Haroutunian v. Valueoptions, Inc.

OPINION

PELANDER, Chief Judge.

¶ 1 Appellant/eross-appellee ValueOptions, Inc., appeals from the trial court’s denial of its motion to extend the time to appeal, made pursuant to Rule 9(a), Ariz. R. Civ.App. P. (ARCAP), and its motion to enlarge time to file post-judgment motions, made pursuant to Rule 6(b), Ariz. R. Civ. P.¹ It also asserts that the court erred in admitting expert testimony and that the evidence did not support the jury verdict in favor of appellee/crossappellant Charles Haroutunian. In his cross-appeal, Haroutunian challenges the trial court’s denial of his request for attorney fees and costs. For the reasons stated below, we reverse the court’s denial of ValueOptions’ motions under ARCAP 9(a) and Rule 6(b) and remand the case for further proceedings.

Background

¶ 2 The facts pertinent to our resolution of this appeal are undisputed. After Haroutunian attempted suicide in 2002, his family successfully petitioned for court-ordered mental health treatment for him. In 2004, Haroutunian filed this action against ValueOptions, asserting that it had been “under Court order to provide for [his] mental health care and supervision” and had negligently failed to do so to his detriment. Haroutunian also alleged that ValueOptions’ conduct was “elder abuse or neglect under Arizona State law.” See A.R.S. § 46-455(B), (Q). After a four-day jury trial in November 2006, the jury found in Haroutunian’s favor and awarded him $365,000 in damages. The jury found ValueOptions bore eighty-five percent of the fault and allocated the remainder to a designated nonparty at fault.

¶ 3 Following the jury verdict in his favor, Haroutunian filed a motion requesting attorney fees and costs. After hearing argument, the trial court denied the motion in a minute entry dated February 20, 2007, and filed February 22. In that minute entry, the comí; stated it would “sign the form of judgment submitted by [Haroutunian] after deleting the costs and attorney’s fees” contained in the proposed judgment.² The court signed the judgment on February 20, and the record shows it was filed the following day. On February 22, a legal assistant to ValueOptions’ attorney called the Clerk of the Pima County Superior Court and was told by someone in that office that no judgment had been entered and that there had been “no activity” in the case since February 14. On February 26, Haroutunian moved for reconsideration of the trial court’s denial of his motion for attorney fees and costs. After ordering a response, the court ultimately denied the motion on May 3.

¶4 Although the signed judgment was filed on February 21, the court clerk failed to comply with her obligation to immediately distribute notice of the entry of judgment to the parties, as required by Rule 58(e). That notice, dated March 21, was filed and apparently finally mailed to the parties on March 27, well past both the fifteen-day deadline for filing post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial, see Ariz. R. Civ. P. 50(b), 59(d), and the thirty-day limit for filing a notice of appeal. See ARCAP 9(a). On April 2, after having eventually received the clerk’s belated notice of the entry of judgment, ValueOptions timely filed its motion under ARCAP 9(a), seeking to expand the time to appeal.³ That motion also included a request, pursuant to Rule 6(b), to enlarge the time for filing post-trial motions. The trial court denied both requests on May 3, the same day it also denied Haroutunian’s motion for reconsideration of its prior denial of his request for attorney fees and costs.

¶ 5 On May 29, ValueOptions filed its notice of appeal from the trial court’s February 21 judgment and its May 3 order denying ValueOptions’ requests for enlargement of time under ARCAP 9(a) and Rule 6(b). Haroutunian filed his notice of cross-appeal on June 8. We have jurisdiction of ValueOptions’ appeal from the trial court’s May 3 order pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(C).

Discussion

1. Denial of motion to extend appeal time under ARCAP 9(a)

¶ 6 ValueOptions first argues the trial court erred by denying its motion pursuant to ARCAP 9(a) to extend the deadline for filing its appeal. We review the denial of such a motion for an abuse of discretion. See United Metro Materials, Inc. v. Pena Blanca Props., L.L.C., 197 Ariz. 479, ¶¶ 18, 22, 4 P.3d 1022, 1025, 1026 (App.2000). But we review de novo questions involving the interpretation of court rules and “evaluate procedural rules using principles of statutory construction.” Fragoso v. Fell, 210 Ariz. 427, ¶¶ 7, 13, 111 P.3d 1027, 1030, 1032 (App.2005); see also State v. Hansen, 215 Ariz. 287, ¶ 7, 160 P.3d 166, 168 (2007) (principles of statutory construction used to interpret court rules). In addition, we interpret court rules “in accordance with the intent of the drafters, and we look to the plain language of the ... rule as the best indicator of that intent.” Fragoso, 210 Ariz. 427, ¶ 7, 111 P.3d at 1030. If the language of a rule is ambiguous, however, we may consider “a variety of elements, including the rule’s context, the language used, the subject matter, the historical background, the effects and consequences, and its spirit and purpose,” to determine the framers’ intent. State ex rel. Romley v. Superior Court, 168 Ariz. 167, 169, 812 P.2d 985, 987 (1991); see also Vega v. Sullivan, 199 Ariz. 504, ¶ 8, 19 P.3d 645, 648 (App.2001).

