Clifford Giles Springstead v. The State of Wyoming ( 2020 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING
2020 WY 47APRIL TERM, A.D. 2020
April 6, 2020
CLIFFORD GILES SPRINGSTEAD,
Appellant
(Defendant),
v. S-19-0201
THE STATE OF WYOMING,
Appellee
(Plaintiff).
Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County
The Honorable Steven K. Sharpe, Judge
Representing Appellant:
Office of the State Public Defender: Diane Lozano, Wyoming State Public
Defender; Kirk A. Morgan, Chief Appellate Counsel; David E. Westling, Senior
Assistant Appellate Counsel.
Representing Appellee:
Bridget Hill, Wyoming Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Deputy Attorney
General; Joshua C. Eames, Senior Assistant Attorney General.
Before DAVIS, C.J., and FOX, KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers
are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming
82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in
the permanent volume.
GRAY, Justice.
[¶1] Clifford Springstead was charged with failure to register as a sex offender. He
entered into a plea agreement where in exchange for his guilty plea, the State agreed to
recommend a two- to three-year prison sentence, suspended in favor of two years’
probation. The agreement incorporated Mr. Springstead’s bond conditions which
required he not be arrested or cited for a violation of the law and entitled the State to
deviate from the agreement if Mr. Springstead violated its terms. Before sentencing, Mr.
Springstead received two citations for criminal trespass and one citation for false
reporting. The State recommended the maximum sentence of four and one-half to five
years, which the district court imposed. Mr. Springstead appeals, claiming the State
breached the plea agreement. We affirm.
ISSUE
[¶2] We rephrase the issue:
Did Mr. Springstead’s breach of the plea agreement release
the State from its obligation to recommend a reduced
sentence?
FACTS
[¶3] Mr. Springstead was charged with failure to register as a sex offender under Wyo.
Stat. Ann. § 7-19-302. 1 At his arraignment, he entered a plea of not guilty. He reached a
plea agreement with the State under W.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(1)(B) 2 where he agreed to plead
guilty to one count of failure to register as a sex offender in exchange for the State’s
recommendation of not less than two years and not more than three years in prison,
suspended in favor of two years of supervised probation. The plea agreement also
provided:
THE DEFENDANT understands and agrees to obey all laws,
all court orders, including bond conditions, . . . and shall not
commit any acts of violence pending sentencing. Defendant’s
violations of any of these provisions are a basis for the State
to deviate from the plea agreement. . . . The Defendant agrees
1
Mr. Springstead’s duty to register arose from his 1989 conviction for first-degree sexual assault. He was
also convicted of attempted second-degree murder, aggravated robbery, and kidnapping.
2
W.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(1)(B) provides that when a defendant enters a guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement,
the State will “[m]ake a recommendation, or agree not to oppose the defendant’s request, for a particular
sentence, with the understanding that such recommendation or request shall not be binding upon the
court[.]”
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that any violation of this agreement, any laws, or any court
order, including bond conditions . . . may entitle the State to
withdraw its sentencing recommendation and that the
Defendant shall NOT be allowed to withdraw the plea(s)
entered.
(First and second emphasis added.) One of the conditions of Mr. Springstead’s bond was
that he “not be arrested or cited for any violation of the law other than minor traffic
offenses.” (Emphasis added.) At a change of plea hearing, after Mr. Springstead
acknowledged that he understood the terms of the agreement, the district court entered his
guilty plea.
[¶4] Following the change of plea and before the sentencing hearing, Mr. Springstead
received a citation for criminal trespass. The State moved to revoke his bond and the
court issued a bench warrant for his arrest. By the time of his bond revocation hearing,
Mr. Springstead had received two additional citations—one for criminal trespass and one
for false reporting. 3 At that hearing, the State announced that it “would not be standing
behind” the plea agreement. The State, later, filed a “Notice of State’s Intent to Deviate
from Plea Agreement” making clear that it would seek the maximum sentence for Mr.
Springstead. Mr. Springstead filed no response or objection.
[¶5] At sentencing, the State recommended that Mr. Springstead be sentenced to four to
five years in prison. Mr. Springstead urged the district court to reject the State’s
recommendation and to ignore his pending misdemeanor citations. He did not argue that
the sentencing recommendation was a breach of the plea agreement. Instead, Mr.
Springstead conceded that the plea agreement was now inapplicable and said that he was
“not going to necessarily ask that the Court follow [the original] recommendation.” He
argued for a sentence of four and one-half to five years, suspended in favor of five years’
probation. The court sentenced Mr. Springstead to four and one-half to five years in
prison. Mr. Springstead filed a timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
Did Mr. Springstead’s breach of the plea agreement release the State from its
obligation to recommend a reduced sentence?
