James Michael Wiley v. The State of Wyoming ( 2020 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING
2020 WY 49APRIL TERM, A.D. 2020
April 15, 2020
JAMES MICHAEL WILEY,
Appellant
(Defendant),
v. S-19-0174
THE STATE OF WYOMING,
Appellee
(Plaintiff).
Appeal from the District Court of Hot Springs County
The Honorable Bill Simpson, Judge
Representing Appellant:
Office of the State Public Defender: Diane Lozano, Wyoming State Public
Defender; Kirk A. Morgan, Chief Appellate Counsel; David E. Westling, Senior
Assistant Appellate Counsel. Argument by Mr. Westling.
Representing Appellee:
Bridget Hill, Wyoming Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Deputy Attorney
General; Joshua C. Eames, Senior Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Mr.
Eames.
Before DAVIS, C.J., and FOX, KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.
GRAY, J., delivers the opinion of the Court; KAUTZ, J., files a specially concurring
opinion.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers
are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming
82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in
the permanent volume.
GRAY, Justice.
[¶1] James Michael Wiley was sentenced to three life sentences (for three first-degree
murder counts) and one twenty-year to life sentence (for a second-degree murder count),
all running concurrently, and one eighteen- to twenty-year sentence (for an arson count)
running consecutively to the other sentences, for crimes he committed when he was
fifteen years old (collectively, 1992 sentence). Mr. Wiley moved to correct his 1992
sentence, claiming it was illegal, in violation of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132
S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), Bear Cloud v. State, 2014 WY 113, 334 P.3d 132(Wyo. 2014) (Bear Cloud III), and their progeny. He asserts he is entitled to an
individualized sentencing hearing. The district court denied the motion and Mr. Wiley
appeals. We affirm.
ISSUE
[¶2] Is the 1992 sentence imposed when Mr. Wiley was a juvenile a de facto life
sentence entitling him to an individualized sentencing hearing under Miller?
FACTS
[¶3] In 1992, when he was sixteen years old, Mr. Wiley pled guilty to three counts of
first-degree murder, one count of second-degree murder, and one count of first-degree
arson—crimes he committed when he was fifteen. The trial court sentenced him to three
life sentences (for the first-degree murder counts) and one twenty-year to life sentence
(for the second-degree murder count), all running concurrently, and one eighteen- to
twenty-year sentence (for the arson count) running consecutively to the other sentences.
[¶4] In June 1996, when he was twenty-one, Mr. Wiley pled guilty to a charge of
escape and was sentenced to not less than three years nor more than six years running
consecutively to his 1992 sentence.
[¶5] Mr. Wiley filed a Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence based on the sentences
imposed in 1992. His motion was denied and Mr. Wiley appeals.
DISCUSSION
Is the 1992 sentence imposed when Mr. Wiley was a juvenile a de facto life sentence
entitling him to an individualized sentencing hearing under Miller?
A. Standard of Review
[¶6] “A district court has discretion in ruling on a motion to correct an illegal sentence;
consequently, we review the district court’s ruling for abuse of discretion.” Gould v.
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State, 2006 WY 157, ¶ 7, 151 P.3d 261, 264 (Wyo. 2006). However, we review
constitutional challenges to sentences de novo. Davis v. State, 2018 WY 40, ¶ 23, 415
P.3d 666, 676 (Wyo. 2018); Bear Cloud III, ¶ 13, 334 P.3d at 137.
B. Analysis
[¶7] In 2012, twenty years after Mr. Wiley was originally sentenced, the United States
Supreme Court issued its decision in Miller. The Miller Court held that a life sentence
for juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment for all but “the rarest of children, those
whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption.” Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. ____,
____, 136 S.Ct. 718, 726, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016), as revised (Jan. 27, 2016) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Miller, 567 U.S. at 479, 132 S.Ct. at
2469. Accordingly, Miller requires juvenile sentencing courts to consider a child’s
“diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change” before sentencing a child to
life in prison. Id. at 479, 132 S.Ct. at 2469. We adopted the Miller holding in Bear
Cloud II, where we held that in order to fulfill the requirements of Miller, a trial court
must consider “the factors of youth and the nature of the homicide at an individualized
sentencing hearing when determining whether to sentence the juvenile offender to life
without the possibility of parole or to life according to law.” Bear Cloud v. State, 2013
WY 18, ¶ 42, 294 P.3d 36, 47 (Wyo. 2013) (Bear Cloud II).
