Goodlataw v. State, Department of Health & Social Services

OPINION

MOORE, Justice.

I. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

This case involves a wrongful death action brought by Martha Goodlataw on behalf of Alvin Goodlataw, her son, now deceased. A jury declared him presumed dead “as a result of undetermined causes” after he disappeared from a rural camp where he had gone to work soon after being sentenced for unlawful entry.

Alvin Goodlataw had a history of alcohol abuse and resultant misconduct. On December 12, 1976 he was arrested and charged with unlawful entry in violation of AS 11.20.135(a). At the time of his arrest he had been drinking; he and a companion had broken into the home of the latter’s sister in search of a place to sleep. After his arrest Goodlataw was imprisoned in the Glenallen jail for a day. The next day he was brought before Magistrate Sheldon Sprecker for arraignment. Goodlataw pleaded guilty at the hearing. The magistrate imposed a sentence of 30 days, with 28 days suspended on the condition that Goodlataw report within two weeks to Craig Anderson, an alcoholism rehabilitation counselor at the Copper River Native Association, for evaluation of his drinking problem. Goodlataw was given credit for two days already served and ordered to make restitution.

On February 3, 1977 Goodlataw appeared before acting magistrate Janet B. Harris for a decision on the recommendations of the alcoholism rehabilitation counselor. The counselor recommended: (1) that Good-lataw have a thorough physical examination with emphasis on ulceration and possible liver dysfunction, vitamin deficiency, and hypoglycemia, all resulting from habitual use of alcohol; (2) that he undergo long-term treatment, for at least six months, in a therapeutic center; (3) that he spend another five days in jail, if necessary, to sober up before going to a halfway treatment house if he were still unemployed; (4) that he meet with an alcoholism counselor at least once a week; and (5) that he attend two Alcoholics Anonymous meetings per week. Anderson also stated that Goodlataw had told him that his longest periods of sobriety in two years had been no longer than two weeks at a time.

Magistrate Harris stated that Goodlataw should get a physical at the ANS Hospital in Anchorage and then go to the Halfway House or the Studio Club in Anchorage. She asked if Goodlataw could get to Anchorage and Goodlataw replied that he could. The magistrate also told him that the court could not pay for his stay at the Halfway House or at the Studio Club. The magistrate informed Goodlataw that if he did not report to either the Studio Club or the Halfway House, the court would impose the 28-day suspended sentence. Goodlataw did not inform the magistrate that he lacked the funds for the trip or the treatment.

On about February 5, 1977 Goodlataw spoke with Frank Pease, who had hired Goodlataw in the past to work at an isolated horse camp. Pease and Goodlataw went to see Magistrate Sprecker to get permission for Goodlataw to go to work at the horse camp. Goodlataw told Magistrate Sprecker that he did not want to go to the detoxification center, because the horse camp job was out in the Bush and there would be no alcohol available there. Good-lataw told Magistrate Sprecker that he had had a couple of drinks the evening before; however, Magistrate Sprecker has testified that Goodlataw appeared fine in court.

Magistrate Sprecker agreed to allow Goodlataw to go to the horse camp on these conditions: (1) that he submit to a physical examination by Dr. Pinneo and receive permission from him to go to work at the camp; and (2) that he agree to complete the detoxification program in Anchorage after he returned. Dr. Pinneo determined that Goodlataw was healthy enough to take care of himself in the Bush. He gave Goodlataw a supply of vitamins and tranquilizers.

On February 6 Goodlataw was flown to the horse camp. The pilot testified at the inquest that Goodlataw had appeared "hung over” but not drunk or mentally confused. On February 7 Magistrate Harris advised Anderson, the alcoholism counselor, that Goodlataw would not report for detoxification until after his return from the horse camp.

On March 9, 1977 Goodlataw was reported missing and state troopers began to search the area of the camp. He was never found. On October 30, 1979 a jury declared Goodlataw presumed dead “as a result of undetermined causes.” AS 09.55.-030.

