Villalobos v. Maricopa County

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE
NOEL ADAN VILLALOBOS, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellants,
v.
MARICOPA COUNTY, et al., Defendants/Appellees.
No. 1 CA-CV 22-0407
FILED 3-7-2023
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2017-012638
The Honorable Danielle J. Viola, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Ahwatukee Legal Office, P.C., Phoenix
By David L. Abney
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants
The Leader Law Firm, Tucson
By John P. Leader
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants
Chapa Law Group, P.C., Phoenix
By Miguel J. Chapa
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants
Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
By Charles E. Trullinger, III, Joseph J. Branco, Sean M. Moore
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge Maria Elena Cruz delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge James B. Morse Jr. and Judge Daniel J. Kiley joined.
C R U Z, Judge:
¶1 Noel Adan Villalobos, Adan Villalobos, Rosalva Rascon, and
Jose Luis Rodriguez (collectively “Plaintiffs”) challenge the superior court’s
grant of summary judgment to Maricopa County (“the County”). We
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 This case arises from an October 2016 automobile accident
that resulted in the death of Nuvia Villalobos and serious injury to her
minor child. The accident occurred in the intersection of Broadway Road
and 71st Avenue/Sienna Vista Avenue. At that intersection, the County
maintains Broadway Road and the City of Phoenix (“the City”) maintains
the area north of Broadway Road, including Sienna Vista Avenue. Nuvia,
approaching Broadway Road from the north on Sienna Vista Avenue, tried
to turn left onto Broadway Road and collided with a school bus.
¶3 Plaintiffs sued the County, the City, and two parties not
relevant to this appeal alleging the intersection was not reasonably safe for
travel. Plaintiffs identified three alleged safety concerns at or near the
intersection: (1) a misplaced stop sign on Sienna Vista Avenue north of the
intersection; (2) the lack of a stop line or stop bar closer to Broadway Road
on the north side of the intersection; and (3) sight obstruction caused by a
Salt River Project utility pole on the northeast corner of the intersection.
¶4 The County moved for summary judgment, contending in
relevant part that it owed no duty of care because none of the three alleged
safety concerns were within its jurisdiction. The City moved for summary
judgment on other grounds.
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¶5 The superior court granted the County’s motion, finding that
Plaintiffs “ha[d] not come forward with evidence to support a finding that
Maricopa County owed a legal duty as to the placement of the stop sign or
stop line or for motorists on southbound 71st Avenue.” It denied the City’s
motion, finding genuine issues of material fact remained as to its potential
liability. The City filed a special action petition challenging both rulings.
We declined to exercise special action jurisdiction, and the Arizona
Supreme Court declined review.
¶6 Upon returning to the superior court, the City moved to
bifurcate trial, which the superior court granted. Several months later,
Plaintiffs settled their claims against the City. The court then entered a final
judgment under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 54(c) for the
County. Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal challenging the grant of
summary judgment to the County and the bifurcation order. We have
jurisdiction under Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 12-2101(A)(1).
DISCUSSION
¶7 Summary judgment is appropriate when there is “no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Rule 56(a). We review a grant of summary judgment
de novo and view the evidence and reasonable inferences in a light most
favorable to the non-moving parties; here, Plaintiffs. Zambrano v. M & RC
II LLC, 254 Ariz. 53, 58, ¶ 9 (2022).
¶8 To establish a negligence claim against the County, Plaintiffs
must prove four elements: (1) a duty requiring the County to conform to a
certain standard of care; (2) the County’s breach of that standard; (3) a
causal connection between the County’s conduct and the resulting injury;
and (4) actual damages. Quiroz v. ALCOA Inc., 243 Ariz. 560, 563-64, ¶ 7
(2018).
¶9 The superior court determined the County owed no duty of
care in this case. The County concedes on appeal that it owes a duty to keep
its roads reasonably safe for travel. See Dunham v. Pima County, 161 Ariz.