[¶8] A Miller hearing is an individualized sentencing hearing in which the sentencing
court must determine whether the defendant is “irreparably corrupt.” See Bear Cloud III,
¶¶ 27, 33, 334 P.3d at 141–42; Davis, ¶¶ 35–59, 415 P.3d at 679–85. Following Miller,
in Montgomery, the United States Supreme Court held that Miller applied retroactively to
juveniles who were sentenced prior to Miller. See Davis, ¶ 38, 415 P.3d at 679–80. In
response to Miller and Bear Cloud II, the Wyoming Legislature amended Wyo. Stat.
Ann. § 6-10-301(c), by providing that juvenile offenders sentenced to life in prison are
eligible for parole after twenty-five years.
[¶9] Here, we have an aggregate sentence—three concurrent life sentences and one
twenty-year to life sentence, followed by a consecutive term of years. An aggregate
sentence that is the functional equivalent of a life sentence for a juvenile violates the
Eighth Amendment unless the juvenile is sentenced after being found “irreparably
corrupt” in a Miller hearing. Bear Cloud III, ¶ 33, 334 P.3d at 141–42; Davis, ¶¶ 24–28,
415 P.3d at 676–77. Even when Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-301(c) causes a juvenile
offender serving a life sentence to be eligible for parole after twenty-five years, the
juvenile offender is entitled to a Miller hearing if, after application of the statute, his
aggregate sentence is the functional equivalent of a life sentence. Bear Cloud III, ¶ 32,
334 P.3d at 141 (a “lengthy aggregate sentence . . . whose practical effect is that the
juvenile offender will spend his lifetime in prison triggers the Eighth Amendment
protections set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Miller”); see also Sen v.
State, 2017 WY 30, ¶ 18, 390 P.3d 769, 775 (Wyo. 2017) (Sen III). We must consider
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whether Mr. Wiley’s 1992 sentence is the functional equivalent of a life sentence to
determine whether he is entitled to a retroactive individualized sentencing hearing.
[¶10] We have held that “[a]n aggregated minimum sentence exceeding the 45[years in
prison]/61 [years old at the earliest time of release] standard is the functional equivalent
of life without parole and violates Bear Cloud III[,] Miller and [their] progeny.” Sam v.
State, 2017 WY 98, ¶ 80, 401 P.3d 834, 860 (Wyo. 2017).
[¶11] In Bear Cloud III, Mr. Bear Cloud was sentenced to life in prison with the
possibility of parole after twenty-five years for felony murder, to run consecutively to a
twenty- to twenty-five-year sentence for aggravated burglary, and concurrently to a
sentence for conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary. Bear Cloud III, ¶ 11, 334 P.3d at
136. Mr. Bear Cloud’s earliest opportunity for release would have occurred after serving
just over forty-five years, when he reached age sixty-one. We held that the 45/61
aggregate sentence was the “functional equivalent of life without parole” and required the
district court to conduct a Miller hearing. Bear Cloud III, ¶¶ 33–34, 334 P.3d at 141–42.
[¶12] In Sam, we held that that a minimum sentence of fifty-one years with possible
release at seventy, exceeded the 45/61 standard set forth in Bear Cloud III, ¶¶ 11, 33, 334
P.3d at 136, 142, and was the functional equivalent of life without parole. Sam, ¶ 80, 401
P.3d at 860. Similarly, in Davis, the earliest projected parole eligibility occurred after
forty-six years and age sixty-four. 1 Davis, ¶ 24, 415 P.3d at 676. Under the Bear Cloud
III standard, Mr. Davis’s sentence was the functional equivalent of life without parole
entitling him to an individualized sentencing hearing in compliance with Miller. Davis,
¶ 26, 415 P.3d at 676–77.
[¶13] In Sen III, Mr. Sen was serving an aggregate sentence which required at least
thirty-five years in prison before becoming eligible for parole at the age of fifty. Sen III,
¶¶ 10, 25, 390 P.3d at 772–73, 777. Mr. Sen argued that this was the functional
equivalent of life without parole. Id. ¶ 22, 390 P.3d at 776. We rejected his argument,
holding that a thirty-five-year aggregate sentence “did not trigger the Miller protections.”
Sam v. State, 2019 WY 104, ¶ 10, 450 P.3d 217, 221 (Wyo. 2019) (Sam II) (citing Sen
III, ¶¶ 19, 22, 390 P.3d at 775–76).
[¶14] Mr. Wiley argues that his 1992 sentence is the functional equivalent of life without
parole requiring an individualized sentencing hearing. 2 Mr. Wiley is eligible for parole
1
At the time of his appeal, Mr. Davis had “served almost thirty-four years on his life sentence when he
was paroled” from that sentence to begin serving his consecutive twenty- to fifty-year sentence for
aggravated robbery. Davis, ¶ 24, 415 P.3d at 676. If he served the shortest possible sentence on the
aggravated robbery, he would have served almost fifty-four years and would be released when he was
seventy-one years old. Id.
