 P.2d at 1251.
Id. ¶ 13, 74 P.3d at 1245.
[¶19] The State urges us to reconsider our standard of review and to adopt the abuse of
discretion standard of review for defendant competency determinations. According to it,
the substantial evidence standard of review can be traced back to Soares, which we cited
in deShazer. In Soares, although recognizing that most appellate courts had adopted the
abuse of discretion standard for reviewing a trial court’s determination that a defendant
was competent to standard trial, the Hawaii appellate court nevertheless adopted the
substantial evidence standard utilized by the Tenth Circuit in Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d
1546 (10th Cir. 1991). Soares, 916 P.2d at 1251. The State contends the Soares court’s
reliance on Lafferty was misplaced because it was a federal habeas case under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254, and the question was whether the state trial court had applied the appropriate legal
standard for competency. Lafferty, 949 F.2d at 1548-50. It did not address whether the
trial court erred after applying the correct legal standard. More importantly, the State
informs us Soares has since been overruled by the Hawaii Supreme Court. See State v.
Janto, 986 P.2d 306 (Haw. 1999). In Janto, the court instead adopted an abuse of discretion
standard and explained:
We overrule Soares and hold that the trial court’s
determination that a defendant is competent to stand trial will
be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Accord Siah
v. State, 837 P.2d 485, 487 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992) (holding
that “[d]etermination of competency to stand trial is a matter
left to the sound discretion of the [trial] court”); State v.
Perkins, 248 Kan. 760, 811 P.2d 1142 (1991) (holding that,
“[o]n appeal, the reviewing court’s inquiry on a trial court’s
determination that a defendant is competent is whether the trial
court abused its discretion”). The standard for determining
competence is statutorily mandated by HRS Chapter 704 and
primarily a matter for the professional determination of the
examiners appointed by the trial court in accordance with HRS
Chapter 704. An abuse of discretion standard is appropriate
because the determination relies upon the trial court’s
assessment of the testimony of expert witnesses and its
observational assessment of the defendant.
Janto, 986 P.2d at 316.
[¶20] We agree with the State. The substantial evidence standard of review is not
appropriate for reviewing defendant competency decisions. In our jurisprudence, the
6
substantial evidence standard is primarily applied in administrative law.5 The phrase
“substantial evidence” comes directly from the Wyoming Administrative Procedures Act6
and is not included or referenced in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-302. The abuse of discretion
standard is the appropriate standard of review to apply to a lower court’s determination that
a defendant is competent to stand trial. As the Janto court aptly observed, such standard
is fitting given the competency determination turns largely upon the lower court’s
assessment of expert testimony and its observations of the defendant. Janto, 986 P.2d at
316. Therefore, we overrule deShazer and its progeny with respect to the standard of
review applicable to a lower court’s determination that a defendant is competent to stand
trial. We will review a lower court’s decision that a defendant is competent to stand trial
for an abuse of discretion. Its underlying factual findings, however, will be reviewed for
clear error.
[¶21] This is the same standard we employ when reviewing a district court’s
determination that a child victim was competent to testify. In Young v. State, there was
confusion in our case law as to whether the clearly erroneous or abuse of discretion
standard applied to determinations of child witness competency. Young v. State, 2018 WY
53, ¶¶ 9-11, 418 P.3d 224, 226-27 (Wyo. 2018). We noted the two standards had “much
in common”:
The clearly erroneous and abuse of discretion standards
of review have much in common, in that they are both
deferential to the district court. See, e.g., Lovato v. State, 2010
WY 38, ¶ 11, 228 P.3d 55, 57 (Wyo. 2010) (clearly erroneous);
Garland v. State, 2017 WY 102, ¶ 24, 401 P.3d 480, 487 (Wyo.
2017) (abuse of discretion). Typically, though, the clearly
erroneous standard is used to evaluate a district court’s findings
of fact, while another standard is used to determine whether the
district court’s decision was legally correct. For example, in
reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress
evidence allegedly obtained through an improper search and/or
seizure, we apply the clearly erroneous standard to the district
court’s findings of fact and the de novo standard to its ruling
on the underlying legal issue of whether the defendant’s
constitutional rights were violated. See, e.g., Kennison v. State,
2018 WY 46, ¶ 11, 417 P.3d 146, 147 (Wyo. 2018); Jennings
v. State, 2016 WY 69, ¶ 8, 375 P.3d 788, 790 (Wyo. 2016).
5
This Court applies the substantial evidence standard in cases where the administrative agency decision
being reviewed was made after a contested case hearing. Wilson Advisory Comm. v. Bd. of County
Comm’rs, 2012 WY 163, ¶ 18, 292 P.3d 855, 861 (Wyo. 2012).
6
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c)(ii)(E) (LexisNexis 2021) states that a court should “[h]old unlawful and
set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be . . . [u]nsupported by substantial evidence in
a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute.”
