United States v. Kribs

U NITED S TATES A IR F ORCE
C OURT OF C RIMINAL APPEALS
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No. ACM 40383
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UNITED STATES
Appellee
v.
Kole W. KRIBS
Technical Sergeant (E-6), U.S. Air Force, Appellant
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Appeal from the United States Air Force Trial Judiciary
Decided 8 December 2023
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Military Judge: Michael A. Schrama.
Sentence: Sentence adjudged 29 July 2022 by GCM convened at Dover
Air Force Base, Delaware. Sentence entered by military judge on 2 Oc-
tober 2022: Bad-conduct discharge, confinement for 28 months, forfei-
ture of all pay and allowances, reduction to E-1, and a reprimand.
For Appellant: Major Abhishek S. Kambli, USAF.
For Appellee: Lieutenant Colonel Thomas J. Alford, USAF; Captain
Vanessa Bairos, USAF; Mary Ellen Payne, Esquire; Abigail E. Thomas
(legal extern). 1
Before JOHNSON, CADOTTE, and MASON, Appellate Military Judges.
Judge MASON delivered the opinion of the court, in which Chief Judge
JOHNSON and Senior Judge CADOTTE joined.
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1 Ms. Thomas was a legal extern with the Government Trial and Appellate Operations
Division and was at all times supervised by attorneys admitted to practice before this
court.
United States v. Kribs, No. ACM 40383
This is an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as
precedent under AFCCA Rule of Practice and Procedure 30.4.
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MASON, Judge:
At a general court-martial, Appellant was convicted, consistent with his
plea, of one charge with one specification of dereliction of duty, in violation of
Article 92, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 892.2 A panel
of officer and enlisted members convicted Appellant, contrary to his pleas, of
three specifications of abusive sexual contact, in violation of Article 120,
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 920.3 Appellant elected sentencing by military judge alone.
The military judge sentenced Appellant to a bad-conduct discharge, confine-
ment for 28 months, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, reduction to the grade
of E-1, and a reprimand. The convening authority took no action on the find-
ings or sentence. Pursuant to Appellant’s requests, the convening authority
directed deferment of the rank reduction until the entry of judgment, waived
purported automatic forfeitures for a period of six months, and directed the
total pay and allowances to be paid to Appellant’s former spouse for the benefit
of Appellant’s dependent children.4
Appellant raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether Appellant’s conviction
for abusive sexual contact upon EB is factually and legally insufficient; and (2)
whether Appellant’s sentence, which included 28 months of confinement, is in-
appropriately severe. We find no error materially prejudicial to Appellant’s
substantial rights and affirm the findings and sentence.
I. BACKGROUND
In March 2020, Appellant was married to KG and was the stepfather to
then 16-year-old EB. Appellant had been her stepfather for approximately 13
years. At some point in the evening on 8 March 2020, EB went around the
home to say goodnight to her siblings and Appellant. EB went into an upstairs
room and entered to say goodnight to Appellant who was laying on a bed and
watching television at the time. She sat down next to him. Appellant proceeded
to put his hand on EB’s buttocks under her shorts and over her underwear. EB
2 Unless otherwise noted, all references in this opinion to the UCMJ are to the Manual
for Courts-Martial, United States (2019 ed.).
3 The court members found Appellant not guilty of one specification of abusive sexual
contact, in violation of Article 120, UCMJ.
4 The convening authority purportedly waived the automatic forfeitures but did not
take any action on the adjudged forfeitures. Appellant has not raised an allegation of
error, and we find no corrective action is required.
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United States v. Kribs, No. ACM 40383
was shocked and not sure what was going on. EB turned her body away from
him and told him that she wanted to go to bed. Appellant put his hand up EB’s
shirt, under her bra and grabbed her breast. EB remained frozen in place. Ap-
pellant also put his hand under her shorts, over her underwear and touched
her on the front part of her hip and her right hip flexor.5 EB told Appellant
again that she wanted to go to bed. Appellant responded, “come on, come on,
stay.” EB stood up and Appellant pulled on her. Eventually, Appellant let up
and EB left the room and went to her bedroom. A few minutes later, Appellant
came into EB’s bedroom and laid in the bed with her. Appellant asked EB if
she was okay. EB responded that she was fine and that she just wanted to go
to sleep. Appellant asked EB if she was going to tell her mother. EB stated
“no,” that she was fine and that she wanted to go to sleep. EB’s sister walked
in and shortly thereafter, Appellant left EB’s bedroom. A couple of days later,
EB told her mother, KG, what happened. KG asked Appellant to move out.
