DocketNumber: Supreme Court No. S-16866
Citation Numbers: 447 P.3d 737
Judges: Carney
Filed Date: 8/16/2019
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/19/2022
I. INTRODUCTION
An inmate representing himself sued the prison superintendent and chaplain for violating his religious rights by providing an inadequate halal diet, banning scented prayer oils, and not allowing him to have additional religious texts in his cell beyond the prison's limit. He claimed these actions violated the Equal Protection Clause of both the Alaska Constitution and the federal Constitution, and the federal Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The inmate also sought reimbursement for scented oils that the prison had destroyed. The superior court granted the prison officials' motion for summary judgment and dismissed all of the inmate's claims.
We reverse summary judgment on the inmate's RLUIPA claim regarding the halal diet because the inmate did not receive adequate guidance on how to file affidavits in opposition to the summary judgment motion. We reverse summary judgment on the RLUIPA claim regarding scented oils because the prison officials failed to satisfy *741their burden of proving that banning such oils was the least restrictive means to address their substantial interest in maintaining prison security and health. We affirm the dismissal of the inmate's claims regarding the religious book limit because the issue is not yet ripe. And we vacate the award of attorney's fees and costs.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Raymond Leahy is a Muslim inmate at Goose Creek Correctional Center (Goose Creek) in Wasilla. He observes Islam's dietary restrictions (called "halal") and incorporates scented prayer oils in his daily prayers. To further his religious studies he requested additional religious texts above the number generally allowed per inmate.
Leahy first requested a diet that included halal or kosher meat in April 2013.
Leahy claims to have used scented oils in his daily prayers until April 2014. He asserts that unscented prayer oil does not serve his religious needs because the scent is an important component of his prayers. But in April 2014 Goose Creek banned scented prayer oils following documented health concerns. Leahy objected to the ban and requested that his oils be stored until his objections were resolved, but Goose Creek disposed of them in December. The disposed oils cost Leahy a total of $65.70.
In April and May of 2014, respectively, Leahy filed grievances after his requests for a halal meat diet and an exception to Goose Creek's ban on scented prayer oils were denied. After the grievances were denied, he submitted administrative appeals which were also denied.
A. The First Complaint
After he was unable to convince Goose Creek to grant him access to halal meat or scented oils, Leahy filed a complaint in superior court in December 2014
Goose Creek began serving halal/kosher meat meals at about the same time that Leahy filed his complaint. But Leahy objected to the quality and nutritional value of the meals. Leahy claimed that around the same time, Goose Creek introduced pork for the first time into its kitchen. Islamic law considers pork to be "haram" or unlawful; Leahy was concerned that his meals were being contaminated by their preparation in the same kitchen.
B. The Second Complaint
A month after filing his first complaint Leahy filed a second one, asserting that his religious rights were being violated by Goose Creek's limit on religious books and its ban and disposal of scented prayer oils he had already received approval to purchase. He argued that, despite Goose Creek's limit of *74211 publications per inmate, he should be allowed to possess ten religious books and ten religious magazines in his cell.
In September 2015 Conant granted Leahy an exception to the scented oil ban, allowing him to store scented prayer oils in the chaplain's closet and check them out for prayers in his cell. But in July 2016, after reports of allergic reactions to the oils by inmates and staff, Conant reinstated the total ban against scented oils. Goose Creek continues to allow the use of unscented prayer oils; the oils are stored and used only in the chapel.
C. Summary Judgment
The officials moved for summary judgment, arguing that neither the Goose Creek halal diet nor the prayer oil policy violated RLUIPA, that the diet did not violate Leahy's equal protection rights, and that the book limitation policy did not violate either RLUIPA or Leahy's equal protection rights.