In an affidavit dated July 14, 1983 Anderson stated that if the court had contacted him when deciding whether to permit Goodlataw to fly to the horse camp, Anderson would have objected. He stated that if Goodlataw did not have something to drink within 48 hours, Goodlataw would likely have gone into delirium tremens. Anderson also observed that Goodlataw functioned at the level of a 12-to-l 5-year-old. He further stated:

I am still troubled as to why the District Court didn’t send for me when the horse camp proposal was raised. The magistrate knew where I lived. I always told him that if you’ve got a problem with something I recommend, and you need to get hold of me quick, just send a State Trooper out and I will find a way to work with the Court. I understand that sometime these things happen so I really don’t understand why I wasn’t contacted. I would have protested about what they proposed to do with Alvin. The Troopers knew who I was and where I lived and so did the magistrate.

II. STATEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS

Martha Goodlataw, as personal representative and special administratrix for the estate of Alvin Goodlataw, filed a complaint in the superior court. AS 09.55.570; AS 09.55.580. She alleged that he was denied his statutory (AS 33.30.020) and constitutional rights to alcoholism rehabilitation. She further alleged that the Commissioner and the Department of Health and Social Services (“Department”) had a responsibility to provide alcoholism rehbilitation for Goodlataw and that their failure to do so proximately caused his death. The Department and its Commissioner moved for dismissal on the ground that any such negligence was not the proximate cause of Goodlataw’s death. After a hearing, the State also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing (1) that the Department was immune from any alleged liability on the basis of AS 09.50.250; (2) that any alleged breach of duty was negated by intervening judicial acts; and (3) that Good-lataw was not denied any constitutional or statutory right to alcoholism rehabilitation.

At a hearing on September 16, 1983 the superior court ruled that there was no breach of any legal duty owed to Goodla-taw and that there was no showing of proximate causation. The superior court granted the defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss on September 19, 1983.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Goodlataw was not deprived of his constitutional right to treatment as a prisoner.

Mrs. Goodlataw argues that Goodlataw was an incarcerated prisoner and that as such he had a right to alcoholism rehabilitation under the Alaska Constitution and United States Constitution, and that he was denied this right.

Incarcerated prisoners clearly have a constitutional right to have their medical needs met. In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103, 97 S.Ct. 285, 290, 50 L.Ed.2d 251, 259 (1976), the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the “elementary principles [of the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment] establish the government’s obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration.” The court reasoned:

An inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met. In the worst cases, such a failure may actually produce physical “torture or a lingering death,”.... In less serious cases, denial of medical care may result in pain and suffering which no one suggests would serve any peno-logical purpose. The infliction of such unnecessary suffering is inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency as manifested, in modern legislation codifying the common view that “It is but just that the public be required to care for the prisoner, who cannot by reason of the deprivation of his liberty, care for himself.”

Id. 429 U.S. at 103-04, 97 S.Ct. at 290-91, 50 L.Ed.2d at 259-60.

The court further stated that in order for a prisoner to show that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated, the prisoner must demonstrate that there was a “deliberate indifference” to his serious medical needs. According to the court, such indifference would constitute “ ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” Id. 429 U.S. at 105, 97 S.Ct. at 291, 50 L.Ed.2d at 260.

Estelle was based on the principle that prison officials should care for those who, because of imprisonment, cannot care for themselves. Applying this principle to the situation of a brief detainee, simple decency indicates that someone with a broken bone or someone threatening suicide should be given the medical treatment necessary to prevent immediate harm. Such treatment is “protective” of the prisoner rather than rehabilitative.

When the detention is brief, as in this case, rehabilitation is not an applicable duty. Rehabilitation implies a therapeutic program of working over a period of time to correct a complex problem. The time necessary for rehabilitation is simply not present when a detainee is in the custody of the Department for only one day.¹ To require rehabilitative, as opposed to protective, efforts in the situation of a brief detention might suggest that the state should retain custody of all alcoholics and emotionally disturbed individuals until they are “cured.”

In Abraham v. State, 585 P.2d 526, 533 (Alaska 1978), Abraham was imprisoned for one year for a crime committed in a drunken rage. We stated that he was entitled to rehabilitative treatment, including alcoholism counseling. Our decision was based, in part, on the objectives of article I, § 12 of the Alaska Constitution. As we noted in Abraham, “one of the objectives of art. I, § 12 of the constitution dealing with penal administration was the ‘rehabilitation of the offender into a noncriminal member of society.’ ” Id. at 530.

