D.D. v. Etowah County Department of Human Resources

REL: February 17, 2023
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023
_________________________
2210430, 2210431, and 2210432
_________________________
D.D.
v.
Etowah County Department of Human Resources
Appeals from Etowah Juvenile Court
(JU-20-203.02, JU-20-204.02, and JU-20-205.02)
EDWARDS, Judge.
In August 2021, the Etowah County Department of Human
Resources ("DHR") filed a petition in the Etowah Juvenile Court ("the
juvenile court") seeking to terminate the parental rights of D.D. ("the
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mother") to I.M.D., B.H.E.D., and K.M.H. ("the children"). 1 After a trial,
the juvenile court entered a single judgment terminating the parental
rights of the mother to the children. The mother filed a timely
postjudgment motion in each termination-of-parental-rights action on
January 13, 2022. DHR filed a response to the mother's postjudgment
motions on January 24, 2022. On January 27, 2022, 14 days after the
filing of the mother's postjudgment motions, the State Judicial
Information System case-action-summary sheet reflects that the juvenile
court entered an order setting a hearing on the mother's postjudgment
motions to be held on February 24, 2022. At that hearing, counsel for
DHR objected to the juvenile court's conducting the hearing on the
ground that the juvenile court had lost jurisdiction to rule on the mother's
postjudgment motions. The juvenile court agreed and entered an order
in each underlying action on February 24, 2022, stating that it lacked
1The petition contained three separate case numbers -- JU-20-
203.02, JU-20-204.02, and JU-20-205.02 -- and, in addition to seeking
termination of the mother's parental rights, also sought to terminate the
parental rights of M.H., the father of K.M.H.
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jurisdiction to consider the mother's postjudgment motions. The mother
filed notices of appeal on that same day. We dismiss the appeals.
This court called for letter briefs on the timeliness of the mother's
appeals. The mother argued that the appeals were timely because the
juvenile court's January 27, 2022, orders setting the February 24, 2022,
hearing were, she said, an implicit, but effective, extension of the time to
rule on the postjudgment motions for an additional 14-day period under
Rule 1(B)(1), Ala. R. Juv. P. Thus, she contended, the juvenile court lost
jurisdiction to rule on the postjudgment motions on February 10, 2022,
14 days after the entry of the January 27, 2022, order, and her notices of
appeal, which were filed on February 24, 2022, were timely filed within
14 days of the denial of her postjudgment motions by operation of law.
See Rule 1(B), Ala. R. Juv. P. (providing that a postjudgment motion is
denied by operation of law if the juvenile court does not render an order
on that motion within 14 days or within a proper extension of that 14-
day period); Rule 28, Ala. R. Juv. P. (providing that a party must appeal
from a judgment entered by a juvenile court within 14 days after the
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entry of the judgment). As legal authority for her position, the mother
relied on K.T. v. B.C., 232 So. 3d 897, 898-99 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017).
In K.T., this court considered appeals from judgments entered by
the Lee Juvenile Court on November 1, 2016, declaring the children of
K.T. to be dependent. 232 So. 3d at 898. On November 23, 2016, the Lee
Juvenile Court, acting on postjudgment motions filed by K.T., entered
orders on those motions
"providing that the postjudgment motions were 'granted in
part' and further providing:
" 'The [November 1, 2016, judgment] is hereby set
aside as a final Order, but the terms thereof
remain in place, pendente lite, to determine issues
of service related to the mother's unique status as
a minor herself.' "
232 So. 3d at 898. The Lee Juvenile Court did not set a hearing on the
service issue in that order or at any time within the initial 14-day period
that the Lee Juvenile Court had to rule on the postjudgment motions
under Rule 1(B). Id. This court indicated that the orders entered by the
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Lee Juvenile Court had not definitively ruled on the postjudgment
motions. 2 Id. This court then explained that
"[i]n substance, the [Lee] [J]uvenile [C]ourt entered written
orders extending the time to rule on the service issue raised
in the mother's postjudgment motions, which was allowable.
However, the juvenile court purported to retain jurisdiction to
address the issue beyond the '14 additional days' allowed by
Rule 1(B)(1), [Ala. R. Juv. P.,] which it could not do."