After Appellant moved out, KG and Appellant continued to communicate.
Appellant wanted to salvage the marriage. Around this time, he wrote KG and
EB each a letter.6 In the letter to KG, Appellant admitted touching EB’s but-
tocks and that he meant to do it. He also admitted to touching EB’s breast and
squeezing it when he realized where his hand was. In the letter to EB, Appel-
lant stated, “What I did that night is unforgivable. I took advantage of your
trust [and] vulnerability.”
In July 2020, Appellant was serving as a special agent with the Air Force
Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) at Dover Air Force Base, Delaware.
As part of his duties, he was provided access to certain government-procured
database subscriptions. One of those databases contained personal information
regarding private citizens. By regulation, AFOSI personnel were prohibited
from utilizing this database outside their official duties. Around 20 July 2020,
Appellant accessed the database to look up three private citizens to gain infor-
mation about them for his personal use. Specifically, he used the database to
look up information about a woman he had met online as well as information
about her parents.
5 EB described this in more detail by saying it was “[m]ore like the groin area, I would
say.” Trial counsel subsequently had EB stand and demonstrate where Appellant
touched her. The military judge noted that “[i]t looked like her right hip flexor.”
6 The parties stipulated at trial to the authenticity of these letters.
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United States v. Kribs, No. ACM 40383
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal and Factual Sufficiency
Appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of his abusive sexual
contact conviction regarding the touching of EB’s groin.
1. Law
We review issues of legal and factual sufficiency de novo. United States v.
Washington, 57 M.J. 394, 399 (C.A.A.F. 2002).
“The test for legal sufficiency is whether, after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United
States v. Robinson, 77 M.J. 294, 297–98 (C.A.A.F. 2018) (quoting United States
v. Rosario, 76 M.J. 114, 117 (C.A.A.F. 2017)). “The term reasonable doubt, how-
ever, does not mean that the evidence must be free from conflict.” United States
v. Wheeler, 76 M.J. 564, 568 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2017) (citing United States v.
Lips, 22 M.J. 679, 684 (A.F.C.M.R. 1986)), aff’d, 77 M.J. 289 (C.A.A.F. 2018).
“[I]n resolving questions of legal sufficiency, we are bound to draw every rea-
sonable inference from the evidence of record in favor of the prosecution.”
United States v. Barner, 56 M.J. 131, 134 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (citations omitted).
As a result, “[t]he standard for legal sufficiency involves a very low threshold
to sustain a conviction.” United States v. King, 78 M.J. 218, 221 (C.A.A.F. 2019)
(alteration in original) (citation omitted). The test for legal sufficiency “gives
full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the
testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic
facts to ultimate facts.” United States v. Oliver, 70 M.J. 64, 68 (C.A.A.F. 2011)
(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1973)).
“The test for factual sufficiency ‘is whether, after weighing the evidence in
the record of trial and making allowances for not having personally observed
the witnesses,’ [this] court is ‘convinced of the [appellant]’s guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.’” United States v. Reed, 54 M.J. 37, 41 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (quoting
United States v. Turner, 25 M.J. 324, 325 (C.M.A. 1987)). “In conducting this
unique appellate role, we take ‘a fresh, impartial look at the evidence,’ applying
‘neither a presumption of innocence nor a presumption of guilt’ to ‘make [our]
own independent determination as to whether the evidence constitutes proof
of each required element beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Wheeler, 76 M.J. at 568(alteration in original) (quoting Washington, 57 M.J. at 399). This court’s re-
view of the factual sufficiency of evidence for findings is limited to the evidence
admitted at trial. See Article 66(d), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(d); United States v.
Rodela, 82 M.J. 521, 525 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2021) (citation omitted), rev. de-
nied, 82 M.J. 312 (C.A.A.F. 2022); United States v. Beatty, 64 M.J. 456, 458
(C.A.A.F. 2007) (citations omitted).
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Appellant was convicted of abusive sexual contact in violation of Article
120, UCMJ, which required the Government to prove the following two ele-
ments beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that Appellant committed sexual contact
upon EB, to wit: touching her groin with his hand, with an intent to gratify his
sexual desire; and (2) that Appellant did so without EB’s consent. See Manual
for Courts-Martial, United States (2019 ed.), pt. IV, ¶ 60.e.(4)(d).