In the instant case, Goodlataw was imprisoned for only one day before arraignment and was then given a suspended sentence. The evidence shows that, in the twenty-three hours that Goodlataw was in the custody of the Department of Health and Social Services, the Department provided for his safety and welfare, and allowed him to dry out as much as possible.

We find that twenty-three hours is insufficient time to institute an effective program. We also find that the Department of Health and Social Services was not deliberately indifferent to Goodlataw’s medical needs when it failed to institute alcoholism rehabilitative treatment during the hours of his imprisonment. Given the brevity of his confinement, Goodlataw was not denied a constitutional right to alcoholism rehabilitative treatment.

Furthermore, we find that Good-lataw was not constitutionally entitled to alcoholism rehabilitative treatment after his release. The duty to provide a rehabilitation program arises from the fact that a prisoner is not at liberty to obtain treatment himself. Once released, Goodlataw was not deprived of his liberty to seek rehabilitation.

B. AS 33.30.020 does not require that the Department of Health and Social Services provide alcoholism rehabilitation to persons released from incarceration.

Mrs. Goodlataw asserts that AS 33.-30.020, which requires the Department to meet the medical needs of prisoners, also requires the Department to meet those same needs after prisoners are released. She argues that because Goodlataw was imprisoned, however briefly, it became the responsibility of the Department to provide alcoholism rehabilitation during his confinement and after his release.

AS 33.30.020 provides:

The commissioner shall establish prison facilities and classify the prisoners in prison facilities. The commissioner shall provide for the safety, subsistence, proper government, and discipline of prisoners. The commissioner shall establish programs for the treatment, care, rehabilitation and reformation of prisoners.

AS 33.30.900(6) defines prisoner as:

“Prisoner” means a person detained or confined for any period of time in a prison facility, whether by arrest, conviction, order of court or a person held as a witness, or otherwise;

Clearly, the statute imposes a duty on the Department only with regard to individuals detained or in custody. Again, the brief period during which Goodlataw was imprisoned was insufficient time to institute effective treatment of his alcoholism. Therefore, the Department was not required by AS 33.30.020 to provide such treatment. A contrary holding would lead to absurd results. The prospect of excessive state intrusion into the lives of brief detainees (retaining some control of them until they are “cured”) and the incalculable costs of trying to reform every alcoholic briefly detained by law enforcement authorities, are but two reasons for us to distinguish between a duty to protect and a duty to rehabilitate in eases of very brief incarceration.

C. Goodlataw, as a rural Alaskan, was not denied equal protection of the law.

Mrs. Goodlataw asserts that Goodla-taw was denied equal protection of the law. She argues that under AS 47.37.020 et seq., it is the responsibility of the Department to establish alcoholism rehabilitation programs throughout the state. She argues that urban Alaskans have far greater access to live-in alcoholism rehabilitation programs than do rural Alaskans. She further argues that if Goodlataw had had access to an alcoholism rehabilitation program near his home community, he would not have had to go to Anchorage and thus he would not have gone to the horse camp.

In State v. Reefer King Co., Inc., 559 P.2d 56, 65 (Alaska 1977), we stated that:

[A]n individual who claims that selective enforcement has deprived him or her of equal protection under the state constitution must show “a deliberate and intentional plan to discriminate,” based upon some unjustifiable or arbitrary classification. There is a similar requirement for proof of a violation of equal protection rights under the federal constitution. See Mackay Telegraph and Cable v. Little Rock, 250 U.S. 94, 39 S.Ct. 428, 63 L.Ed. 863 (1919).

No selective enforcement of the law has been shown here. George Mundell, the acting coordinator of the Department of Health and Social Services Office of Alcoholism and Drug Abuse, explained the procedure for the funding of alcoholism rehabilitation programs in his affidavit. He stated that a prerequisite to selecting a program site is that local interest be expressed and that an application for grant-in-aid funds be submitted to the Office. He also stated that the Office of Alcoholism and Drug Abuse had previously funded treatment programs for outpatients in the Copper River Basin area. However, it was not until February 1984 that an application was submitted for a resident inpatient treatment program in the Copper River Basin area. Since no application was submitted before 1984, no evidence of an intentional plan to discriminate was presented.

