Jefferson v. State

Cite as 2017 Ark. 293
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS.
No. CR-07-681
Opinion Delivered October 26, 2017
WESLEY JEFFERSON
PETITIONER
PRO SE PETITION TO REINVEST
V. JURISDICTION IN THE TRIAL
COURT TO CONSIDER A
PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR
STATE OF ARKANSAS CORAM NOBIS
[ST. FRANCIS COUNTY CIRCUIT
RESPONDENT COURT, NO. 62CR-05-513]
PETITION DENIED.
SHAWN A. WOMACK, Associate Justice
Petitioner Wesley Jefferson, who was found guilty by a jury of capital murder and
other felony offenses, asks this court to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a
petition for writ of error coram nobis. Jefferson asserts that the State violated Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by not revealing to the defense that there was a commentary
to the capital-murder statute, Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-10-101(a)(1) (Supp.
2005), that would have supported his argument at trial that his conduct did not satisfy the
elements of capital murder. He also argues that the evidence adduced at trial was not
sufficient to sustain the judgment that he committed capital murder. Because Jefferson has
not stated a ground on which the writ could issue, the petition is denied.
Jefferson’s petition for leave to proceed in the trial court is necessary because this
court affirmed the judgment in his case in 2008, Jefferson v. State, 372 Ark. 307, 276 S.W.3d
214 (2008), and the trial court cannot entertain a petition for writ of error coram nobis after
Cite as 2017 Ark. 293
a judgment has been affirmed on appeal unless we grant permission. Newman v. State, 2009
Ark. 539, 354 S.W.3d 61. The function of the writ is to secure relief from a judgment
rendered while there existed some fact that would have prevented its rendition if it had been
known to the trial court and which, through no negligence or fault of the defendant, was
not brought forward before rendition of the judgment. Id. The petitioner has the burden
of demonstrating a fundamental error of fact extrinsic to the record. Roberts v. State, 2013
Ark. 56, 425 S.W.3d 771. The writ is allowed only under compelling circumstances to
achieve justice and to address errors of the most fundamental nature. Id. A writ of error
coram nobis is available for addressing certain errors that are found in one of four categories:
(1) insanity at the time of trial, (2) a coerced guilty plea, (3) material evidence withheld by
the prosecutor, or (4) a third-party confession to the crime during the time between
conviction and appeal. Howard v. State, 2012 Ark. 177, 403 S.W.3d 38.
In making the determination of whether the writ should issue, we look to the
reasonableness of the allegations in the petition and to the existence of the probability of the
truth thereof. Id. A writ of error coram nobis is an extraordinarily rare remedy and there
is a strong presumption that the judgment of conviction is valid. State v. Larimore, 341 Ark.
397, 17 S.W.3d 87 (2000); Westerman v. State, 2015 Ark. 69, at 4, 456 S.W.3d 374, 376.
With respect to Jefferson’s claim that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the
judgment, an allegation that calls into question the sufficiency of the evidence at trial is a
direct challenge to the judgment that is not cognizable in a coram nobis proceeding. Scott
v. State, 2017 Ark. 199, at 3, 520 S.W.3d 262, 265.
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Cite as 2017 Ark. 293
Jefferson’s claim of a Brady violation does not establish that the writ should issue
because he fails to satisfy the requirement under Brady that the petitioner establish that the
State wrongfully withheld material evidence from the defense. Isom v. State, 2015 Ark. 225,
462 S.W.3d 662. In Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999), the Supreme Court held that,
when the petitioner contends that material evidence was not disclosed to the defense, the
petitioner must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been
disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickler,
527 U.S. at 280 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)). In Strickler, the
Court also set out the three elements of a true Brady violation: (1) the evidence at issue must
be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory or because it is impeaching; (2)
the evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and
(3) prejudice must have ensued. Strickler, 527 U.S. 263; see Howard, 2012 Ark. 177, at 8, 403
S.W.3d 38, 44.
Jefferson contends the legislative commentary that was withheld by the State was an
important statement of legislative intent and that the State had a duty under Brady to learn
of this commentary and alert his defense to it. He argues that the State’s failure to do so
amounted to the wrongful withholding of material evidence. Clearly, however, any
published commentary to a statute could have been known at the time of trial and did not
constitute “material evidence” that could have been withheld by the State from the defense
in violation of Brady. Brady does not require the State to conduct legal research and provide
that research to the defense.
Petition denied.
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