2. Analysis
Appellant asserts that his conviction for abusive sexual contact by touching
EB’s groin is both legally and factually insufficient. He argues that EB “never”
testified to Appellant touching her groin.
A careful review of EB’s testimony as well as all the evidence presented in
the findings portion of the trial demonstrates the legal and factual sufficiency
of Appellant’s conviction. EB testified that Appellant put his hand in her shorts
and touched her buttocks. She also testified that he touched her on the front
part of her hip and identified this touching as “[m]ore like the groin area.” Trial
counsel had EB demonstrate in court the area of the touching. The military
judge commented that it appeared to be on her right hip flexor. At the conclu-
sion of the Government’s case-in-chief, trial defense counsel moved for a find-
ing of not guilty for this specification. The military judge denied this motion
and noted that EB did testify referencing her groin. Further, he noted that EB
“stood while she was testifying and when asked by counsel to touch the areas
that she was touched, she did touch the area between her pubic area and her
thigh.”
In United States v. McDonald, 78 M.J. 669, 680 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App. 2018),
our sister service court found the medical definition of groin to mean, “[t]he
groove, and the part of the body around it, formed by the junction of the thigh
with the abdomen, on either side.” (Alteration in original) (footnote omitted).
The military judge applied this definition to the facts to dispose of trial defense
counsel’s motion for a finding of not guilty. Given the state of the evidence,
particularly EB’s demonstration to the court where she was touched as noted
by the military judge, we are convinced that Appellant touched EB’s groin as
alleged in the specification.
We conclude that the members rationally found the essential elements of
this crime beyond a reasonable doubt, to include that Appellant touched EB’s
groin. See Robinson, 77 M.J. at 297–98. Furthermore, after weighing all the
evidence in the record of trial and having made allowances for not having per-
sonally observed the witnesses, we are convinced of Appellant’s guilt beyond a
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reasonable doubt.7 Therefore, we find Appellant’s conviction both legally and
factually sufficient.
B. Sentence Appropriateness
Appellant argues that his sentence, which included confinement for 28
months, is inappropriately severe.
1. Law
We review sentence appropriateness de novo. United States v. Lane, 64
M.J. 1, 2 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (footnote omitted). We may affirm only as much of the
sentence as we find correct in law and fact and determine should be approved
based on the entire record. 10 U.S.C. § 866(d). “We assess sentence appropri-
ateness by considering the particular appellant, the nature and seriousness of
the offenses, the appellant’s record of service, and all matters contained in the
record of trial.” United States v. Fields, 74 M.J. 619, 625 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App.
2015) (quoting United States v. Bare, 63 M.J. 707, 714 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App.
2006)) (additional citation omitted). While we have significant “discretion in
determining whether a particular sentence is appropriate, we are not author-
ized to engage in exercises of clemency.” Id. (citations omitted).
2. Analysis
We have conducted a thorough review of Appellant’s entire court-martial
record, including his record of service, and all matters submitted in extenua-
tion and mitigation. We find that the nature and seriousness of the offenses
clearly support the adjudged sentence of a bad-conduct discharge, confinement
for 28 months, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, reduction to the grade of
E-1, and a reprimand. Understanding we have a statutory responsibility pur-
suant to Article 66(d), UCMJ, to affirm only so much of the sentence that is
correct and should be approved, we conclude the sentence is not inappropri-
ately severe and we affirm the sentence as adjudged.
III. CONCLUSION
The findings and sentence as entered are correct in law and fact, and no
error materially prejudicial to the substantial rights of Appellant occurred.
7 See United States v. Westcott, No. ACM 39936, 2022 CCA LEXIS 156, at *24–25 (A.F.
Ct. Crim. App. 17 Mar. 2022) (unpub. op.) (upholding legal and factually sufficiency of
abusive sexual assault by touching the groin in the absence of the use of the specific
word “groin” in victim’s testimony, but with a description of where she was touched);
cf. United States v. Perez, No. ARMY 20140117, 2016 CCA LEXIS 131, at *6 (A. Ct.
Crim. App. 29 Feb. 2016) (per curiam) (unpub. op.) (setting aside guilty plea where
accused was charged with touching victim’s genitals, but providence inquiry demon-
strated that he touched victim’s pubic mound, just above her genitals).
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Articles 59(a) and 66(d), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 859(a), 866(d). Accordingly, the
findings and sentence are AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT
CAROL K. JOYCE
Clerk of the Court
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