Debora Willingham, as administrator of the Estate of Brandy Matthews v. Rodney Matthews, as administrator of the Estate of Joshua Taylor Matthews

REL: 09/19/2014
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
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before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2014
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Debora Willingham, as the administrator of the Estate of
Brandy Matthews, deceased
v.
Rodney Matthews, as the administrator of the Estate of
Joshua Taylor Matthews, deceased
Appeal from DeKalb Circuit Court
(CV-13-900066)
WISE, Justice.
Debora Willingham, as the administrator of the estate of
Brandy Matthews, deceased ("Willingham"), appeals from a
summary judgment entered by the DeKalb Circuit Court ("the
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trial court") on her complaint for a judgment declaring the
rights, duties, and liabilities of the parties under § 43-8-
253, Ala. Code 1975, which is known as "the Slayer's Statute."
Facts and Procedural History
Brandy Matthews and Joshua Taylor Matthews were married
in September 2004. On March 20 or March 21, 2011, Brandy died
as a result of gunshot wounds inflicted by Joshua. Brandy's
death was determined to be a homicide. On the same date,
Joshua died as a result of a self-inflicted gunshot wound.
Brandy and Joshua both died intestate. Willingham,
Brandy's mother, was appointed by the DeKalb Probate Court as
the administrator of Brandy's estate. Rodney Matthews
("Matthews"), Joshua's brother, was appointed by the DeKalb
Probate Court as the administrator of Joshua's estate.
On March 20, 2013, Willingham filed a complaint for a
declaratory judgment in the trial court, stating that there
was a justiciable controversy between Brandy's estate and
Joshua's estate as to their respective rights, duties, and
liabilities based on Willingham's interpretation of §
43-8-253. She contended that, upon application of § 43-8-253,
"Joshua Taylor Matthews would have been unable to
inherit from Brandy Matthews. Furthermore, based
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upon the actions of Joshua Taylor Matthews, his
property is to pass as if he had predeceased [Brandy
Matthews]. In other words, the estate of Joshua
Taylor Matthews would pass to his spouse, Brandy
Matthews. In this instance, the estate of Joshua
Taylor Matthews should pass directly to the estate
of Brandy Matthews."
On November 19, 2013, Willingham filed a motion for a
summary judgment. Based on her interpretation of § 43-8-253,
she argued that Joshua's estate should pass directly to
Brandy's estate. On January 14, 2014, Matthews filed a
response to the motion for a summary judgment. He argued that
§ 43-8-253 addresses only how Brandy's estate would pass but
not how Joshua's estate would pass and that it therefore would
have no bearing on the administration of Joshua's estate.
On January 30, 2014, the trial court conducted a hearing
on the summary-judgment motion, and on February 4, 2014, it
entered a summary judgment declaring that § 43-8-253 applied
to the passing of Brandy's estate but not to the passing of
Joshua's estate. Willingham appealed that judgment to this
Court.
Standard of Review
"An order granting or denying a summary judgment
is reviewed de novo, applying the same standard as
the trial court applied. American Gen. Life &
Accident Ins. Co. v. Underwood, 886 So. 2d 807, 811
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(Ala. 2004). In addition, '[t]his court reviews de
novo a trial court's interpretation of a statute,
because only a question of law is presented.' Scott
Bridge Co. v. Wright, 883 So. 2d 1221, 1223 (Ala.
2003). Where, as here, the facts of a case are
essentially undisputed, this Court must determine
whether the trial court misapplied the law to the
undisputed facts, applying a de novo standard of
review. Carter v. City of Haleyville, 669 So. 2d
812, 815 (Ala. 1995). Here, in reviewing the
[entry] of a summary judgment when the facts are
undisputed, we review de novo the trial court's
interpretation of statutory language and our
previous caselaw on a controlling question of law."
Continental Nat'l Indem. Co. v. Fields, 926 So. 2d 1033, 1034-
35 (Ala. 2005).
Discussion
Willingham argues that, because Brandy's death was the
result of an intentional and felonious action on Joshua's
part, the trial court erred in finding that, for purposes of
administering Joshua's estate, Brandy should be considered to
have predeceased Joshua. In its order on the summary-
judgment motion, the trial court found:
"On either March 20 or March 21, 2011, Joshua
Matthews killed his wife, Brandy Matthews. He then
killed himself. Both Joshua and Brandy died
intestate. A personal representative has been
appointed for each of their estates and the
administration of each estate has been removed to
Circuit Court. In this action, the Administratrix
of Brandy's estate has filed a declaratory judgment
action against the Administrator of Joshua's estate
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seeking a determination of the effect of Ala. Code
§ 43-8-253 on this case.
