Clifford J Ochser v. Gerard funk/anthony Cruz

SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA
En Banc
CLIFFORD J. OCHSER, a single man, ) Arizona Supreme Court
) No. CV-11-0028-PR
)
Plaintiff/Appellant, ) Court of Appeals
) Division One
v. ) No. 1 CA-CV 09-0141
)
DEPUTY GERARD FUNK, in his ) Maricopa County
individual capacity as a deputy ) Superior Court
with the Maricopa County ) No. CV2006-006624
Sheriff’s Office, and JANE DOE )
FUNK, husband and wife; SERGEANT )
ANTHONY R. CRUZ, in his )
individual capacity as a deputy ) O P I N I O N
with the Maricopa County )
Sheriff’s Office, and JANE DOE )
CRUZ, husband and wife, )
)
Defendants/Appellees. )
)
__________________________________)
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
The Honorable Joseph B. Heilman, Judge
The Honorable Robert E. Miles, Judge
AFFIRMED
________________________________________________________________
Opinion of the Court of Appeals Division One
225 Ariz. 484, 240 P.3d 1246 (App. 2010)
VACATED
________________________________________________________________
ROBBINS & CURTIN, P.L.L.C. Phoenix
By Joel B. Robbins
Anne E. Findling
Attorneys for Clifford J. Ochser
JONES, SKELTON & HOCHULI, P.L.C. Phoenix
By Eileen Dennis GilBride
1
Attorney for Gerard Funk, Jane Doe Funk, Anthony R.
Cruz, and Jane Doe Cruz
THOMAS C. HORNE, ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL Phoenix
By Paula S. Bickett, Assistant Attorney General
Daniel P. Schaack, Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae State of Arizona
LASOTA & PETERS PLC Phoenix
By Kristin M. Mackin
William J. Sims, III
Attorneys for Amici Curiae Arizona Municipal Risk
Retention Pool, The League of Arizona Cities
and Towns, and The Arizona Counties Insurance
Pool
________________________________________________________________
P E L A N D E R, Justice
¶1 Clifford Ochser brought this civil rights action
against two deputy sheriffs for arresting him on a warrant that
had been quashed some thirteen months earlier. Although we hold
that Ochser’s arrest was an unreasonable seizure prohibited by
the Fourth Amendment, we conclude that the deputies are entitled
to qualified immunity because then-existing law did not clearly
establish the unconstitutionality of their actions.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to
Ochser, against whom summary judgment was entered below.
Andrews v. Blake, 205 Ariz. 236, 240 ¶ 12, 69 P.3d 7, 11 (2003).
In January 2003, after Ochser did not appear at a status
conference in his marriage dissolution proceeding, a Maricopa
County Superior Court judge found him in civil contempt for
2
failure to pay child support and issued an arrest warrant. In
March, the court quashed the warrant after determining that
Ochser never received notice of the January status conference.
The minute entry quashing the warrant indicates it was faxed to
the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (“MCSO”). Nonetheless, as
a precautionary measure, Ochser obtained certified copies of the
order quashing the warrant, keeping one in his vehicle and one
at his office.
¶3 In May 2004, MCSO conducted Operation Mother’s Day, in
which officers arrested parents with outstanding child-support
arrest warrants. Deputies Gerard Funk and Anthony Cruz were
assigned several warrants for execution in northern Arizona,
including the 2003 warrant for Ochser’s arrest. MCSO checked
each warrant for validity before assigning it, but despite
having been quashed, the warrant showed as active in MCSO’s
records. Before executing the warrant, the deputies confirmed
its validity with the MCSO Operations Information Center
(“OIC”), which maintains warrant records.
¶4 On May 5, 2004, Funk and Cruz went to Ochser’s
workplace at Lowell Observatory in Flagstaff. After Ochser
arrived in a company vehicle, the deputies arrested him. Ochser
protested, stating the 2003 warrant had been quashed. He told
the deputies that he had a certified copy of the court’s minute
entry quashing the warrant in the inbox at his office, about
3
twenty yards from the scene of the arrest. One of the deputies
replied, “I don’t need to go to your office to find anything.
I’ve got everything I need.”
¶5 Ochser continued to assert that the warrant had been
quashed. After several minutes, Funk went into the observatory.
What occurred thereafter is not entirely clear from the record.