7
On the other hand, the abuse of discretion standard is
generally used to review claims that the district court erred in
admitting evidence when a proper objection was made at trial.
See, e.g., Garrison v. State, 2018 WY 9, ¶ 19, 409 P.3d 1209,
1215 (Wyo. 2018). A review of cases from other jurisdictions
reveals the abuse of discretion standard is commonly used to
review a lower court’s determination that a child witness was
competent to testify. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Delbridge,
578 Pa. 641, 855 A.2d 27, 34, n.8 (2003); Baldit v. State, 522
S.W.3d 753, 761 (Tex. Ct. App. 2017); Davis v. State, 24 Ark.
App. 152, 751 S.W.2d 11, 13 (1988); State v. Williams, 2018
WL 1217361, *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2018); State v.
Spaniol, 895 N.W.2d 329, 337 (S.D. 2017); Marn v. People,
175 Colo. 242, 486 P.2d 424, 426 (1971) (en banc); Ortiz v.
Commonwealth, 276 Va. 705, 667 S.E.2d 751, 756 (2008).
Young, ¶¶ 12-13, 418 P.3d at 227. In the end, we concluded: “While the clearly erroneous
standard of review is the correct standard for reviewing a district court’s underlying factual
findings, the abuse of discretion standard is appropriate for reviewing the district court’s
final determination of competence and, thus, the admissibility of the child’s testimony.”
Young, ¶ 14, 418 P.3d at 227 (footnote omitted). See also Miller v. State, 2021 WY 16,
¶ 25, 479 P.3d 387, 393 (Wyo. 2021) (“We review the district court’s competency
determination for an abuse of discretion and its underlying factual findings under our
clearly erroneous standard of review.”) (citation omitted).
[¶22] A review of case law from other jurisdictions reveals that the abuse of discretion
standard is commonly applied by appellate courts to review a lower court’s decision that a
defendant is competent to stand trial. See, e.g., Julio Garcia v. State, 300 So.3d 945, 965
(Miss. 2020) (“As to the trial court’s actual finding—that Garcia was competent during the
entire trial-court proceedings—we find no abuse of discretion.”) (citation omitted);
Commonwealth v. Jones, 90 N.E.3d 1238, 1248-49 (Mass. 2018) (“A judge’s competency
determination is reviewed for abuse of discretion.”) (citation omitted); State v. Marshall,
362 P.3d 587, 592 (Kan. 2015) (“An appellate court applies an abuse of discretion standard
when determining whether a district court made the correct decision regarding a
defendant’s competency to stand trial.”) (citation omitted); Harper v. State, 579 N.E.2d 68,
70 (Ind. 1991) (“The trial court’s decision as to whether a defendant is competent to stand
trial will not be disturbed except for a showing of a clear abuse of discretion.”) (citation
omitted); State v. Statczar, 743 P.2d 606, 613 (Mont. 1987) (“Fitness to proceed to trial is
a matter largely within the discretion of the District Court. Therefore, we will not overturn
a decision of the District Court in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion.”) (citations
omitted); State v. Ortiz, 706 P.2d 1069, 1071 (Wash. 1985) (“The trial court has wide
discretion in judging the mental competency of a defendant to stand trial. Accordingly, a
8
trial court’s decision will not be reversed unless it has abused its discretion.”) (citations
omitted).
[¶23] Under the abuse of discretion standard, we consider whether the trial court could
“reasonably conclude as it did.” Requejo v. State, 2019 WY 44, ¶ 7, 439 P.3d 747, 749
(Wyo. 2019). See also Miller, ¶ 25, 479 P.3d at 393 (“Determining whether the trial court
abused its discretion involves consideration of whether the court could reasonably conclude
as it did, and whether it acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.”) (citation omitted).
“An abuse of discretion can also exist if the wrong law has been applied, the correct law
has been applied but incorrectly interpreted, or if the correct law has been improperly
applied.” Steffey v. State, 2019 WY 101, ¶ 18, 449 P.3d 1100, 1105 (Wyo. 2019) (quoting
Grove v. Pfister, 2005 WY 51, ¶ 6, 110 P.3d 275, 278 (Wyo. 2005)).
[¶24] Under the clearly erroneous standard, we presume the lower court’s underlying
factual findings to be correct and view them in the light most favorable to the lower court
“because it has an opportunity to view and hear the witnesses, and to assess credibility.”
Cf. Maestas v. State, 2018 WY 47, ¶ 7, 416 P.3d 777, 780 (Wyo. 2018) (citation omitted)
(review of factual findings on a motion to suppress). See also Miller, ¶ 25, 479 P.3d at 393
(when reviewing a lower court’s child witness competency determination, “we do not
presume to place ourselves in the shoes of the trial court in these cases by reading a cold
record. The trial court sees the witness’s facial expressions, hears inflections in his voice
and watches his mannerisms during examination. These observations are a vital part of the
ultimate ruling on competency.”) (citation omitted).
