Quinn v. Cardenas

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE
TIMERA QUINN, Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
v.
JULIO CARDENAS, Defendant/Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
No. 1 CA-CV 22-0398
FILED 8-1-2023
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2018-007278
The Honorable Bradley H. Astrowsky, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Bradley & Associates, Goodyear
By Percival R. Bradley
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross-Appellee
Jones Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C., Phoenix
By John T. Masterson, Michele Molinario, Justin M. Ackerman,
Derek R. Graffious
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee/Cross-Appellant
QUINN v. CARDENAS
Opinion of the Court
OPINION
Judge Michael S. Catlett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.
C A T L E T T, Judge:
¶1 Following a minor traffic accident, Timera Quinn (“Quinn”)
and Julio Cardenas (“Cardenas”) got into an altercation. What made this
conflict different is that, unbeknownst to Quinn, Cardenas was an off-duty
City of Phoenix Police Officer. The altercation quickly escalated until
Cardenas pulled his service weapon, revealed his status as a police officer,
and detained Quinn while on-duty officers arrived.
¶2 Quinn brought four claims against Cardenas in superior
court: a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (for excessive force), and three
state law claims for assault, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction
of emotional distress. After Cardenas removed the case to federal court,
that court granted summary judgment for Cardenas on the § 1983 claim.
The federal district court remanded the three state-law claims to state court.
¶3 The primary issue we answer is whether, on remand, a federal
court’s final judgment binds the superior court in any way. And if so,
whether a final judgment is binding under preclusion principles (issue and
claim preclusion) or, instead, the law of the case principles.
¶4 We hold that a federal court’s final judgment is, upon remand,
binding on the superior court under preclusion principles. We also
conclude the federal court’s final judgment granting Cardenas qualified
immunity is, under the issue preclusion doctrine, fatal to her state law
claims for assault and false imprisonment. We, therefore, affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶5 Quinn and Cardenas were involved in a traffic accident on the
evening of May 14, 2017. The record is unclear how the accident came about
or who caused it, but those matters are immaterial. What we do know is
that Cardenas, who was off-duty, pulled off the interstate. Quinn, who was
accompanied by two male passengers, drove behind him. At some point,
their vehicles collided.
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Opinion of the Court
¶6 Cardenas then drove to a nearby gas station; Quinn followed.
There, Quinn’s male passengers exited the vehicle and one of them
discussed the collision with Cardenas. Quinn’s passengers returned to the
vehicle, and Quinn began driving away before the parties exchanged
identification or insurance information. Cardenas began running after
Quinn’s vehicle, causing Quinn to turn around and park. Quinn exited her
vehicle and confronted Cardenas about who caused the accident and who
failed to remain at the scene. At some point during the discussion, Quinn’s
two male passengers also exited.
¶7 Cardenas then utilized an “impact push” against Quinn.
Using his two hands against her upper chest, Cardenas pushed Quinn
while taking a step back. Quinn still did not know Cardenas was a police
officer. So Quinn responded, pushing Cardenas. Cardenas then revealed
his occupation; he drew his service weapon, announced he was a police
officer, and ordered Quinn to return to her vehicle. Quinn complied.
Eventually, on-duty police arrived and took control.
¶8 Quinn sued Cardenas in the superior court under § 1983 for
allegedly violating her Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive
force. Quinn also asserted state law tort claims for assault, false
imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Cardenas
removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of
Arizona, where it was assigned to the Hon. Michael T. Liburdi. The parties
completed fact and expert discovery, after which Cardenas moved for
summary judgment on all claims. The federal court granted Cardenas’
motion concerning Quinn’s § 1983 claim on qualified immunity grounds.
Having disposed of the lone federal claim, the court remanded Quinn’s
state law claims back to the superior court. Quinn did not appeal the
federal court’s order and judgment.
¶9 On remand, Cardenas moved for summary judgment on the
remaining tort claims, arguing in part that the federal judgment precluded
re-litigation of the federal court’s qualified immunity decision. The court
granted the motion on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim
based on evidentiary shortcomings, but it otherwise denied the motion.1
¶10 A different superior court judge rotated onto the case. Shortly
before trial, the parties filed a joint pretrial statement, with Cardenas again
raising issue preclusion arguments. But this time, Cardenas’ arguments
1 Quinn did not appeal this ruling, so the only claims at issue are her
assault and false imprisonment claims.
