Worsham v. Bassett

Cite as 2016 Ark. 146SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No. CV-15-422
MARILYN WORSHAM Opinion Delivered April 7, 2016
APPEAL FROM THE BOARD OF
V. REVIEW
[NO. 2014-BR-02149]
DARYL BASSETT, DIRECTOR OF
WORKFORCE SERVICES
APPELLEE AFFIRMED.
HOWARD W. BRILL, Chief Justice
Appellant Marilyn J. Worsham, pro se, appeals from the decision of the Board of
Review (Board) affirming the decision of the Appeal Tribunal, which upheld the denial of
her unemployment benefits by appellee Daryl Bassett, Director, Department of Workforce
Services (Department). On appeal, Worsham argues that the court of appeals should have
ordered the Board to conduct a further hearing to take additional evidence; that the Board
and the Appeal Tribunal erred in refusing to offer a further hearing, thereby denying her
equal protection guaranteed by the United States Constitution; and that the Board erred in
ruling that she did not meet the wage requirements pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated
section 11-10-507(5)(A) (Repl. 2012), for establishing an unemployment-benefit claim. We
affirm the Board’s decision.
On May 6, 2012, the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) hired
Worsham as a part-time employee for the AARP Senior Community Service Employment
Cite as 2016 Ark. 146Program (SCSEP), which is grant-funded through the United States Department of Labor.
AARP, a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization according to its Internal Revenue Service Form
990, placed senior citizens in host agencies for job training while they searched for
employment. Worsham’s base period began April 1, 2013, and lasted through March 31,
2014. During Worsham’s base period, AARP was her only employer, and she received
wages only from AARP during that time. Terri Boone, AARP’s project director, indicated
that Worsham was paid under Title V of the Older Americans Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 3056.
On July 7, 2014, Worsham, after working in the AARP SCSEP office, was transferred
to a host agency, and her pay was reduced from $12.00 per hour to $7.25 per hour. During
her work training, she was required to continue to search for work. According to Worsham,
she filed for unemployment benefits when she received the reduction in pay after her
transfer. On July 24, 2014, the Department of Workforce Services denied Worsham’s claim
for benefits, finding that she did not have covered wages during her base period to qualify
for benefits pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated sections 11-10-522(a) and 11-12-
507(5)(A). Worsham timely appealed the Board’s decision to the Appeal Tribunal. After a
hearing during which Worsham appeared on her behalf, the Appeal Tribunal affirmed the
Board’s decision, finding that Worsham “only had wages from a nonprofit organization
during her base period.” Citing section 11-10-522(a) and section 11-10-507(5)(A), the
Appeal Tribunal concluded that wages from a nonprofit organization were not qualified
wages for unemployment-insurance purposes and that Worsham did not have qualifying
wages to establish her claim.
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Cite as 2016 Ark. 146On August 26, 2014, Worsham wrote a letter to the Board asking it to consider her
record of wages before the Appeal Tribunal, including a printout of wages from AARP
dating from May 2012 through April 30, 2014. In a letter dated August 27, 2014, the Board
advised Worsham that, pursuant to section 11-10-525(c), the Board was without jurisdiction
to accept or consider additional evidence unless accepted by the Board in a subsequent
hearing, and the Board stated that it would render its decision based on the record forwarded
by the Appeal Tribunal. Worsham timely filed an appeal to the Board, which affirmed and
adopted the Appeal Tribunal’s ruling. The Board found that Worsham did not meet the
wage requirements, pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-10-507(5)(A), for
establishing a claim. Worsham appealed to the court of appeals, which affirmed without
written opinion. See Worsham v. Bassett, No. E-14-864. Worsham then petitioned this court
for review, which we granted. When we grant a petition for review, we consider the appeal
as though it had originally been filed in this court. See Blake v. Shellstrom, 2012 Ark. 428, 424
S.W.3d 830. We turn to Worsham’s appeal from the Board’s decision.
On appeal, Worsham argues that the Board erroneously ruled that she did not meet
the wage requirements for establishing a claim. The Department responds that employment
had been funded by a federal grant as part of a work-relief or training program is not
considered employment for the purposes of unemployment benefits.
The question of the correct application and interpretation of an Arkansas statute is a
question of law, which this court decides de novo. See, e.g., Rose v. Harbor E., Inc., 2013
Ark. 496, 430 S.W.3d 773. The basic rule of statutory construction to which all other
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Cite as 2016 Ark. 146interpretive guides defer is to give effect to the intent of the drafting body. See id. In
reviewing issues of statutory interpretation, we first construe a statute just as it reads, giving
the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. See id. When
the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning,
there is no need to resort to rules of statutory construction. See id.The Board based its decision on section 11-10-507(5)(A):
(5)(A) Qualifying Wages. For any benefit year, he or she has during his
or her base period been paid wages in at least two (2) quarters of his or her
base period for insured work, and the total wages paid during his or her base
period equal not less than thirty-five (35) times his or her weekly benefit
amount.
Section 11-10-507(5)(A) does not expressly state that wages from a nonprofit organization
are not qualifying wages. Although wages from a nonprofit organization may constitute
qualifying wages under section 11-10-507(5)(A), an exception applicable to this case is found
at Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-10-210(a). That section provides in relevant part:
(3) Service performed by an individual in the employ of a religious,
charitable, educational, or other organization described in Section 501(c)(3) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 if the organization had one (1) or more
individuals in employment for some portion of a day in each of ten (10)
different days, whether or not the days were consecutive, within the current
or preceding calendar year irrespective of whether the same individuals are or
were employed in each day;
(4) For the purposes of subdivisions (a)(2) and (3) of this section, the
term “employment” does not apply to service performed:
....
(E) As part of an unemployment work-relief or work-training program
assisted or financed in whole or in part by any federal agency or an agency of
a state or political subdivision thereof, by an individual receiving the work
relief or work training.
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Cite as 2016 Ark. 146Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-210(a)(3)–(4).
Given the plain language of the statute, section 11-10-210(a)(4) means that
employment “does not apply to a service performed” in “an unemployment work-relief or
work-training program,” that is funded by a federal grant. Here, Worsham’s employment
with AARP fits this statutory scheme. She was employed by AARP, a nonprofit
organization that paid her wages through a federal grant. Thus, based on our statutory
interpretation of section 11-10-210(a)(4), we hold that her employment with AARP was
excluded, and she did not qualify for unemployment benefits.
Further, Worsham contends that the Board erred in refusing to accept additional
evidence at another hearing and that denying her that hearing violated her equal-protection
rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Here, the Board properly decided the
matter after considering the entire record of prior proceedings before the Appeal Tribunal.
See Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-525(c). Additionally, we decline to reach Worsham’s equal-
protection argument because the Board did not make a specific finding on that issue. When
an argument is not raised below or ruled upon, the issue is not preserved for appellate review.
See Mountain Pure, LLC v. Little Rock Wastewater Util., 2011 Ark. 258, 383 S.W.3d 347;
Nelson v. Dir., Dep’t of Workforce Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 533. For these reasons, Worsham’s
argument on this issue is without merit.
Affirmed.
Marilyn Worsham, pro se appellant.
Phyllis Edwards, for appellee.
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