2. Law of Competency
[¶25] We have described the general legal principles underlying the requirement that a
defendant be competent as follows:
“A criminal defendant may not be tried unless he is competent,
and he may not waive his right to counsel or plead guilty unless
he does so ‘competently and intelligently.’” Godinez v. Moran,
509 U.S. 389, 396, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993),
quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468, 58 S.Ct. 1019,
82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). The same standard of competency
applies whether a defendant goes to trial or pleads guilty.
Godinez, 509 U.S. at 398, 113 S.Ct. 2680. The United States
Supreme Court has ruled that a defendant is competent, under
the standards of due process, if he has “‘sufficient present
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding’ and has ‘a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him.’” Godinez, 509
U.S. at 396, 113 S.Ct. 2680, quoting Dusky v. United States,
9
362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960) (per curiam).
The determination of whether a defendant is mentally fit to
proceed must be made by the trial court. Hayes v. State, 599
P.2d 558, 563 (Wyo. 1979). “It is not in the nature of a defense
to the charge. It is a threshold issue, necessary to be resolved
to prevent a violation of due process through conviction of a
person incompetent to stand trial.” Id. Moreover, the
competency requirement continues from the time of
arraignment through sentencing. See Godinez, 509 U.S. at 403,
113 S.Ct. 2680 (Kennedy, J., concurring); deShazer v. State,
2003 WY 98, ¶ 20, 74 P.3d 1240, 1248 (Wyo. 2003).
Follett v. State, 2006 WY 47, ¶ 8, 132 P.3d 1155, 1158 (Wyo. 2006).
[¶26] In accordance with the due process requirement that a criminal defendant be
competent, Wyoming adopted a statute which sets the standard by which a defendant’s
competency is measured. That statute provides:
(a) No person shall be tried, sentenced or punished for the
commission of an offense while, as a result of mental illness or
deficiency, he lacks the capacity, to:
(i) Comprehend his position;
(ii) Understand the nature and object of the proceedings
against him;
(iii) Conduct his defense in a rational manner; and
(iv) Cooperate with his counsel to the end that any available
defense may be interposed.
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-302 (LexisNexis 2021).
[¶27] Under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-302, a criminal defendant may be found unfit to
proceed due to a “mental illness or deficiency.” Section 7-11-301 defines “mental
deficiency” as a “defect attributable to intellectual disability, brain damage and cognitive
abilities.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-301(a)(iii). Although the phrase “mental illness or
deficiency” is defined in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-304 for purposes of determining when a
defendant is not responsible for criminal conduct as a result of mental illness, the term
“mental illness” is not defined for purposes of the competency statutes. In other words,
there is no specific definition of “mental illness” applicable to competency decisions under
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-302.
10
3. Analysis
[¶28] Mr. Snyder contests the circuit court’s finding that he possessed the competency to
“conduct his defense in a rational manner” and to “cooperate with his counsel to the end
that any available defense may be interposed.” In support of his position, Mr. Snyder
presents two distinct arguments. First, he argues Dr. Mahaffey’s conclusions are flawed
because they were based on an incorrect premise that borderline personality disorder is not
a mental illness. Second, Mr. Snyder contends the evidence presented does not support the
circuit court’s conclusion that he was competent to proceed.
[¶29] Whether or not Dr. Mahaffey was correct in implying that borderline personality
disorder is not a mental illness or deficiency, that statement or implication was not the sole
basis for her ultimate conclusions. Mr. Snyder correctly stated that Dr. Mahaffey’s
conclusions indicated Mr. Snyder had no incapacities related to his competency in part
because any incapacity was related to Mr. Snyder’s “personality pathology” and not “due
to mental illness or deficiency.” Dr. Mahaffey, however, testified she also based her
conclusions regarding Mr. Snyder’s fitness on the fact that his borderline personality
disorder was stable.
[¶30] In other words, assuming a borderline personality disorder qualifies as a “mental
illness or deficiency” under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-302, Dr. Mahaffey opined that Mr.
Snyder’s borderline personality disorder was stable and was not interfering with his ability
to function. Dr. Mahaffey further testified Mr. Snyder was not chaotic, was able to comply,
was able to work with his treatment providers and he did not “show that kind of chaos or
anxiety that could contribute in interfering with his ability to work with [his] defense.”
Instead, Dr. Mahaffey attributed Mr. Snyder’s behaviors to his lack of candor and
unwillingness to cooperate. Dr. Mahaffey concluded:
In the previous report, this examiner expressed concern the
Defendant’s mental illness appeared to interfere with his
ability to apply that knowledge in a rational manner. Based on
a lengthy period of observation and assessment as well as
additional collateral information, it appears that this initial
assessment was inaccurate; and Mr. Snyder’s presentation and
behavior during the evaluation process was attributable to a
lack of candor and willingness to cooperate, personality
pathology, and not a psychotic process or major mental illness.