304, 306 (1989); see also A.R.S. § 11-251(4) (granting county boards of
supervisors the power to “[l]ay out, maintain, control and manage public
roads”). And while Plaintiffs concede on appeal the three safety concerns
they identified “may not have been on a roadway for which Maricopa
County was responsible,” they contend the County’s duty extends to
“motorists . . . turning into Maricopa County’s roadways from other
jurisdictions.” See Coburn v. City of Tucson, 143 Ariz. 50, 52 (1984) (stating
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Decision of the Court
that the duty to maintain reasonably safe roads extends to “those who use
the public streets”). The County, on the other hand, contends its duty does
not include “inspect[ing] and tak[ing] action to correct . . . roadway defects
on adjoining roads owned and maintained by other entities.”
¶10 We need not decide whether the County had any duty to
correct defects on adjoining roads because Plaintiffs presented no evidence
establishing the County failed to meet the standard of care. Whether a
defendant breached the standard of care generally is for the trier of fact to
resolve, Ritchie v. Krasner, 221 Ariz. 288, 295, ¶ 11 (App. 2009), but summary
judgment can be granted if “no reasonable juror could conclude that the
standard of care was breached.” Sanders v. Alger, 242 Ariz. 246, 251, ¶ 24
(2017) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Rudolph v.
Ariz. B.A.S.S. Fed’n, 182 Ariz. 622, 626 (App. 1995) (Court of Appeals can
affirm summary judgment when superior court errs in granting summary
judgment based on lack of duty “if there is no evidence that defendants
breached their duty.”).
¶11 As discussed above, Plaintiffs presented evidence that the
City placed a stop sign too far from Broadway Road and did not place a
“stop line/bar directing vehicles where to safely stop,” both of which
Plaintiffs contend “violated a host of applicable roadway engineering
standards” and caused or contributed to the accident. Plaintiffs also
presented evidence suggesting that the utility pole on the northeast corner
“significantly hinder[ed] southbound . . . motorists from seeing westbound
traffic on Broadway.” They conceded, however, that the stop sign, missing
stop line, and utility pole “are within City . . . jurisdiction.” Moreover, their
expert acknowledged the County’s only connection to this accident was
that it happened on Broadway Road.
¶12 Plaintiffs nonetheless contend the County can be held liable
because it “was on notice—based on prior crashes at this intersection and
another nearby similar intersection . . . about the unreasonably dangerous
condition of the intersectional area[.]” But their expert admitted the prior
accidents he contended had “similar dynamics” merely involved
“southbound vehicles on 71st Ave. [Sienna Vista Avenue], turning left on
to W. Broadway, when impact occurred with another vehicle.” Plaintiffs’
expert’s deposition testimony was that only two of those accidents occurred
prior to the Villalobos’ accident and neither involved the motorist’s view
being obstructed due to a utility pole.
¶13 Plaintiffs also contend the County “was obligated to make
reasonable efforts to correct the defect[s].” But they did not identify any
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Decision of the Court
specific efforts the County should have undertaken; their expert instead
speculated that the City “likely would have consented and cooperated” had
the County approached it and “expressed a desire to correct the hazardous
conditions.” Plaintiffs expanded on that speculation in their opening brief:
[T]here are any number of measures Maricopa County could
have taken to fulfill its standard of care, including: (1)
vigorously requesting and, as needed, demanding that the
City make changes to the stop-sign placement and install a
stop line/bar in the proper location, (2) providing some type
of warning to westbound motorists on Broadway Road as
they approached the intersection, (3) placing a traffic light and
warning lights in the jurisdictional area of the intersection
that Maricopa County controlled, and (4) even suing to have
the conditions on the City property declared a public
nuisance and judicially forcing the necessary remedial action.
But they cite no record evidence or legal authority showing the applicable
standard of care required the County to do any of these things. See Rule
56(e) (stating that a party opposing summary judgment “must . . . set forth
specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial”); Rogers v. Retrum, 170 Ariz.
399, 403 (App. 1991) (“A jury will not be permitted to require a party to take
a precaution that is clearly unreasonable.”) (citation omitted).
¶14 For these reasons, we conclude the superior court did not err
in granting summary judgment to the County. As the County is the only
remaining defendant, we need not address Plaintiffs’ challenges to the
superior court’s trial bifurcation order.
CONCLUSION
¶15 We affirm. The County may recover its taxable costs incurred
in this appeal upon compliance with ARCAP 21.
AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AA
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