DocketNumber： CV-16-0301-SA
Judges： Pelander, Bales, Brutinel, Timmer, Bolick, Gould, Lopez
Filed Date： 8/17/2017
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 11/2/2024
opinion of the Court:
¶ 1 The primary issue we address here is whether the state may constitutionally prohibit a city’s practice, prescribed by local ordinance, of destroying firearms that the city obtains through forfeiture or as unclaimed property. We conclude that a generally applicable state statute on this subject controls over a conflicting municipal ordinance, that the legislature may require the Attorney General to investigate and file a special action in this Court regarding alleged violations of the state law, and that this Court has mandatory jurisdiction to resolve whether the allegedly conflicting ordinance violates state law. Applying those principles here, we accept jurisdiction of the State’s special action and hold, in accordance with article 13, section 2 of the Arizona Constitution, that AR.S. §§ 12-945(B) and 13-3108(F) supersede Tucson Code § 2-142.
BACKGROUND
¶ 2 In 2000, the Arizona Legislature passed House Bill 2095, which declared:
It is the intent of the legislature to clarify existing law relating to the state’s preemption of firearms regulation in this state. Firearms regulation is of statewide concern. Therefore, the legislature intends to limit the ability of any political subdivision of this state to regulate firearms and ammunition. This act applies to any ordinance enacted before or after the effective date of this act.
2000 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 376, § 4 (2d Reg. Sess.). That legislation also amended AR.S. § 13-3108(A) to provide: “[A] political subdivision of this state shall not enact any ordinance, rule or tax relating to the transportation, possession, carrying, sale, transfer, purchase, acquisition, gift, devise, storage, licensing, registration, discharge or use of firearms or ammunition ... in this state.” Id. § 2 (codified as amended at A.R.S. § 13-3108(A)).
¶3 In 2005, the City of Tucson passed Ordinance No. 10146 (the “Ordinance”), which enacted Tucson Code §§ 2-140 to - 142. Section 2-142 governs the “[disposition of unclaimed and forfeited firearms by the [Tucson] police department.” Tucson Code § 2-142. The Tucson Code permits the Tucson Police Department to keep a forfeited firearm for its own purposes or to lend or transfer it to another law enforcement agency or museum; otherwise, the Code states that the police “shall dispose” of unclaimed and forfeited firearms ‘by destroying” them. Id.
¶ 4 In 2013, the legislature amended two statutes governing the destruction of firearms. Section 13-3108 was revised to add new subsection (F), which provides: “[A]ny agency or political subdivision of this state and any law enforcement agency in this state shall not facilitate the destruction of a firearm. ...” 2013 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 145, § 6 (1st Reg. Sess.) (codified as amended at A.R.S. § 13~3108(F)). And § 12-945(B), contained in an article that governs the disposal of “unclaimed property in [the] hands of [a] public agency,” was amended to state:
[I]f the property is a firearm, the agency shall sell the firearm to any business that is authorized to receive and dispose of the firearm under federal and state law and that shall sell the firearm to the public according to federal and state law, unless the firearm is otherwise prohibited from being sold under federal and state law.
2013 Ariz. Sess. Laws, eh. 145, § 5 (1st Reg. Sess.) (codified as amended at AR.S. § 12-945(B)). Also enacted by the legislature in 2013, A.R.S. § 12-943 provides that certain specified property, including firearms, “in the possession of a ... city ... may only be disposed of pursuant to this article.” 2013 Ariz. Sess. Laws, eh. 145, § 3 (1st Reg. Sess.).
¶ 5 Pursuant to the Ordinance, between 2013 and October 2016, the City of Tucson destroyed approximately 4,800 unclaimed or
¶ 6 If the Attorney General concludes that the regulation or ordinance at issue affirmatively “[violates any provision of state law, ... the attorney general shall provide notice to the county, city or town ... of the violation, [and the local government] has thirty days to resolve the violation.” A.R.S. § 41-194.01(B)(1). If the Attorney General concludes that the matter has not been resolved in that time frame, he “shall ... [n]otify the state treasurer who shall withhold [from the offending entity] and redistribute state shared monies” until the “offending ordinance ... is repealed or the violation is otherwise resolved.” A.R.S. § 41-194.01(B)(l)(a)-(b).
¶ 7 If the Attorney General concludes that the regulation or ordinance at issue “[m]ay violate a provision of state law, ... [he] shall file a special action in [the] supreme court to resolve the issue, and the supreme court shall give the action precedence over all other cases.” A.R.S. § 41-194.01(B)(2). And “[t]he court shall require the county, city or town to post a bond equal to the amount of state shared revenue paid to the county, city or town pursuant to § [§ ] 42-5029 and 43-206 in the preceding six months.” Id.
¶ 8 In October 2016, Representative Mark Finchem asked the Attorney General’s Office to investigate whether the Ordinance violates state law. The Office investigated, and the City provided public records and a written response. The City contended that the Ordinance was a valid exercise of the City’s “organic law” as a charter city, see Ariz. Const, art. 13, § 2, and that the state’s firearms statutes “have no application to the City.”
¶ 9 In November 2016, the Attorney General issued his report, concluding that the Ordinance “may violate one or more provisions of state law” because it requires the destruction of firearms, conflicting with A.R.S. § 13-3108(F), which prohibits any “political subdivision” from “facilitating] the destruction of a firearm.” The Attorney General rejected Tucson’s charter city argument.
¶ 10 After the Attorney General’s Office sent its report to the City, the Tucson City Council met in December and refused to repeal or otherwise change the Ordinance. The City did, however, “suspend the implementation of gun destruction required by [the Ordinance] until the issue is adjudicated.” That same day the Attorney General’s Office filed this special action pursuant to § 41-194.01(B)(2).