[¶31] Therefore, even if Dr. Mahaffey may have incorrectly concluded that Mr. Snyder’s
borderline personality disorder was not a mental illness, her determination that he was
competent did not rest entirely on that conclusion. We therefore find Dr. Mahaffey’s legal
11
conclusion that a personality disorder is not a mental illness did not require the circuit court
to disregard her ultimate conclusions on Mr. Snyder’s competency.7
[¶32] Applying our adopted standard of review, we further conclude the circuit court did
not abuse its discretion in determining Mr. Snyder was competent to stand trial.8
[¶33] The evidence presented at the competency hearing was primarily the testimony of
two expert witnesses. When weighing expert medical opinion testimony, the fact finder
should consider: “(1) the opinion; (2) the reasons, if any, given for it; (3) the strength of it;
and (4) the qualifications and credibility of the witness or witnesses expressing it.” Anastos
v. Gen. Chem. Soda Ash, 2005 WY 122, ¶ 20, 120 P.3d 658, 666 (Wyo. 2005) (quoting
Bando v. Clure Bros. Furniture, 980 P.2d 323, 329-30 (Wyo. 1999)). A fact finder may
“disregard an expert opinion if [it] finds the opinion unreasonable, not adequately
supported by the facts upon which the opinion is based, or based upon an incomplete and
inaccurate medical history provided by the claimant.” Taylor v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’
Safety & Comp. Div., 2005 WY 148, ¶ 15, 123 P.3d 143, 148 (Wyo. 2005). When a trial
court is faced with conflicting expert opinions, it “does not clearly err simply by crediting
one opinion over another where other record evidence exists to support the conclusion.”
Jendresen v. State, 2021 WY 82, ¶ 33, 491 P.3d 273, 284 (Wyo. 2021) (quoting Fletcher,
¶ 20, 245 P.3d at 333).
[¶34] Dr. Mahaffey, in her restoration report and her testimony, opined that Mr. Snyder
was competent. Dr. Mahaffey’s opinions were based upon numerous interviews with Mr.
Snyder, her review of extensive collateral information pertaining to Mr. Snyder, his
medical and psychological histories, and observation of him during his in-patient stay at
WSH between September 24 and December 20, 2018. Dr. Mahaffey acknowledged Mr.
Snyder has a borderline personality disorder which “could undermine a person’s ability to
work with their attorney,” but she testified Mr. Snyder “didn’t show that kind of chaos or
anxiety that could contribute in interfering with his ability to work with [his] defense.” She
testified it was her opinion that Mr. Snyder was competent and did not need further
treatment.
[¶35] Dr. Wachtel, a forensic psychologist retained by defense counsel performed only
one clinical examination of Mr. Snyder for approximately five and one-half hours. Dr.
7
We do not reach the question of whether a borderline personality disorder is a mental illness for purposes
of competency under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-302, because reaching that conclusion is unnecessary to our
decision.
8
It is worth noting that Mr. Snyder, following the circuit court’s decision, did not raise his competency
again while the case proceeded through the district court. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-303 allows competency
to be raised at any stage of the criminal proceedings when there is reasonable cause to believe the defendant
is unfit to proceed. See Merlak, ¶ 15, 493 P.3d at 192 (reflecting that the court has a continuing duty to
monitor a defendant for competency and that a second evaluation is potentially available upon a proper
showing).
12
Wachtel did not opine that Mr. Snyder was not competent. Instead, he testified that he did
not have enough “experience yet with Mr. Snyder to come up with an opinion that would
override . . . the evaluation done by [WSH] in terms of their diagnosis.” Dr. Watchel
generally agreed Dr. Mahaffey’s report was more accurate and merely indicated that Mr.
Snyder’s diagnosis could affect a person’s decision-making ability, particularly regarding
waivers, pleas, and trial.
[¶36] Dr. Wachtel’s opinions as to the effect Mr. Snyder’s personality disorder had on his
competency were couched only in terms of possibilities. Dr. Mahaffey’s opinions, on the
other hand, were instead based upon a more extensive and thorough evaluation and more
strongly stated. Although Mr. Snyder has a borderline personality disorder which could
affect his capacity to conduct his defense in a rational manner and to cooperate with his
counsel to the end that any available defense may be interposed, the evidence established
his personality disorder was not affecting those abilities. Therefore, we conclude the circuit
court did not abuse its discretion when it found Mr. Snyder competent to proceed.
B. Voluntariness
1. Standard of Review
[¶37] The standard of review we apply to trial court decisions on the voluntariness of a
defendant’s statements to law enforcement has been described as:
Voluntariness is a legal question; thus, we review the ultimate
issue, whether a defendant’s statements were voluntary, de
novo. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 110, 106 S.Ct. 445, 449-
50, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985); Doyle [v. State], 954 P.2d [969,] at
972 [(Wyo. 1998)]; Simmers v. State, 943 P.2d 1189, 1194
(Wyo. 1997); [State v.] Evans, 944 P.2d [1120,] at 1124 [(Wyo.