Funk testified in his deposition that he first called the
judge’s chambers and talked to a “temp” who did not know how to
check warrants, and he then called OIC. After Funk allegedly
informed OIC that Ochser insisted the warrant had been quashed,
Funk testified that OIC confirmed its validity. Cruz, however,
testified that when Funk came out from the building, Funk said
he had talked to a court clerk who informed him the warrant was
valid.
¶6 MCSO’s Records Specialist Supervisor, Julie Ahlquist,
testified that if a deputy had called OIC and told her the
arrestee insisted that a warrant had been quashed, she would
have checked the minute entries website for the Maricopa County
Superior Court. According to Ahlquist, taking that step is what
reasonable OIC employees do when there is a question of whether
the warrant has been quashed. She testified that checking the
superior court website typically takes less than ten minutes,
and she retrieved the order quashing Ochser’s warrant within two
4
minutes at her deposition.1
¶7 What is undisputed is that the deputies did not go to
Ochser’s office to obtain the minute entry quashing the warrant.
Ochser was handcuffed, shackled, and taken to Phoenix, where he
was jailed overnight. He was released the next day when it was
determined that his warrant had been quashed.
¶8 A defense expert on police procedures testified that
if Ochser had told the deputies he had a copy of the order
quashing the warrant on his desk, the deputies should have
retrieved it. Similarly, the MCSO captain who supervised Funk
and Cruz at the time of the arrest testified that if an arrestee
had informed the deputies that he had paperwork showing the
warrant had been quashed, the deputies should have checked the
paperwork to ensure the warrant was valid, provided that doing
so would not jeopardize their safety.
¶9 Ochser filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983(2006), alleging the deputies violated his Fourth Amendment
rights. The trial court granted the deputies’ motion for
summary judgment, ruling that an arresting officer is entitled
1
The OIC Training Guide, however, merely instructs employees
to check the physical warrant card. And Alan Quackenbush,
MCSO’s Records Lead for the OIC, averred that when a deputy
calls to confirm the validity of an arrest warrant, the OIC
employee pulls the file containing the physical copies of the
warrant cards. According to Quackenbush, if the “original copy”
is in the file, OIC reports the warrant as valid.
5
to qualified immunity when the arrest is made on a facially
valid warrant. A divided court of appeals affirmed, concluding
that although Ochser had “a broad constitutional right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures, . . . [i]t is not
clearly established that an arresting officer acting pursuant to
a facially valid warrant has the obligation to investigate
documentary evidence.” Ochser v. Funk, 225 Ariz. 484, 489 ¶ 17,
240 P.3d 1246, 1251 (App. 2010). The dissenting judge rejected
the qualified immunity claim, believing it was “‘clearly
established’ at the time of [Ochser’s] arrest . . . that an
arresting officer may not disregard documentary evidence offered
by a person named on an arrest warrant that proves the warrant
is invalid.” Id. at 494 ¶ 45, 240 P.3d at 1256 (Johnsen, J.,
dissenting). She concluded that because retrieving the minute
entry would not have required “extraordinary effort” or
“jeopardized [the deputies’] mission or public safety,” no
reasonable officer could disagree “that the deputies should have
retrieved and inspected the order.” Id. at ¶ 43.
¶10 We granted review to consider the scope of qualified
immunity in the context of arrests made pursuant to a facially
valid but quashed warrant, a legal issue of statewide
importance. We have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 5(3)
of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-120.24 (2003).
II. DISCUSSION
6
A. Standard of Review
¶11 We review de novo a grant of summary judgment, viewing
the evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion. Andrews, 205 Ariz.
at 240 ¶ 12, 69 P.3d at 11. Summary judgment is appropriate
only if no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ariz. R. Civ.
P. 56(c)(1); Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 309, 802 P.2d
1000, 1008 (1990). “The de novo standard also applies to our
review of the defendant officers’ entitlement to qualified
immunity as a matter of law.” Glenn v. Washington Cnty., 661
F.3d 460, 465 (9th Cir. 2011).
B. Qualified Immunity
¶12 Qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim is governed by
federal law. See Weatherford ex rel. Michael L. v. State, 206
Ariz. 529, 532 ¶ 8, 81 P.3d 320, 323 (2003). The doctrine
“shields federal and state officials from money damages unless a
plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a
statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was
‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.”
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011) (quoting
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
¶13 Actions against government officials for money damages
raise competing policy considerations. If a government official
7
abuses his or her office, an “action for damages may offer the
only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional
guarantees.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987)
(quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814) (alteration omitted). But
freely permitting lawsuits against government officials “can
entail substantial social costs, including the risk that fear of
personal monetary liability and harassing litigation will unduly
inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties.” Id.;
accord Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807 (expressing “the need to protect
officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the
related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of
official authority”).