¶ 7 Under Rule 58(a), “[t]he filing with the clerk of the judgment constitutes entry of such judgment, and the judgment [generally] is not effective before such entry.” Therefore, the trial court’s February 20 minute entry, in which the court stated it would “sign the form of judgment submitted by [Haroutunian] after deleting the costs and attorney’s fees,” neither constituted formal entry of the judgment nor specified when the judgment would be signed or, more importantly, filed. The date of filing, or entry, of judgment is critically important, however, because it typically commences the running of the time for filing post-trial motions, see Ariz. R. Civ. P. 50(b), 59(d), 59(l), or prosecuting an appeal, see ARCAP 9(a). Thus, the date a judgment actually is entered will determine whether a notice of appeal or motions for post-judgment relief are timely. See DNB Constr., Inc. v. Superior Court, 125 Ariz. 61, 62, 607 P.2d 380, 381 (1980); City of Tucson v. Wondergem, 4 Ariz.App. 291, 292, 419 P.2d 552, 553 (1966).

¶8 Rule 58(e), Ariz. R. Civ. P., requires the trial court clerk to distribute to all parties, “[immediately upon the entry of a judgment,” “a notice of the entry of judgment stating the date of entry.” Pursuant to AR-CAP 9(a),

If [a trial] court finds that (1) a party entitled to notice of entry of judgment did not receive such notice from the clerk or any party within 21 days of its entry and (2) no party would be prejudiced, the court may upon motion ... extend the time for appeal for a period not to exceed 14 days from the date of the order granting the motion.

Our supreme court added that provision in 1994 when it amended ARCAP 9(a) and other procedural rules, including Rule 6(b), in order “ ‘to address a problem experienced by practitioners, whereby they were not receiving notice of entry of judgment in some cases and their clients’ rights to appeal were jeopardized.’” J.C. Penney v. Lane, 197 Ariz. 113, ¶ 18, 3 P.3d 1033, 1037 (App.1999), quoting ARCAP 9(a) court cmt. to 1994 amend., 178 Ariz. LX (1994). Based on its comment to the 1994 amendment, the supreme court clearly intended to grant trial courts increased flexibility in this area and relax the standards for extending a party’s time to appeal when the conditions set forth in AR-CAP 9(a) are met. See J.C. Penney, 197 Ariz. 113, ¶ 20, 3 P.3d at 1037 (“Courts have now been given discretion to extend the time for appeal upon a party’s showing of the bare failure to receive the clerk’s notice without its having to show additionally the compelling circumstances or any other circumstances provided in Rule 60(c), [Ariz. R. Civ. P.,] but under the very limited time constraints and other circumstances provided in amended [ARCAP] Rule 9(a).”).

¶ 9 The trial court found as an undisputed fact that ValueOptions “did not receive notice of entry of judgment from the clerk or any party within twenty-one (21) days of entry.” ⁴ The court also found that Haroutunian had not shown prejudice. It nonetheless denied ValueOptions’ motion to extend the time for filing its appeal, “for the same reason [it] refused to extend the time for filing post-trial motions.” That refusal, in turn, was based on ValueOptions’ failure to show “excusable neglect” under Rule 6(b); the court concluded that “[a] reasonable attorney would have called the judge’s chamber's or placed another call to the clerk or taken other appropriate steps before the time limits expired to make sure that a judgment had not been entered.” In denying any extension of the time to appeal under ARCAP 9(a), the court also stated that ValueOptions “has not shown good cause.”