1997)]. On review, however, we will not disturb the trial
court’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. Id. We look
to the totality of the circumstances to determine if the
defendant’s statements were voluntary. Vigil v. State, 859 P.2d
659, 664 (Wyo. 1993).
Pena v. State, 2004 WY 115, ¶ 7, 98 P.3d 857, 862 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting Mitchell v. State,
982 P.2d 717, 720-21 (Wyo. 1999)). Regarding our review of a trial court’s factual
findings on voluntariness, we have also said:
This Court considers the evidence in the light most favorable
to the trial court’s determination because the trial court has the
opportunity to hear the evidence and to assess the credibility of
witnesses. Id. [Hannon v. State, 2004 WY 8, ¶ 12, 84 P.3d 320,
13
328 (Wyo. 2004)] When the defendant claims that his
statements were involuntary, “it is the duty of an appellate
court . . . ‘to examine the entire record and make an
independent determination of the ultimate issue of
voluntariness.’” Id., ¶ 50, 84 P.3d at 339 (quoting Beckwith v.
United States, 425 U.S. 341, 348, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 1617, 48
L.Ed.2d 1 (1976)).
Sen v. State, 2013 WY 47, ¶ 15, 301 P.3d 106, 114 (Wyo. 2013). If the court concludes a
defendant’s statements to police were involuntary, then it must determine de novo if the
introduction of the statement was harmless. See generally Large v. State, 2008 WY 22, ¶
25, 177 P.3d 807, 814-815 (Wyo. 2008); Lewis v. State, 2002 WY 92, ¶ 26, 48 P.3d 1063,
1071 (Wyo. 2002) (“the remaining question is whether the admission at trial of those
statements that should have been suppressed was harmless error”).
2. Law of Voluntariness
[¶38] The “determination that a defendant was subject to custodial interrogation for
purposes of Miranda does not answer the separate question of whether any statements
given were given voluntarily.” Rodriguez v. State, 2018 WY 134, ¶ 31, 430 P.3d 766, 773
(Wyo. 2018) (quoting Jelle v. State, 2005 WY 111, ¶ 15, 119 P.3d 403, 408 (Wyo. 2005)).
“Confessions, admissions, and statements are constitutionally required to be voluntary by
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and by Art. 1, § 6
of the Wyoming Constitution.” State v. Evans, 944 P.2d 1120, 1124 (Wyo. 1997) (quoting
Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 478, 92 S.Ct. 619, 621, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972)); Black v.
State, 820 P.2d 969, 971 (Wyo. 1991)). Since its decision in Bram v. United States, 168
U.S. 532, 542, 18 S.Ct. 183, 187, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897), the voluntariness requirement has
been a part of the United States Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence. Evans, 944
P.2d at 1124-25.
[¶39] An “accused’s extrajudicial statement” is deemed involuntary “until the State meets
its burden of proving and persuading that the statement was made freely and voluntarily.”
Evans, 944 P.2d at 1127 (referencing Maki v. State, 18 Wyo. 481, 485-86, 112 P. 334, 335
(1911)). “The prosecution has the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that a defendant’s statement is voluntary.” Sen, ¶ 19, 301 P.3d at 115-16 (quoting Wilkins
v. State, 2005 WY 2, ¶ 9, 104 P.3d 85, 89 (Wyo. 2005)). The test for determining
voluntariness is not limited to an objective test because we must look at the nature of the
defendant. Jelle, ¶ 18 n.9, 119 P.3d at 410 n.9.
[¶40] “A confession is not voluntary if extracted by threats or improper influences or
promises.” Rodriguez, ¶ 31, 430 P.3d at 773 (citing Garcia v. State, 777 P.2d 603, 606
(Wyo. 1989)). “In Wyoming, coercive police tactics violate the due process clause of Wyo.
Const. Art. 1, § 6 and statements elicited pursuant to these tactics may be suppressed.”
14
Rodriguez, ¶ 33, 430 P.3d at 774 (citing Evans, 944 P.2d at 1125). “[I]nvoluntariness
requires coercive state action, such as trickery, psychological pressure, or mistreatment.”
Gunn v. State, 2003 WY 24, ¶ 25, 64 P.3d 716, 723 (Wyo. 2003). We have said, however,
that “[a] finding of coercion or overreaching by law enforcement does not necessarily
require evidence of violence, threats, overt intimidation or misconduct” and that coercion
can be mental as well as physical. Hannon v. State, 2004 WY 8, ¶ 54, 84 P.3d 320, 341
(Wyo. 2004) (citing Garcia, 777 P.2d at 606). “The use of misstatements or tricks in and
of themselves does not render a confession or admission involuntary.” Gunn, ¶ 25, 64 P.3d
at 723 (citation omitted).
