DocketNumber: 2100194
Citation Numbers: 92 So. 3d 785
Judges: Bryan, Moore, Pittman, Thomas, Thompson, Writing
Filed Date: 3/30/2012
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 8/26/2021
After Remand from the Alabama Supreme Court
The Alabama Supreme Court (1) has reversed the prior judgment of this court, Smith v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 92 So.3d 766 (Ala.Civ.App.2011), which reversed the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court, Bessemer Division, and (2) has remanded the cause for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. See Ex parte Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 92 So.3d 771 (Ala.2012). We now address an
Frank argues that the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment in favor of the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, an officer of the United States of America (“the Secretary”), because, Frank says, the evidence before the trial court established a genuine issue of material fact regarding the identity of the party who sold his property at the foreclosure sale. The Secretary supported his summary-judgment motion with, among other things, an affidavit signed by Scott Hiatt, a copy of the promissory note signed by Frank, a copy of the mortgage signed by Frank, copies of three subsequent assignments of the mortgagee’s interest in the mortgage, a copy of an affidavit signed by the publisher of the Alabama Messenger, the newspaper in which notice of the foreclosure sale was published, and a copy of the foreclosure deed. Hiatt’s affidavit states that “Plaintiff, Bank of America, N.A.,” sold Frank’s property at the foreclosure sale. On the other hand, the copy of the notice of the foreclosure sale that was published in the Alabama Messenger, which was included with the affidavit signed by the publisher of the Alabama Messenger, states that the Secretary would be selling Frank’s property at the foreclosure sale. Likewise, the foreclosure deed states that Dana Wright McGowin, the auctioneer who conducted the foreclosure sale, sold Frank’s property at the foreclosure sale on behalf of the Secretary. The three assignments of the mortgagee’s interest in the mortgage consist of an assignment from Franklin American Mortgage Company (“Franklin American”) to North American Mortgage Company (“North American”); an assignment from North American to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”), as nominee for PNC Mortgage Corp. of America (“PNC”); and an assignment from MERS, as nominee for PNC, to the Secretary. The promissory note signed by Frank indicates that Franklin American signed an indorsement making the promissory note payable to the order of North American; that North American signed an indorsement making the promissory note payable to the order of MERS, as nominee for PNC; and that MERS, as nominee for PNC, signed an indorsement making the promissory note payable to the order of the Secretary. The record does not contain any evidence indicating that Bank of America, N.A., was ever the owner of the mortgagee’s interest in the mortgage or the owner of the debt secured by the mortgage. See Coleman v. BAC Servicing, [Ms. 2100453, Feb. 3, 2012] (Ala.Civ.App.2012)
Although Frank did not argue to the trial court that Hiatt’s statement that Bank of America, N.A., sold the property at the foreclosure sale established the existence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the foreclosure was valid, “[t]he issue of a lack of standing may not be waived, and an argument concerning standing may be asserted for the first time on appeal.” Sturdivant, — So.3d at — (citing RLI Ins. Co. v. MLK Ave. Redev. Corp., 925 So.2d 914, 918 (Ala.2005)).
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
. The factual background of this case and its procedural history in the trial court are recited in our original decision. See Smith v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs, supra.
Note from the reporter of decisions: On June 22, 2012, the Court of Civil Appeals withdrew the February 3, 2012, opinion in Coleman and substituted another one. See Coleman v. BAC Servicing, [Ms. 2100453, June 22, 2012] — So.3d — (Ala.Civ.App.2012).