¶ 10 We preliminarily address and reject Haroutunian’s alternative arguments seeking to uphold the trial court’s ruling on different grounds. He contends the court’s February 20 minute entry qualified as a “notice of entry of judgment” by “a minute entry,” a form of notice authorized by Rule 58(e). But the February 20 minute entry merely indicated the trial court would sign the judgment; it did not reflect entry of the judgment, which occurs when the judgment is file-stamped by the clerk. See Valley Nat’l Bank v. Meneghin, 130 Ariz. 119, 123 n. 3, 634 P.2d 570, 574 n. 3 (1981) (“the court renders judgment, ... and the clerk of the court enters the judgment”); see also Schoenfelder v. Ariz. Bank, 161 Ariz. 601, 604, 780 P.2d 434, 437 (App.1989), vacated in part on other grounds, 165 Ariz. 79, 796 P.2d 881 (1990); see also Ariz. R. Civ. P. 58(a). The judgment here was entered on February 21, but the clerk did not mail notice of that entry until March 27.

¶ 11 We also find meritless Haroutunian’s contention that he “clearly would have been prejudiced if the trial court had allowed untimely post-trial motions and an appeal.” Haroutunian does not challenge the trial court’s finding that he had failed to show prejudice, nor does he cite the record to support his contention on appeal. See AR-CAP 13(a)(6), (b). In short, Haroutunian has neither argued nor established that the trial court clearly erred in finding he would not be “prejudiced by the appeal being delayed rather than timely.” Lennar Corp. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 214 Ariz. 255, ¶ 55, 151 P.3d 538, 552 (App.2007); see Federoff v. Pioneer Title & Trust Co., 166 Ariz. 383, 388, 803 P.2d 104, 109 (1990) (appellate court will sustain trial court’s factual findings unless “clearly erroneous or unsupported by any credible evidence”); Davis v. Davis, 143 Ariz. 54, 58, 691 P.2d 1082, 1086 (1984) (finding absence of prejudice when appellee informed promptly after trial of appellant’s intent to appeal).

¶ 12 We turn now to ValueOptions’ arguments. It first contends the trial court abused its discretion by improperly requiring it to show “good cause” and “excusable neglect” to obtain relief under ARCAP 9(a). We agree. As ValueOptions correctly notes and Haroutunian acknowledges, ARCAP 9(a) does not require a party to demonstrate good cause as a condition for obtaining an exten-

sion of tíme to appeal. See J.C. Penney, 197 Ariz. 113, ¶ 20, 3 P.3d at 1037. By requiring such a showing, the court essentially imposed an additional element for relief that the language of the rule does not require and its drafters did not intend.

¶ 13 Because the trial court’s ruling was based on an incorrect legal standard, the court abused its discretion in denying ValueOptions’ motion to extend its time to appeal under ARCAP 9(a) on the ground stated. See Webb v. Omni Block, Inc., 216 Ariz. 349, ¶ 6, 166 P.3d 140, 143 (App.2007) (“An abuse of discretion exists when the court commits an error of law in reaching a discretionary conclusion.”); see also State v. Chap-pie, 135 Ariz. 281, 297 n. 18, 660 P.2d 1208, 1224 n. 18 (1983) (appellate court not bound by trial court’s discretionary rulings when “the facts or inferences from them are not in dispute and where there are few or no conflicting procedural, factual or equitable considerations”); Marco C. v. Sean C, 218 Ariz. 216, ¶ 4, 181 P.3d 1137, 1139 (App.2008) (“To soundly exercise its discretion, the court must also correctly apply the law.”).

¶ 14 In support of the trial court’s ruling, Haroutunian correctly points out that relief under ARCAP 9(a) “is discretionary, not mandatory.” Likewise, the dissent emphasizes the broad discretion a trial court has in ruling on requests for extensions of time under that rule.⁵ In our view, however, that discretion does not permit a trial court to incorporate an incorrect legal standard, in contravention of the rule’s express language and purpose, when determining whether the rule authorizes an extension of time to appeal.

¶ 15 Haroutunian and the dissent also emphasize the trial court’s determination that, under the circumstances presented here, “[a] reasonable attorney would have called the judge’s chambers or placed another call to the clerk or taken other appropriate steps before the time limits expired to make sure that a judgment had not been entered.” That determination, however, was not based on any evidence presented below or any weighing of conflicting facts. Therefore, the trial court’s statement was simply a conclusion, not a factual finding. And, because that conclusion was not “based on an assessment of conflicting procedural, factual or equitable considerations which vary from case to case and which can be better determined or resolved by the trial judge,” we do not owe it any particular deference. Chap-pie, 135 Ariz. at 297 n. 18, 660 P.2d at 1224 n. 18.

