DocketNumber: ARMY 20080352
Filed Date: 2/27/2009
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS Before HOLDEN, HOFFMAN, CONN Appellate Military Judges UNITED STATES, Appellee v. Private E1 KAYA M. FEW United States Army, Appellant ARMY 20080352 U.S. Army Signal Center and Fort Gordon William L. Deneke, Military Judge Colonel Edward J. Sheeran, Staff Judge Advocate For Appellant: Lieutenant Colonel Mark Tellitocci, JA; Lieutenant Colonel Matthew M. Miller, JA; Major Grace M. Gallagher, JA; Captain Alison L. Gregoire, JA (on brief). For Appellee: Lieutenant Colonel Mark H. Sydenham, JA; Major Lisa L. Gumbs, JA; Major Christopher R. Clements, JA (on brief). 27 February 2009 -------------------------------- SUMMARY DISPOSITION -------------------------------- Per Curiam: This case is before us for review under Article 66, Uniform Code of Military Justice,10 U.S.C. §866
[hereinafter UCMJ]. We find that Specification 1 of the Charge (wrongful possession of 0.2 grams of marijuana) and Specification 2 of the Charge (wrongful use of marijuana) at the same location and within a close proximity of time constitute an unreasonable multiplication of charges. See United States v. Quiroz,55 M.J. 334
(C.A.A.F. 2001). Appellant was charged with five specifications of marijuana use and one specification of marijuana possession, in violation of Article 112a, UCMJ. At trial, appellant moved to consolidate two of the specifications, Specifications 1 and 2 of the Charge, as being an unreasonable multiplication of charges. LAW “What is substantially one transaction should not be made the basis for an unreasonable multiplication of charges against one person.” Rule for Courts-Martial 307(c)(4) discussion. In determining whether the government has unreasonably multiplied the charges, we consider the following factors: (1) Did the accused object at trial that there was an unreasonable multiplication of charges and/or specifications; (2) Is each charge and specification aimed at distinctly separate criminal acts; (3) Does the number of charges and specifications misrepresent or exaggerate the appellant’s criminality; (4) Does the number of charges and specifications unreasonably increase the appellant’s punitive exposure; and (5) Is there any evidence of prosecutorial overreaching or abuse in the drafting of the charges? See Quiroz, 55 M.J. at 338. DISCUSSION The facts upon which those specifications were based are clear and uncontroverted. On 2 November 2007, appellant possessed enough marijuana for a single use. Appellant smoked the marijuana in his barracks room and left the marijuana residue in his bathroom sink. A short time later, a fellow soldier discovered the residue in the sink and informed the chain-of- command. Appellant’s commander directed a probable cause urinalysis based upon the physical evidence. The results of this urinalysis form the basis for Specification 2 of the Charge; the 0.2 grams of leftover marijuana residue form the basis of Specification 1 of the Charge. In denying appellant’s motion to consolidate, the military judge applied the Quiroz test to determine whether the charges were unreasonably multiplied. Regarding the third Quiroz factor, the military judge found, “we have a truly trivial quantity of marijuana which remained in the accused’s possession after he finished using what was presumably a larger quantity” and “given the diminutive amount of marijuana charged in Specification 1 of the Charge, I find that the two specifications do not misrepresent or exaggerate the accused’s criminality.” We disagree with the findings of the military judge. Appellant smoked a single-use quantity of marijuana and left only residue behind. Charging both use and possession under these facts exaggerates appellant’s criminality. See generally United States v. Wilson,45 M.J. 512
(Army Ct. Crim. App. 1996). Applying Quiroz, we find charging the possession along with use represented an unreasonable multiplication of charges. DECISION Specification 1 of the Charge is dismissed. The remaining findings are affirmed. Reassessing the sentence on the basis of the error noted, the entire record, and applying the principles of United States v. Sales,22 M.J. 305
(C.M.A. 1986) and United States v. Moffeit, including Judge Baker’s concurring opinion,63 M.J. 40
, 43 (C.A.A.F. 2006), the court affirms the sentence. FOR THE COURT: MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. Clerk of Court