State v. Williams

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,
v.
THEODORE BRADY WILLIAMS, Appellant.
No. 1 CA-CR 22-0136
FILED 5-4-2023
Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County
No. S8015CR202100412
The Honorable Billy K. Sipe, Jr., Judge Pro Tempore
AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART
COUNSEL
Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Andrew Reilly
Counsel for Appellee
Jill L. Evans Attorney at Law, Flagstaff
By Jill L. Evans
Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. WILLIAMS
Decision of the Court
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Acting Presiding Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the
Court, in which Judge Daniel J. Kiley and Judge Angela K. Paton joined.
M O R S E, Judge:
¶1 Theodore Brady Williams appeals his convictions and
sentences for one count of aggravated assault, a class 3 felony, and one
count of disorderly conduct, a class 6 felony. We affirm in part and vacate
in part.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 In April 2021, two families were camping near Kingman,
Arizona. In the late afternoon, four of the families' young boys rode their
all-terrain vehicles ("ATVs") down a trail toward a nearby wash. Williams
had set up camp near the wash, about 60-75 feet from the ATV trail.
¶3 Williams took issue with the boys riding near his campsite
and yelled to try to get their attention. The boys could not hear Williams
initially because of their padded helmets and the noise from their ATVs.
Williams proceeded to retrieve a handgun from his truck and fire two shots
near where the boys were riding. The gunshots scared the boys and caused
them to leave the area near Williams's campsite and return to their parents.
¶4 The boys' parents went to Williams's campsite to speak with
him about the incident. When they arrived, Williams pulled out a gun and
threatened to shoot. Williams told the parents that he "shot at" the boys and
later confirmed to police that he had "fired two shots to get their attention."
Williams claimed the boys were burning out, doing doughnuts, and
creating a "whirlwind of dirt," but the police found no evidence of this
behavior and found no ATV tracks within 60 feet of Williams's campsite.
¶5 The State charged Williams with aggravated assault and
disorderly conduct involving a weapon. A jury convicted Williams of both
charges. The superior court suspended imposition of Williams's sentence
and placed him on three years' supervised probation.
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STATE v. WILLIAMS
Decision of the Court
¶6 Williams timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under
Arizona Constitution article VI, section 9 and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1),
13-4031, and -4033(A)(1).
DISCUSSION
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence.
¶7 Williams challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his conviction for aggravated assault.
¶8 We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. State v.
West, 226 Ariz. 559, 562, ¶ 15 (2011). We view the evidence in the light most
favorable to affirming the verdict, and "will reverse only if there is a
complete absence of substantial evidence to support the conviction." State
v. Ramsey, 211 Ariz. 529, 542, ¶ 40 (App. 2005) (citation omitted).
"Substantial evidence is that which reasonable persons could accept as
sufficient to support a guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt." State v.
Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191, 212, ¶ 87 (2004). We will consider both direct and
circumstantial evidence, West, 226 Ariz. at 562, ¶ 16, but we will not reweigh
conflicting evidence or reassess witness credibility on appeal, State v.
Buccheri-Bianca, 233 Ariz. 324, 334, ¶ 38 (App. 2013).
¶9 To support Williams's conviction, the State had to prove he
"[i]ntentionally plac[ed] another person in reasonable apprehension of
imminent physical injury" using "a deadly weapon or dangerous
instrument." A.R.S. §§ 13-1203(A)(2), -1204(A)(2). Williams argues that the
State failed to provide evidence of either his intent to place the boys in fear
of imminent injury or that the boys feared imminent injury.
¶10 As to Williams's intent, because a defendant's mental state
"will rarely be provable by direct evidence," a jury may "infer it from his
behaviors and other circumstances surrounding the event." State v. Noriega,
187 Ariz. 282, 286 (App. 1996); see also State v. Routhier, 137 Ariz. 90, 99 (1983)
("Criminal intent, being a state of mind, is shown by circumstantial
evidence."). Viewed in its entirety, the evidence is sufficient to allow a
reasonable factfinder to find that Williams intended to place the victims in
reasonable apprehension of physical injury. See State v. VanWinkle, 230
Ariz. 387, 392, ¶ 16 (2012).
¶11 At least one victim recalled that Williams shouted at the
group to get off his property before pointing his gun and firing the first
shot. The jury heard Williams testify that he fired the first shot at a tree in
the "opposite" direction from the children and fired a second shot to let
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STATE v. WILLIAMS
Decision of the Court
them know not to return. But an officer testified that the tree at which
Williams claimed to shoot was only 20 feet away from the children. When
asked where Williams pointed the gun when he fired the shot, a boy
testified that it "kind of looked, like, at us, but, like, I can't really say." And
the jury also heard that officers could not locate evidence to support
Williams's claim that he was "return[ing] fire" in response to being pelted
by rocks from the ATV tires. The parents testified that when confronted,
Williams admitted he "shot at" the boys. And Williams later told police he
had "fired two shots to get their attention." Williams also testified to firing
the first shot to get them to stop riding near his camp and the second to
make sure they did not come back.
¶12 We "view the evidence in the light most favorable to
sustaining the conviction" and resolve all reasonable inferences against the
defendant. State v. Lee, 189 Ariz. 590, 603 (1997). The jury "was not required
to accept [Williams's] testimony and could consider his false denials as
evidence of guilt." State v. Crain, 250 Ariz. 387, 400, ¶ 53 (App. 2021); see also
United States v. Davis, 909 F.3d 9, 19 (1st Cir. 2018) ("It is a 'well-settled
principle that false exculpatory statements are evidence — often strong
evidence — of guilt.'" (quoting Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1107 (D.C.