¶ 16 In addition, the trial court’s conclusion overlooks several significant and undisputed facts. As the court correctly noted, both parties received its February 20, 2007, minute entry, in which the court stated it would revise and “sign the form of judgment submitted by [Haroutunian].” But, again, that minute entry did not state that the court had signed the judgment, nor did it indicate when the judgment would be signed or entered. Cf. Lennar Corp., 214 Ariz. 255, ¶ 53, 151 P.3d at 552 (upholding order reentering judgment so party could timely appeal and noting, inter alia, that trial court previously “did not issue a minute order that the judgment had been signed as it had done with respect to the judgments in favor of the other defendants”) (emphasis added). And, as ValueOptions aptly observes, notwithstanding the February 20 minute entry, both parties “believed that no Judgment had been entered and conveyed this belief to the Court without correction.”

¶ 17 For example, when Haroutunian moved on February 26 for reconsideration of the court’s denial of his request for attorney fees, he stated the trial court “has not yet signed the judgment and the case has not been resolved.” Similarly, Haroutunian stated in that motion that “[t]he time for the filing of an appeal has not even begun to toll.” The trial court’s ruling of March 1, 2007, ordering ValueOptions to file a response to Haroutunian’s motion for reconsideration did not address or correct those statements.⁶ In the interim, the clerk’s office provided inaccurate or misleading information when it informed ValueOptions on February 22 that no judgment had been entered. And it is undisputed that the clerk failed to timely distribute to the parties notice of the entry of judgment, as required by Rule 58(e); that ValueOptions timely moved for relief under ARCAP 9(a) after it finally received that notice; and that ValueOptions timely appealed from the trial court’s order denying its motion to extend the appeal time under ARCAP 9(a).

¶ 18 Under the circumstances presented here, in which both parties were unaware that a judgment had been entered until well after expiration of the time for filing both post-trial motions and a notice of appeal, the trial court’s ruling is inconsistent with the less stringent standards set forth in ARCAP 9(a).⁷ We find support for our conelusion in Nunley v. City of Los Angeles, 52 F.3d 792 (9th Cir.1995). There, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted Rule 4(a)(6), Fed. R.App. P., which is similar to ARCAP 9(a).⁸ Rule 4(a)(6) provides that a “district court may reopen the time to file an appeal” only if the court finds the moving party did not receive within twenty-one days notice the judgment had been entered pursuant to Rule 77(d), Fed.R.Civ.P., and “no party would be prejudiced.”⁹ In vacating the district court’s denial of relief under Rule 4(a)(6), the Ninth Circuit held “the concept of excusable neglect has no place in the application of Rule 4(a)(6).” 52 F.3d at 798. The court reasoned that applying excusable neglect principles to Rule 4(a)(6) would “ ‘subvert the central purpose’ ” of the rule, which was “ ‘to permit district courts to ease strict sanctions now imposed on appellants whose notices of appeal are filed late because of their failure to receive notice of entry of a judgment.’ ” Id., quoting Avolio v. County of Suffolk, 29 F.3d 50, 53 (2d Cir.1994) (internal quotations omitted). In light of our supreme court’s comment accompanying the 1994 amendment to ARCAP 9(a), that same observation and reasoning apply equally here and support our conclusion that relief under ARCAP 9(a) should not hinge on a showing of excusable neglect.

¶ 19 The Nunley court also reasoned that “[t]o hold otherwise would negate the addition of Rule 4(a)(6), which provides an avenue of relief separate and apart from Rule 4(a)(5).” 52 F.3d at 798. Federal Rule 4(a)(5) allows a district court, upon a motion made “no later than 30 days after the time prescribed by this Rule 4(a) expires,” to “extend the time to file a notice of appeal” upon a showing of “excusable neglect or good cause.” Thus, although the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the district court had discretion under Rule 4(a)(6), it stated that “the denial of relief cannot rest on a party’s failure to learn independently of the entry of judgment during the thirty-day period for filing notices of appeal.” Nunley, 52 F.3d at 798. The court declined, however, to “reach the exact scope of district court discretion” under Rule 4(a)(6). Id. Other courts that have addressed a district court’s exercise of discretion under Rule 4(a)(6) also have concluded that the court cannot consider the possible merits of an appeal, see, e.g., Arai v. Am. Bryce Ranches, Inc., 316 F.3d 1066, 1070-71 (9th Cir.2003), but may deny relief when the moving party has contributed to its own failure to receive notice, such as by changing its mailing address without informing the court. See, e.g., Benavides v. Bureau of Prisons, 79 F.3d 1211, 1214 (D.C.Cir. 1996).¹⁰

