Brown v. State

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE
PATRICE EDMOND BROWN, Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
STATE OF ARIZONA, et al., Defendants/Appellees.
No. 1 CA-CV 22-0184
FILED 6-22-2023
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2019-095650
The Honorable Stephen M. Hopkins, Judge (Retired)
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Patrice Edmond Brown, Florence
Plaintiff/Appellant
Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
By Maxine S. Mak, Joseph Branco, Rosa Aguilar
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee The County of Maricopa
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge Maria Elena Cruz delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge James B. Morse Jr. and Judge Daniel J. Kiley joined.
BROWN v. STATE, et al.
Decision of the Court
C R U Z, Judge:
¶1 Patrice Edmond Brown appeals the superior court’s orders
granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by the County of
Maricopa (“the County”), entering judgment against him, and dismissing
the case with prejudice. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 In February 2000, a jury found Brown guilty of six counts of
dangerous crimes against children; he is currently serving consecutive
sentences aggregating to 77 years in the Arizona Department of
Corrections.1 In September 2019, Brown filed a complaint against the State
of Arizona, the County, and the Arizona Department of Corrections’
Former Director Ryan alleging fraud, unlawful imprisonment, and false
imprisonment, arguing the superior court lacked jurisdiction over his
criminal proceedings because he “was charged with, and indicted for,
violating an invalid statute,” Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section
13-604.01.2 The County moved for judgment on the pleadings arguing
Brown failed to state a claim against it, and the court granted the motion.
¶3 Brown then moved under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure
(“Rule”) 15 to amend the complaint, and the County moved for entry of
judgment, incorrectly stating Brown had not filed a Rule 15 motion. The
court granted the County’s motion and entered judgment against Brown
without ruling on Brown’s Rule 15 motion. Brown appealed and moved to
set aside the judgment. This court then revested jurisdiction in the superior
court to resolve Brown’s Rule 15 motion.
¶4 In June 2022, the superior court granted Brown’s motion to set
aside the judgment and granted the parties leave to submit supplemental
briefing on Brown’s Rule 15 motion to amend the complaint. In July 2022,
the court denied Brown’s Rule 15 motion finding “amendment of the
Complaint . . . would be futile.” The court then dismissed the case with
1 This court previously affirmed Brown’s convictions and sentences.
See State v. Brown, 1 CA-CR 01-0152, 9 (Ariz. App. Mar. 19, 2002) (mem.
decision).
2 After Brown’s conviction and sentencing, the legislature
renumbered the provision as A.R.S. § 13-705. See 2008 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch.
301, §§ 17, 29, 120.
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BROWN v. STATE, et al.
Decision of the Court
prejudice and entered judgment against Brown. We have jurisdiction
pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(1).
DISCUSSION
¶5 Brown argues the superior court’s July 2022 order denying his
Rule 15 motion to amend the complaint is “moot” because the court, in June
2022, had previously granted his Rule 15 motion. This court generally will
“not give opinions on moot questions,” but here, the court did not rule
twice on Brown’s Rule 15 motion as he alleges. Contempo-Tempe Mobile
Home Owners Ass’n v. Steinert, 144 Ariz. 227, 229 (App. 1985). In June 2022,
the superior court granted Brown’s motion to set aside the judgment “in
order to determine [the] Rule 15 motion to amend on the merits” and
granted the parties leave to “submit a supplemental written submission on
the issue of amendment of the Complaint.” After reviewing Brown’s
motion and the County’s supplemental briefing, the court issued its July
2022 order denying Brown’s Rule 15 motion and finding “amendment of
the Complaint . . . would be futile.” The court did not grant Brown’s Rule
15 motion in June 2022, and that order therefore did not render the July 2022
order moot.
¶6 Brown alleges that opposing counsel committed acts that
violate the Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct and suggests some other
attorney may have been duty-bound to report those acts, but he fails to
identify any specific rule that was purportedly violated, does not make
specific citations to the record, does not identify any other attorney aware
of the purported misconduct, nor explain why any such violation would
give rise to a claim for relief. See ARCAP 13(a)(7); see also Polanco v. Indus.
Comm’n, 214 Ariz. 489, 491, ¶ 6 n.2 (App. 2007). Because Brown makes no
other substantive arguments on appeal, we therefore affirm the superior
court’s orders granting the County’s motion for judgment on the pleadings,
entering judgment against Brown, and dismissing the case with prejudice.
See ARCAP 13(a)(7).
CONCLUSION
¶7 We affirm.
AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AA
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