2Judge Donaldson concurred in the result, stating:
"I agree that in some cases an order that purports to
'grant' a postjudgment motion but that actually only sets a
hearing on the motion is ineffective. Smith v. Smith, 4 So. 3d
1178, 1181 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008). The first sentence of the
November 23, 2016, orders purporting to grant the
postjudgment motions 'in part' is confusing. See Venturi v.
Venturi, [233] So. 3d [982, 984] (Ala. Civ. App. 2016)
(Donaldson, J., concurring specially) (observing the confusion
that might result from the automatically generated language
used in the electronic-filing system provided to the trial
courts). Despite the first sentence, however, I read the
remaining portions of the November 23, 2016, orders as
specifically vacating the final judgments by setting them
aside."
K.T., 232 So. 3d at 901 (Donaldson, J., concurring in the result). Judge
Donaldson stated that he would dismiss the appeals as having been taken
from nonappealable, nonfinal pendente lite orders entered by the Lee
Juvenile Court. Id.
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232 So. 3d at 899. Although it seems apparent that the Lee Juvenile
Court was not granting itself a 14-day extension to rule on the
postjudgment motions under Rule 1(B)(1) because the order did not set a
hearing on the motions to be held at any point, much less within the 14-
day extension period, this court treated the November 23, 2016, order as
implicitly, if incorrectly, exercising that authority. Because the mother
in K.T. had filed notices of appeal on December 7, 2016, within 14 days
of the entry of the Lee Juvenile Court's postjudgment orders setting aside
the judgments, this court concluded that those notices of appeals
quickened on December 12, 2016, 14 days after the Lee Juvenile Court
entered the postjudgment orders "implicitly" extending the time for
ruling on the postjudgment motions; essentially, this court limited the
"implicit" extension to the permitted additional 14-day period so that the
"implicit" extension would fall within the juvenile court's authority under
Rule 1(B)(1). Id.
Just eight weeks later, this court decided K.R. v. W.L., 238 So. 3d
664, 665-66 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017) (authored by Thompson, P.J., with
Pittman, J., concurring and Thomas, J., concurring in the result). In
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K.R., this court concluded that a parent's March 17, 2016, postjudgment
motion directed to a termination-of-parental-rights judgment had been
denied by operation of law 14 days after its filing despite the fact that the
Shelby Juvenile Court had entered an order on March 29, 2016, setting
a hearing on the postjudgment motion for April 8, 2016, a date within the
additional 14-day period that the Shelby Juvenile Court could have
extended the time to rule on the postjudgment motion under Rule 1(B)(1).
K.R., 238 So. 3d at 665. Judge Moore authored a dissent echoing the
holding in K.T. Id. at 666 (Moore, J., dissenting). In that dissent, Judge
Moore explained that "[t]he juvenile court is presumed to know and apply
the law." Id. at 667. According to Judge Moore, "interpret[ing] the
[March 29, 2016,] written order as scheduling a hearing after the juvenile
court lost jurisdiction … would [amount to this court's] presuming that
the juvenile court either was ignorant of Rule 1(B)(1) or that it
intentionally acted in contravention of the law." Id. Thus, he said, he
would conclude that "a written order scheduling a hearing within the
additional 14-day period provided by Rule 1(B)(1) should be considered
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as extending the time in which the postjudgment motion can remain
pending unless the context of the order clearly indicates otherwise." Id.More recently, in S.C. v. Lauderdale County Department of Human
Resources, [Ms. 2210267, Aug. 5, 2022] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App.
2022), this court dismissed two appeals because the parent had not filed
notices of appeal within 14 days after that parent's postjudgment motions
were denied by operation of law. The parent filed the postjudgment
motions on September 1, 2021. S.C., ___ So. 3d at ___. The Lauderdale
Juvenile Court entered orders on September 8, 2021, setting the
postjudgment motions for a hearing to be held on September 23, 2021.