¶ 20 Arizona’s rules have no identical counterpart to Federal Rule 4(a)(5). But, pursuant to Rule 60(e), Ariz. R. Civ. P., a trial court may vacate and reenter a judgment to effectively extend the time for appeal. See J.C. Penney, 197 Ariz. 113, ¶¶ 1, 20, 3 P.3d at 1034, 1037; see also Lennar Corp., 214 Ariz. 255, ¶ 51 & n. 18, 151 P.3d at 551, 552 n. 18. To obtain such relief under Rule 60(e), in addition to satisfying the other requirement of the rule that the party show compelling circumstances favoring relief from the judgment, a party must demonstrate (1) that it did not timely receive notice that the judgment had been entered; (2) that it promptly filed a motion after actually receiving such notice; (3) that it exercised due diligence, or had a reason for the lack thereof, in attempting to learn the date of the decision; and (4) that no party would be prejudiced. See J.C. Penney, 197 Ariz. 113, ¶¶ 15, 20, 3 P.3d at 1036, 1037; see also City of Phoenix v. Geyler, 144 Ariz. 323, 328, 697 P.2d 1073, 1078 (1985).

¶21 In short, the procedure available in Arizona under Rule 60(c) for effectively extending the time to appeal, albeit under more stringent standards than those set forth in ARCAP 9(a), closely parallels the alternative mechanism for relief provided under Federal Rule 4(a)(5). Accordingly, Nunley strongly supports our view that, when the clerk failed to comply with its obligation under Rule 58(e) and when both parties are reasonably operating under the mistaken belief that no judgment has been entered, a party’s alleged lack of diligence in ascertaining whether a judgment actually has been entered does not warrant denial of relief under ARCAP 9(a).¹¹ For all of these reasons, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion in denying ValueOptions’ motion under ARCAP 9(a) for extending the time within which to file its appeal.

2. Denial of Rule 6(b) motion

¶22 ValueOptions also argues the trial court erred by denying its request pursuant to Rule 6(b), Ariz. R. Civ. P., to enlarge the time to file post-judgment motions. As it also argued in relation to ARCAP 9(a), ValueOptions contends the court erred by “read[ing] into” Rule 6(b) “an ‘excusable neglect’ standard.” We review a trial court’s denial of relief under Rule 6(b) for an abuse of discretion. See Brant v. Hargrove, 129 Ariz. 475, 484, 632 P.2d 978, 987 (App.1981). But, again, we review de novo any questions involving interpretation or application of court rules. See Fragoso, 210 Ariz. 427, ¶ 7, 111 P.3d at 1030.

¶23 Analysis of ValueOptions’ argument relating to Rule 6(b) is complicated somewhat by the structure and length of that rale. In its entirety, Rule 6(b) provides:

When by these rales or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time for taking any action under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(d), (g) and ffi, and 60(c), except to the extent and under the conditions stated in them, unless the court finds (a) that a party entitled to notice of the entry of judgment or order did not receive such notice from the clerk or any party within 21 days of its entry, and (b) that no party would be prejudiced, in which case the court may, upon motion filed within thirty days after the expiration of the period originally prescribed or within 7 days of receipt of such notice, whichever is earlier, extend the time far taking such action for a period of 10 days from the date of entry of the order extending the time for taking such action.

Ariz. R. Civ. P. 6(b) (emphasis added).

¶24 The italicized language in Rule 6(b) above was added when our supreme court amended the rule in 1994. See Order Amending Rule 6(b), Rules of Civil Procedure, 178 Ariz. XLI (1994). That amendment coincided with the 1994 amendment to ARCAP 9(a); the amendments took effect simultaneously. See id. & Order Amending Rule 9(a), Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, 178 Ariz. LIX (1994). The contemporaneous amendments to both rules were substantively identical — prescribing two, but only two, conditions for enlarging the time for filing certain post-judgment motions under Rule 6(b) or for extending the time for appeal under ARCAP 9(a). In addition, as we previously noted in ¶8, supra, our supreme court’s comments accompanying the amendments to both rules were identical, stating the amendments “were designed to address a problem experienced by practitioners” whose clients’ appeal rights were sometimes jeopardized by counsel’s failure to receive notice of the entry of judgment. See 178 Ariz. at XLII, LX; see also State v. Empire Am. Bail Bonds, Inc., 191 Ariz. 218, n. 1, 953 P.2d 1271, 1273 n. 1 (App.1998) (1994 amendments to rules, including AR-CAP 9(a) and Rule 6(b), “complement each other and together are directed at preserving parties’ appeal rights”).

