Smith v. State

Cite as 2014 Ark. 204
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No. CV-13-1115
Opinion Delivered May 8, 2014
MELVIN SMITH APPEAL FROM THE LINCOLN
APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. LCV-2013-82-5]
V. HONORABLE JODI RAINES
DENNIS, JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE AFFIRMED.
JOSEPHINE LINKER HART, Associate Justice
A Pulaski County judgment dated November 30, 1977, states that a jury “returned a
verdict of Guilty of Murder I and Burglary” against appellant Melvin Smith “with punishment
fixed at life imprisonment in the State Penitentiary on Murder I and six years’ imprisonment
in the State Penitentiary on Burglary.” The judgment further provided that the “Court doth
this date sentence and commit defendant to life imprisonment and six years,” with the “six
years to commence at the expiration of the life sentence.” In 2013, Smith petitioned the
Lincoln County Circuit Court for writ of habeas corpus, which the court denied. Smith
appeals, asserting that, in accordance with Miller v. Alabama, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455
(2012) and Jackson v. Norris, 2013 Ark. 175, ___ S.W.3d ___, his sentence to life
imprisonment was invalid on its face because the sentencer did not hold a hearing to consider
mitigating factors relating to Smith’s youth before imposing the maximum sentence of life
imprisonment. We affirm.
Cite as 2014 Ark. 204
In his petition, Smith asserted that he was serving a sentence of life imprisonment after
he was convicted of first-degree murder. He alleged that he was charged with capital murder
on June 21, 1977, convicted of first-degree murder on November 30, 1977, and that at the
time of the offense, he was sixteen years old, with his date of birth being August 4, 1960.
Smith argued that the imposition of life imprisonment upon a juvenile offender was contrary
to Miller and Jackson. The circuit court dismissed the petition, concluding that because Smith’s
life sentence was not mandatory, Miller was inapplicable.1 Smith appeals.
A writ of habeas corpus is proper when a judgment of conviction is invalid on its face
or when a circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the cause. Murry v. Hobbs, 2013 Ark. 64, at
2. (per curiam). In 1977, first-degree murder was a class A felony. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-
1502(3) (Repl. 1977). The term of imprisonment for a class A felony was not less than five
years nor more than fifty years, or life. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-901(a) (Repl. 1977); see Ark. Stat.
Ann. § 41-803(3) (Repl. 1977). Capital murder was punishable by death or life imprisonment
without parole. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-803(2); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1351 (Repl. 1977); Ark.
Stat. Ann. § 41-1501(3) (Repl. 1977).
1
In his original petition, Smith asserted that he had pleaded guilty to first-degree
murder but stated in his amended petition that he was convicted of the crime. In its order
denying the petition, the circuit court apparently relied on the allegations contained in the
original petition, stating that Smith had asserted in his petition that he had entered a
negotiated guilty plea to first-degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. The
circuit court observed that Smith accepted life imprisonment from the sentencing range for
first-degree murder. Smith argues on appeal that because the circuit court misstated the
facts in its order, its ruling should be reversed. We may, however, affirm the circuit court
if it reached the right decision albeit for the wrong reason. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 347 Ark.
409, 422, 64 S.W.3d 728, 737 (2002).
2
Cite as 2014 Ark. 204
The United States Supreme Court held that Arkansas’s “mandatory life without parole
for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’” Miller, at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2460. The
Court stated that the “Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in
prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. The
Court also stated, “Although we do not foreclose a sentencer’s ability to make that judgment
in homicide cases, we require it to take into account how children are different, and how
those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” Id. at
___, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. The Court further stated, “Our decision . . . . mandates only that a
sentencer follow a certain process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant
characteristics—before imposing a particular penalty.” Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2471. The
Court also stated that “[b]y requiring that all children convicted of homicide receive lifetime
incarceration without possibility of parole, regardless of their age and age-related
characteristics and the nature of their crimes, the mandatory sentencing schemes before us
violate this principle of proportionality, and so the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and
unusual punishment.” Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2475. On remand, this court reversed the
denial of Jackson’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, issued the writ, and remanded Jackson’s
case to the circuit court with the instruction that a sentencing hearing be held “where Jackson
may present for consideration evidence that would include that of his ‘age, age-related
characteristics, and the nature of’ his crime.” Jackson, 2013 Ark. 175, at 2, ___ S.W.3d at ___.
(citing Miller, ___ U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2475).
3
Cite as 2014 Ark. 204
On appeal, Smith argues that Miller and Jackson do not hold only that a mandatory life
sentence for a juvenile violates the Eighth Amendment. Rather, Smith asserts that those cases
further hold that the sentencer must have a hearing to consider the mitigating circumstances
related to youth before it may impose a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. In
support of his argument, Smith notes that in Jackson, this court ordered the circuit court to
hold a sentencing hearing where Jackson could present such mitigating evidence.
After Miller, but prior to Jackson, this court considered the applicability of Miller to an
instance where the petitioner, who was seventeen years old at the time of the crime, was
convicted of first-degree murder under the 1977 statute and sentenced to life imprisonment
without parole. This court held that “Miller is only applicable in Arkansas when a mandatory
life sentence is imposed without the sentencer’s being able to ‘take into account how children
are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a
lifetime in prison.’” Murry, 2013 Ark. 64, at 3 (citing Miller, ___ U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at
2469). This court concluded that because Murry’s life sentence for first-degree murder was
not mandatory, Miller was “simply inapposite.” Id. at 4. After Jackson was decided, we
observed in Hobbs v. Turner, 2014 Ark. 19, at 11, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___, (citing Murry, 2013
Ark. 64), that “Miller prohibits a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without the
possibility of parole for juvenile homicide offenders,” and because “Turner was not subjected
as a juvenile homicide offender to a mandatory life-without-parole sentence. . . . Miller is
inapplicable.” In Britt v. State, 2014 Ark. 134 (per curiam), Britt, who alleged that he was a
juvenile when he committed the crime, was found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced
4
Cite as 2014 Ark. 204
to life imprisonment. This court reaffirmed its holding in Murry, concluding that because
Britt’s life sentence for first-degree murder was not mandatory, his sentence was not illegal
under Miller. Britt, 2014 Ark. 134, at 4.
Given our holdings in Murry, Turner, and Britt, we again hold that Miller is inapplicable,
as Smith’s 1977 sentence to life imprisonment for first-degree murder was not mandatory.
Moreover, Jackson does not require that we remand this case for a sentencing hearing. Jackson
was initially sentenced to a mandatory life sentence. On remand, we afforded Jackson an
opportunity to present mitigating evidence, because Jackson’s initial sentence did not allow
for consideration of mitigating evidence. Here, Smith did not face a mandatory sentence;
rather, he was subject to a discretionary sentencing range, and the sentencer was permitted
to consider sentencing-related mitigating evidence.
Affirmed.
Marion A. Humphrey, for appellant.
Dustin McDaniel, Att’y Gen., by: Christian Harris, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
5