Id. at ___. At the September 23, 2021, hearing, the Lauderdale County
Department of Human Resources ("the Lauderdale County DHR")
argued to the Lauderdale Juvenile Court that it had lost jurisdiction to
rule on the postjudgment motions because the court had not entered an
order specifically extending the time to rule on those motions pursuant
to Rule 1(B)(1). Id. at ___. The Lauderdale Juvenile Court admitted on
the record that the Lauderdale County DHR's position was correct, and,
thus, the Lauderdale Juvenile Court entered orders on September 24,
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2021, stating, in pertinent part, that " 'the time for the hearing is
extended to Thursday, [September] 22 [sic], 2021, and this order shall
relate back to the date the motion (Doc 169) was filed.' " Id. at ___. The
parent filed notices of appeal on October 7, 2021, more than three weeks
beyond the 14th day following the denial of the postjudgment motions by
operation of law on September 15, 2021. Id. at ___. This court did not
discuss whether the September 8, 2021, orders setting the hearing for
September 23, 2021, could have been an implicit extension of the time to
rule on the postjudgment motions.
Rule 1(B) provides, in pertinent part:
"All postjudgment motions, whether provided for by the
Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure or the Alabama Rules of
Criminal Procedure, must be filed within 14 days after entry
of order or judgment and shall not remain pending for more
than 14 days, unless, within that time, the period during
which a postjudgment motion may remain pending is
extended:
"(1) By written order of the juvenile court on
its own motion, or upon motion of a party for good
cause shown, for not more than 14 additional days;
or
"(2) By the appellate court to which an
appeal of the judgment would lie.
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"The period during which a postjudgment motion may
remain pending may not be extended by consent of the
parties.
"A failure by the juvenile court to render an order
disposing of any pending postjudgment motion within the
time permitted hereunder, or any extension thereof, shall
constitute a denial of such motion as of the date of the
expiration of the period."
Rule 1(B)(1) is quite simple -- to extend the time for ruling on a
pending postjudgment motion, a juvenile court must enter a written
order doing so. The rule allows for an extension of the time for ruling on
a postjudgment motion for up to an additional 14 days, and it
presupposes that the written order will specify the additional number of
days that the period is extended, which can be less than the entire 14-
day extension period permitted under the rule. Although we
acknowledge that the rule does not contain the word "express" or
"expressly," we cannot see how an order of a juvenile court can effectuate
an extension of the time to rule on a postjudgment motion without
mentioning the rule itself or how long the extension will be. We cannot
agree that this court should construe an order setting a hearing for a date
outside the initial 14-day period for ruling on a postjudgment motion but
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within the permitted additional 14-day period for an extension as a
written order extending the time for ruling on the motion. Doing so
makes the extension "accidental," at best. At worst, it renders what
should be a thoughtful decision to extend the 14-day period to rule on the
postjudgment motion merely an automatic result of scheduling a "late"
hearing. Thus, construing an order setting an untimely postjudgment
hearing as an order extending the time for ruling on a postjudgment
motion does not, in any way, comport with the purpose of the rule, which
is to ensure that a postjudgment motion is ruled upon, in most cases,
within 14 days.
We note that we would be even more reluctant to construe an order
scheduling a hearing for a date outside the additional 14-day period
permitted under Rule 1(B)(1) to effectuate an extension of the period for
only the additional 14 days allowed under the rule. That is, we cannot
presume that a juvenile court knows the law, see K.R., 238 So. 3d at 667(Moore, J., dissenting), and then logically conclude that if it sets a hearing
for more than 28 days after the filing of the postjudgment motion, that
juvenile court was exercising its discretion under Rule 1(B)(1). Any
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juvenile court setting a hearing for more than 28 days after the filing of
a postjudgment motion is not exercising discretion to extend the time for
ruling on that motion; that court is mistaken about the period during
which it retains jurisdiction over postjudgment motions.
We also reject the idea that construing Rule 1(B)(1) to require an
express statement of intent to extend the time for ruling on a
postjudgment motion is a trap for the unwary.3 Construing Rule 1(B)(1)
to require a written order and also to require specific information -- the
intent to grant an extension and the length of that extension -- is not a
hyper-technical construction of Rule 1(B)(1) and does not make
application of the rule "a trap for the unwary." The construction of Rule
3To the contrary, construing any order setting a hearing for a date
within the additional 14-day period that a juvenile court may grant itself
under Rule 1(B)(1) as an implicit extension under the rule may result in
quite a trap for the unwary if the juvenile court does not issue a decision
on the postjudgment motion on the same day as the hearing, especially
when a juvenile court sets a hearing within the additional 14-day period
but before the final day of that additional 14-day period. In such a case,
the implicit extension would necessarily expire on the date of the hearing,
even if the additional 14-day period is not yet set to expire, and any ruling
rendered after the date of the hearing would be too late to fall within the
extension.