[¶41] Additionally, we explained:
As one Wyoming jurist has noted:
The role of the courts is to ensure that an individual’s
right to remain silent offers true protection to the
individual. It is therefore dangerous for courts to end
their inquiry into whether an individual’s statements are
truly voluntary once they have located the magic phrase
“you do not have to answer any questions and you are
free to leave.” Coercion does not always come in such
easy to spot packages as racks and whips. All too often
it comes in the more subtle forms of an individual
placed in jeopardy and told to make a crucial decision
without the benefit of an attorney.
Thus, we have held particular tactics were not coercive when
used by law enforcement on some suspects, but have found
other tactics, used in combination with the particular personal
characteristics of the accused, resulted in coercion. The inquiry
is a fact-sensitive one, often resulting in cases that closely
resemble each other being decided differently.
Hannon, ¶ 54, 84 P.3d at 341 (internal citations omitted)
[¶42] In Evans, we described some of the factors which should be considered when
determining the voluntariness of a defendant’s statements to law enforcement:
In resolving the voluntariness issue, the trial court must
consider the totality of the circumstances under which the
statement was given, including:
15
The atmosphere and events surrounding the elicitation
of the statement, such as the use of violence, threats,
promises, improper influence or official misconduct,
the conduct of the defendant before and during the
interrogation and the defendant’s mental condition at
the time the statement is made.
Evans, 944 P.2d at 1125 (citation omitted). We also described the factors to be considered
in the analysis of “the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation,”
including the following:
whether the defendant was in custody or was free to leave and
was aware of the situation; whether Miranda warnings were
given prior to any interrogation and whether the defendant
understood and waived Miranda rights; whether the defendant
had the opportunity to confer with counsel or anyone else prior
to the interrogation; whether the challenged statement was
made during the course of an interrogation or instead was
volunteered; whether any overt or implied threat or promise
was directed to the defendant; the method and style employed
by the interrogator in questioning the defendant and the length
and place of the interrogation; and the defendant’s mental and
physical condition immediately prior to and during the
interrogation, as well as educational background, employment
status, and prior experience with law enforcement and the
criminal justice system.
Id. at 1126 (citations omitted)).
3. Analysis
[¶43] Mr. Snyder argues the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress and
found his statements were voluntary. He contests the district court’s conclusion that he
had “sufficient intellect and experience to understand the situation he faced when being
interrogated by law enforcement” and that his statements to law enforcement were
voluntary.
[¶44] Mr. Snyder’s arguments on the voluntariness of his statements focus on his
deteriorating mental condition in the days leading up to Mr. Erschabek’s death, Sergeant
Fleenor’s false statements about the existence of DNA evidence linking Mr. Snyder to the
knife, and the timing and length of the interview. The State contends there was insufficient
evidence to support that Mr. Snyder was deteriorating mentally, and Dr. Mahaffey’s
unrefuted testimony reflected Mr. Snyder was not suffering from a mental illness that
16
impacted his ability to participate voluntarily in the interview. The State also asserts
Sergeant Fleenor’s untruthful statement about DNA evidence is not sufficient to show Mr.
Snyder’s statements were involuntary and coerced, and that the length of the interview was
used as an advantage by law enforcement.
[¶45] Certainly, there are several facts which could support a finding that Mr. Snyder’s
statements were involuntary. The interview lasted four hours, Mr. Snyder was in custody,
and he was not wearing socks and shoes during a portion of the interview. Mr. Snyder has
a significant history of mental illness, which includes delusional symptoms and diagnoses.
Mr. Snyder’s mother was concerned enough about Mr. Snyder’s declining mental health
to contact law enforcement for a welfare check. A witness observed Mr. Snyder walking
alone down the railroad tracks and talking to his gloved hands the day before the killing.
Mr. Snyder, during the first evaluations by Dr. Mahaffey in June and July 2018, told her
that he thought the police outside his home on May 24, 2018, were tricolored people or
aliens who were after him. Sergeant Fleenor stated to Mr. Snyder during the interrogation
that Mr. Snyder’s fingerprints and DNA were on the knife law enforcement found, though
such statements were untruthful.
[¶46] Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court’s
determination, however, we agree the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence Mr.
Snyder’s statements to law enforcement were voluntary. According to Sergeant Fleenor,
earlier on May 24, 2018, Mr. Snyder had been “very pleasant” and “was the clearest” he
had seen him. Additionally, Sergeant Fleenor said he did not have any concern about Mr.
Snyder harming himself or about his mental health at that time. Sergeant Fleenor read Mr.
Snyder his Miranda rights, and Mr. Snyder waived those rights in writing and agreed to
speak with law enforcement. The interview was conducted in the law library and not an
interrogation room. Mr. Snyder was not physically restrained other than the fact he had
been arrested and was in custody, but neither deputy had weapons with them. The
interview was generally conversational, without any overt threats or overtly coercive law
enforcement conduct. Mr. Snyder also had prior experience with law enforcement and no
known educational deficiencies.