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Opinion of the Court
focused on the federal court’s factual findings and how they might impact
jury instructions. The court ordered Quinn to address Cardenas’ preclusion
arguments. After oral argument, the court concluded that because there
was a final federal judgment involving the same parties and the same
issues, issue preclusion prohibited Quinn from moving forward with her
assault and false imprisonment claims.
¶11 Quinn timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S.
§ 12-2101.
DISCUSSION
I. Summary Judgment Timing
¶12 Before addressing the meat of the appeal, we address two
preliminaries. First, Quinn asserts that the superior court’s ruling stemmed
from an untimely renewed motion for summary judgment tucked into
Cardenas’ joint pretrial statement. Cardenas responds that the court raised
the summary judgment issue on its own under Rule 56(f). We review
whether the superior court properly heard a motion, even an untimely one,
for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Vincent, 147 Ariz. 6, 9 (App. 1985).
¶13 Under Rule 56(f)(3), “[a]fter giving notice and a reasonable
time to respond, the court may: . . . consider summary judgment on its own
after identifying for the parties material facts that may not be genuinely in
dispute.” After unsuccessfully moving for summary judgment on two of
Quinn’s claims, Cardenas, in the joint pretrial statement, again addressed
the federal court’s order and judgment and their impact on the surviving
claims. The superior court held a status conference where this issue was
discussed, and the court allowed Quinn to file a brief explaining why the
surviving claims should be tried. While Quinn’s brief is not part of the
record because Quinn emailed it directly to opposing counsel and the court
without ever filing it, Quinn concedes she complied with the court’s order
by providing a brief.2 The court then held oral argument and ultimately
concluded that the federal judgment precluded the state tort claims.
Because the parties were given notice and an opportunity to respond, the
superior court’s judgment was procedurally permitted under Rule 56(f).
¶14 Additionally, trial courts serve an important function as
gatekeepers to ensure only meritorious claims and defenses reach a jury.
2 To aid appellate review, counsel should ensure that any briefs
submitted directly to the superior court through email are also filed on the
court’s docket. Cf. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 7.1(a).
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See, e.g., Booth v. State, 207 Ariz. 61, 68 ¶ 20 (App. 2004); Sign Here Petitions
LLC v. Chavez, 243 Ariz. 99, 102 ¶ 1 (App. 2017). Indeed, a superior court
has the authority to “eliminate nonmeritorious claims or defenses” at a
scheduling conference. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 16(d)(9). And courts must also
“manage a civil action” with the objectives to (1) manage the court’s
calendar to eliminate unnecessary trial settings; (2) adhere to “applicable
standards for timely resolution of civil actions”; and (3) conserve the
parties’ resources. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 16(A); see also Ariz. R. Civ. P. 1. The court
did not abuse its discretion in disposing of claims it thought were non-
meritorious in lieu of conducting an unnecessary jury trial.
II. Horizontal Appeal
¶15 Second, Quinn contends Cardenas asked Judge Astrowsky
for an impermissible “horizontal appeal” of Judge McCoy’s earlier decision
denying summary judgment. “We review the superior court’s
reconsideration of an earlier ruling for an abuse of discretion.” Humphrey
v. State, 249 Ariz. 57, 67 ¶ 36 (App. 2020).
¶16 We refer to a request for “a second trial judge to reconsider
the decision of the first trial judge in the same matter, even though no new
circumstances have arisen in the interim and no other reason justifies
reconsideration” as a “horizontal appeal.” Powell-Cerkoney v. TCR-Mont.
Ranch Joint Venture, II, 176 Ariz. 275, 278–79 (App. 1993). A court cannot
turn away a horizontal appeal simply to “justify [its] refusal to reconsider a
ruling when an error in the first decision renders it manifestly erroneous or
unjust[.]” Id. at 279. In such circumstances, “a second judge does not abuse
his discretion by agreeing to reconsider an earlier decision.” Id.; Humphrey,
249 Ariz. at 68 ¶ 39.
¶17 Cardenas argues the superior court did not violate the
horizontal appeal doctrine because Judge Astrowsky was permitted to
revisit a prior ruling if it was “palpably erroneous.” Because summary
judgment should have been granted earlier based on issue preclusion, he
argues, any decision holding otherwise was erroneous.
