Citation Numbers: 43 S.W.2d 225, 184 Ark. 655, 1931 Ark. LEXIS 253
Judges: Hart
Filed Date: 11/16/1931
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/2/2024
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Appellant brought this suit against appellees to enjoin them from issuing bonds in the sum of $11,093.89, which, he alleges, has been paid off since the 25th day of March, 1931, the date fixed by the Legislature of 1931 for issuing bonds to pay the outstanding indebtedness of the district.
According to the allegations of the complaint, appellant, L. C. Berry, is a resident and taxpayer of the Laura Connor School District of Woodruff County, Arkansas. Appellees compose the school board of said district, and are proceeding to make an issue of bonds in the sum of $58,500, and are about to mortgage the school property and equipment of said district and to pledge its school funds as security for said bonds. These proceedings are being had under the provisions of act 169 of the 1931 General Assembly, which act was approved March 25, 1931. Said sum of $58,500 represents the outstanding indebtedness of said school district as of the date of the approval of the act; but, since March 25, 1931, the collector of Woodruff County has advanced to appellees, in anticipation of the collection of school taxes of said district payable in 1931, certain moneys; and out of the money so advanced by said collector appellees have paid off the sum *Page 657 of $11,093.89 of the indebtedness of $58,500 of said school district which existed on March 25, 1931.
Appellees filed a demurrer to the complaint, which was sustained by the court. Appellant elected to stand upon his complaint and refused to plead further. Whereupon it was decreed by the court that the complaint should be dismissed for want of equity. The case is here on appeal. (after stating the facts). The Legislature of 1931 passed an act to provide for the organization and administration of the public schools. Acts of 1931, p. 476. Section 59 of the act gives the school districts authority to borrow money for certain purposes, and reads as follows:
"All school districts are authorized to borrow money and issue negotiable coupon bonds for the repayment thereof from school funds for building and equipment of school buildings, making additional repairs thereto, purchasing sites therefor, and for funding any indebtedness created for any purpose and outstanding at the time of the passage of this act as provided in this act."
This court has uniformly held that, in the construction and interpretation of statutes, the intention of the Legislature is to be ascertained and given effect from the language of the act if that can be done. In doing this, each section is to be read in the light of every other section, and the object and purposes of the act are to be considered. Miller v. Yell Pope Bridge District,
The section of the act under construction was a part of the act passed by the last Legislature for the organization and administration of common public schools. The act contains 198 sections with an emergency declared, and there is nothing in any other section of the act which tends to show that the language used in 59 was intended to be given any other than its ordinary and normal meaning. Under the express terms of the act, power is given to the school district to borrow money and issue negotiable coupon bonds for funding any indebtedness created for any purpose and outstanding at the time of the passage of the act, March 25, 1931. According to the allegations of the complaint, which are admitted by the demurrer, the outstanding indebtedness of the district at that date was $58,500. It is also alleged in the complaint that since that time the school district has paid the sum of $11,093.89 of this indebtedness by certain sums of money received from the tax collector and advanced by him to the district from the school taxes of said district, payable in 1931. Payment is a satisfaction of a debt and extinguishes the indebtedness. The section of the statute under consideration authorizes school districts to borrow money and issue bonds for funding any indebtedness outstanding at the time of the passage of the act, but does not contain any mandatory requirement for the issue of bonds for such purposes.
In the present case, the district might have issued bonds in the sum of $58,500, which represented the outstanding indebtedness of the district at the time of the passage of the act; but the district did not choose to do so. It paid the sum of $11,093.89, and this had the effect of extinguishing that much of the outstanding indebtedness. Consequently, the district would only have power and authority under the act to issue bonds for the remaining indebtedness, which was outstanding as of March 25, 1931. If it had paid all of the indebtedness of the district out of the tax moneys due the district from the collection of tax money due the school district, it would not *Page 659 have had any authority to issue bonds at all. Having paid only a part of the outstanding indebtedness of the date of March 25, 1931, it has the power and authority to issue bonds in the principal sum of $58,500, lessened by the sum of $11,093.89, which has been paid since that date.
It is contended, however, that such construction of the statute is contrary to the holding and reasoning of the court in Hagler v. Arkansas County,
No such issue is presented in the present case. As we have already seen, 59 authorizes school districts to issue bonds for funding any indebtedness outstanding at the time of the passage of the act. No mistake has been made as to the time of the passage of the act, and bonds could be issued only for an indebtedness of the district at that time. If the whole or any part of the indebtedness has been paid, this would extinguish the debt in whole or as to the part paid, and no bonds could be issued to fund an indebtedness which had already been paid and thereby had become extinguished.
It follows that the decree will be reversed, and the cause will be remanded with directions to overrule the demurrer, and for further proceedings in accordance with the principles of equity and not inconsistent with this opinion.
Miller v. Yell and Pope Bridge District , 175 Ark. 314 ( 1927 )
Hagler v. Arkansas County , 176 Ark. 115 ( 1928 )
Berry v. Cousart Bayou Drainage District , 181 Ark. 974 ( 1930 )
Arkansas State Licensing Board for General Contractors v. ... , 214 Ark. 312 ( 1948 )
Bishop v. LINKWAY STORES, INC. , 280 Ark. 106 ( 1983 )
Call v. Wharton , 204 Ark. 544 ( 1942 )
Stover v. Stover , 287 Ark. 116 ( 1985 )
Cook v. Bevill , 246 Ark. 805 ( 1969 )
Chism v. Phelps , 228 Ark. 936 ( 1958 )
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance v. Toler , 187 Ark. 1073 ( 1933 )
Caskey v. Holmes , 190 Ark. 183 ( 1935 )
Casualty Reciprocal Exchange v. Bounds , 191 Ark. 934 ( 1935 )
Yocum v. Oklahoma Tire & Supply Co. , 191 Ark. 1126 ( 1936 )
Bay Special Consolidated School District No. 21 v. Hall , 194 Ark. 423 ( 1937 )
McCarroll, Commissioner of Revenues v. Williams , 195 Ark. 715 ( 1938 )
Gill and Hamrick v. State , 195 Ark. 846 ( 1938 )
Delaplaine Consolidated School District No. 7 v. State ... , 196 Ark. 434 ( 1938 )
McCaa Chevrolet Co. v. Bounds, Admr. , 207 Ark. 1043 ( 1944 )