DocketNumber: 2 Div. 957.
Citation Numbers: 132 So. 728, 222 Ala. 496, 1931 Ala. LEXIS 224
Judges: Brown, Anderson, Sayre, Thomas
Filed Date: 1/15/1931
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
It seems to be well settled that where the plaintiff in stating his cause of action must affirm a negative, he has the burden of proving the negative averment unless the facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant. Rogers v. Brooks,
This rule applies alike to pleading statutes or contracts, where the plaintiff relies on a general clause embodying an exception. Lunt v. Ætna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford,
The rule of pleading is stated as follows in Commonwealth v. Hart, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 130, 134:
" 'If there be an exception in the enacting clause, the party pleading must show that his adversary is not within the exception; but if there be an exception in a subsequent clause or subsequent statute, that is matter *Page 498 of defense, and is to be shown by the other party.' The same rule is applied in pleading a private instrument of contract. If such instrument contain in it, first, a general clause, and afterwards a separate and distinct clause which has the effect of taking out of the general clause something that would otherwise be included in it, a party, relying upon the general clause, in pleading, may set out that clause only, without noticing the separate and distinct clause which operates as an exception; but if the exception itself be incorporated in the general clause, then the party relying on it must, in pleading, state it together with the exception."
This rule was applied to a policy of insurance in Lunt v. Ætna Life Ins. Co., supra.
The rule as to the burden of proof is stated in Givens et al. v. Tidmore,
This action is on the double indemnity clause of a policy of life insurance, and by the policy contract as pleaded, the defendant engaged to pay the plaintiff, as the beneficiary therein named, "the sum of ten thousand dollars in the event (the death of the insured) resulted from bodily injury within ninety days after such injury, directly and independently ofall other causes, affected solely through external, violent andaccidental means"; and the complaint avers "that while said policy was in full force and effect, and before the said (insured) attained the age of sixty years, on to-wit, the 17th day of April, 1928, the said (insured) died, and that his death resulted from bodily injury directly and independently of allother causes * * * solely through external, violent andaccidental means." (Italics supplied.)
The provision of the policy and the cause of death as pleaded bring the case within the principles above stated, and though the plaintiff upon offering evidence tending to show violent, accidental death, is aided by the presumptions against self-destruction, making the case one for the jury, nevertheless, the subject-matter of the negative averments not being peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant, she has the burden of reasonably satisfying the jury that the insured's death resulted directly from external, violent, and accidental means, exclusive of all other causes, including suicide. 1 Greenl. on Ev. 78; Preferred Accident Ins. Co. v. Fielding, Adm'r, etc.,
The rule of our cases is that the presumption of innocence is a matter of evidence for the consideration of the jury, and where the evidence is in conflict on the question at issue, the determination of the issue is for the jury, not for the court. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Maddox,
That the insured voluntarily committed suicide was not made an issue by the pleadings. Evidence tending to show suicide was merely countervailing evidence offered in rebuttal of evidence of the plaintiff going to show that the death resulted from external, violent, and accidental means.
The judgment here is that the learned trial court fell into error in charging the jury that the burden of proof was on the defendant to reasonably satisfy the jury that the insured committed suicide, and if the evidence was in equilibrium, the plaintiff should recover. Whitlatch v. Fidelity Casualty Co. of N.Y., supra.
For this error the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded.
ANDERSON, C. J., and SAYRE and THOMAS, JJ., concur. *Page 499
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Maddox , 221 Ala. 292 ( 1930 )
Globe Indemnity Co. v. Reinhart , 152 Md. 439 ( 1927 )
Whitlatch v. . Fidelity and Casualty Co. , 149 N.Y. 45 ( 1896 )
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Wilkes , 76 F.2d 701 ( 1935 )
Firefighters Inc. for Racial Equality v. Bach , 611 F. Supp. 166 ( 1985 )
Lambert v. National Casualty Co. , 249 Ala. 85 ( 1947 )
Coastal Plains Feeders, Inc., Cross v. Hartford Fire ... , 545 F.2d 448 ( 1977 )
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Rosier , 189 Okla. 448 ( 1941 )
Liberty National Life Insurance Company v. Reid , 276 Ala. 25 ( 1963 )
Sovereign Camp, W. O. W. v. Gunn , 229 Ala. 508 ( 1934 )
Inter-Ocean Casualty Co. v. Foster , 226 Ala. 348 ( 1933 )
Saenger Theatres Corporation v. McDermott , 239 Ala. 629 ( 1940 )
McBride v. Baggett Transp. Co. , 250 Ala. 488 ( 1948 )
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Calvin , 227 Ala. 146 ( 1933 )
Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co. v. Pate , 290 Ala. 110 ( 1973 )
Independent Life and Accident Insurance Co. of Jacksonville ... , 282 Ala. 685 ( 1968 )