Jerome Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Consolidated Underwriters

Hart, J.,

(after stating the facts). We think the conclusion of the circuit court was correct. It is true that, in passing upon contracts of insurance or indemnity like the one now in hand, courts will resolve all doubts as to the meaning of the language used in favor of the insured. The reason is that the contract of insurance is made upon the written form of the insurer, and the insured has nothing to do with the language of the contract. Home Mutual Benefit Assn. v. Mayfield, 142 Ark. 240.

We do not think, however, that the terms of the contract in the instant case are ambiguous, and are of the opinion that the claim of the plaintiff does not fall within the liability provided for in the contract of insurance as expressed by its language.

It will be noted that in section 5 of the contract of insurance, which is copied in our statement of facts, the estimated compensation includes that of all persons employed, whether compensated by salary, wages, for piece work, overtime, or allowances, and whether paid in cash or otherwise.

The evident purpose of the contract was to include within the terms of the policy all employees employed by the plaintiff to whom compensation of any kind was paid. The word “compensation” is evidently used as an equivalent for recompense for services rendered to the plaintiff in the operation of its business by its employees. Ezell was first injured in April, 1921. We do not think he thereafter received any compensation at the hands of the plaintiff for services rendered it in the operation of its business. It is true that the representative of the plaintiff speaks of his being employed after that time, but he also explains what he meant by the use of this expression. After he was' injured in April, 1921, Ezell was sent to the hospital and kept there at the expense of the plaintiff until the morning before he was injured in the following July. Advances were made to him from time to time to support his family, and the representative of the plaintiff states that It was its intention to deduct these advances from the sum it should pay him as damages for his injury.

According to the testimony of Ezell, he left the hospital and went to the mill of the company on the morning of the day in July when he received his second injury. He was told to go in the boiler room and watch the work there, in order to familiarize himself with it. While watching the work there, on the afternoon of the same day, he was injured by a pile of slabs falling on him. He was not being paid for the services that he was rendering the plaintiff on that day. According to his testimony, he was merely there at the invitation of the plaintiff to watch the work. Hence he was not receiving compensation, within the moaning of the policy, at the time lie received his second injury.

As we have already seen, the evident intention of the parties as expressed by the terms of the contract was to insure the plaintiff from liability by reason of injuries which its servants might receive in the operation of its business and while they were being paid a compensation for their services. Ezell was not working for the company and receiving compensation therefor at the time he received his second injury in July, 1921.

Therefore the defendant was not liable, under the policy sued on, for the injury to Ezell, and the circuit court properly directed a verdict in its favor.

It follows that the judgment of the circuit court was correct, and should be affirmed.