¶25 As with statutes, court rales “‘should be harmonized wherever possible and read in conjunction with each other.’” Hansen, 215 Ariz. 287, ¶ 7, 160 P.3d at 168, quoting Phoenix of Hartford, Inc. v. Harmony Rests., Inc., 114 Ariz. 257, 258, 560 P.2d 441, 442 (App.1977); see also Robson Ranch Mountains, L.L.C. v. Pinal County, 203 Ariz. 120, ¶ 13, 51 P.3d 342, 347 (App.2002) (courts seek to harmonize and attain consistency among related, statutory provisions in context of overall statutory seheme). In view of their identical timing, substance, and accompanying comments, the 1994 amendments to Rule 6(b) and ARCAP 9(a) clearly share a common purpose. Therefore, to the extent possible, we must endeavor to harmonize those amended rules by interpreting them consistently with each other in order to fulfill our supreme court’s intent. See Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue v. Trico Elec. Coop., Inc., 151 Ariz. 544, 548, 729 P.2d 898, 902 (1986) (simultaneous amendment of two related statutes “indicates legislative intent to harmonize” them); see also United States v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 277, 95 S.Ct. 2150, 45 L.Ed.2d 177 (1975) (prior construction of one statute deemed “particularly relevant” to proper interpretation of other, related statute, “since both sections were enacted by the [same] Congress, and both were designed to deal with closely related aspects of the same problem”); United States v. Marzullo, 780 F.Supp. 658, 661 (W.D.Mo.1991) (“Certainly, it is reasonable to conclude that Congress, in choosing to use the same language in enacting [two related statutes] and choosing to enact them as part of the same bill on the same day, intended that both sections would mean the same thing.”).

¶26 As noted earlier, ARCAP 9(a) does not require any showing of good cause or excusable neglect to obtain an extension of time for appeal. Rather, the only express prerequisites for relief under the rule are that “(1) a party entitled to notice of entry of judgment did not receive such notice from the clerk or any party within 21 days of its entry and (2) no party would be prejudiced” by extending the time for appeal. ARCAP 9(a). The 1994 amendment to Rule 6(b) prescribed those same two criteria for enlarging the time to file post-judgment motions, without conditioning such relief on a showing of good cause or excusable neglect. Indeed, Haroutunian acknowledges that the portion of Rule 6(b) pertinent to ValueOptions’ motion has no excusable neglect or good cause elements.

¶27 Unlike ARCAP 9(a), however, the pre-1994 version of Rule 6(b) required showings of “cause” and “excusable neglect” for obtaining enlargements of time under that rule. And, somewhat confusingly, that language was retained, unchanged, in Rule 6(b) even after the 1994 amendment. See ¶23, supra. The question, then, is whether, based on the wording of Rule 6(b)(2), a party still must show excusable neglect in order to obtain an enlargement of time under the amended version of the rule, even when the two prerequisites set forth in the 1994 amendment have been met. In denying ValueOptions’ motion under Rule 6(b), the trial court determined the rule “requires a showing of excusable neglect when the motion is made after the expiration of the specified period.” Although that is one plausible reading of Rule 6(b), even after its 1994 amendment, we interpret the rule differently.

¶28 “When statutory language gives rise to differing interpretations, ‘we will adopt the interpretation that is most harmonious with the statutory scheme and legislative purpose.’” Sw. Gas Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n, 200 Ariz. 292, ¶ 16, 25 P.3d 1164, 1169 (App.2001), quoting State v. Pinto, 179 Ariz. 593, 596, 880 P.2d 1139, 1142 (App. 1994). Similarly, when the language of a court rule is reasonably susceptible to differing interpretations, as the language of Rule 6(b) is, we will seek to harmonize it with related rules and interpret it in a manner that is consistent with the intent of the drafters — our supreme court. See Vega, 199 Ariz. 504, ¶ 8, 19 P.3d at 648. Again, the identical and contemporaneous 1994 amendments to ARCAP 9(a) and Rule 6(b) “were designed to address [the same] problem” — parties’ unwittingly losing their rights to file post-judgment motions and appeals for lack of timely and mandatory notice to counsel of the entry of judgment. ARCAP 9(a), Rule 6(b) court cmts. to 1994 amends., 178 Ariz. at XLII, LX. Having concluded that our supreme court did not intend to condition relief under ARCAP 9(a) on a showing of either good cause or excusable neglect, we likewise conclude that the 1994 amendments to Rule 6(b) require no such showings when, as here, the two express prerequisites for relief under the rule are established. To hold otherwise would create disharmony and inconsistency between the two rules, contrary to their apparent purpose and to our supreme court’s stated objective when it changed both rules simultaneously in 1994. Because the trial court expressly found ValueOptions had established the two prerequisites for relief under Rule 6(b) but then applied an incorrect legal standard by imposing additional requirements, the court abused its discretion in denying ValueOptions’ motion for enlargement of time under Rule 6(b).