¶18 We agree that Quinn’s horizontal appeal argument ultimately
turns on the correctness of Judge Astrowsky’s final preclusion ruling. As
an appellate court, we primarily review the content of final judgments. The
horizontal appeal argument does not really get Quinn anything her
challenges to the final judgment would not already get her—once final
judgment is entered, the horizontal appeal argument largely collapses into
the merits of the appeal. Think about it—if Judge Astrowsky correctly
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decided the preclusion issue (reflected in the final judgment), Quinn’s
horizontal appeal argument (along with the rest of her appeal) fails. If he
incorrectly decided the preclusion issue, we would reverse the final
judgment on that basis, even if a prior ruling by the superior court once got
the merits right. To the extent Quinn argues Judge Astrowsky might have
been right in the end but the ruling he reversed was also not “palpably
erroneous,” we reject the argument as slicing the onion a bit too thin.
III. The Merits of the Superior Court’s Preclusion Decision
¶19 Turning to the merits, Quinn argues the superior court
erroneously granted summary judgment by concluding the federal order
and judgment precluded her assault and false imprisonment claims. We
review the superior court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, affirming
if there are no genuine disputes of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Williamson
v. PVOrbit, Inc., 228 Ariz. 69, 71 ¶ 11 (App. 2011). We may affirm the grant
of summary judgment on any grounds raised in the superior court. See Zuck
v. State, 159 Ariz. 37, 42 (App. 1988).
A. Preclusion vs. Law of the Case
¶20 Quinn first questions whether a federal court judgment has
preclusive effect when state law claims return after removal. Quinn argues
that a federal court judgment should not have preclusive effect on remand
because the state court action is the same as the action removed. With the
mere continuation of an already-existing case, there is no second action in
which to apply preclusion. Although Quinn’s argument makes some sense,
we conclude that preclusion, rather than law of the case, principles apply
when litigation is removed to federal court, a final federal court judgment
issues, and the case then completes the round trip back to state court for
resolution of pendant state law claims.
¶21 Ordinarily, claim preclusion (once referred to as res judicata)
“bars litigation in a subsequent action of any claims that were raised or could
have been raised in the prior action” resulting in a final judgment. Clem v.
Pinal County, 251 Ariz. 349, 353 ¶ 8 (App. 2021) (emphasis added).
Similarly, issue preclusion (once referred to as collateral estoppel) prohibits
the re-litigation of an issue actually litigated and decided in a final
judgment. See Brown v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 199 Ariz. 521, 524 ¶ 11 (App.
2001). Litigants ordinarily invoke issue preclusion when, in a subsequent
action, a party tries to litigate an issue decided after final judgment in a
prior lawsuit.
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Opinion of the Court
¶22 To enforce rulings made in the same case, the best a party can
usually do is invoke the law of the case doctrine. That doctrine reflects the
“judicial policy of refusing to reopen questions previously decided in the
same case by the same court or a higher appellate court.” Powell-Cerkoney,
176 Ariz. at 278 (emphasis added).
¶23 The situation here does not fit perfectly within preclusion
principles or the law of the case doctrine. On the one hand, the federal
judgment is not a judgment from a prior action—it is a judgment on the
federal claims in this action before remand. The superior court case number
pre-remand is the same post-remand. So applying preclusion is a bit
awkward. On the other hand, a federal district court is neither the same as
the superior court nor a court maintaining appellate jurisdiction over the
superior court. So applying the law of the case doctrine is likewise
awkward.
¶24 This quandary has split other state courts—some have
applied preclusion principles after remand from federal court, and others
have used the law of the case doctrine. Compare Stewart v. City of Hammond,
322 So. 3d 1253, 1257 (La. Ct. App. 2021) (applying preclusion principles);
Massad v. Greaves, 977 A.2d 662, 668 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009) (same), with
Cordova v. Larsen, 94 P.3d 830, 834 ¶ 10 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004) (applying the
law of the case doctrine); Hess v. Wojcik-Hess, 86 A.D.3d 847, 848 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2011) (same).
