Naro v. State

McCLELLAN, j.

The appellant (defendant) was convicted of murder in the second degree and sentenced to imprisonment for 25 years. Tbe victim was one Ralph Roberts.

Tbe bill of exceptions recites:

“During the course of his argument to the jury the solicitor for the state made the following argument to the jury: ‘You know, as a matter of common experience and common knowledge, the infirmities and weaknesses that men of his (Wilhoit) type are subject to, and is it any surprise that this poor drug addict would succumb to the influence of a man of the type of Alf Naro?’

“Counsel for defendant objected to said argument to the jury, and stated: T want to move the court to charge the jury right now that statement of the solicitor is not founded on anything in the evidence, and it is improper to say a man is a dope fiend, a man is a drug addict, when, as in this case, they asked the man if he wasn’t addicted to the use of drugs and he said, “No.” Thereby they laid a predicate to impeach him and didn’t even offer by any witness any suggestion that that man was addicted to the use of drugs, and for the solicitor to come here then, having laid the predicate, having in substance and in fact given his solemn word of honor that he proposes to substantiate his predicate and make his proof —in other words, having offered that prejudicial statement by way of a question to the jury that he was a dope addict and then having failed to follow up his moral obligation to prove or attempt to prove he was a dope addict, for him to come along and in his argument to the jury to say he was'a drug addict and dope fiend is highly improper, it seems to us, if the court please, and we respectfully insist that it is, and move the court to instruct the jury that is improper on the part of the solicitor; that they should not allow their minds to be influenced by such improper statements or remarks made by the solicitor in this case.’

“The court overruled said objection and denied defendant’s motion to exclude said argument from the jury and to instruct the jury as requested, to which ruling of the court defendant then and there duly and legally excepted.”

Wilboit, tbe man mentioned in tbe excerpt from tbe argument, was a witness for tbe defendant, and bad given testimony calculated to support tbe theory advanced in her behalf on the trial. There was not only no evidence that Wilboit was a “drug addict,” but, to tbe contrary, be denied be was a “dope fiend” on his cross-examination by representatives of tbe state. Tbe mere recitation of the affirmation, in tbe absence of all evidence to support it, made by tbe solicitor, that Wilboit, a witness for defendant, wp.s a “drug addict,” suffices to disclose error of such unpalliated vice as to require tbe reversal of tbe judgment of conviction. Tbe court erred in overruling tbe seasonable objection to it.

Tbe other matters urged for error are not likely to recur. Tbe law applicable to such cases as this, so often stated by this court, needs no repetition on this occasion.

For the error indicated, tbe judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded.'

Reversed and remanded.

ANDERSON, O. J., and SOMERVILLE and THOMAS, JJ., concur.