Walter v. State

CARR, Judge.

The appellant was convicted in the court below for violating the provisions of Sections 8 and 9 of what is commonly referred to as the “Bradford Act.” Act No. 298, General Acts 1943, p. 252, Title 26, Sections 383 and 384, Cum. Pocket Part, Code 1940. They are:

“Section 383. Every person shall be free to join ordo refrain from joining any labor organization except as otherwise provided in section 391 of this title, and in the exercise of such freedom shall be free from interference by force, coercion or intimidation, or by threats of force or coercion, or by intimidation of or injury to his family.”

“Section 384. It shall be unlawful for any person by the use of force or violence, or the threat of the use of force or violence, to prevent or to attempt to prevent any person from engaging in any lawful vocation within this state.”

Without the citation of any authorities, appellant’s counsel in brief states that the above sections are unconstitutional.

It appears to us that the Supreme Court, in Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 246 Ala. 1, 18 So.2d 810, has in effect determined this question contrary to the position of the appellant. See also, Alabama State Federation of Labor v. Lusk, 246 Ala. 32, 18 So.2d 833.

In the case of Hotel & Restaurant Employees v. Greenwood, 249 Ala. 265, 30 So.2d 696, 705, the Supreme Court expressed the view and held that a closed shop is not outlawed in Alabama. In- reply to a contention that Sections 383 and 384, supra, had this effective result, the court observed:

“Manifestly these sections only denounce the imposition of restraint on one regarding his attitude toward affiliation with a labor organization by force, coercion, intimidation or by threats thereof, or bv intimidation of or injury to his family. Their essence -is no-t to ban a closed shop but to make unlawful interference, by the stated methods, with a person’s freedom of choice in regard to such affiliation.

“Nor do we think that §§ 57 and 103 of Title 14 and the aforesaid sections of the Bradford Act can be read together so as to ban the closed shop. All the provisions speak of the use of force, threats or intimidation or other improper or unlawful means and do not prohibit a requirement of union membership as a condition of employment so long as such means are not utilized to enforce the stipulation.”

Clearly we have here an expression from the court of the meaning and purport of the terms of the sections of the act.- Their constitutionality vel non must be determined in consonance with this interpretation.

The sections of instant concern were not specifically treated or analyzed in the McAdory case, supra [246 Ala. 1, 18 So.2d 823], but there can be no doubt or question that the validity of each must be upheld on the basis of the authority of this able opinion. As one illustration of this view we quote: “If we follow the argument of counsel for plaintiff to its ultimate conclusion, it is difficult to see where any effective legislation could be had concerning regulations of organizations of this character. We think the authorities which we have herein ci.ted clearly demonstrate that they are subject to the police power of the state, and that the contention as to the violation of the constitutional provisions of free speech and assembly invalidates any of the provisions of the Act, is untenable.” (Emphasis ours.)

This disposes of the only question upon which insistence is made in appellant’s brief. In deference to the record, however,, we will respond to one other matter.

It appears that the Fourth Regional War Labor Board requested or directed t-hat the employee be suspended for five days a week for four weeks and then be discharged if he had not paid his labor union dues. The accused followed these instructions, -and the employee was discharged as. a result of his failure to make said payment

It is clear to us that the Labor Board could act only in an advisory or recommendatory capacity and it was without power or authority as a tribunal to defeat or obstruct the provisions and mandates, of the penal statute. This seems to be the effect of the holdings in the following-cases. Masso et al. v. Burke et al., 138. N.J.Eq. 276, 47 A.2d 732; In re Suburban Bus Co., Inc., 65 F.Supp. 389; Baltimore-Transit Co. v. Flynn et al., 50 F.Supp. 382; May Dept. Stores Co. v. Brown et al., 60 F.Supp. 735.

The judgment of the court below is. ordered affirmed.

Affirmed.