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1(B)(1) to permit implicit extensions of time excuses the lack of
knowledge of the rule and would undercut the intent of the rule.
Because the January 27, 2022, order setting a hearing on the
mother's postjudgment motion did not effectuate an extension of the 14-
day period for ruling on that motion, and because, as a result, the
mother's notices of appeal were untimely filed more than 14 days after
the denial of those motions by operation of law on January 27, 2022, we
dismiss the mother's appeals.
2210430 -- APPEAL DISMISSED.
2210431 -- APPEAL DISMISSED.
2210432 -- APPEAL DISMISSED.
Thompson, P.J., and Fridy, J., concur.
Hanson, J., dissents, with opinion, which Moore, J., joins.
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HANSON, Judge, dissenting.
I believe that the appeals were timely; therefore, I respectfully
dissent to dismissing the appeals. In my opinion, the order of the Etowah
Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court") dated January 27, 2022, setting the
postjudgment motion filed by D.D. ("the mother") for a hearing, extended
the time within which the postjudgment motion could remain pending.
Although the juvenile court purported to extend the time that the
postjudgment motion could have remained pending to a time outside of
the 14-day time limit of Rule 1(B)(1), Ala. R. Juv. P., the written order of
the juvenile court did extend the time for the motion to remain pending
as permitted by that rule.
In this case, the juvenile court entered final judgments terminating
the parental rights of the mother on December 30, 2021. On January 13,
2022, the mother timely filed a postjudgment motion in the actions. See
Rule 1(B), Ala. R. Juv. P. ("All postjudgment motions, whether provided
for by the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure or the Alabama Rules of
Criminal Procedure, must be filed within 14 days after entry of order or
judgment …."). The mother's timely-filed postjudgment motion tolled the
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time for filing an appeal. See C.B. v. D.P.B., 80 So. 3d 918, 920 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2011)(relying on well-settled law that a timely filed postjudgment
motion tolls the time for filing a notice of appeal). On January 27, 2022,
the juvenile court entered an order setting a hearing on the postjudgment
motion for February 24, 2022. The comment accompanying the 2011
amendment to Rule 1(B)(1) recognized that the 14-day time limit to rule
on a postjudgment motion is sometimes insufficient to address the issues
raised by such motions. While a juvenile court may extend the time for
a timely filed postjudgment motion to remain pending, Rule 1(B) does not
allow an extension of more than 14 days. Accordingly, the mother's
postjudgment motion was deemed denied by operation of law on February
10, 2022. The mother timely filed her notice of appeal on February 24,
2022. See H.J.T. v. State ex rel. M.S.M., 34 So. 3d 1276, 1279 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2009)("A notice of appeal in a juvenile action must be filed within
14 days of the date of entry of the judgment or the denial of a [timely
filed] postjudgment motion."); see also Rule 4(a)(1), Ala. R. App. P.
In K.R. v. W.L., 238 So. 3d 664 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017) (authored by
Thompson, P.J., with Pittman, J., concurring and Thomas, J., concurring
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in the result)., the juvenile court entered final judgments terminating the
parental rights of the mother on March 3, 2016. On March 17, 2016, the
mother timely filed a postjudgment motion in the actions. On March 29,
2016, the juvenile court entered an order setting the postjudgment
motion for a hearing on April 8, 2016. Following the hearing, the juvenile
court entered an order purporting to grant the motion in part and deny
it in part. On April 15, 2016, the mother filed a notice of appeal. This
court dismissed the appeal as untimely because the juvenile court's order
did not expressly extend the time for the mother's postjudgment motion
to remain pending under Rule 1(B)(1).
In his dissent to the main opinion in K.R. v. W.L., Judge Moore
explained why Rule 1(B), Ala. R. Juv. P., should be liberally construed:
"In these cases, the juvenile court entered a written order
within the 14-day period in which the mother's postjudgment
motion could remain pending, but the written order stated
only that the hearing on the postjudgment motion would take
place after the initial 14-day period had expired. The written
order did not specifically provide that the juvenile court
intended to extend the time that the postjudgment motion
could remain pending.