¶ 11 Several days later, the City filed a complaint in Pima County Superior Court, seeking an injunction against implementation of § 41-194.01 and a declaration that the statute is unconstitutional. The City responded in this Court to the State’s special action petition and also moved to dismiss it, arguing that the State’s allegations are covered by § 41-194.01(B)(1), not (B)(2), that the State sought relief not provided for in (B)(2), and that dismissal would “allow full consideration of the issues raised in the [City’s] superior court action.” Earlier this year, we ordered the parties to brief several discrete issues raised in this special action and held oral argument, -without prejudice to the parties continuing to litigate the superior court action.
DISCUSSION
I. Separation of Powers Challenge to S.B. 1487
¶ 12 This litigation was prompted by a single state legislator’s request for the Attor
¶ 13 As it has in its pending superior court action, the City raises a host of constitutional challenges to S.B. 1487, but we address only those portions of the law that are directly implicated here. The City contends that S.B. 1487 violates the separation of powers doctrine, see Ariz. Const, art. 3, § 1, by directing the Attorney General to investigate alleged violations upon a single legislator’s request and, if the Attorney General concludes that a local ordinance “may violate” state law, requiring him to file a special action in this Court “to resolve the issue.” § 41-194,01(A), (B)(2), These statutory procedural mandates, the City asserts, unconstitutionally infringe on both executive and judicial powers. We reject these arguments.
¶ 14 In determining whether a statute violates separation of powers, we examine: (1) the essential nature of the power being exercised; (2) the legislature’s degree of control in the exercise of that power; (3) the legislature’s objective; and (4) the practical consequences of the action. State ex rel. Woods v. Block, 189 Ariz. 269, 276, 942 P.2d 428, 435 (1997). As for the first factor, implementing the law, disbursing appropriations, and enforcing legislative conditions on appropriations are essentially executive functions. See id. at 277, 942 P.2d at 436 (stating that “acts necessary to carry out the legislative policies and purposes already declared by [the Legislature] are administrative” and, thus, “executive function[s]”) (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pioneer Trust Co. v. Pima Cty., 168 Ariz. 61, 65, 811 P.2d 22, 26 (1991)). Under S.B. 1487, the executive branch exercises those powers.
¶ 15 Regarding the second factor, neither the requesting legislator(s) nor the legislature as a whole controls the “exercise” of the executive branch’s investigative and enforcement power under S.B. 1487. In fact, the legislature has no role beyond initiating Attorney General review. The Attorney General retains his discretion to apply independent legal analysis and judgment when opining whether a municipal action violates state law. He also retains discretion to choose the legal positions he will advance should he file a special action under § 41-194.01(B)(2). A legislator does not control the investigation itself, decision-making related to the investigation, or any action taken upon a determination under § 41-194.01. Cf. McDonald v. Thomas, 202 Ariz. 35, 41 ¶ 17, 40 P.3d 819, 825 (2002) (upholding legislative enactments that increased the power of clemency board recommendations and imposed time limitations on the Governor’s power to act on those recommendations because “the governor—and the governor alone—has the final word with regard to whether clemency is granted”). But cf. Woods, 189 Ariz. at 276-78, 942 P.2d at 435-37 (holding that the legislatively created Constitutional Defense Council, the controlling members of which were appointed by the legislature, violated separation of powers because it “create[d] conflict between an executive agency and a legislative agency performing an executive function”).
¶ 16 Nor does the third or fourth factor support a finding that S.B. 1487 violates separation-of-powers principles. The enactment itself suggests that the legislature’s apparent objective in S.B. 1487 was not to usurp executive or judicial authority but rather to require and incentivize political subdivisions to comply with state law. Likewise, the practical consequence of S.B. 1487 is to encourage compliance with state law, not to coerce, control, or interfere with executive powers or prerogatives.
¶ 17 S.B, 1487 permits a single legislator to initiate and require an investigation by the Attorney General’s Office. See § 41-194.01(A). But other statutes similarly allow or direct the initiation of an investigation or issuance of an opinion upon legislative request. See A.R.S. §§ 32-3246(D), 41-193(A)(7). We do not view S.B. 1487 as materially different for separation-of-powers pur
¶ 18 The Attorney General’s duties are “prescribed by law,” Ariz. Const, art. 5, § 9, and through S.B. 1487 the legislature has validly established that a single legislator may compel an Attorney General investigation and opinion (and nothing more) regarding whether a local ordinance violates state law. That this procedure may cause the Attorney General’s Office to focus and expend resources to identify possibly conflicting local laws and to resolve any related issues in this Court does not offend separation-of-powers principles. The procedure authorized by § 41-194.01(A) is very different from a legislative attempt to direct the exercise of prose-cutorial discretion in a criminal case or civil enforcement action.
¶ 19 Upon the Attorney General’s determination that a local law “[m]ay violate a provision of state law,” S.B. 1487 also requires the Attorney General to file a special action “to resolve the issue” in this Court, which shall prioritize the action “over all other cases.” § 41-194.01(B)(2). Those provisions do not unconstitutionally infringe on judicial power. The Attorney General is not exercising a judicial function in determining whether an action may violate state law. Rather, such determinations are legal opinions, which the Attorney General routinely and permissibly issues in other contexts. See § 41-193(A)(7) (stating that “[ujpon demand by the legislature, or either house or any member thereof,” the Attorney General’s Office shall “render a written opinion upon any question of law relating to their offices”); cf. A.R.S. § 41-1481(B) (requiring, at any citizen’s request, the Attorney General’s Civil Rights Division to investigate complaints of employment discrimination); id. § 41-1491.09 (providing the same for Fair Housing complaints).