Disposition

¶ 29 We reverse the trial court’s denial of ValueOptions’ motion to extend the time to appeal and to enlarge the time for filing post-judgment motions. The case is remanded for further proceedings on those post-judgment motions. In view of that disposition, we do not address the other issues raised in ValueOptions’ appeal or Haroutunian’s cross-appeal. See Cohen v. Frey, 215 Ariz. 62, ¶¶ 16, 19, 157 P.3d 482, 487, 488 (App.2007); Envtl. Liners, Inc. v. Ryley, Carlock & Applewhite, 187 Ariz. 379, 384 n. 4, 930 P.2d 456, 461 n. 4 (App.1996). Finally, Haroutunian’s request for attorney fees and costs on appeal and cross-appeal is denied, without prejudice to his seeking such awards on remand or in subsequent proceedings, if any.

CONCURRING: JOSEPH W. HOWARD, Presiding Judge.

1 . In this opinion and dissent, the Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure are referred to as "ARCAP,” and otherwise any reference to "Rule” will mean the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure.

2 . At the close of trial on November 14, 2006, the trial court ordered Haroutunian's counsel to prepare a form of judgment. Although the record does not include any notice of lodging or service of a proposed form of judgment, see Ariz. R. Civ. P. 58(a), (d), the judgment itself suggests that Haroutunian’s counsel might have sent the proposed form of judgment to ValueOptions' counsel sometime in December 2006.

3 . Under ARCAP 9(a), a party must file a motion to extend the time for appeal "not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time for appeal, or within 7 days of receipt of [the clerk’s] notice [of entry of judgment], whichever is earlier.” It is undisputed that ValueOptions filed its motion within the time allowed.

4 . Rule 58(e) also permits ”[a]ny party [to] ... serve a notice of such entry [of judgment] in the manner provided in Rule 5 for the service of papers.” See State v. Empire Am. Bail Bonds, Inc., 191 Ariz. 218, n. 1, 953 P.2d 1271, 1273 n. 1 (App.1998) (clerk’s duty to distribute notice of entry of judgment is "mandatory," whereas party's ability to serve such notice is "permissive”). Any party may use that permissive option to either prevent another party from obtaining an extension of time within which to appeal “or minimize the period during which one can be sought and secured.” Daniel J. McAuliffe, Atizona Civil Rules Handbook at 682 (2008). Haroutunian did not exercise that option here, presumably because he, like ValueOptions, was unaware that any judgment had been filed until sometime in late March 2007, when the clerk finally notified the parties of the entry of judgment.

5 . As the dissent correctly notes, see ¶¶ 33, 45, infra, Division One of this court has recognized a trial court’s discretion under both ARCAP 9(a) and Rule 6(b), Ariz. R. Civ. P. See United Metro Materials, Inc. v. Pena Blanca Props., L.L.C., 197 Ariz. 479, ¶¶ 18-19, 4 P.3d 1022, 1025 (App. 2000). In that same case, however, the court found sufficient for time-extending relief under those rules "counsel’s avowal that he did not receive notice of the entry of judgment” and the lack of any alleged prejudice to the appellee. Id. ¶¶ 21-22. The court did not suggest that any other factors such as good cause or excusable neglect played any permissible or relevant role in a trial court’s exercise of discretion under AR-CAP 9(a) or Rule 6(b). Rather, the court noted that those rules merely "concern themselves with whether the notice of the judgment is 'received,' not with whether it was sent." Id. ¶ 22.

6 . Contrary to the dissent’s assertion in ¶ 43, infra, we do not suggest the trial court had any such duty to do so. But the uncorrected statements by Haroutunian, at a minimum, arguably misled ValueOptions to reasonably believe no judgment had been entered and contributed to the circumstances warranting relief under AR-CAP 9(a).

