Dimond v. Samaritan Health Service

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

HOWARD, Chief Judge.

Appellant contends in her motion on rehearing that the judgment of the trial court deprives her of a right to a hearing before dismissal. We do not so construe the trial court’s judgment. The appellee was at all'times willing to follow the procedures in the poli-gram and grant appellant a hearing. In fact a time had already been set for the hearing when appellant filed her complaint for declaring relief and for an injunction to stop the hearing. What appellant desired by way of relief was an order requiring the hospital to allow her attorney to be present at the hearing and for an order allowing compulsory attendance of witnesses. As we pointed out in our original opinion, the poli-gram did not provide for such procedures. The only way she would be entitled to such relief would be if it were constitutionally required or, under a theory of “fair procedure” such as is espoused in the case of Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Society of Orthodontists, 12 Cal.3d 541, 116 Cal.Rptr. 245, 526 P.2d 253 (1974). As far as a private hospital is concerned, it must follow its own rules and regulations and failure to do so justifies judicial intervention. Shulman v. Washington Hospital Center, 222 F.Supp. 59 (D.C.1963). But, the hearing to which appellant is entitled need only be conducted in a fair manner. All the legal accoutrements of a trial are not necessary. Appellant is not entitled to have an attorney present nor compulsory attendance of witnesses. Sussman v. Overlook Hospital Association, 95 N.J.Super. 418, 231 A.2d 389 (1967). She does have a right to have a hearing as set forth in the poli-gram.

The motion for rehearing is denied.

KRUCKER and HATHAWAY, JJ., concur.