¶ 20 Moreover, as this case illustrates, judicial review is available when the Attorney General determines that a local ordinance “may violate” state law. And even if the Attorney General were to conclude under § 41-194.01(B)(1) that a local law violates state law, the offending municipality has a cure period and (as the State concedes) may file an action challenging the conclusion and any withholding of funds.
II. Jurisdiction
¶ 21 We next address whether this Court’s special action jurisdiction under § 41-194.01(B)(2) is mandatory, as the State contends, or discretionary, as the City asserts. Based on the statute’s text, its underlying legislative intent, and the legislature’s constitutional authority to prescribe this Court’s jurisdiction, we conclude that our jurisdiction in this matter is mandatory.
¶ 22 When, as here, the Attorney General determines that a municipal ordinance or regulation “may violate” state law and then files a “special action” in this Court pursuant to § 41-194.01(B)(2)’s mandate, the statute compels us “to resolve the issue” and “give the action precedence over all other cases.” As long as it comports with the Arizona Constitution, that language quite clearly makes our jurisdiction mandatory. See Litgo N.J. Inc. v. Comm’r N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 725 F.3d 369, 394-95 (3d Cir. 2013) (characterizing as “a mandate” Congress’s statement that a particular claim “shall be brought” in a “district court”).
¶ 23 Our state constitution identifies the various components of this Court’s subject
¶ 24 Section 41-194.01(B)(2) provides “mandatory” jurisdiction for this Court in the sense that this is a statutory special action rather than a “discretionary” special action. (The latter reflects the Court’s constitutional authority to issue extraordinary writs under article 6, section 5(1), which historically were a form of discretionary relief, see Dobson v. State, 233 Ariz. 119, 121 ¶ 6, 309 P.3d 1289, 1291 (2013).) “[Statutory special actions ‘are not at all discretionary.’ ” Circle K Convenience Stores, Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 178 Ariz. 102, 103, 870 P.2d 1198, 1199 (App. 1993) (quoting Ariz. R.P. Spec. Action 1 state bar committee’s note to subsec. (b)); accord Book Cellar, Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 139 Ariz. 332, 336, 678 P.2d 517, 521 (App. 1983). By requiring the Attorney General to file “a special action” in this Court if he determines that a local ordinance “may violate” state law, and by directing the Court “to resolve the issue” and “give the action precedence over all other cases,” § 41-194.01(B)(2), the legislature clearly intended for us to have mandatory jurisdiction.
¶ 25 The City contends that § 41-194.01(B)(2) is inapplicable and thus cannot support jurisdiction here because the State asserts in its special action briefs that Tucson Code § 2-142 “does in fact violate,” not merely that it “may violate,” state law. “Under § 41-194.01(B)(1),” the City argues, “the Attorney General’s finding that a local ordinance ‘does’ violate state law triggers a different path—administrative action by the Attorney General and Treasurer—not a special action under (B)(2).” But the City misapprehends the relationship between (B)(1) and (B)(2). The latter recognizes that there might be circumstances, as this case illustrates, when a local ordinance arguably violates state law, but the issue is not settled by existing case law. In light of (B)(2), the most reasonable interpretation of (B)(1) is that it allows a “does violate” determination only when existing law clearly and unambiguously compels that conclusion. Otherwise, it is this Court’s responsibility “to resolve the issue” via a process that, as the State notes, is “akin to a standard declaratory judgment action.” § 41-194.01(B)(2); see also A.R.S. § 12-1831 to -1846; cf. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n v. Brewer, 229 Ariz. 347, 354-55 ¶¶ 33-34, 275 P.3d 1267, 1274-75 (2012) (stating that this Court is authorized and obligated “to interpret and apply constitutional law,” that is, “to say what the law is”) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803)).
¶ 26 Finally, we reject the City’s contention that “§ 41-194.01(B)(2)’s purported mandatory jurisdiction unconstitutionally invades the Court’s rule making authority” concerning “procedural” matters. See Ariz. Const, art. 6, §§ 1, 5(5). Because article 6, section 5(6) of the Arizona Constitution expressly authorizes the legislature to expand this Court’s original jurisdiction, it arguably does not matter whether S.B. 1487’s grant of such jurisdiction is “procedural” or “substantive.” Even if that distinction were pertinent here, however, the City’s contention is without merit.
¶ 27 Although “the legislature and this Court both have rulemaking power, ... in the event of irreconcilable conflict between a procedural statute and a rule, the rule prevails.” Seisinger v. Siebel, 220 Ariz. 85, 89 ¶ 8, 203 P.3d 483, 487 (2009). But because “the legislature has plenary power to deal with any topic unless otherwise restrained by the Constitution,” if a “statute conflicting with a court-promulgated rule is ‘substantive,’ the statute must prevail.” Id. at 92 ¶ 26, 203 P.3d at 490 (citations omitted). “[T]he precise dividing line between substance and procedure” is at best elusive. Id. at 92 ¶ 29, 203 P.3d at 490.
¶ 28 Even assuming that subsection (B)(2)’s vesting of mandatory jurisdiction in
¶ 29 In short, § 41-194.01(B)(2)’s mandatory jurisdiction and procedural framework do not run afoul of this Court’s rule-making authority. And, as the State has acknowledged, the “mandatory” jurisdiction under (B)(2) would not require the Court to decide a case that is moot or otherwise nonjusticia-ble. Accordingly, we exercise the jurisdiction established by subsection (B)(2) and deny the City’s motion to dismiss the special action.