Cir. 2010)). In this context, we must accept the reasonable inference that
Williams brandished and fired the gun "to place the victims in reasonable
apprehension of imminent physical injury. The use of a gun as a method of
control is, after all, based on its potential to inflict harm." State v. Tschilar,
200 Ariz. 427, 437, ¶ 41 (App. 2001).
¶13 As to whether the boys were afraid of imminent physical
injury, two of the boys testified that they were "scared" after Williams fired
the gun and the third testified that it gave him "a big adrenaline rush" and
that he could tell the younger two boys "were really scared."1 Two boys
also testified that the reason they went right back to their parents' camp was
because they were scared. The jury also heard from a parent that all the
boys "were scared" when they returned to camp, and the oldest boy, who
saw Williams point the handgun, "looked like he was going to cry." Again,
we must accept the jury's reasonable inference from this evidence that the
two gunshots placed another person in reasonable apprehension of
imminent physical injury. See Lee, 189 Ariz. at 603; Tschilar, 200 Ariz. at 437,
¶ 41.
1During oral argument, Williams's counsel acknowledged that sufficient
evidence as to any individual victim would be adequate to affirm the
conviction.
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STATE v. WILLIAMS
Decision of the Court
¶14 Because the testimony presented at trial provides substantial
evidence of each element of the charged offense, we affirm Williams's
conviction for aggravated assault.
II. Double Jeopardy.
¶15 Williams claims his convictions for both disorderly conduct
and aggravated assault violated his double jeopardy protections. Double
jeopardy claims are a matter of statutory interpretation, which we review
de novo. State v. Powers, 200 Ariz. 123, 125, ¶ 5 (App. 2001).
¶16 "The Double Jeopardy Clauses in both the United States and
Arizona Constitutions protect a defendant 'against a second prosecution for
the same offense after acquittal' and 'against a second prosecution for the
same offense after conviction.'" State v. Carter, 249 Ariz. 312, 315, ¶ 7 (2020)
(quoting Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 498 (1984)). And lesser-included
offenses are considered the same as the greater for purposes of double
jeopardy analysis. State v. Ortega, 220 Ariz. 320, 324, ¶ 9 (App. 2008).
Offenses are "lesser included" if they share some, but not all, of the elements
of a greater crime such that one cannot commit the greater offense without
also committing the lesser crime. Carter, 249 Ariz. at 316, ¶ 10 (citing State
v. Wall, 212 Ariz. 1, 3, ¶ 14 (2006)); State v. Celaya, 135 Ariz. 248, 251 (1983).
¶17 Our supreme court has repeatedly stated that disorderly
conduct by recklessly displaying a firearm is a lesser-included offense of
aggravated assault as charged in this case. State v. Miranda, 200 Ariz. 67, 68,
¶ 3 (2001); State v. Angle, 149 Ariz. 478, 479 (1986). The State argues that this
line of cases has been impliedly overruled by Carter, 249 Ariz. at 315-16.
But we are not free to disregard our supreme court's explicit rulings in
Miranda and Angle, and it would be error to try to anticipate whether Carter
will lead our supreme court to depart from those cases:
The lower courts are bound by our decisions, and this Court
alone is responsible for modifying that precedent. State v.
Smyers, 207 Ariz. 314, 318, ¶ 15 n. 4 (2004); see also McKay v.
Indus. Comm'n, 103 Ariz. 191, 193 (1968) ("Whether prior
decisions of the highest court in a state are to be disaffirmed
is a question for the court which makes the decisions. Any
other rule would lead to chaos in our judicial system."). Trial
courts are required to follow the decisions of a higher court,
and the superior court here failed to abide by that
fundamental principle. We therefore caution lower courts
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STATE v. WILLIAMS
Decision of the Court
not to depart from binding precedent anticipating that we
will overrule existing case law.
Sell v. Gama, 231 Ariz. 323, 330, ¶ 31 (2013) (emphasis added) (parallel
citations omitted).
¶18 "[B]ecause one cannot place a person in reasonable
apprehension of imminent physical danger without in fact also disturbing
her peace, all elements of disorderly conduct by reckless display of a
firearm are in fact elements of aggravated assault." Miranda, 200 Ariz. at 68,
¶ 3. Thus, Williams's convictions for both aggravated assault and
disorderly conduct arising from the same event violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause, and we must vacate his conviction for disorderly conduct. Ortega,
220 Ariz. at 328, ¶ 25.2
CONCLUSION
¶19 For the above-stated reasons, we affirm Williams's conviction
for aggravated assault and vacate his conviction for the lesser included
offense of disorderly conduct.
AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AA
2The State also argues that the reasoning in our decision in State v. Erivez,
236 Ariz. 472, 476, ¶ 18 (App. 2015) is "irreconcilable" with Miranda and
Angle. We fail to see any merit in the State's argument. In Erivez, we
explicitly cited Miranda and Angle in affirming that both "disorderly
conduct and assault are lesser-included offenses of" aggravated assault as
charged in this case, but that neither disorderly conduct nor misdemeanor
assault "is a lesser-included offense of the other." Id. at 475-76, ¶¶ 15, 17.
We noted that assault cannot be a lesser-included offense of disorderly
conduct because one can disturb the peace and quiet of a victim without
placing them in apprehension of physical injury. Id. at ¶ 18. Erivez's
reasoning is consistent, not irreconcilable, with Miranda's statement that
placing a victim in reasonable apprehension of physical injury necessarily
disturbs the victim's peace. Miranda, 200 Ariz. at 68, ¶ 3.
6