As for the claim that the Department violated Goodlataw’s right to equal protection under the federal constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court has said that “the equal protection clause relates to equal protection of the laws between persons as such rather than areas.” Griffin v. School Board of Prince Edward, 377 U.S. 218, 230, 84 S.Ct. 1226, 1233, 12 L.Ed.2d 256, 264 (1964). In Griffin, the school board had closed the county public schools in order to avoid a desegregation order. The court concluded that the school board’s action denied the plaintiffs equal protection of the laws because the clear reason behind the shutting of the schools was to prevent the racial integration of the county’s school children. The court stressed that “[w]ha-tever non-racial grounds might support a State’s allowing a county to abandon public schools,” the grounds must be constitutional, and opposition to racial integration does not qualify as constitutional. Id. 377 U.S. at 231, 84 S.Ct. at 1233.²

Absolute uniformity of the laws throughout a state is not constitutionally required, nor is uniform implementation of programs throughout the geographic regions of a state. Weber v. City of Sachse, 591 S.W.2d 563 (Tex.1979); Young v. Byrne, 144 N.J.Super. 10, 364 A.2d 47 (1976). Absent some invidious discrimination based on a suspect classification, equal protection under the U.S. Constitution requires only that a state or local government have a rational basis for providing different levels of services to different parts of the state or locality. In this case it would be impractical for the state to implement a resident-inpatient program of alcoholism rehabilitation in every community within the state. It is not unreasonable for the Department of Health and Social Services to require that a community must apply for an inpatient alcoholism-treatment program before the Department will undertake to provide such services.³ Thus, since the plaintiff has presented no allegation of total arbitrariness or discrimination based on a suspect classification, the federal equal protection argument must fail.

IV. CONCLUSION

We find that the Department of Health and Social Services and its Commissioner did not deny Goodlataw his constitutional right to alcoholism rehabilitation, nor did it deny him equal protection. We also find that the Department did not breach any statutory duty to provide him with alcoholism rehabilitative treatment during his confinement or after his release. If Goodla-taw had been sentenced to imprisonment for a substantial length of time, a duty to provide alcoholism rehabilitation during confinement would have arisen. However, the statutory duty to provide medical treatment or alcoholism counseling runs only to prisoners. Once Goodlataw was released by the magistrate, the Department of Health and Social Services had no duty to provide alcoholism rehabilitative treatment.

Because there was no breach of duty, and no violation of Goodlataw’s constitutional rights, while he was confined or after he was released, we decline to discuss the apparent lack of evidence of proximate causation in this case.

We therefore conclude that the motions for summary judgment and dismissal were properly granted.

AFFIRMED.

1 . In Abraham v. State, 585 P.2d 526, 534 (Alaska 1978), the dissenting justices pointed out that a right to a rehabilitation program applies to a prisoner incarcerated for "a substantial period of time” and that a period of “only a few months” is "too short for the institution of any meaningful program.” While it is possible that a few months of intensive treatment might be helpful in some cases, one day is simply too short a period in which to institute an effective program.

2 . See abo McGlothlen v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 71 Cal.App.3d 1005, 140 Cal.Rptr. 168 (1977). The McGlothlen court ruled that legislative classification as to treatment and procedure within a state judicial system according to factors such as geographic area, population, or other relevant considerations, does not deny equal protection of the laws under the federal constitution unless such classification is shown to be clearly arbitrary and unreasonable.

3 . It may well be that the Department should consider doing more to actively encourage rural communities to apply for inpatient alcoholism-treatment programs, especially in light of the state’s access to community-by-community data on alcohol-related offenses. See the National Council on Alcoholism’s report entitled "Executive Summary of Alcohol Misuse and Alcoholism in Alaska,” part of which is quoted in Abraham, 585 P.2d at 532-33 n. 19.