III. Bond Requirement
¶ 30 Section 41-194.01(B)(2) provides that “[t]he court shall require the county, city or town to post a bond equal to the amount of state shared revenue [ (“SSR”) ] paid to the county, city or town pursuant to § [§ ] 42-5029 and 43-206 in the preceding six months.” In an uncontested declaration filed in this Court, the City states that its SSR for the 2016-2017 fiscal year is approximately $115 million or 23.5% of the City’s budget. Similarly, in its pending superior court action, the City alleged that diming the six-month period between June and November 2016, “the City received SSR under §§ 42-5029 and 43-206 in the aggregate amount of $55,639,999.37,” and that the City could not post a bond at or near that amount as it would “exceed[ ] the sum total of the City’s available reserves by nearly $5 million.” The State has not requested—and this Court has not ordered—posting of a bond in this action. Whether the statute requires the Court to order a bond even absent any request is not before us.
¶ 31 The State contends that S.B. 1487 makes the (B)(2) bond mandatory but that this Court has authority to reduce or waive the bond in certain circumstances, for example, when requiring the bond would lead to absurd or impossible results or cause a “severe financial hardship.” The City acknowledges (B)(2)’s mandatory wording (“shall”), but argues we should interpret the bond provision “as directory, and therefore discretionary,” because otherwise it poses “an unconstitutional financial blockade to judicial access.” See Ariz. Downs v. Ariz. Horsemen’s Found., 130 Ariz, 550, 554-55, 637 P.2d 1053, 1057-58 (1981) (interpreting “shall” as permissive rather than mandatory to preserve a statute’s constitutionality).
¶32 We agree with the State that the bond provision is mandatory, but we share the City’s concerns regarding the bond’s purpose, basis, practical application, and constitutionality. See Ariz. Const, art. 3, § 1 (“Distribution of Powers”); id. art. 6, § 1 (“Judicial power; courts”), § 5(5) (vesting the Supreme Court with “[pjower to make rules relative to all procedural matters in any court”); cf. Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz, 576, 586, 570 P.2d 744, 754 (1977) (finding a non-waivable cost bond requirement in medical malpractice cases unconstitutional under article 2, section 13 of Arizona Constitution, “by denying access to the courts”); New v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 127 Ariz. 68, 70, 618 P.2d 238, 240 (App. 1980) (finding a bond requirement in negligence actions against the state unconstitutional as “a monetary blockade to access to the courts”).
¶ 33 The statute does not identify the purpose of a large bond, the practical application or enforcement of the bond requirement, or the disposition of the bond proceeds upon the conclusion of the special action; nor does
¶34 In any event, although the purpose, practical application, and ramifications of the bond requirement are unclear, the State asserts that if it is meant to ensure that a city “does not benefit from receiving SSR while possibly violating state law, then an agreement to cease the violating action (and enforcement thereof) is likely to fulfill that purpose in the same way as a bond.” Because that is the situation here (inasmuch as the City voluntarily agreed to suspend Tucson Code § 2-142 pending this litigation), the State sees no reason to impose the bond requirement against the City. In addition, assuming the bond requirement is unconstitutional, the State asserts that it can be severed because, “[e]ven without the bond provision, the statute would achieve the Legislature’s purpose—incentivizing state-law compliance and quickly resolving whether a subdivision is violating state law.” See State Comp. Fund v. Symington, 174 Ariz. 188, 195-96, 848 P.2d 273, 280-81 (1993) (setting forth requirements for finding severability).
¶ 35 In his concurrence, Justice Gould declares the bond provision “unenforceable because it is incomplete and unintelligible.” Infra ¶85 (Gould, J., concurring in part and in the result). Neither party made this argument. And given the procedural posture of this case, there is no reason to address the enforceability of (B)(2)’s bond provision. Whether the bond requirement may, as written, be constitutionally enforced, or ignored under the novel theory advanced by Justice Gould, can be addressed in future cases where that issue is specifically raised and we have the benefit of full briefing on that particular point. Here, we instead turn to the issue raised by the special action petition— whether the Ordinance conflicts with and violates state law. Cf. Slayton v. Shumway, 166 Ariz. 87, 92, 800 P.2d 590, 595 (1990) (we generally seek to avoid constitutional issues when interpreting and applying statutes).
IV. Validity of Tucson Code § 2-142 under State Law
¶ 36 With certain exceptions, Tucson’s Ordinance provides that the City’s police department “shall dispose” of unclaimed and forfeited firearms “by destroying” them. Tucson Code § 2-142. State law, in contrast, specifically prohibits any political subdivision or law enforcement agency from “facili-tat[ing] the destruction of a firearm,” A.R.S. § 13-3108(F), and instead, with certain exceptions, requires public agencies to “sell the firearm to any business that is authorized to receive and dispose of the firearm under federal and state law,” AR.S. § 12-945(B); see also id. § 12-943 (providing that certain specified property, including firearms, “that is in the possession of a ... city ... may only be disposed of pursuant to this article”). Thus, the Tucson Code unquestionably conflicts with Arizona law on this subject.
¶ 37 Under state law, a political subdivision may not “enact any ordinance ... relating to,” among other things, the possession, sale, transfer, purchase, acquisition, or
¶38 Despite the legislature’s broad pronouncements regarding firearms, the City argues that Tucson Code § 2-142 does not violate state law because it is authorized and protected by article 13, section 2 of the Arizona Constitution. The clear conflict between its Code and state law, the City asserts, “does not require the repeal of [the Ordinance] because as a charter city it is authorized to determine matters of local concern free from the Legislature’s interference.” According to the City, “[disposition of the City’s own property—even firearms—is solely a matter of local concern,” and therefore Tucson Code § 2-142 “supersedes A.R.S. §§ 12-945(B) and 13-3108(F)” under article 13, section 2. The State counters that its applicable, firearms-related statutes implicate several matters of statewide, not merely local, concern and therefore govern over the conflicting municipal Ordinance. We agree with the State.
