DocketNumber: CR-04-0868
Judges: Wise, McMillan, Cobb, Baschab, Shaw
Filed Date: 4/29/2005
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
The appellant, Victor Ayler, appeals from the circuit court’s dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief, filed pursuant to Rule 32, Aia.R.Crim.P., in which he attacked his 1982 guilty-plea convictions for two counts of robbery in the second degree and his resulting sentences of 10 years’ imprisonment for each conviction. No direct appeal was taken from these convictions.
On appeal, Ayler reasserts the allegation he presented in his petition to the trial court and also contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for an eviden-tiary hearing.
Ayler’s original indictments charging him with robbery in the first degree are included in the record, but the amended indictments are not. (C. 29.) Nevertheless, the record clearly reveals that a count was added to each indictment with Ayler’s consent. (C. 2, 6.)
The Alabama Supreme Court has addressed this issue and stated:
“When, as here, an indictment for first-degree robbery fails to set forth facts from which one might conclude that the defendant was aided in the robbery by another participant — an essential element of the offense of second-degree robbery — the insufficiency of the factual basis for a guilty plea to second-degree robbery may be subsequently attacked on the basis that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to accept the plea. Had the trial court obtained [the defendant’s] consent to amend the indictment charging first-degree robbery by adding the fact that another participant was present, no new offense would have been charged because first-degree robbery is broad enough to include such an element. An indictment so amended, permitting a defendant to plead guilty to second-degree robbery, would not run afoul of Rule 13.5(a)[, Ala.R.Crim.PJ That, however, did not occur here. To treat the proceedings in this case as if the original indictment included that additional fact just because Cole pleaded guilty would disregard the settled principle that one cannot consent to an improper amendment to an indictment. See Murray v. State, [814 So.2d 1006 (Ala.Crim.App.2001) ]; Wingard v. State, [821 So.2d 240 (Ala.Crim.App.2001) ]; Green v. State, [619 So.2d 952 (Ala.Crim.App.1993) ]; and Ross v. State, [529 So.2d 1074 (Ala.Crim.App.1988) ].”
Ex parte Cole, 842 So.2d 605, 609 (Ala.2002).
Although the record reflects that each indictment was amended to add a second count charging Ayler with second-degree robbery, the question is not whether the amended indictments, i.e., those charging the added counts of second-degree robbery, included the fact that Ayler was aided in the robberies by another person but whether the first-degree-robbery charges themselves were amended to add the fact that Ayler was aided in the robberies by another person before the indictments were amended to add the second-degree-robbery counts. Therefore, we find it necessary to remand this cause to the trial court for that court to determine whether the first-degree-robbery charges were amended to add the fact that Ayler was aided in the robberies by another person before the indictments were amended to add the additional counts of second-degree robbery.
If the trial court determines that the first-degree-robbery charges were not
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.