[¶6] Mr. Springstead argues that the State breached the plea agreement by refusing to
recommend a two- to three-year sentence, suspended in favor of probation. He also
claims there was no breach of the agreement because he had not been found guilty of the
3
The motion for bond revocation was based on the first citation for criminal trespass. The district court
acknowledged all three citations at the bond revocation hearing and again at the sentencing.
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cited conduct; the State could not deviate from the agreement but was required instead to
withdraw from it prior to sentencing; and the agreement was, essentially, a contract of
adhesion. We reject these arguments. We find that Mr. Springstead violated the plea
agreement by receiving citations in contravention of his bond conditions, and his breach
released the State from its obligation to recommend a reduced sentence.
[¶7] Generally, we review the question of whether the State violated a plea agreement
de novo. Mendoza v. State, 2016 WY 31, ¶ 26, 368 P.3d 886, 894 (Wyo. 2016); Ford v.
State, 2003 WY 65, ¶ 8, 69 P.3d 407, 410 (Wyo. 2003); Schade v. State, 2002 WY 133,
¶ 5, 53 P.3d 551, 554 (Wyo. 2002). “However, when a party fails to raise the issue of
breach of a plea agreement with the district court, we review the alleged breach for plain
error.” Christensen v. State, 2010 WY 95, ¶ 6, 234 P.3d 1229, 1230 (Wyo. 2010); see
also Fernandez v. State, 2006 WY 8, ¶¶ 18–19, 126 P.3d 111, 115–16 (Wyo. 2006).
“[P]lain error exists when 1) the record is clear about the incident alleged as error; 2)
there was a transgression of a clear and unequivocal rule of law; and 3) the party claiming
the error was denied a substantial right which materially prejudiced him.” Mercer v.
State, 2012 WY 54, ¶ 8, 273 P.3d 1100, 1102 (Wyo. 2012) (citations omitted). Mr.
Springstead did not raise the issue of the State’s breach of the plea agreement or raise any
of his other arguments to the district court. We therefore apply the plain error standard of
review. Id.[¶8] Under plain error, the appellant must first establish that “the record clearly shows
the incident alleged as error[.]” Bazzle v. State, 2019 WY 18, ¶ 28, 434 P.3d 1090, 1097
(Wyo. 2019). Here, the record clearly reflects that the State declined to stand behind the
plea agreement in recommending the maximum sentence.
[¶9] We turn next to the question of whether the error transgressed a clear and
unequivocal rule of law. Mercer, ¶ 8, 273 P.3d at 1102. A plea agreement is a contract
between the State and the defendant. Mendoza, ¶ 26, 368 P.3d at 895 (quoting Deeds v.
State, 2014 WY 124, ¶ 14, 335 P.3d 473, 478 (Wyo. 2014)). As such, “[p]rinciples of
general contract law guide our analysis of the [parties’] obligations under the agreement.”
Gibbs v. State, 2008 WY 79, ¶ 10, 187 P.3d 862, 865 (Wyo. 2008) (citations omitted).
[¶10] “As in a contract, courts will not release a party from its obligations under a plea
agreement unless another party materially and substantially breaches the agreement.”
Montano v. State, 2019 WY 34, ¶ 13, 437 P.3d 838, 842 (Wyo. 2019).
A material or substantial breach is one that goes to the whole
consideration of the agreement. Several factors are relevant
to whether a breach is material or substantial, including the
extent to which the non-breaching party will be deprived of
the benefit it reasonably expected and the extent to which the
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breaching party’s conduct comports with the standards of
good faith and fair dealing.
Schade, ¶ 5, 53 P.3d at 554 (quoting Browning v. State, 2001 WY 93, ¶ 32, 32 P.3d 1061,
1071 (Wyo. 2001)). To determine whether a party has breached a plea agreement, we
“(1) examine the nature of the promise; and (2) evaluate the promise in light of the
defendant’s reasonable understanding of the promise at the time the plea was entered.”
Montano, ¶ 13, 437 P.3d at 842 (quoting Mendoza, ¶ 26, 368 P.3d at 895).
[¶11] The first issue we must resolve is whether Mr. Springstead’s conduct constituted a
material and substantial breach of the plea agreement, releasing the State from its
performance. In determining whether a breach occurred, we begin by examining the
terms of the agreement. Montano, ¶ 14, 437 P.3d at 842. The plea agreement required
Mr. Springstead to “obey all laws [and] all court orders, including bond conditions.”
