Hobbs v. Grubbs

Cite as 2015 Ark. 205
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No. CV-14-468
RAY HOBBS, DIRECTOR, Opinion Delivered May 14, 2015
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTION APPEAL FROM THE LEE COUNTY
APPELLANT CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. 39-CV-13-81]
V.
HONORABLE L.T. SIMES, JUDGE
JAMES GRUBBS REVERSED AND REMANDED.
APPELLEE
COURTNEY HUDSON GOODSON, Associate Justice
Appellant Ray Hobbs, Director of the Arkansas Department of Correction (hereinafter
“State”), appeals an order entered by the Lee County Circuit Court granting habeas-corpus
relief to appellee James Grubbs. For reversal, the State contends that the circuit court erred
(1) in ruling that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, ___ U.S.
___, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), applies retroactively to invalidate Grubbs’s sentence of life
without parole imposed upon his conviction for capital murder, and (2) by not adhering to the
statutory procedure governing the resolution of habeas-corpus petitions. We reverse and
remand on the second point.
The record reflects that on September 26, 1995, Grubbs entered in the White County
Circuit Court a negotiated plea of guilty to the offense of capital murder. As a result of the plea,
he received a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. On June 24, 2013, Grubbs filed
a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Lee County Circuit Court, the court in the county
Cite as 2015 Ark. 205
where he is incarcerated. In the petition, Grubbs alleged that he was being detained without
lawful authority because he was a juvenile at the time of the offense and received a mandatory
sentence of life without parole contrary to the opinion in Miller, supra, where the Court held
that the imposition of a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole for juvenile
homicide offenders violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. He also asserted that the decision in Miller applies retroactively to cases, like his
own, on collateral review. In compliance with Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-112-
103(d) (Repl. 2006), Grubbs attached a certified copy of the 1995 judgment and commitment
order. The judgment contains a notation that Grubbs’s date of birth is May 4, 1977, and states
that Grubbs committed the offense on March 8, 1995.
In reply, the State submitted a response and memorandum of authorities in opposition
to the petition. In this response, the State made clear that, procedurally, it was not required to
file a response or formal “return” unless the circuit court first determined that there was
probable cause for issuing the writ, and the State maintained that it was offering the response
and memoranda of authorities solely for the purpose of assisting the court in making a probable-
cause determination. Further, the State asserted that Grubbs could not benefit from the decision
in Miller because its holding was not retroactive in application. For this assertion, the State
principally relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)
(plurality opinion).
On September 23, 2013, the circuit court held a hearing on the petition.1 The court
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The circuit court conducted a joint hearing, combining a consideration of Grubbs’s
petition with that of Aaron Hodge, who was represented by the same attorneys and who
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took no evidence but heard argument of counsel regarding the retroactive application of the
holding in Miller. During the course of the hearing, the circuit court asked whether there was
any dispute that Grubbs was under the age of eighteen when the offense was committed.
Grubbs’ counsel replied that there was no dispute, but counsel for the State maintained that,
while it believed that Grubbs was underage, it considered it necessary to verify Grubbs’s age
with a certified vital record. The circuit court acknowledged the State’s position that is was
necessary to “verify this age thing, certainly.” At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court
asked the parties to submit briefs along with proposed orders reflecting their respective positions
on the retroactivity of Miller.
In its brief, the State “emphasized that the only question presently before the Court is
whether petitioners’ applications for the writ sufficiently demonstrate probable cause to believe
they are confined in the penitentiary without lawful authority.” The State supplemented this
statement with the following footnote:
Although petitioners’ counsel argued at the hearing that there is no dispute that
petitioners were minors when they committed their brutal homicides, he is
mistaken. Because petitioners’ counsel has, in at least two other cases involving
Miller issues, alleged discrepancies between other petitioners’ true ages and their
ages as reflected in the penitentiary records, see Gordon v. Hobbs, No. 39CV-
13-84 (Lee County Circuit Court), and Brown v. Hobbs, No. LCV 2013-75-2
(Lincoln County Circuit Court), it cannot be assumed simply from the
allegations and records before the Court that petitioners Grubbs and Hodge were,
as a matter of fact, under age eighteen at the time of their crimes. As respondent
argued at the hearing, it seems at a minimum that a vital record would be
necessary to establish that fact, but only if the Court first concludes that probable
cause has been established so as to warrant a determination of that fact.
presented an identical habeas claim in his petition. Today, we also address the appeal of
Hobbs v. Hodge, 2015 Ark. 207.
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On November 6, 2013, the circuit court entered its order granting habeas-corpus relief.
The court found that Grubbs was serving a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without
parole for capital murder and that his conviction involved a homicide committed before he had
attained the age of eighteen. Further, the circuit court ruled that the only available sentence to
Grubbs for capital murder was life in prison without parole and that the sentence violated the
Eighth Amendment as announced in Miller. The circuit court also accepted Grubbs’s argument
that Miller applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. Alternatively, and noting that state
courts are free to afford Supreme Court decisions greater retroactivity than federal courts, the
circuit court was persuaded by the fact that this court had granted habeas-corpus relief on
collateral review in Jackson v. Norris, 2013 Ark. 175, 426 S.W.3d 906, the Arkansas case also
considered by the Court in Miller. Thus, the court concluded that to deny Grubbs relief would
violate both federal and state guarantees of equal protection. Based on these findings and
conclusions of law, the circuit court vacated Grubbs’s sentence and remanded to the White
County Circuit Court for resentencing. The State brings this appeal from the circuit court’s
order.
As its second point on appeal, the State raises the preliminary issue that the circuit court
failed to follow the mandatory statutory procedures for granting habeas-corpus relief. It
contends that the circuit court prematurely granted the writ and afforded habeas-corpus relief
before making a determination of probable cause and without requiring it to file a return to
justify the confinement and to enable the court to determine the material facts. This precise
issue was raised in the companion case of Hobbs v. Hodge, 2015 Ark. 207, where this court found
merit in the State’s argument and reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Our decision
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in Hodge is controlling of the issue in this case. Therefore, we consider it unnecessary to
reiterate here what we have said in the companion case, and we adopt and incorporate herein
by reference the reasoning set forth in Hodge. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further
proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
WOOD and WYNNE, JJ., dissent.
RHONDA K. WOOD, Justice, dissenting. I dissent for the same reasons explained
in my dissenting opinion to the companion case of Hobbs v. Hodge, 2015 Ark. 207.
WYNNE, J., joins.
Dustin McDaniel, Att’y Gen., by: Eileen W. Harrison, for appellant.
D’Lorah L. Hughes; and Jeff Rosenzweig, for appellee.
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