¶14 The qualified immunity doctrine arose to
“accommodate[] these conflicting concerns,” Anderson, 483 U.S.
at 638, by “hold[ing] public officials accountable when they
exercise power irresponsibly,” but “shield[ing] officials from
harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their
duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231
(2009); see also Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)
(stating qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law”).
¶15 Qualified immunity shields officers not only from
ultimate liability, but also from the burdens of litigation.
See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (stating
8
qualified immunity is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere
defense to liability”). Accordingly, the Supreme Court has
“repeatedly . . . stressed the importance of resolving immunity
questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation,”
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232 (internal quotation marks omitted),
including by summary judgment proceedings, Butz v. Economou, 438
U.S. 478, 507-08 (1978).
¶16 We may address in any order the two steps of qualified
immunity analysis — whether the officer’s conduct violated a
federal statutory or constitutional right and whether the right
was clearly established at the time. See al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at
2080; Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. Analyzing the first step,
however, “is often beneficial” in that it “promotes the
development of constitutional precedent.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at
236; see also Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2031 (2011) (A
“policy of avoidance sometimes does not fit the qualified
immunity situation because it threatens to leave standards of
official conduct permanently in limbo.”). To provide guidance
for future cases, we first address whether the deputies violated
Ochser’s Fourth Amendment rights.
C. Fourth Amendment Violation
¶17 The Fourth Amendment not only requires probable cause
for an arrest warrant, but also protects against “unreasonable
searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. All arrests,
9
either with or without a warrant, “must be reasonable under the
circumstances.” al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2080; see Sodal v. Cook
Cnty., Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 71 (1992) (“[R]easonableness is still
the ultimate standard under the Fourth Amendment” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
¶18 It is undisputed that the warrant on which Ochser’s
arrest was made had been quashed. A quashed warrant provides no
valid constitutional basis for an arrest. See State v. Evans,
177 Ariz. 201, 203, 866 P.2d 869, 871 (1994) (stating that an
arrest made pursuant to a quashed warrant is “warrantless” and
“plainly illegal,” despite the arresting officer relying on an
erroneous computer entry), rev’d on other grounds, 514 U.S. 1(1995); cf. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139 (2009)
(accepting parties’ assumption of Fourth Amendment violation
when arrest was based on recalled warrant, but noting that
arrest “on reasonable but mistaken assumptions” does not
necessarily result in “a constitutional violation”).
¶19 In this civil action under § 1983, however, the
threshold question is whether the deputies themselves acted
unreasonably in arresting Ochser under the particular
circumstances. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)
(explaining that first step of qualified-immunity analysis
inquires whether “the officer’s conduct violated a
constitutional right” (emphasis added)). Although the facial
10
validity of an arrest warrant will almost always demonstrate the
reasonableness of an officer’s actions in executing the warrant,
facial validity alone is not automatically dispositive.
Otherwise, an arrest pursuant to such a warrant would be
“reasonable” even when the arresting officer has reliable,
official information that the warrant in fact is invalid. We
therefore reject the notion that an officer need never inquire
further about the warrant’s validity.
¶20 We recognize that arrestees often protest their
innocence and claim the arrest warrant is either invalid or was
issued for the wrong person. As the Supreme Court has stated,
an officer “executing an arrest warrant is [not] required by the
Constitution to investigate independently every claim of
innocence.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145-46 (1979).
But neither may an officer unreasonably disregard readily
accessible information indicating that the warrant is invalid.
¶21 On the facts of this case, viewed in the light most
favorable to Ochser, we conclude that the deputies acted
unreasonably under the Fourth Amendment by failing to retrieve
the certified copy of the minute entry from Ochser’s nearby
office and conduct appropriate inquiry into the warrant’s
validity before arresting him. First, the conditions did not
require an urgent arrest. The arrest warrant was issued sixteen
months earlier and was based on an alleged failure to pay child
11
support, not a violent crime or circumstance posing an imminent
public danger.
¶22 Second, retrieving the minute entry would not have
jeopardized the deputies’ safety. Unlike a situation where
documentary evidence is allegedly inside a suspect’s home or
some potentially dangerous locale, the court order quashing the
warrant was in the observatory, a workplace open to the public.