"Rule 1(B)(2) and (3), Ala. R. Juv. P., follows Rule 59.1,
Ala. R. Civ. P., which allows the parties and the appellate
court to extend the time in which a postjudgment motion may
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remain pending. In regard to an agreement of the parties to
extend the time that a postjudgment motion may remain
pending, the appellate courts of this state have consistently
held that an agreement by the parties to continue a hearing
on a postjudgment motion does not equate to an agreement
to extend the time a postjudgment motion can remain
pending under Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P. See Ex parte Bolen,
915 So. 2d 565, 569 (Ala. 2005) (explaining that Rule 59.1 has
been construed consistently since at least 1979). However, I
cannot locate any cases construing Rule 1(B)(1), Ala. R. Juv.
P., in the same manner.
"In K.T. v. B.C., 232 So. 3d 897 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017),
this court held that a juvenile court can, by written order,
extend the time for ruling on a postjudgment motion by
entering a written order granting itself additional time to rule
on the merits of the motion and by scheduling a subsequent
hearing for that purpose, so long as the ruling on the motion
takes place within the additional 14-day period provided by
Rule 1(B)(1). In these cases, the juvenile court, in substance,
scheduled a hearing within the additional 14-day period
allowed in Rule 1(B)(1) in order to determine the merits of the
mother's postjudgment motion. The juvenile court's order
communicated that it was extending the time to rule on the
postjudgment motion. Although the juvenile court did not
expressly state as much, its order clearly implied that it was
planning to hear arguments regarding the postjudgment
motion and to rule upon the motion following those
arguments, which it did, after the postjudgment motion
otherwise would have been denied by operation of law. The
juvenile court is presumed to know and apply the law. See Ex
parte Slaton, 680 So. 2d 909 (Ala. 1996). If we were to
interpret the written order as scheduling a hearing after the
juvenile court lost jurisdiction, we would be presuming that
the juvenile court either was ignorant of Rule 1(B)(1) or that
it intentionally acted in contravention of the law.
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"Furthermore, in a Rule 59.1 situation, the parties must
place on the record their agreement to extend the time that a
postjudgment motion can remain pending. The contents of
that agreement are wholly within the power of the parties. In
a Rule 1(B)(1) situation, the parties have no control over the
content of the written order issued by the juvenile court.
Presumably, a party could seek clarification of such an order,
but the party does not have any input into its original
wording. Given those circumstances, the rule should be
liberally construed in a manner different from the manner in
which Rule 59.1 has been construed so that a written order
scheduling a hearing within the additional 14-day period
provided by Rule 1(B)(1) should be considered as extending
the time in which the postjudgment motion can remain
pending unless the context of the order clearly indicates
otherwise.
"Finally, the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Alabama Rules of Juvenile Procedure should be not be
construed in such a manner that it creates a trap for an
unwary attorney. Kissic v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 641 So.
2d 250, 252 (Ala. 1994). The manner in which the appellate
courts have construed Rule 59.1 has certainly ensnared many
an appellant who, in reliance on an agreement to extend the
time for a hearing on a postjudgment motion, has failed to
timely file a notice of appeal, leading many supreme court
justices and judges of this court to question the justness of
that construction. See Harrison v. Alabama Power Co., 371
So. 2d 19, 21 (Ala. 1979) (Maddox, J., dissenting); State v.
Redtop Mkt., Inc., 937 So. 2d 1013, 1015-17 (Ala. 2006) (in
which Nabers, C.J., and Stuart and Bolin, JJ., all expressed
that the overly technical construction of Rule 59.1 should be
overruled); Traylor v. Traylor, 976 So. 2d 447, 450 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2007) (Bryan, J., concurring in result, joined by Thomas,
J., stating that an agreement to extend the time to hold a
hearing should be considered an agreement to extend the time
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that a postjudgment motion can remain pending). I believe
that, in a proper setting, the supreme court would overrule
the line of cases that have construed Rule 59.1 so strictly.