2
In considering Mr. Wiley’s argument, we do not consider his subsequent consecutive sentence for
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on his concurrent sentences (three life sentences and one twenty-year to life sentence) by
operation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-301(c). See State v. Mares, 2014 WY 126, ¶¶ 24–
25, 335 P.3d 487, 497–98 (Wyo. 2014). Once granted parole, his consecutive eighteen-
to twenty-year sentence for arson would begin. Mr. Wiley’s 1992 sentence renders him
eligible for parole after serving a minimum of forty-three years—twenty-five years for
the concurrent life sentences followed by eighteen years for the arson sentence. After
forty-three years, Mr. Wiley would be fifty-eight years old. His 1992 sentence is not the
functional equivalent of life in prison. See, e.g., People v. Wyatt, No. 1-16-0032-, ¶ 19,
2018 WL 3244476 (D. IL App. (1st) June 29, 2018), appeal pending (Sept. Term 2018)
(defendant’s forty-two-year combined sentence, for which he would be eligible for
release at age fifty-six, is not a de facto life sentence); Mason v. State, 235 So. 3d 129,
134 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (defendant’s potential release date at fifty-seven years old is
not a de facto life sentence); State v. Diaz, ¶ 58, 887 N.W.2d 751, 768 (S.D. 2016)
(lengthy juvenile sentence with opportunity for release at age fifty-five did not constitute
a de facto life sentence). Mr. Wiley is not entitled to an individualized sentencing
hearing under Miller.
escape. Mr. Wiley’s escape did not occur while he was a juvenile, he was not sentenced for the escape
while he was a juvenile, nor was the escape sentence part of a “lengthy aggregate sentence for closely-
related crimes.” Bear Cloud III, ¶¶ 32–33, 334 P.3d at 141–42; Sen III, ¶ 18, 390 P.3d at 775. The
district court erroneously considered Mr. Wiley’s 1996 sentence for escape when it denied Mr. Wiley’s
motion to correct illegal sentence:
Independent of [the finding that his sentence was not a de facto life
sentence], the Court finds that the issues raised in the Defendant’s
Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence have been rendered moot by the
Defendant’s conviction for escape while serving his life sentences.
Under [Wyo. Stat. Ann. §] 7-13-402(b)(ii) the Defendant is no longer
eligible for parole and this Court cannot provide any meaningful remedy
to Defendant’s claims.
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-402 sets forth the general powers and duties of the Wyoming Board of Parole.
Subsection (a) provides that the Board may “grant parole to a person serving a sentence for an offense
committed before the person reached the age of eighteen (18) years of age as provided in W.S. 6-10-
301(c).” Subsection (b) states that a “prisoner is not eligible for parole on a sentence if, while serving that
sentence, he has: . . . (ii) [e]scaped, attempted to escape or assisted others to escape from any institution.”
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-402(a), (b)(ii) (LexisNexis 2019).
The Wyoming Legislature has vested the power to grant parole in the Board of Parole and not the
courts. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-13-401 through -421; see also Dorman v. State, 665 P.2d 511, 512 (Wyo.
1983). The question before the district court was not tethered to the later charge or the Board’s authority
to grant parole on that charge. Therefore, the district court’s findings in regard to parole are a nullity.
We further note that the effect of Mr. Wiley’s escape charge on his eligibility for parole would
not properly be addressed in a proceeding to correct an illegal sentence. If Mr. Wiley wished to challenge
the Board of Parole’s application of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-402(b)(ii), that would require a separate
action against the Board. See Barela v. State, 2016 WY 68, ¶ 8, 375 P.3d 783, 786–87 (Wyo. 2016)
(quoting Pfeil v. State, 2014 WY 137, ¶¶ 24–25, 336 P.3d 1206, 1213–14 (Wyo. 2014)).
4
CONCLUSION
[¶15] Mr. Wiley’s sentence is not a de facto life sentence entitling him to an
individualized sentencing hearing under Miller. Affirmed.
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KAUTZ, J., specially concurring.
[¶16] I concur in the result reached by the majority, but respectfully reiterate my
position as set out in Sam v. State, 2017 WY 98, ¶ 88-89, 401 P.3d 834, 862 (Wyo.
2017), Sen v. State, 2017 WY 30, ¶¶ 36-37, 390 P.3d 769, 779 (Wyo. 2017) (Sen III), and
Davis v. State, 2018 WY 40, ¶¶ 109-114, 415 P.3d 666, 696-97 (Wyo. 2018).
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