DocketNumber: 6 Div. 203.
Citation Numbers: 178 So. 823, 28 Ala. App. 70, 1938 Ala. App. LEXIS 46
Judges: Samford
Filed Date: 2/1/1938
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
The action in this case was a claim for damages for simple negligence, growing out of a collision between a Ford truck, in which plaintiff was riding, and a touring car, being driven at the time by the defendant. The injury to the plaintiff was shown by the evidence to have been serious, and as a result of said injury she was confined in the hospital from the 29th day of August until the middle of October. Both arms were broken, one leg was broken above the ankle, and she was otherwise bruised and lacerated. She was taken to the hospital as a charity patient, and no charge was made for hospitalization and none for doctor's bill.
On the trial of the case, which was tried in conjunction with a suit by plaintiff's husband, both the plaintiff and her husband recovered judgment, the jury fixing the damages to the plaintiff at $750.
Deeming the amount inadequate, the plaintiff made a motion for a new trial which was granted by the court, and from this judgment the defendant takes this appeal.
In view of the fact that the verdict of the jury was in favor of the plaintiff, we pretermit a consideration of grounds 1 and 2 of the motion for a new trial, alleging that the verdict was contrary to the law and evidence.
It also appears, from a reading of this record, that there was no evidence of subsequent negligence, and, therefore, the court committed no error in giving at the request of the defendant, in writing, the following charge: "I charge you that the plaintiff can recover nothing because of any subsequent negligence in this case." This leaves for consideration other grounds of the motion, which, differing in verbiage, raise the question of inadequacy of the damages assessed by the jury, after a consideration of all the evidence.
The evidence for the plaintiff tended to prove negligence on the part of the defendant, and while in some particulars this evidence was weak and inconclusive, there was sufficient evidence to make this a jury question. On the other hand, the testimony for the defendant tended strongly to prove that the collision between the two cars was not due to the negligence of the defendant, but, on the contrary, was due to the negligence of the driver of the truck in which this plaintiff was riding at the time of the accident. In view of this state of the evidence, as shown by the record, it is very evident to us that the verdict of the jury responded more in sympathy toward the plaintiff than it did toward the defendant.
In Montgomery Light Traction Co. v. King,
In Birmingham Electric Co. v. Ella Chandler,
We recognize the rule that the power of trial judges to set aside verdicts of a jury is essential to prevent irreparable injustice in cases where a verdict wholly wrong is the result of inadvertence, forgetfulness, or intentional or capricious disregard of the testimony, or of bias or prejudice, on the part of the juries, which sometimes occur. But, in exercising the power, the court should be careful not to infringe the right of trial by jury in matters which have been left to them by the law.
It is also declared to be a general rule, without exception, so far as we have been able to find, that, so long as the principle of compensation is not violated, no limitation is placed upon the amount of awards of damages for personal injury. 17 Corpus Juris 1089, 398B.
In recognition of this rule, this court in McEntyre et al. v. First Nat. Bank of Headland,
In the case of Taylor v. Lewis,
In the instant case, however, the damages awarded were substantial in amount, and we find in this record no evidence of inadvertence, forgetfulness, or intentional or capricious disregard of the testimony, or of bias or prejudice, or other improper motive.
To allow the judgment, setting aside the verdict of the jury, to stand would be to place in the hands of one man the power to set aside the calm and deliberate conclusion of twelve men, equally honest, equally unprejudiced, and upon whom, by the law, is fixed the duty of ascertaining this very question. We cannot subscribe to such a doctrine. *Page 73
The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded that the judgment of the circuit court may be reinstated.
Reversed and remanded.
Birmingham Electric Co. v. Chandler , 28 Ala. App. 9 ( 1937 )
McEntyre v. First Nat. Bank of Headland , 27 Ala. App. 311 ( 1937 )
Taylor v. Lewis , 27 Ala. App. 240 ( 1936 )
Walker County v. Davis , 221 Ala. 195 ( 1930 )
Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n , 1991 Ala. LEXIS 1001 ( 1991 )
Jawad v. Granade , 497 So. 2d 471 ( 1986 )
Clark v. Container Corp. of America, Inc. , 589 So. 2d 184 ( 1991 )
Birmingham Electric Co. v. Howard , 250 Ala. 421 ( 1948 )
Hubbard Bros. Construction v. C. F. Halstead Contractor, ... , 294 Ala. 688 ( 1975 )
Sinclair Refining Co. v. Robertson , 32 Ala. App. 212 ( 1945 )
Alabama Farm Bureau Mutual Casualty Insurance v. Anderson , 52 Ala. App. 651 ( 1974 )