¶39 Our analysis begins with the “home rale charter” provision in Arizona’s Constitution, which from statehood has provided that any city with a population of more than 3,500 “may frame a charter for its own government consistent with, and subject to, the Constitution and the laws of the state.” Ariz. Const, art. 13, § 2. Once adopted and approved, a city’s charter is, “effectively, a local constitution.” Tucson II, 229 Ariz. at 174 ¶ 10, 273 P.3d at 626. By statute, the roots of which also trace back to statehood, see Rev. Stat. of Ariz., Civ. Code, tit. 7, ch. 16, ¶¶ 2033, 2036 (1913), the charter “shall prevail” over any conflicting law relating to charter cities in force when the charter was adopted and approved. AR.S. § 9-284(A) (also stating that the charter “shall operate as a repeal or suspension of the law to the extent of conflict, and the law shall not thereafter be operative as to such conflict”). “The charter,” however, “shall be consistent with and subject to the state constitution, and not in conflict with ... general laws of the state not relating to cities.” A.R.S. § 9-284(B); see City of Tucson v. Ariz. Alpha of Sigma Alpha Epsilon (Arizona ASAE), 67 Ariz. 330, 335, 195 P.2d 562 (1948) (noting that § 9-284’s predecessor statute “supplements” article 13, section 2 of the Arizona Constitution).
¶40 “The purpose of the home rule charter provision of the Constitution was to render the cities adopting such charter provisions as nearly independent of state legislation as was possible.” City of Tucson v. Walker, 60 Ariz. 232, 239, 135 P.2d 223 (1943) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Axberg v. City of Lincoln, 141 Neb. 55, 2 N.W.2d 613, 614 (1942)). Consistent with that purpose, we have articulated the following rule:
Where the legislature has enacted a law affecting municipal affairs, but which is also of state concern, the law takes precedence over any municipal action taken under the home rale charter. But where the legislative act deals with a strictly local municipal concern, it can have no application to a city which has adopted a home rale charter. Whether or not an act of the legislature pertains to a matter of local or state-wide concern becomes a question for the courts when a conflict of authority rises.
Id.; see also Tucson II, 229 Ariz. at 174 ¶ 10, 273 P.3d at 626 (“[A] home rale city deriving its powers from the Constitution is independent of the state Legislature as to all subjects of strictly local municipal concern.”)
¶ 41 Tucson has been a charter city pursuant to article 13, section 2 since 1929. See Tucson II, 229 Ariz. at 173 ¶ 1, 273 P.3d at 625. Its charter broadly states that the City has the “power ... [t]o purchase, receive, have, take, hold, lease, use and enjoy property of every kind and description, both within and without the limits of said city, and control and dispose of the same for the common benefit.” Tucson City Charter, ch. 4, § 1(4). Based on that authority, in 2005 the City passed the Ordinance in which Tucson Code § 2-142 was enacted.
¶ 42 Under this state’s well-established jurisprudence, whether the City’s Code controls over the conflicting state laws essentially hinges “on whether the subject matter is characterized as of statewide or purely local interest.” Tucson II, 229 Ariz. at 176 ¶ 20, 273 P.3d at 628 (citing Strode v. Sullivan, 72 Ariz. 360, 365, 236 P.2d 48 (1951)). We acknowledge that the extensive Arizona case law in this area is muddled. As we noted in Tucson II, “[mjany municipal issues will be of both local and state concern,” and thus differentiation is “problematic in application” because it “often involves case-specific line drawing,” and “[t]he concepts of ‘local’ versus ‘statewide’ interest do not have self-evident definitions.” 229 Ariz. at 176 ¶ 20, 273 P.3d at 628; see also Luhrs, 52 Ariz. at 442-43, 83 P.2d 283 (to same effect); John D. Leshy, The Arizona State Constitution 334 (2d ed. 2013) (observing that “the numerous court decisions addressing issues of charter city power show considerable variation in the flexibility with which they construe charters”); cf. Strode, 72 Ariz. at 366, 236 P.2d 48 (noting the “difference of opinion” in case law “as to what activities of a charter city are of local interest or concern and therefore free from legislative interference”).
¶ 43 Our concurring colleague, Justice Bol-ick, faults Strode as setting Arizona courts on a wayward path that is untethered to article 13, section 2, asserts that Strode and similar cases should be overruled, and disavows as irrelevant in cases like this any distinction between matters of statewide interest and those of purely local concern. Infra ¶¶76-78, 80 (Bolick, J., concurring in part and in the result). Notably, well before Strode, this Court in several cases (including Clayton, which Justice Bolick applauds, infra ¶73-74) recognized as significant the distinction that he deems immaterial. See, e.g., Clayton v. State, 38 Ariz. 466, 468, 300 P. 1010 (1931) (on motion for rehearing) (stating that where “the subject is of state-wide concern, and the legislature has appropriated the field and declared the rule, its declaration is binding throughout the state” and controls over conflicting local laws); Luhrs, 52 Ariz. at 442, 83 P.2d 283 (same, and recognizing this as “the general rule”); Walker, 60 Ariz. at 239, 135 P.2d 223 (quoting Axberg, 2 N.W.2d at 614) (noting that if a state statute addresses a matter of purely local concern it does not apply to a charter city’s law on that subject).