¶25 We think applying preclusion principles is the better path.
Under the U.S. Constitution, “both the Federal Government and the States
wield sovereign powers, and that is why our system of government is said
to be one of ‘dual sovereignty.’” Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,
138 S. Ct. 1461, 1475 (2018). The federal courts are part and parcel of that
dual sovereignty. Treating a final judgment from a federal court under
preclusion principles is most consistent with that system, particularly when
(as explained below) we apply federal law to determine the preclusive
effect of a federal judgment. See Clem, 251 Ariz. at 353 ¶ 7. Using preclusion
principles “helps maintain the integrity of federal judicial power and the
coherence of the federalist judicial system.” Maricopa-Stanfield Irrigation &
Drainage Dist. v. Robertson, 211 Ariz. 485, 491 ¶ 38 (2005).
¶26 Ordinarily, when a party seeks to re-litigate a claim or issue
rejected by a federal court resulting in a final judgment issued in a different
action, preclusion principles apply. See id. at 491–92 ¶¶ 39–43 (applying
issue preclusion principle to a prior federal judgment). Moreover,
preclusion can apply in the same action when a trial court certifies a
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judgment as final under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). See
Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 819 F.2d 1519, 1525
(9th Cir. 1987) (acknowledging that “a 54(b) ruling in fact has res judicata
ramifications, which are potentially very important”). We see no
compelling reason—and Quinn offers none—why preclusion should not
also apply when a party seeks to re-litigate a claim or issue decided in a
final judgment issued in the same case after removal but prior to remand.
¶27 Applying the law of the case doctrine instead of preclusion is
less consistent with dual sovereignty. Treating a final judgment from a
federal court the same as a ruling issued in the same case by the superior
court or a higher appellate court, ignores that federal and state courts
operate within separate and sovereign judicial systems—a “federalist
judicial system.” Id. at 491 ¶ 38.
¶28 Moreover, it is doubtful that applying preclusion principles
instead of law of the case will make it easier for federal judgments to have a
binding effect. Rather, in most circumstances, applying preclusion
principles will make it more difficult to cut off state court litigation.
Compare Clem, 251 Ariz. at 356 ¶ 18 (discussing federal issue preclusion
standard), with Powell-Cerkoney, 176 Ariz. at 279 (discussing Arizona law of
the case doctrine). Using preclusion principles, thus, strikes the proper
balance between respecting federalism, by showing respect for federal
court judgments, and not prematurely cutting off additional state court
litigation.
¶29 The U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged that a federal
court’s decision before remand may have issue preclusive effects. See
Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 585 (1999) (“If a federal court
dismisses a removed case for want of personal jurisdiction, that
determination may preclude the parties from relitigating the very same
personal jurisdiction issue in state court.”). This Court’s only prior opinion
dealing with the issue has, without discussion, implicitly followed that path
by applying preclusion principles. See S. Leasing Corp. v. Tufts, 167 Ariz. 133(App. 1991). We now hold that the preclusive effect of a federal court
judgment travels back with it to the superior court after remand, even in
the same case.
B. Issue Preclusion Applies
¶30 We determine the preclusive effect of a prior judgment de
novo. Clem, 251 Ariz. at 353 ¶ 7. When a federal court entered the prior
judgment at issue, we apply federal law to determine whether the judgment
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precludes later state court litigation. Id. In any event, Arizona courts apply
the same issue preclusion test as federal courts. Compare Oyeniran v. Holder,
672 F.3d 800, 806 (9th Cir. 2012), with Chaney Bldg. Co. v. City of Tucson, 148
Ariz. 571, 573 (1986).
¶31 As explained, there are two types of preclusion—claim and
issue. Claim preclusion “treats a judgment, once rendered as the full
measure of relief to be accorded between the same parties on the same
‘claim’ or ‘cause of action.’” Robi v. Five Platters, Inc., 838 F.2d 318, 321 (9th
Cir. 1988). Issue preclusion, similarly based on the issuance of a prior final
judgment, “prevents relitigation of all ‘issues of fact or law that were
actually litigated and necessarily decided’ in a prior proceeding.’” Id. at 322(citation omitted). An issue may be precluded from re-litigation “even if
the issue recurs in the context of a different claim.” Taylor v. Sturgell, 553
U.S. 880, 892 (2008). Because Quinn’s § 1983 claim differs from her state-
law assault and false imprisonment claims, issue preclusion is the only
potentially applicable preclusion doctrine.