And, perhaps most importantly, Deputy Funk in fact entered the
building, making it all the more reasonable for him to retrieve
the minute entry from Ochser’s office.
¶23 Third, retrieval of the minute entry would not have
involved significant dislocation or difficulty. Ochser’s office
was only twenty yards away from the place of arrest. When
Deputy Funk entered the observatory, he was likely closer to
Ochser’s office than when he first confronted him. Given that
the deputies had already spent two hours driving to Flagstaff,
the brief time required to retrieve and examine the minute entry
would not have been an unreasonable imposition.
¶24 Fourth, the defense expert testified that when
officers are told an order quashing a warrant is easily at hand,
good police practice requires the officers to retrieve the
order. Given the procedural posture of this case, we accept as
true Ochser’s testimony that he told the deputies about the
certified copy of the minute entry. Even though the deputies
12
claim he never mentioned the minute entry, Funk acknowledged
that had Ochser brought it to his attention he would have gone
to Ochser’s office and investigated it. And had the deputies
retrieved the minute entry, they likely would have determined
that the arrest warrant was invalid. See supra ¶ 6.
¶25 We hold, and clearly establish prospectively, that
when, as here, law enforcement officers arrest someone pursuant
to a warrant and are confronted with readily available
information that objectively casts genuine doubt on the
warrant’s validity, the officers must undertake further
reasonable inquiry. Officers do not violate that standard,
however, if further inquiry on the warrant’s validity would be
difficult, time-consuming, or would jeopardize officer safety.
Moreover, the inquiry need only seek a determination of whether
the warrant remains valid. It does not require officers to
undertake the judicial function of determining whether the
warrant should be invalidated.
D. Clearly Established Law
¶26 We now turn to the second step of the qualified-
immunity analysis — whether the right was clearly established at
the time of Ochser’s arrest. An officer’s “conduct violates
clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged
conduct, the contours of a right are sufficiently clear that
every reasonable official would have understood that what he is
13
doing violates that right.” al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2083(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); see also
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202 (stating “[t]he relevant, dispositive
inquiry . . . is whether it would be clear to a reasonable
officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he
confronted”).
¶27 The requirement that the right be clearly established
“gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable
but mistaken judgments about open legal questions,” al-Kidd, 131
S. Ct. at 2085, and “ensure[s] that before they are subjected to
suit, officers are on notice their conduct is unlawful,”
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 206. Thus, “the right allegedly violated
must be defined at [an] appropriate level of specificity before
a court can determine if it was clearly established.” Wilson v.
Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999). In al-Kidd, the Supreme Court
rejected the court of appeals’ finding of “clearly established
law lurking in the broad history and purposes of the Fourth
Amendment” because “[t]he general proposition . . . that an
unreasonable search or seizure violates the Fourth Amendment is
of little help in determining whether the violative nature of
particular conduct is clearly established.” 131 S. Ct. at 2084
(internal quotation marks omitted); see id. (“We have repeatedly
told courts . . . not to define clearly established law at a
high level of generality.” (citations omitted)). Only “in an
14
obvious case” may standards “cast at a high level of generality”
constitute clearly established law. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543
U.S. 194, 199 (2004).
¶28 To determine whether a right was clearly established
at the time of an officer’s conduct, we “look to cases from the
Supreme Court and this court, as well as to cases from other
courts exhibiting a consensus view.” Bame v. Dillard, 637 F.3d
380, 384 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see also Weatherford, 206 Ariz. at532-33 ¶¶ 8-9, 81 P.3d at 323-24 (in evaluating immunity claims
in § 1983 actions, we look first to Supreme Court decisions and
then may choose to follow Ninth Circuit authority that “has
announced a clear rule” of law and that “appears just”).
Although “[a] case directly on point” is not required, al-Kidd,
131 S. Ct. at 2083, and the facts of other cases need not be
“materially similar” to the case at hand, Hope v. Pelzer, 536
U.S. 730, 741 (2002), “existing precedent must have placed the
statutory or constitutional question beyond debate,” al-Kidd,
131 S. Ct. at 2083. Stated differently, “in the light of pre-
existing law[,] the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Hope, 536
U.S. at 739.