¶44 The unarticulated but obvious take away from Justice Boliek’s concurrence is this: assuming it is constitutional, a state statute on any particular topic will always trump and invalidate a political subdivision’s conflicting ordinance, even if the topic indisputably is solely and purely one of local concern. Under that view, one must wonder what is left of charter cities’ authority under article 13, section 2.
¶ 45 While thought-provoking, Justice Bolick’s concurrence is puzzling not because of its content but rather because of its gratuitous nature. No party or amicus has briefed or argued that Strode was wrongly decided, that its analysis conflicts with the constitution, or that it or any other case should be overruled. We generally do not reach out to decide important constitutional issues or to upset established precedent when no party has raised or argued such issues. See, e.g., State v. Valenzuela, 239 Ariz. 299, 306 ¶ 21, 371 P.3d 627, 634 (2016) (declining to address issues “[t]he parties did not brief’); State v. Martinez, 230 Ariz. 208, 212 ¶ 10 n.2, 282 P.3d 409, 413 (2012) (refusing to address Arizona constitutional issues
¶ 46 In the end, we find no need here to overhaul our longstanding analytical approach to resolving conflicts between state and local laws. This case does not fall within the “doubtful or twilight zone separating those matters that are clearly of municipal concern from those that are not.” Clayton, 38 Ariz. at 148, 297 P. 1037; see also Ariz. ASAE, 67 Ariz. at 336, 195 P.2d 562 (also referring to “a twilight zone” in which it is difficult to clearly discern whether legislation is of general or rather merely local concern). The State identifies several matters of alleged statewide concern implicated by its statutes and on which Tucson Code § 2-142 encroaches: regulating firearms under the state’s police powers; regulating police departments (and other government agencies) handling forfeited or unclaimed property; protecting the constitutional right to bear arms; and regulating city budgets and finances. To varying degrees, we are persuaded that at least some of those asserted state interests exist and prevail over the Ordinance.
¶ 47 Unlike municipalities, which have “no inherent police power,” the state has broad police power, including “[t]he protection of life, liberty, and property, and the preservation of the public peace and order, in every part, division, and subdivision of the state,” Luhrs, 52 Ariz. at 444, 83 P.2d 283 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kansas City v. J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 337 Mo. 913, 87 S.W.2d 195, 202 (1935)); see also State v. Jaastad, 43 Ariz. 458, 463, 32 P.2d 799 (1934) (“The police power inheres in the state and not in its municipalities.” (quoting Clayton, 38 Ariz. at 145, 297 P. 1037)), Matters involving the police power generally are of statewide concern. See Associated Dairy Prods. v. Page, 68 Ariz. 393, 396-97, 400-01, 206 P.2d 1041 (1949) (noting “concern of the state in the exercise of its police powers” and holding that regulation of milk products was within scope of statewide concern for public health); see also City of Scottsdale v. State, 237 Ariz. 467, 471 ¶ 17, 352 P.3d 936, 940 (App. 2015) (“Arizona courts have rejected municipal ordinances that conflict with state statutes ..., particularly when such ordinances involve the police powers of the state.”).
¶ 48 The laws at issue here implicate the state’s police power in several respects: the disposition of forfeited or unclaimed property, the conduct of law enforcement officers, including their handling of unclaimed property, and the regulation of firearms.
¶ 49 The Tucson Police Department’s disposition of property (whether forfeited or unclaimed) is an exercise of police power granted by the state. See A.R.S. §§ 12-940 to -945 (relating to disposition of unclaimed property); A.R.S. §§ 13-4301 to -4315 (forfeiture); see also Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 467, 47 S.Ct. 133, 71 L.Ed. 354 (1926) (“[A] state in the exercise of its police power may forfeit property....”). Thus, the state’s authority validly extends over the possession and disposition of the firearms. See McMann v. City of Tucson, 202 Ariz. 468, 472 ¶ 9, 47 P.3d 672, 676 (App. 2002) (“In general, when a city acts ‘as an agent of the state,’ the subject upon which it acts is not of solely local concern.” (quoting Luhrs, 52 Ariz. at 443, 83 P.2d 283)).
¶50 Relatedly, regulating police departments’ conduct, including their handling of unclaimed property, is also a matter of statewide concern. See A.R.S. §§ 12-940 to -945. Arizona case law recognizes the statewide interest in subjects even tangentially connected to the work of public safety officers and criminal justice. See Jett v. City of Tucson, 180 Ariz. 115, 121, 882 P.2d 426, 432 (1994) (removal of city magistrates from office); Walker, 60 Ariz. at 237, 135 P.2d 223 (police pensions); Luhrs, 52 Ariz. at 448, 83 P.2d 283 (police and firefighter minimum wage); Prendergast v. City of Tempe, 143 Ariz. 14, 17-18, 691 P.2d 726, 729 (App. 1984) (pay for police officers’ lunch hour). “[A]
¶ 51 Regulation of firearms, including their preservation or destruction, also involves the state’s police power and is of statewide concern. See Dano v. Collins, 166 Ariz. 322, 324, 802 P.2d 1021, 1023 (App. 1990) (compiling cases from other jurisdictions where firearm regulations were upheld as valid exercises of police power); State v. Beadle, 84 Ariz. 217, 221-22, 326 P.2d 344 (1958) (“The purpose of an Act, promulgated under the State’s police power, is to protect the public health, safety or welfare.”). The legislature has indicated that the disposal of firearms by government agencies is itself a component of firearm regulation by specifically including the disposal restrictions within a comprehensive statutory firearms regulation scheme. See A.R.S. § 13-3108; cf. Tucson Sunshine Climate Club, 64 Ariz. at 8, 164 P.2d 598 (requiring municipalities to participate in a general advertising plan would show the matter is of statewide concern). Because both Tucson Code § 2-142 and the state laws with which it conflicts involve the state’s police power and matters “that the entire state is interested in,” the matters at issue here “are proper subjects for general laws.” Luhrs, 52 Ariz. at 448, 83 P.2d 283 (holding that “the matter of pensioning policemen, as also the matter of fixing a minimum wage for policemen and firemen, is of state-wide concern”). Accordingly, although the state laws in question undoubtedly “affect[ ] municipal affairs,” they are also of “state concern” and therefore “take[ ] precedence” over the City’s conflicting Ordinance. Walker, 60 Ariz. at 239, 135 P.2d 223.