¶32 A party asserting issue preclusion must prove: “(1) the issue
at stake was identical in both proceedings; (2) the issue was actually
litigated and decided in the prior proceeding; (3) there was a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue; and (4) the issue was necessary to decide
the merits.” Oyeniran, 672 F.3d at 806. We conclude the federal court’s final
judgment satisfies each requirement.
1. Identical Issues
¶33 Quinn argues the federal judgment cannot preclude her tort
claims because those claims are not governed by federal qualified immunity
standards, and thus the issues are not identical. To determine whether
issues are identical, federal courts apply the following four factors from the
Restatement (Second) of Judgments:
(1) [I]s there a substantial overlap between the evidence or
argument to be advanced in the second proceeding and that
advanced in the first? (2) does the new evidence or argument
involve the application of the same rule of law as that
involved in the prior proceeding? (3) could pretrial
preparation and discovery related to the matter presented in
the first action reasonably be expected to have embraced the
matter sought to be presented in the second? (4) how closely
related are the claims involved in the two proceedings?
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Howard v. City of Coos Bay, 871 F.3d 1032, 1041 (9th Cir. 2017); accord Clem,
251 Ariz. at 356 ¶ 20. We are not required to apply the factors mechanically
but should instead use them as a helpful guide in assessing whether issues
are identical. See Howard, 871 F.3d at 1041–44 (holding that the issues were
identical after finding only the first restatement factor was “illuminating”).
a. Substantial Overlap of Evidence
¶34 In the federal litigation, Cardenas maintained that his actions
were constitutional but also asserted qualified immunity as a defense to
Quinn’s § 1983 claim. Quinn points out that resolving a federal qualified
immunity defense does not address her assault or false imprisonment
claims. That is correct so far as it goes. But Quinn’s argument misses at
least two points. First, the evidence and arguments underlying her assault
and false imprisonment claims overlap substantially with the evidence and
arguments supporting her § 1983 claim based on excessive force. In fact,
the evidence underlying each of those claims is identical. Second, while
Quinn’s assault and false imprisonment claims may not have identical
elements as her § 1983 claim, Quinn does not dispute that, when the
applicable elements are satisfied, state-law qualified immunity can apply to
assault and false imprisonment claims, just as federal qualified immunity
applied to her § 1983 claim.3 The issues underlying those defenses are
substantially overlapping and thus governed by nearly identical
arguments.
¶35 Federal qualified immunity bars recovery of monetary
damages “unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official
violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly
established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563
U.S. 731, 735 (2011). Federal qualified immunity is said to combat “the risk
that fear of personal monetary liability and harassing litigation will unduly
inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483
U.S. 635, 638 (1987). The Ninth Circuit has explained that “[i]n excessive
3 Because Quinn does not argue that state-law qualified immunity is
wholly inapplicable to an assault or a false imprisonment claim, we assume
for purposes of our analysis that qualified immunity can apply to those
claims (and not just negligence claims). But see Chamberlain v. Mathis, 151
Ariz. 551, 558 (1986) (applying state-law qualified immunity to a
defamation claim); McKinney v. City of Tukwila, 13 P.3d 631, 641 (Wash. App.
2000) (“Having found that the officers’ use of force was reasonable, we find
that they are entitled to state law qualified immunity for the assault and
battery claims.”).
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force cases, the inquiry remains whether, under the circumstances, a
reasonable officer would have had fair notice that the force employed was
unlawful, and whether any mistake to the contrary would have been
unreasonable.” Boyd v. Benton County, 374 F.3d 773, 781 (9th Cir. 2004)
(cleaned up).
¶36 Similarly, in Arizona, “qualified immunity generally
provides public officials, including police officers, limited protection from
liability when ‘performing an act that inherently requires judgment or
discretion.’” Spooner v. City of Phoenix, 246 Ariz. 119, 123 ¶ 9 (App. 2018).