¶29 Ochser relies heavily on Berg v. County of Allegheny,
219 F.3d 261, 267-68 (3d Cir. 2000), which considered qualified
immunity for an officer who executed an arrest pursuant to a
warrant mistakenly issued for the wrong person. A records clerk
15
accidently transposed two digits from a criminal complaint for a
person named Banks, resulting in a warrant being generated for
Berg, who had completed his parole three years earlier. Id. at
266. When a constable came to arrest him, Berg produced his
release documents, but the constable refused to examine the
paperwork. Id. at 267. The court found no probable cause for
Berg’s arrest and proceeded to analyze whether qualified
immunity applied, stating “an apparently valid warrant does not
render an officer immune from suit if his reliance on it is
unreasonable in light of the relevant circumstances.” Id. at
273. The court explained that “[s]uch circumstances include,
but are not limited to, other information that the officer
possesses or to which he has reasonable access, and whether
failing to make an immediate arrest creates a public threat or
danger of flight.” Id. The Third Circuit remanded the case to
the district court for additional fact-finding to determine, as
a matter of law, whether the constable’s reliance on the warrant
was unreasonable in light of the circumstances, including the
fact that the constable was possibly predisposed to arrest
because he earned a fee for each arrest. Id. at 273-74.
¶30 Ochser also relies on Peña-Borrero v. Estremeda, 365
F.3d 7, 10 (1st Cir. 2004), in which a man not only informed his
arresting officers that the warrant they held had already been
executed, but also produced a copy of an identical arrest
16
warrant bearing a stamp that showed prior execution. Calling
the stamped warrant “unequivocal documentary evidence,” the
First Circuit concluded a jury could find that the officers
acted unreasonably in making the arrest. Id. at 11, 13. The
court explained that a failure to seek additional verification
in the face of the stamped warrant “reflected a much more
deliberate disregard for whether the warrant remained valid.”
Id. at 13. Emphasizing the importance of reasonable
verification, the court noted that “[i]f any doubts remained
after appellant displayed the stamped warrant, a quick phone
call to the precinct presumably would have resolved them.” Id.¶31 Berg and Peña-Borrero are analogous to this case and
support our conclusion that the deputies’ conduct here was
unreasonable. Like Berg, this case involves readily accessible
documentation that called the warrant’s validity into question.
And in those cases, as here, the officers did not face safety
concerns or have an urgent need to immediately arrest.
¶32 But the court in Berg did not actually decide the
issue of reasonableness, and the constable’s possible
predisposition to arrest complicated the reasonableness
analysis. And because the officers in Peña-Borrero retrieved
the proffered documents from the arrestee’s trunk, the First
Circuit had no need to address whether the officers would have
been unreasonable had they not done so. Peña-Borrero, 365 F.3d
17at 10. Rather, Peña-Borrero turned on the officers’ failure to
undertake reasonable verification after an inspection of the
documents revealed the substantial likelihood that the warrant
was already executed.
¶33 Nonetheless, the Fourth Amendment requires that an
arrest “be reasonable under the circumstances.” al-Kidd, 131 S.
Ct. at 2080 (emphasis added). Courts have explained that
relevant circumstances include whether the officer knew or
should have known that the warrant had been quashed. See Torres
Ramirez v. Bermudez Garcia, 898 F.2d 224, 226, 228 (1st Cir.
1990) (rejecting summary judgment in a vacated-warrant case when
entry in officer’s log book and notations on the warrant itself
could allow a jury to conclude the officer knew or should have
known the warrant had been quashed); see also Martin v. Russell,
563 F.3d 683, 685 (8th Cir. 2009) (stating, without deciding,
that “[i]f [an arrest warrant] was vacated and the officers knew
or should have known that it was, then the arrests would have
been unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment because they
would have been unwarranted and unreasonable”). Courts have
also considered whether an officer knew that the law enforcement
agency’s warrant database was unreliable. See McMurry v.
Sheahan, 927 F. Supp. 1082, 1090-91 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (concluding
an arrest was unreasonable when the arrestee repeatedly
protested the arrest warrant was previously quashed and the
18
arresting officer should have known his computer check was
unreliable because the warrant database was known to be an utter
failure).
¶34 The law as a whole at the time of Ochser’s arrest in
May 2004, however, did not clearly establish the
unconstitutionality of the deputies’ actions. No opinions of
the United States Supreme Court are closely on point. In Baker,
a man assumed his brother’s identity on bail release. 443 U.S.
at 140-41. When the man failed to return, a warrant was issued
in the brother’s name for the man’s arrest. Id. at 141.
Officers arrested the brother, despite his claims of mistaken
identification, and the brother was detained for several days.