¶ 52 The City points to the lack of any evidence “of a gun shortage in Tucson, leaving Tucsonans or visitors without access to firearms in the City,” or any evidence “that the ordinance impacts anyone or anything outside of Tucson.” But as the State observes, “[t]he number of firearms affected by [Code § 2-142] has nothing to do with the nature of the regulated subject matter. As this Court has explained, ‘whether general state laws displace charter provisions depends on whether the subject matter is characterized as of statewide or purely local interest.’ ” (citing Tucson II, 229 Ariz. at 176 ¶ 20, 273 P.3d at 628).
¶ 53 The State and amicus National Rifle Association argue that preserving the right to bear arms under the federal and state constitutions is also a subject of state concern. See U.S. Const. amend. II; Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 26; see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 177 L.Ed.2d 894 (2010) (describing the right to bear arms as “fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty” and “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (first citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968); and then quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721, 117 S.Ct. 2302, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997)); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008) (noting that the people “elevate[d] above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home”), We agree with that proposition, but even assuming that the Ordinance somehow implicates that right, we need not address this argument inasmuch as the superiority of state law over the Ordinance is clearly established based on the state’s asserted police powers discussed above.
¶ 54 The confluence of the state’s broad police powers, Arizona’s comprehensive statutory and regulatory schemes regarding firearms and unclaimed or forfeited property, and the state’s interests in regulating law enforcement agencies’ handling of such property, all lead to one conclusion; the pertinent state statutes, §§ 12-943, -945(B), and 13-3108(F), embrace a topic of statewide interest and concern and, conversely, the Ordinance does not address a matter of purely local concern. Therefore, the Ordinance cannot legally coexist with the applicable and controlling state law.
¶ 66 This Court has narrowly limited the concept of “purely municipal affairs,” or “local interest or concern,” see Strode, 72 Ariz. at 365-66, 236 P.2d 48, restricting the extent to which charter city ordinances can prevail over state law. In only two areas have we upheld a municipal ordinance that directly conflicts with state law. First, we have held that the “method and manner of conducting elections in the city ... is peculiarly the subject of local interest and is not a matter of statewide concern.” Strode, 72 Ariz. at 368, 236 P.2d 48; see also Tucson II, 229 Ariz. at 177 ¶¶ 30-31, 273 P.3d at 629 (concluding that “Tucson’s manner of electing its city council members supersedes the conflicting provisions of [state law],” and observing that “[i]f the ‘home rule’ provisions of Article 13, Section 2 are to have effect, they must at the least afford charter cities autonomy in choosing how to elect their governing officers”). These cases are inapposite and unhelpful to the City, inasmuch as the conflict here does not involve municipal elections or “the authority of charter cities to structure how their governing officers are elected.” City of Tucson v. State (Tucson III), 235 Ariz. 434, 435 ¶ 2, 333 P.3d 761, 762 (App. 2014).
¶ 57 Second, this Court has held that “the manner and method of disposal of real estate of a city is not a matter of state-wide public concern.” Arizona ASAE, 67 Ariz. at 336, 195 P.2d 562; see also McMann, 202 Ariz. at 470 ¶ 1, 472 ¶¶ 10-11, 474 ¶ 18, 47 P.3d at 674, 676, 680 (upholding city ordinance requiring lessees of city-owned real property to perform “instant background checks for prospective gun purchasers during gun shows held at the [City’s convention center]” because “the use permit” is “essentially a lease” and thus “a disposition of property,” a city was “engaging in business activities,” and “the legislature did not clearly intend to preempt the City from requiring [such] background checks”). These cases likewise do not support the City’s position here.
¶ 58 Unlike this case, neither Arizona ASAE nor McMann involved a clear conflict between a municipal law or action and a state law of general application and concern. In Arizona ASAE, for example, this Court determined that the state law at issue clearly “ha[d] no application to charter cities” and observed that other Arizona cities and towns have “no interest” in what Tucson’s charter provides regarding “the manner and method of disposal of [a city’s] real estate.” 67 Ariz. at 335, 336, 196 P.2d 562. And in McMann, the state had not attempted to regulate (as an exercise of its police power) the leasing of city property. See McMann, 202 Ariz. at 473 ¶ 14, 47 P.3d at 677 (noting that “the context of [the subject statute] in the entire [state] legislative scheme does not establish a clear legislative intent to preempt the City’s ordinance”); cf. City of Scottsdale, 237 Ariz. at 471 ¶ 16, 472 ¶ 23, 352 P.3d at 940 (distinguishing Arizona ASAE and McMann because “selling and leasing property owned by a municipality do not implicate the police
¶ 69 Other arguments presented by the City and amicus the League of Arizona Cities and Towns are also unpersuasive. Relying on iMkrs, the League asserts that “whether the property at issue is real or personal, guns or butter, if it is owned by a charter city, its use or disposition is a matter in which the Legislature is constitutionally proscribed from interfering.” See Luhrs, 52 Ariz. at 442-43, 83 P.2d 283 (noting that when the particular activity “is exercised by the city in its proprietary capacity, it is a power incident to home rule”); see also Tucson Sunshine Climate Club, 64 Ariz. at 8, 164 P.2d 598 (observing that in advertising its advantages, city was “acting in its proprietary rather than its governmental capacity” and “not acting as the agent of the state”); cf. Ariz. Const, art. 13, § 5 (“Every municipal corporation within this State shall have the right to engage in any business or enterprise which may be engaged in by a person, firm, or corporation by virtue of a franchise from said municipal corporation”).