[¶47] Dr. Mahaffey, after watching the video recording of Mr. Snyder’s interview, was
not concerned that Mr. Snyder’s mental health or personality disorder was affecting the
voluntariness of his statements. She testified:
[Mr. Snyder] appeared to track information just fine. He was
fully aware that he was in custody. That he was interacting . . .
with . . . Sergeant Fleenor [] who he had known from some
time from previous encounters. He was aware he was in
trouble. He was aware that [] at one point he made statements
that he is aware he is providing enough evidence to I believe
he said put him away for 25 years. So he was aware when he
17
was making incriminating statements or statements that were
evidence that the police could use. So he seems to be fully
connected to reality and aware of his surroundings and
organized.
[¶48] Although the interview lasted four hours, the length and timing of the interview is
only one factor considered by the court in determining the voluntariness of a defendant’s
statements. Schwartz v. State, 2021 WY 48, ¶ 15, 483 P.3d 861, 866 (Wyo. 2021).
Moreover, there was no evidence presented establishing how law enforcement used the
length of the interview or its timing to their advantage to coerce any of Mr. Snyder’s
statements. See Schwartz, ¶ 17, 483 P.3d at 866-67. As we have previously held
“confinement to an interview room for ‘the better part of a day,’ when such detention serves
the legitimate purposes of a murder investigation, cannot be characterized as coercive.”
Sen, ¶ 22, 301 P.3d at 116 (quoting Bhutto v. State, 2005 WY 78, ¶ 18, 114 P.3d 1252,
1262 (Wyo. 2005)). Additionally, Sergeant Fleenor gave Mr. Snyder his Miranda
advisements, Mr. Snyder acknowledged his rights, and he continued to speak with law
enforcement. See Vena v. State, 941 P.2d 33, 38 (Wyo. 1997) (finding Mr. Vena’s
statements were voluntary in part because he was advised of his Miranda rights two times
before his admission), abrogated on other grounds by Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149 (Wyo.
1998); Simmers v. State, 943 P.2d 1189, 1196 (Wyo. 1997) (finding Mr. Simmers
statements were voluntary in part because he was advised of his Miranda rights and clearly
understood those rights). Finally, although Sergeant Fleenor was untruthful about the
existence of DNA evidence, that single statement during a four-hour interview is
insufficient, by itself, to show Mr. Snyder’s statements were involuntary.
[¶49] In addition, the circumstances surrounding Mr. Snyder’s statements are dissimilar
to the previous cases where a defendant’s statements have been found to be involuntary.
See Black, 820 P.2d at 972 (confession was involuntary where it resulted from a two-hour
interrogation of a woman who was seven months pregnant and was upset and crying during
the interrogation); Evans, 944 P.2d at 1127-29 (upheld trial court’s decision that state did
not prove defendant’s statement was voluntary where the police officer’s interview
technique, tone, and approach were aggressive, insistently accusatory, and demanding);
and Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135, 142-43 (Wyo. 1986) (overturning a trial court ruling,
noting there were threats, accusations and browbeating as well as a defendant who had only
limited understanding of the English language and his rights under the American justice
system). Based on the record before us, the evidence did not establish the type of coercive
state action necessary to render Mr. Snyder’s statements involuntary.
18
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence on Premeditation
1. Standard of Review
[¶50] When reviewing Mr. Snyder’s claim on the sufficiency of the evidence, the court
determines “whether any rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements
of a charged crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt on the evidence presented.”
Morones v. State, 2020 WY 85, ¶ 8, 466 P.3d 300, 303 (Wyo. 2020) (citing Gonzalez-
Chavarria v. State, 2019 WY 100, ¶ 22, 449 P.3d 1094, 1099 (Wyo. 2019)). “In doing so,
we assume that the State’s evidence is true, disregard any evidence favoring the defendant,
and give the State the benefit of every favorable inference that may reasonably be drawn
from the evidence.” Morones, ¶ 8, 466 P.3d at 303 (citing Gonzalez-Chavarria, ¶ 22, 449
P.3d at 1099). After examining the State’s evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, we
“do not substitute our judgment for that of jury,” but instead, “we determine whether a jury
could have reasonably concluded each of the elements of the crime was proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Andersen v. State, 2014 WY 88, ¶ 23, 330 P.3d 256, 264 (Wyo. 2014)
(quoting Guerrero v. State, 2012 WY 77, ¶ 14, 277 P.3d 735, 738-39 (Wyo. 2012)).