"Law
"'(a) A surviving spouse, heir or
devisee who feloniously and intentionally
kills the decedent is not entitled to any
benefits under the will or under articles
3 through 10 of this chapter, and the
estate of decedent passes as if the killer
had predeceased the decedent. Property
appointed by the will of the decedent to or
for the benefit of the killer passes as if
the killer had predeceased the decedent.'
"Ala. Code [1975,] § 43-8-253.
"Discussion
"A restatement of § 43-8-253 in which the
decedents' names are inserted is instructive of this
matter.
"'(a) [Joshua Matthews,] [a] surviving
spouse ... who feloniously and
intentionally kill[ed Brandy Matthews] is
not entitled to any benefits under ...
articles 3 through 10 of this chapter, and
the estate of [Brandy Matthews] passes as
if [Joshua Matthews] had predeceased
[Brandy Matthews]. ...'
"It is clear by reading the statute in this
manner that Brandy Matthews's estate shall pass as
though Joshua Matthews predeceased her. Summary
judgment on this issue is appropriate.
"It is also clear that this statute refers only
to what happens to the estate of the person who was
the victim of the homicide. That is, this statute
only refers to what happens to the estate of Brandy
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Matthews. The reference in the statute that 'the
estate of the decedent passes as if the killer had
predeceased the decedent' does not refer to what
happens to the killer's estate.
"Therefore, it is clear that Joshua Matthews's
estate shall be administered in accordance with the
general statutes governing the situation in which
Brandy Matthews predeceased him. Summary judgment on
this issue is appropriate.
"Conclusion
"Consistent with the findings of the Court as
stated above, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:
"1. The estate of Brandy Matthews
shall be administered as though Joshua
Matthews predeceased her. Summary judgment
is hereby granted on this issue.
"2. The estate of Joshua Matthews
shall be administered in accordance with
the general statutes governing the
situation in which Brandy Matthews
predeceased him. Summary judgment is
hereby granted on this issue."
Willingham argues that the trial court should have
applied § 43-8-253 to find that Joshua's estate would be
administered as if he had predeceased Brandy. Section 43-8-
253 provides, in pertinent part:
"(a) A surviving spouse, heir or devisee who
feloniously and intentionally kills the decedent is
not entitled to any benefits under the will or under
articles 3 through 10 of this chapter, and the
estate of decedent passes as if the killer had
predeceased the decedent. Property appointed by the
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will of the decedent to or for the benefit of the
killer passes as if the killer had predeceased the
decedent.
"....
"(c) A named beneficiary of a bond, life
insurance policy, or other contractual arrangement
who feloniously and intentionally kills the
principal obligee or the person upon whose life the
policy is issued is not entitled to any benefit
under the bond, policy or other contractual
arrangement, and it becomes payable as though the
killer had predeceased the decedent.
"(d) Any other acquisition of property or
interest by the killer shall be treated in
accordance with the principles of this section."
(Emphasis added.) Based on the plain language of § 43-8-
253(a), the statute applies only to the estate of the murdered
decedent, not the estate of the party who feloniously and
intentionally killed the decedent. See Alfa Life Ins. Corp.
v. Bonner, 933 So. 2d 362, 365-66 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005)
(stating that "subsection (a) of the Slayer's Statute prevents
the party who intentionally kills a decedent from receiving
'any benefits under the will or under articles 3 through 10
of' the Probate Code, that is, from 'the estate of the
decedent'"). Further, Willingham has not cited any authority
to support her proposition that, under § 43-8-253, Joshua's
estate should pass as if he had predeceased Brandy. None of
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the cases cited by Willingham address the issue of how a
probate court should treat the estate of a person who has
murdered his or her spouse and then committed suicide. In
fact, during the hearing on the motion for a summary judgment,
counsel for Willingham conceded that she had not "found a case
exactly like this on point."
Willingham also asserts:
"The commentary [to § 43-8-253] also mentions
that '[i]n many of the cases arising under this
section there may be no criminal prosecution because
the murderer has committed suicide.' This shows
that the legislature knew that a situation like the
instant one could occur."
However, that language comes from the portion of the
Commentary to § 43-8-253 that explains why, although the
matter addressed by the statute appears to be criminal in
nature, it is actually a proper matter for the probate courts.
The Commentary does not include any discussion as to how a
murdering spouse's estate will pass in situations involving a
murder-suicide. Therefore, the language in the Commentary
that Willingham relies upon does not support her assertions.
Conclusion
For the above-stated reasons, Willingham has not
established that the trial court erred in finding that § 43-8-
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253 is not applicable to the administration of Joshua's
estate. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
AFFIRMED.
Moore, C.J., and Stuart, Parker, and Shaw, JJ., concur.
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