“The doctrine thus gives ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting
all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”
Id. (quotation marks omitted). If an officer is performing a discretionary act
within the scope of his public duties, he can only be liable if he “knew or
should have known that he was acting in violation of established law or
acted in reckless disregard of whether his activities would deprive another
person of their rights.” Chamberlain, 151 Ariz. at 558. “If immunity applies,
an officer is shielded from liability unless the conduct rises to gross
negligence or recklessness.” Jennings v. Agne in & for Cnty. of Maricopa, 254
Ariz. 174, __ ¶ 15 (App. 2022).
¶37 Both federal and state qualified immunity require an analysis
of whether Cardenas violated established law or unreasonably disregarded
the unlawful nature of his conduct. Because the evidence and arguments
required to resolve either qualified immunity defense are nearly the same
(at least in the context of excessive force), we conclude there is a substantial
overlap between the issues.
b. Remaining Identical Issue Factors
¶38 Additionally, the parties completed discovery and summary
judgment briefing on all issues in federal court before remand. No
additional discovery was later conducted back in state court. Indeed, in the
order remanding, the federal court “anticipate[d] that the parties could
refile the same or substantially similar summary judgment briefing on the
state law claims in state court with limited additional effort.” Quinn v.
Cardenas, 2020 WL 2512787, at *5 (D. Ariz. May 15, 2020). And that is exactly
what transpired. This factor supports Cardenas.
¶39 Both the second and fourth restatement factors also support
that the issues are identical. See Howard, 871 F.3d at 1041–44. As explained,
although Quinn’s assault and false imprisonment claims do not share
elements with her § 1983 claim, Cardenas’ federal and state qualified
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immunity defenses are substantially similar because both involve a similar
standard. In other words, both require the application of a similar rule of
law—whether Cardenas, under the circumstances, unreasonably violated
established law. Consequently, we hold that the issues are identical for the
purposes of issue preclusion.
2. Remaining Issue Preclusion Factors
¶40 The remaining issue preclusion factors are also satisfied. The
parties actually litigated, and the federal court decided, whether Cardenas
acted reasonably under the circumstances. Resolution of that issue was
necessary to determine the merits of the federal qualified immunity
defense. Finally, there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue.
The parties completed discovery and full summary judgment briefing in
federal court, and Quinn does not argue that she was deprived in federal
court of the opportunity to fully develop any evidence necessary to
overcome Cardenas’ qualified immunity defense. Consequently, on
remand, the federal court’s resolution of issues was binding on the parties.
C. Effect of Issue Preclusion
¶41 The superior court correctly concluded that, applying issue
preclusion principles, the federal court’s resolution of federal qualified
immunity is fatal to Quinn’s state law claims. The federal court recognized
that the altercation between Quinn and Cardenas resulted in three events
that could “give rise to liability under § 1983”: (1) Cardenas’ impact push
against Quinn; (2) Cardenas pulling his weapon when he announced he
was a police officer; and (3) Cardenas ordering Quinn to remain in her car
until police arrived. Quinn, 2020 WL 2512787 at *3. These three
circumstances provide the underlying factual basis for Quinn’s assault and
false imprisonment claims. The federal court held that under each set of
facts, Quinn failed to meet her burden to show clearly established law
prohibited Cardenas’ actions, holding instead that Cardenas was justified
and acted as a reasonable officer would at each turn. Id. at *3–4.
¶42 First, the federal court recognized that for liability to arise
under § 1983, Cardenas had to have been acting under color of law during
the events in question. Id. at *3 n.5. The federal court found that “[t]he
parties agree that Officer Cardenas was acting under color of law during
his interaction with Ms. Quinn.” Id. The federal court then analyzed each
of the three events. Regarding the impact push, the federal court found as
follows:
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Here, Ms. Quinn has failed to satisfy her burden that clearly
established law would have prohibited Officer Cardenas’ impact
push under the presented circumstances. Officer Cardenas
utilized the impact push to create distance between himself,
on the one hand, and Ms. Quinn and her two male passengers,
on the other. Officer Cardenas and Ms. Quinn were engaged
in a shouting match at close proximity. From the perspective of
a reasonable officer, the situation could have deteriorated to a much
more serious altercation where Officer Cardenas would be
outnumbered three to one and without knowledge of whether any of
the individuals were armed.