Furthermore, we defer to the jury as the fact-finder, and “assume [the jury] believed only
the evidence adverse to the defendant since they found the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Foltz v. State, 2017 WY 155, ¶ 10, 407 P.3d 398, 401-02 (Wyo. 2017)
(citations omitted). Ultimately, our standard of review is not whether the evidence is
sufficient for us, “but whether, when viewed favorably to the state, it was enough on which
a jury could form a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Pena, ¶ 37,
98 P.3d at 872; Bouwkamp v. State, 833 P.2d 486, 493 (Wyo. 1992) (citation omitted).
2. Law on Premeditation
[¶51] In Bouwkamp, we set out the following framework for evaluating whether there was
sufficient evidence of premeditation:
Evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of premeditation and
deliberation “falls into three basic categories: (1) facts about
. . . what defendant did prior to the actual killing which show
that the defendant was engaged in activity directed toward, and
explicable as intended to result in, the killing—what may be
characterized as ‘planning’ activity; (2) facts about the
defendant’s prior relationship and/or conduct with the victim
from which the jury could reasonably infer a ‘motive’ to kill
the victim, which inference of motive, together with facts of
type (1) or (3) would . . . support an inference that the killing
was the result of ‘a pre-existing reflection’ and ‘careful thought
and weighing of considerations’ rather than ‘mere
unconsidered or rash impulse hastily executed’; (3) facts about
19
the nature of the killing from which the jury could infer that the
manner of killing was so particular and exacting that the
defendant must have intentionally killed according to a
‘preconceived design’ to take the victim’s life in a particular
way for a ‘reason’ which the jury can reasonably infer from
facts of type (1) or (2).”
Bouwkamp, 833 P.2d at 494-95 (citation omitted).
3. Analysis
[¶52] Mr. Snyder contends the evidence did not support the jury’s finding that he engaged
in planning activity. Mr. Snyder generally asserts that his statements to law enforcement
suggest there was no premeditation, Mr. Ellis’ testimony did not demonstrate Mr. Snyder
engaged in cool calculation before stabbing Mr. Erschabek, and the evidence about Mr.
Snyder’s mental health on the day of the killing weighs against the existence of planning
activity. In addition, Mr. Snyder argues the evidence regarding his motive to kill Mr.
Erschabek was thin, and the evidence about the actual killing did not demonstrate he acted
in an exacting and particular manner.
[¶53] Mr. Snyder essentially asks us to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do.
Assuming the jury believed only the evidence adverse to Mr. Snyder, and viewing the
evidence in favor of the State, there was sufficient evidence of premeditation for the jury
to form a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
[¶54] There was evidence Mr. Snyder engaged in “planning activity.” Mr. Snyder
investigated the alleged burglary of his home, and Mr. Erschebek was among the
individuals he believed committed the burglary. On the day before the killing, Mr. Snyder
was carrying a knife in a holster on his chest and was very upset about the alleged burglary.
Michael Paules said four days before the incident Mr. Snyder told him Mr. Erschabek
“needed to die.” After seeing Mr. Erschabek in another vehicle, Mr. Snyder aggressively
turned his big black truck around and closely followed Mr. Erschabek to the location of the
stabbing. Mr. Erschabek parked his truck within two feet of Mr. Ellis’ vehicle and when
Mr. Erschabek went to Mr. Snyder’s passenger side window and began talking, Mr. Snyder
was silent and “seemed serious.” As soon as Mr. Ellis exited his car, Mr. Snyder exited
his truck with a “large, black knife” in his hand, then quickly went between the cars,
“lunged” at Mr. Erschabek, and stabbed him in the chest. The time that elapsed between
when Mr. Snyder first saw Mr. Ellis and Mr. Erschabek driving through Fort Laramie,
followed them to the Martin home, parked there, exited his truck with knife in hand, and
then stabbed Mr. Erschabek allowed an inference of planning activity.
[¶55] There was also evidence from which the jury could infer Mr. Snyder had a motive
to kill Mr. Erschabek. It is not disputed that Mr. Snyder, prior to the day of the stabbing,
20
was significantly concerned that his home had been burgled, which then caused him to be
worried about his safety and the security of his home. In addition, the evidence established
Mr. Snyder conducted his own investigation of possible suspects of the burglary, including
Mr. Erschabek. Four days prior to killing Mr. Erschabek, Mr. Snyder indicated that he had
a grudge against Mr. Erschabek and that Mr. Erschabek looked a little different and
“needed to die.”
[¶56] Finally, there was evidence supporting a finding that the manner of killing was so
exacting and particular to be indicative of premeditation. Mr. Snyder carried his knife with
him as he investigated the alleged burglary. Mr. Snyder had his knife in his hand when he
exited his truck at Mr. Martin’s home. When Mr. Snyder stabbed Mr. Erschabek, the knife
went over five inches into Mr. Erschabek’s chest, cut three ribs, and penetrated his heart.
The jury had before it strong evidence that Mr. Snyder had a “preconceived design” to take
Mr. Erschabek’s life in a “particular way for a reason” and from which the jury could
reasonably infer from his motive and planning activity.
CONCLUSION
[¶57] The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in determining Mr. Snyder was
competent and fit to proceed based upon the credibility and weight of Dr. Mahaffey’s
testimony. The state proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the circumstances of
Mr. Snyder’s statements to law enforcement were not improperly coercive and, therefore,
his statements were made voluntarily. There was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury
to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Snyder premeditated before stabbing Mr.
Erschabek. Therefore, we affirm his conviction.
21