7 . In addition, even if due diligence or excusable neglect were relevant inquiries under ARCAP 9(a), ValueOptions arguably made such a showing. See Lennar Corp. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 214 Ariz. 255, ¶¶ 53-54, 151 P.3d 538, 552 (App. 2007); J.C. Penney v. Lane, 197 Ariz. 113, ¶¶ 2-8, 21, 3 P.3d 1033, 1034-35, 1037 (App.1999); cf. City of Phoenix v. Geyler, 144 Ariz. 323, 332, 697 P.2d 1073, 1082 (1985) (finding "quite unique and compelling” circumstances probably would warrant delayed appeal even though "counsel did not attempt to learn the date of entry of judgment” and “the reason for his failure to do so was the erroneous interpretation of the [trial court’s] order and resulting mistake in computing time”); DNB Constr., Inc. v. Superior Court, 125 Ariz. 61, 63, 607 P.2d 380, 382 (1980) ("A party should be able to rely upon the mail for notice and should not be required to contact the [court] every day to ascertain if judgment has been entered.”). That the trial court concluded otherwise based on undisputed facts, rather than on a weighing and resolution of any conflicting evidence, does not preclude an appellate court from reaching a different conclusion on questions of due diligence or excusable neglect. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 143 Ariz. 54, 59, 691 P.2d 1082, 1087 (1984) (reversing trial court’s order refusing to vacate judgment to permit appeal and noting "[k]nowledge of the pendency of judgment and notice of entry of judgment cannot ... be equated”); Coconino Pulp & Paper Co. v. Marvin, 83 Ariz. 117, 121, 317 P.2d 550, 552 (1957) (overturning trial court’s refusal to set aside default judgment, supreme court noted when "undisputed facts and circumstances as shown in this case require a contrary ruling as a matter of law this court will reverse”); Ulibarri v. Gerstenberger, 178 Ariz. 151, 164, 871 P.2d 698, 711 (App.1993) (concluding trial court abused discretion in not finding excusable neglect for party’s untimely response to motion for summary judgment; determining instead that party's "conduct ... does not seem unreasonable under these facts”).

8 . It is appropriate to look to federal courts’ interpretations of federal rules that mirror Arizona rules. See Geyler, 144 Ariz. at 328, 697 P.2d at 1078 (adopting criteria established by Ninth Circuit for evaluating “whether to allow a delayed appeal” and noting "other courts have become less devoted to applying the strict letter of procedural law and more concerned with equitable disposition on the merits”); Jenney v. Ariz. Ex press, Inc., 89 Ariz. 343, 349, 362 P.2d 664, 668 (1961); Green v. Nygaard, 213 Ariz. 460, n. 3, 143 P.3d 393, 397 n. 3 (App.2006).

9 . The only meaningful difference between the relief available under ARCAP 9(a) and the federal rule is the time within which the motion must be filed. Both rules require a motion be filed within seven days of receiving notice of entry of the final judgment. ARCAP 9(a); Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(6)(B). Regardless of whether notice is received, however, under Arizona’s rule the motion must be filed within thirty days after the expiration of the time for appeal. ARCAP 9(a). The federal rule provides a 180-day window "after the judgment or order is entered.” Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(6)(B). As noted earlier, there is no dispute that ValueOptions’ motion for extension of the appeal time was timely filed under ARCAP 9(a).

10 . We recognize that other federal appellate courts have upheld the denial of relief requested under Federal Rule 4(a)(6) when the moving party failed to act. See, e.g., Kuhn v. Sulzer Orthopedics, Inc., 498 F.3d 365, 370-71 (6th Cir. 2007) (party failed to monitor electronic docket); In re Jones, 970 F.2d 36, 39 (5th Cir.1992) (party failed to notify court of address change and misread docket sheet). In our view, however, those courts applied an overly harsh standard for relief that is incompatible with the wording and intent of ARCAP 9(a).

11 . As the dissent points out, ¶47, infra, dicta in Decola v. Freyer, 198 Ariz. 28, ¶ 19, 6 P.3d 333, 338 (App.2000), suggested that relief under AR-CAP 9(a) would be appropriate if appellant "acted diligently.” But, in noting the pertinent findings the superior court already had made and in remanding the case to that court, id. ¶¶ 22, 24-25, the court in Decola did not require any showing of due diligence, excusable neglect, or good cause for a delayed appeal.