Leahy filed an opposition to summary judgment the same month. He asserted that he had never previously been informed of Goose Creek's policy allowing inmates only five books, five magazines, and one religious text in their cells or that he needed to fill out a Religious Accommodation Request Form if he wanted an exception from the policy. Leahy also asserted that he would not fill out the required form because he wanted a "fluid" book list that was not determined by the officials' judgment of what was religiously appropriate. In response to the officials' argument that they were entitled to summary judgment with regard to the ban on scented prayer oils, Leahy proposed less restrictive alternatives. He suggested permitting only "milder" scents less likely to irritate others, allowing only one ounce to be stored in an inmate's cell, or having all scented oils stored in the chaplain's office and checked out for use in the chapel. Regarding the halal diet, Leahy disagreed with the facts as the officials presented them and argued that the halal diet rarely had meat, that fruit was unnecessarily exposed to potential contamination, and that the actual menu differed from that on which Goose Creek based its nutritional claims. Leahy did not submit any affidavits with his opposition.
The officials replied to Leahy's opposition. Leahy filed a response to their reply. The officials moved to strike the response because it was not permitted by the rules of civil procedure; the court granted the motion. The court also granted the officials' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case with prejudice.
Leahy then filed a motion to reconsider the grant of summary judgment. In his motion he included new facts concerning another religious group's use of scented prayer oils at Goose Creek. The officials moved for entry of final judgment. The court denied Leahy's motion to reconsider and entered final judgment in favor of the officials. The court's order stated that "the claims have either been agreed to be moot or [Leahy] did not raise genuine disputes of material facts and [the officials were] entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The court also noted that Leahy's attempt to present new evidence in his motion to reconsider was not appropriate. Following the superior court's final judgment Goose Creek paid Leahy $65.70 for the prayer oils which it had destroyed.
Leahy appeals.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
"We review for abuse of discretion 'decisions about guidance to a pro se litigant.' "
"We review a grant of summary judgment de novo"
IV. DISCUSSION
Leahy argues that the superior court abused its discretion by granting summary judgment to the officials without first providing him necessary guidance about how to present facts in support of his claims. He argues that it also abused its discretion by not adequately considering the facts that he did present. We agree he received insufficient guidance on how to file affidavits in support of his opposition to summary judgment and we therefore reverse summary judgment on his RLUIPA claim regarding an inadequate halal diet. We also reverse summary judgment on his RLUIPA claim regarding the ban on scented prayer oils because the officials did not demonstrate that a complete ban on such oils was the least restrictive means of achieving Goose Creek's security and safety interests. We affirm the dismissal of Leahy's claims regarding the limit on religious books because it is not ripe.
A. Leahy Received Insufficient Guidance From The Superior Court On Filing Affidavits.
Self-represented litigants are given "considerable leeway" when following procedural requirements.
The superior court should have advised Leahy that he needed to submit affidavits when he opposed the officials' summary judgment motion.
Leahy's response put the superior court on notice of his "obvious attempt" to obtain supporting materials.
Although Leahy filed his response months before the court entered final judgment, there is no indication in the record that the court made any attempt to inform Leahy how to properly file an affidavit or a motion to compel discovery during that time. The affidavits that Leahy did file in support of his opposition to the officials' motion to strike his response to their reply - also filed before the court entered final judgment - were his own statements and were used in nontraditional manners, suggesting confusion as to an affidavit's purpose.
B. The Failure To Provide Guidance Was Not Harmless.
Summary judgment against a self-represented litigant must be reversed and remanded if the superior court's failure to provide guidance was harmful error.
Under RLUIPA "[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution" unless the burden is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest.
*745C. The Officials Failed To Carry Their Burden To Show That The Ban On Scented Oils Was The Least Restrictive Means Of Achieving The Compelling State Interest.
A successful motion for summary judgment requires the moving party to demonstrate through admissible evidence "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
RLUIPA prohibits the government from imposing a substantial burden on an inmate's religious exercise, even by a generally applicable rule, unless the government demonstrates that the burden is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest.
The superior court found that the ban on scented oils was a substantial burden on Leahy's religious exercise in violation of RLUIPA.
The court's finding that the ban placed a substantial burden on Leahy's religious rights required the officials to show that banning all scented oils was the least restrictive means of furthering the recognized *746government interests.
But Goose Creek's banning of all scented prayer oils failed to meet the "exceptionally demanding" standard established by the Supreme Court.