(Emphasis added.) The bond required, among other things, that Mr. Springstead “not be
arrested or cited for any violation of the law other than minor traffic offenses.” The plea
agreement included a provision that Mr. Springstead’s violation of any provision of the
agreement was a basis for the State to deviate from it and that violation “may entitle the
State to withdraw its sentencing recommendation . . . .” The nature of the promise was
clear. When language is clear and unambiguous, we enforce the agreement according to
its terms without looking beyond the four corners of the contract. Montano, ¶ 14, 437
P.3d at 842 (quoting Mendoza, ¶ 27, 368 P.3d at 895).
[¶12] It is uncontested that Mr. Springstead received three citations after he entered into
the plea agreement with the State, in violation of his bond conditions. This conduct went
“to the whole consideration of the agreement.” Browning, ¶ 32, 32 P.3d at 1071. It
“deprived [the State] of the benefit it reasonably expected”—namely, that Mr.
Springstead would comply with the agreement and receive no citations for violation of
the law in exchange for its recommendation of a reduced sentence. Id. It is well
established that “a defendant will be held to the clear terms of a lawful plea agreement.”
Henry v. State, 2015 WY 156, ¶ 13, 362 P.3d 785, 789 (Wyo. 2015). Mr. Springstead
materially and substantially breached the plain terms of the agreement. “It is axiomatic
that, if a defendant fails to comply with a plea agreement, the state is not bound by that
agreement.” Schade, ¶ 8, 53 P.3d at 555. The State did not violate a rule of law by
deviating from the plea agreement in the face of Mr. Springstead’s breach, so we need
not reach the last prong of plain error—whether Mr. Springstead was materially
prejudiced.
[¶13] Mr. Springstead raises several other arguments. He contends that the State did not
provide proof that he breached the plea agreement, ignoring the copy of his citation
attached to the State’s petition to revoke his bond conditions. Mr. Springstead
alternatively claims that a citation alone, without an underlying adjudication, does not
prove guilt and therefore does not establish a violation of his bond conditions. We defer
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to the plain and unambiguous language of the plea agreement. Montano, ¶ 14, 437 P.3d
at 842. The plea agreement required compliance with the bond conditions, one of which
was that Mr. Springstead not be cited for any violation of the law. This Court has held
that bond violations breach a plea agreement despite their being “unproven” at the time of
sentencing. Gibbs, ¶¶ 6–7, 187 P.3d at 864–65.
[¶14] Mr. Springstead next argues that the State’s remedy was to move to withdraw the
plea agreement, not to deviate from it. This argument also overlooks the language of the
agreement providing that the State could deviate from the agreement if Mr. Springstead
violated its terms. The State’s “Notice of State’s Intent to Deviate from Plea Agreement”
put Mr. Springstead on notice that the agreement would no longer control the sentencing
recommendation. We enforce a plea agreement under the principles of contract law and
adhere to the four corners of the agreement. Montano, ¶ 14, 437 P.3d at 842. While the
agreement permitted the State to withdraw in the event of Mr. Springstead’s violation, it
did not require withdrawal.
[¶15] In his final argument, Mr. Springstead contends that the plea agreement contained
boilerplate terms and was analogous to a contract of adhesion, similar to insurance
contracts. “A contract of adhesion is one in which one party to the agreement has little or
no bargaining power to vary the terms thereof.” Durdahl v. Nat’l Safety Assocs., Inc.,
988 P.2d 525, 529 (Wyo. 1999). “Because insurance policies represent contracts of
adhesion where the insured has little or no bargaining power to vary the terms, if the
language is ambiguous, the policy is strictly construed against the insurer,” but “the
language will not be ‘tortured’ to create an ambiguity.” Hurst v. Metro. Prop. & Cas.
Ins. Co., 2017 WY 104, ¶ 12, 401 P.3d 891, 895 (Wyo. 2017) (quoting N. Fork Land &
Cattle, LLLP v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 2015 WY 150, ¶ 14, 362 P.3d 341, 346 (Wyo.
2015)). We find no ambiguity in the plain language of the plea agreement. Mr.
Springstead indicated he read and understood the terms of the agreement and was
represented by counsel. Mr. Springstead knowingly and voluntarily entered into a plea
agreement which comported with the provisions of W.R.Cr.P. 11. See Henry, ¶ 18, 362
P.3d at 790. A valid plea agreement under the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure is
not, per se, a contract of adhesion.
CONCLUSION
[¶16] Mr. Springstead’s failure to comply with the bond conditions contained in the plea
agreement released the State from its obligation to recommend a reduced sentence. His
remaining arguments are without merit. Affirmed.
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