Id. at *3 (emphasis added).
¶43 Regarding Cardenas pulling his weapon and announcing he
was a police officer, the federal court likewise found the following:
Ms. Quinn has similarly failed to show that established law would
have prohibited Officer Cardenas’ use of his service weapon under
the circumstances presented . . . . [Officer Cardenas] used [his
weapon] with the objective of calming a heated verbal
altercation, that could very well have led to a physical
exchange, while waiting for on-duty law enforcement to
arrive . . . . Ms. Quinn’s interaction with Officer Cardenas
cannot be described as peaceful. She engaged in a verbal
argument with him and, at one point, shoved him hard
enough that he was pushed back from where he stood . . . .
Officer Cardenas thought that Ms. Quinn was attempting to
leave the scene in her car . . . . Officer Cardenas was
outnumbered by Ms. Quinn and her two friends . . . . And
Officer Cardenas was not aware of whether any of the three
had a weapon that he did not know about. Under these facts, a
reasonable officer would be concerned for his or her safety and the
use of Officer Cardenas’ weapon was therefore justified for the
purposes of the qualified immunity analysis.
Id. at *3–4 (emphasis added).
¶44 Finally, the federal court concluded, “Ms. Quinn has not
identified any established law that prohibited Officer Cardenas from
holding Ms. Quinn, with his weapon in hand, while waiting for on-duty
officers to arrive.” Id. at *4. Based on these findings, the federal court
granted Cardenas’ request for qualified immunity. Id. at *5.
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¶45 The federal court’s resolution of the issues underlying federal
qualified immunity, unchallenged by Quinn, doom her state-law assault
claim. The federal court concluded Cardenas acted in his official capacity
during each of the underlying incidents. Id. at *3 n.5. The federal court then
found that Cardenas acted as a reasonable officer would; Cardenas was
justified in employing an impact push against Quinn and then pulling his
weapon and announcing himself as a police officer. Id. at *3–4. Those same
conclusions—that Cardenas acted as a reasonable officer would and did not
violate clearly established law—preclude the opposite finding in state court
(i.e., a finding that Cardenas violated established law and was grossly
negligent or reckless in doing so). The federal court’s findings entitle
Cardenas to state qualified immunity from that claim. See Chamberlain, 151
Ariz. at 558.
¶46 Turning to Quinn’s false imprisonment claim, the federal
court resolved qualified immunity against Quinn by finding that “Cardenas
thought that Ms. Quinn was attempting to leave the scene in her car.”
Quinn, 2020 WL 2512787 at *4. A “driver of a vehicle involved in an
accident” must give the other person certain information including their
name and address. A.R.S. § 28-663(A). Failure to do so can be a
misdemeanor offense. A.R.S. § 28-663(C). A police officer may arrest an
individual without a warrant “if the officer has probable cause to
believe . . . [a] misdemeanor has been committed in the officer’s presence
and probable cause to believe the person to be arrested has committed the
offense.” A.R.S. § 13-3883(A)(2). And an officer cannot be liable for false
imprisonment if he “act[ed] in good faith in the lawful performance of his
duty.” A.R.S. § 13-1303(B)(1).
¶47 Both parties agree they had not exchanged information after
the accident when Quinn started to leave the scene, and Quinn is precluded
from re-litigating the federal court’s finding that Cardenas was acting in his
official capacity and reasonably believed Quinn was attempting to leave
before providing required information. Thus, Cardenas was lawfully
allowed to detain Quinn, who Cardenas reasonably believed had violated
the law. See A.R.S. § 28-663(A); A.R.S. § 13-3883(A)(2). Based on the federal
court’s findings, the superior court correctly concluded Quinn cannot
succeed on her false imprisonment claim as a matter of law.
¶48 Because, for Quinn to prevail on her assault and false
imprisonment claims, a jury would have to reach conclusions contrary to
those the federal court reached, we hold the superior court properly
precluded further litigation of Quinn’s assault and false imprisonment
claims.
14
QUINN v. CARDENAS
Opinion of the Court
CONCLUSION
¶49 We affirm the superior court’s judgment.
AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AA
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