This potential resolution presented an issue of material fact. And Goose Creek had previously been willing to accommodate Leahy by storing scented oils in the chaplain's office, but instituted the total ban without fully explaining why its previous accommodation was no longer an option.
D. Leahy's Challenge To The Book Limit Is Not Ripe.
Leahy claims Goose Creek unlawfully denied him religious texts. But his claim is not ripe. As the officials noted in an affidavit, accommodations are available to inmates who seek religious exemptions from Goose Creek's limit on books in cells. Goose Creek has provided Leahy with a route, and a specific form,
E. The Award Of Attorney's Fees And Costs Must Be Vacated.
Alaska Civil Rule 79 provides that "the prevailing party is entitled to recover costs ... that were necessarily incurred in the action."
V. CONCLUSION
We REVERSE the superior court's order granting summary judgment on Leahy's halal diet and scented prayer oil claims. We AFFIRM the superior court's order dismissing the religious books claim. We VACATE the award of attorney's fees and costs.
Because we reverse summary judgment on other grounds, we need not reach the inmate's constitutional claims.
Leahy proposed that Goose Creek provide kosher meats as an acceptable alternative to halal meats.
According to Goose Creek's superintendent, the kosher diet with meat cost $8,551.95 per inmate per year, compared to $1,478.25 for the standard diet.
Leahy signed and mailed his first complaint to the court on August 26, 2014, before the halal meals began including meat. But his complaint was not logged as filed by the court until December 1, 2014.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (2012).
See Alaska Const. art. I, §§ 1 (inherent rights), 4 (freedom of religion).
Greenway v. Heathcott ,
Adkins v. Stansel ,
Stavenjord v. Schmidt ,
Olson v. City of Hooper Bay ,
RBG Bush Planes, LLC v. Kirk ,
Greenway v. Heathcott ,
Rae v. State, Dep't of Corr. ,
See Breck ,
See Bauman v. State, Div. of Family &Youth Servs. ,
See Breck ,
Alaska R. Civ. P. 56(c).
See Shooshanian v. Dire ,
Leahy used affidavits to argue that the officials' discovery was "fraught with inaccuracies," to explain what he "deduce[d]" about Goose Creek's meals, to inform the court when filings were mailed to him, to inform the court he served his complaint, and to amend defective service.
See Breck ,
Alaska R. Civ. P. 56(c) (requirements for summary judgment motion).
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (2012).
See Christensen v. Alaska Sales & Serv., Inc. ,
Shakur v. Schriro ,
Alaska R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Because nothing in the record suggests that procedural guidance from the court would have led to additional evidence on either the scented oils or religious books claims, it was harmless error as to those claims.
Alaska R. Civ. P. 56(c) ; see Christensen ,
Christensen ,
Breck v. Ulmer ,
Christensen ,
Id. at 520 (internal citation omitted).
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (2012).
Shakur v. Schriro ,
See Stavenjord v. Schmidt ,
See
The court did consider whether it was the least restrictive means to address health concerns, and found that Leahy's proposal to use different kinds of scented oil "could resolve the concerns of allergic reactions."
See Holt v. Hobbs ,
Id. at 864 (alterations in original) (quoting Hobby Lobby ,
See id. at 863-64, 866 (finding specific ban on half-inch beard "hard to take seriously" when prison officials allowed - subject to search - quarter-inch beards, longer head hair, shoes, and clothing, but asserted half-inch beards threatened prison's security interest).
Goose Creek had previously said the security risk of scented oils masking the smell of marijuana would only be an issue if the oils were allowed in inmates' cells, and thus it had allowed oils to be stored in the chaplain's closet.
We affirm the superior court's finding that Leahy's claims for restitution for his destroyed scented oils is moot because Goose Creek reimbursed him for the oils.
See Religious Accommodation Request , STATE OF ALASKA DEP'T OF CORR. , Form 816.01a (2014), available at http://www.correct.state.ak.us/pnp/pdf/816.01a.pdf.
Brause v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs. ,
Alaska R. Civ. P. 79(a).
Matanuska Elec. Ass'n v. Rewire the Bd. ,