¶60 This argument, however, skirts the pivotal inquiry in cases like this: “whether the subject matter is characterized as of statewide or purely local interest.” Tucson II, 229 Ariz. at 176 ¶ 20, 273 P.3d at 628. Thus, even if relevant, the City’s ownership interest or proprietary capacity is not determinative. In addition, the City does not destroy firearms in a proprietary capacity (and the City does not specifically argue otherwise). Cf. City of Scottsdale v. Mun. Court, 90 Ariz. 393, 398-99, 368 P.2d 637 (1962) (a city’s operation of a sewage plant is a governmental function); Jones v. City of Phoenix, 29 Ariz. 181, 181-82, 239 P. 1030 (1925) (a city’s disposal of garbage is a governmental function). Just as a city’s wastewater management and disposal are governmental functions, so too is the City’s destruction of firearms.
¶ 61 Notably, over the past seventy years only a few of the many Arizona cases addressing city/state conflicts under article 13, section 2 have cited, let alone based the decision on, a proprietary/governmental distinction that originated from dicta in Luhrs, 52 Ariz. at 443, 83 P.2d 283 (stating that if a municipality’s activity “is carried on ... as an agent of the state[,] ... it is of general or public concern,” but “[i]f it is exercised by the city in its proprietary capacity, it is a power incidental to home rule”). See Tucson Sunshine Climate Club, 64 Ariz. at 8, 164 P.2d 598 (same); McMann, 202 Ariz. at 472 ¶ 11, 47 P.3d at 676 (noting that Tucson’s “[ojperation of a convention center is a constitutionally permitted business activity”); Shaffer v. Allt, 25 Ariz. App. 565, 569-70, 545 P.2d 76 (1976) (referring to a city’s “proprietary powers” and holding that local ordinance allowing city to purchase liquor license and sell alcoholic beverages at city recreation facility was not inconsistent with the Arizona Constitution or “any general law of the state”). Because the proprietary/govemmen-tal distinction is murky and unhelpful in resolving disputes of this kind, we do not view it as an appropriate factor in determining whether a state law relates to a matter of “statewide or purely local interest.” Tucson II, 229 Ariz. at 176 ¶ 20, 273 P.3d at 628; cf. Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 308, 310, 656 P.2d 597, 599 (1982) (abolishing as an unnecessary, “speculative exercise” the “public/private duty doctrine” in determining governmental immunity issues).
¶62 The City also proposes a balancing test, under which courts would balance the competing state and municipal interests to determine if the asserted statewide interest is “sufficiently concrete and identifiable to outweigh the local interest of home rule cities in municipal self-government.” In support of that concept, the City cites Johnson v. Bradley, in which the California Supreme Court stated that “as a condition of state legislar-
¶ 63 We reject the California approach and the City’s proposed balancing test. It would not aid courts in determining if a particular subject is of statewide interest or rather purely local concern. We therefore decline to follow Johnson and cases from other states that embrace a balancing approach. See U.S. Elevator Corp. v. City of Tulsa, 610 P.2d 791 (Okla. 1980); Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, 358 Wis.2d 1, 851 N.W.2d 337 (2014).
¶ 64 In addition, a balancing test finds only limited, marginal support in Arizona. In Tucson v. State (Tucson I), without citing any Arizona authority, the court of appeals found “a balancing test” appropriate in determining whether local or statewide interests were “paramount.” 191 Ariz. 436, 439, 957 P.2d 341, 344 (1997). More recently, however, the court of appeals correctly found that a trial court erred in applying a balancing test to resolve a city/state dispute, aptly noting that this Court has never used or approved such a test in this context. Tucson III, 235 Ariz. at 439 ¶ 16 n.6, 333 P.3d at 766 (App. 2014), We agree and therefore disapprove Tucson I’s use of a balancing test in its analysis. In short, we find such a test is neither helpful nor appropriate, and instead would potentially cause confusion and inconsistent results, in resolving issues under article 13, section 2,
Y. Conclusion
¶ 66 The state laws here, A.R.S. §§ 12-946(B) and 13-3108(F), involve matters of statewide, not purely local, interest and thus displace the City’s inconsistent Ordinance, Tucson Code § 2-142, regarding destruction of firearms. Having decided the legal issue presented under A.R.S. § 41-194.01(B)(2), we do not address other issues pertaining to S.B. 1487. The State is awarded its reasonable attorney fees under A.R.S. § 12-348.01, upon its compliance with ARCAP 21.
. S.B. 1487 is also codified in A.R.S. §§ 42-5029(L) and 43-206(F), which direct the State Treasurer to implement monetary penalties imposed by A.R.S. § 41-194.01. 2016 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 35, §§ 2-3 (2d Reg. Sess.).
. Because § 41-194.01(B)(1) is not at issue here and does not directly impact the questions before us, we express no opinion on the constitutionality of that subsection, including its provision permitting the Attorney General to unilaterally decide whether appropriated monies should be withheld by the State Treasurer from the offending political subdivision and redistributed.