Therefore, in my opinion, this court should not construe Rule
1(B)(1) in the narrow manner that has led to so many unjust
results under Rule 59.1 and I believe that would likely be
overruled by the supreme court on certiorari review in light of
its experience with Rule 59.1.
"Construing Rule 1(B)(1) correctly, the juvenile court in
this case properly extended the time for ruling on the
postjudgment motion so that it was not denied by operation of
law on March 31, 2016, as the main opinion concludes. 238 So.
3d at 665. The juvenile court entered a valid order on April 8,
2016, within the extended 14-day period afforded by Rule
1(B)(1). That order concluded the proceedings. The mother
filed her notice of appeal on April 15, 2016, less than 14 days
later. See Rule 28(C), Ala. R. Juv. P. ('Written notice of appeal
shall be filed within 14 days of the date of the entry of order
or judgment appealed from, whether the appeal is to an
appellate court or to the circuit court for trial de novo.')."
K.R. v. W.L., 238 So. 3d at 666-68 (footnote omitted).
As Judge Moore noted in his dissenting opinion in K.R. v. W.L., our
supreme court has recognized the unfairness of strictly construing orders
extending the time within which a postjudgment motion may remain
pending. In 2020, the supreme court amended Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P.,
to provide that consent to extend the time for a hearing on a
postjudgment motion beyond the 90 days includes consent to extend the
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time for the trial court to rule on and dispose of the postjudgment motion.
As explained in the committee comments to Rule 59.1 that concern that
amendment:
"This amendment adds the following sentence to Rule
59.1: 'Consent to extend the time for a hearing on the
postjudgment motion beyond the 90 days is deemed to include
consent to extend the time for the trial court to rule on and
dispose of the postjudgment motion.' In Ex parte
Bodenhamer, 904 So. 2d 294 (Ala. 2004), the Supreme Court
held that Rule 59.1 did not permit the parties' consent to
extend the hearing on the postjudgment motion to a date
beyond the 90th day to operate to also extend the trial court's
time to rule on or dispose of the postjudgment motion. After
the adoption of this amendment, a consent that consents only
to extend the hearing date beyond the 90th day will operate
to extend the time for the trial court to rule on or dispose of
the postjudgment motion."
Committee Comments to Amendment to Rule 59.1 Effective October 1,
2020.
In 2020, the supreme court also amended Rule 1(B), Ala. R. Juv. P.,
to delete the parties' ability to consent to an extension; the committee
comment concerning that amendment provides:
"The language in the prior subsection (B)(2) of Rule 1,
allowing the time during which a postjudgment motion may
remain pending to be extended by the consent of the parties,
was deleted, and the first sentence following the renumbered
subsection (B)(2) was added to remove any option for
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extending, by agreement of the parties, the period during
which a postjudgment motion may remain pending before
being deemed denied. Thus, the relief available to parties
under Rule 59.1, Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, is not
available under the Rules of Juvenile Procedure."
Comment to Amendment to Rule 1(B) Effective April 1, 2020.
While the parties in a juvenile court case can no longer consent to
extending the time during which a postjudgment motion may remain
pending, the juvenile court continues to have the ability to extend the
time on its own motion or upon motion by a party for good cause. Rule
1(B)(1) continues to a have an outside time limit of 14 days for a
postjudgment motion to remain pending. Providing for such time limits
in termination-of-parental-rights cases serves to "expedite such juvenile
court cases because of their nature and importance." Comment to
Amendment to Rule 1 Effective October 1, 2011.
Here, the juvenile court entered a written order within the 14-day
period in which the mother's postjudgment motion could remain pending,
but the written order set the matter for a hearing and did not specifically
provide that the juvenile court intended to extend the time which the
postjudgment motion could remain pending. I agree with Judge Moore's
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rationale in K.R. v. W.L. that such orders should be liberally construed
so that a written order scheduling a hearing within the additional 14-day
period provided by Rule 1(B)(1) should be considered as extending the
time in which the postjudgment motion can remain pending. Construing
the order liberally also comports with the supreme court's 2020
amendment to Rule 59.1 eliminating the overly technical construction of
Rule 59.1 by adding that a consent to a continuance of a hearing satisfies
the requirement that the record show the parties' express consent to the
extension of the time period during which a postjudgment motion can
remain pending. Therefore, I dissent.
Moore, J., concurs.
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