Id. The Supreme Court rejected the brother’s § 1983 due process
claim. Id. at 144-45. The Court explained that “[t]he
Constitution does not guarantee that only the guilty will be
arrested” and that it did “not think a sheriff executing an
arrest warrant is required by the Constitution to investigate
independently every claim of innocence.” Id. at 145-46.
¶35 Baker did not involve a quashed warrant. Several
federal courts, however, have extended Baker’s reasoning to the
quashed-warrant context. In rejecting a woman’s claim that her
arrest violated due process when she protested to the arresting
officers that her warrant had been quashed, the Fourth Circuit
relied on the facial validity of the warrant and Baker’s
19
guidance that an officer need not “investigate independently
every claim of innocence.” Mitchell v. Aluisi, 872 F.2d 577,
578-79 (4th Cir. 1989). The Tenth Circuit similarly concluded
that an arresting officer need not check the arrest warrant when
requested to do so, because “[u]nless a warrant is facially
invalid an officer has no constitutional duty to independently
determine its validity.” Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391, 393
(10th Cir. 1984). Relying on Mitchell, a district court
considering an arrest pursuant to a canceled warrant found it
“well established that when an arrest and subsequent detention
are undertaken pursuant to a facially valid warrant, there is no
violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Peacock v. Mayor & City
Council of Baltimore, 199 F. Supp. 2d 306, 309 (D. Md. 2002).
¶36 Other courts, in contrast, have distinguished Baker in
the quashed-warrant context. In a case involving a woman
arrested pursuant to a warrant in the face of her protests that
the warrant had been recalled, the Seventh Circuit stated that
“[i]t seems clear” the woman “sustained a violation of
constitutional rights by being arrested and detained pursuant to
an invalid warrant.” Murray v. City of Chicago, 634 F.2d 365,
366 (7th Cir. 1980); see also Wilson v. City of Boston, 421 F.3d
45, 57 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding it “well established in other
federal courts . . . that an arrest made on the basis of a
facially valid warrant which turns out to have been cleared
20
before the arrest violates the Fourth Amendment”).
¶37 These two lines of cases, however, involved arrestees
who baldly asserted, without supporting documentation, that
their arrest warrants were invalid. They are therefore not
particularly helpful in determining whether an arresting
officer’s actions are reasonable in the face of a serious,
provable challenge to a warrant’s validity.
¶38 More pertinent to our analysis, however, is Lauer v.
Dahlberg, 717 F. Supp. 612 (N.D. Ill. 1989), aff’d, 907 F.2d 152(7th Cir. 1990). There, an arrest warrant had been quashed the
day before the arrest was made, but that information had not yet
been disseminated. Id. at 613. The arrestee proffered to the
arresting officer an uncertified copy of the warrant recall
order. Id. at 614. The court rejected the notion that officers
need “to investigate further than confirming the active status
of the warrant over the police radio.” Id. “To hold
otherwise,” the court stated, “would be to place impossible
burdens upon police officers. Judgments as to authenticity of
recall orders, which like all other documents are subject to
error, alteration, and forgery, are ordinarily best made in the
station house or the courthouse, rather than by a police officer
in the field.” Id.¶39 Unlike Lauer, this case involves a certified copy of
the court order quashing the warrant. Although certified copies
21
provide significant intrinsic assurances of authenticity, the
concerns of alteration and forgery expressed in Lauer
nonetheless extend to certified copies, particularly when
proffered by an arrestee. Lauer and Peña-Borrero could thus
reasonably be read as merely requiring officers to make “a quick
phone call to the precinct” to verify. Peña-Borrero, 365 F.3d
at 13.
¶40 Given the conflicting case law at the time of Ochser’s
arrest in May 2004, we cannot conclude that “every reasonable
official would have understood” that the deputies’ conduct here
was unreasonable and violated Ochser’s Fourth Amendment rights.
al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2083 (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. The existing precedent did
not place the question of reasonableness under these
circumstances “beyond debate.” al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2083.
Accordingly, the deputies are entitled to qualified immunity as
a matter of law.
III. DISPOSITION
¶41 The trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor
of Deputies Funk and Cruz is affirmed, and the court of appeals’
opinion is vacated.
_____________________________________
A. John Pelander, Justice
22
CONCURRING:
_____________________________________
Rebecca White Berch, Chief Justice
_____________________________________
Andrew D. Hurwitz, Vice Chief Justice
_____________________________________
W. Scott Bales, Justice
_____________________________________
Robert M. Brutinel, Justice
23