Walker v. Wilmoe Corp.

Cite as 2017 Ark. 340SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No. CV-17-227
Opinion Delivered: November 30, 2017
CHARLES JERRY WALKER,
TIFFANY LOGNION, AND
ALPHONSO WYNN, INDIVIDUALLY
AND ON BEHALF OF A CLASS OF APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
SIMILARLY SITUATED PERSONS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
APPELLANTS SECOND DIVISION
[60CV-16-3004]
V.
HONORABLE CHRIS PIAZZA,
WILMOE CORP. JUDGE
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED.
ROBIN F. WYNNE, Associate Justice
Charles Jerry Walker, Tiffany Lognion, and Alphonso Wynn, individually and on
behalf of a class of similarly situated persons, appeal from the denial of their motion for class
certification in litigation against appellee Wilmoe Corp. Appellants argue that the trial court
abused its discretion by delving into the merits, that the pleadings and evidence demonstrate
that the class should be certified, and that the trial court acted without due consideration of
applicable case law. We affirm.
Appellee operates a business located in North Little Rock known as National Pawn
Shop. Appellants filed a class-action complaint in which they alleged that appellee charged
usurious interest rates in violation of Amendment 89 to the Arkansas Constitution. They
further alleged that the usurious interest rates violated the Arkansas Deceptive Trade
Practices Act (ADTPA). They also alleged that appellee’s conduct violated the federal Truth
in Lending Law. Appellants filed a motion with the trial court to have the following two
classes certified:
(1) Any and all persons who have owed, currently owe, or will incur debts to
Wilmoe Corp. d/b/a National Pawn Shop pursuant to pawn transactions with
Wilmoe Corp. d/b/a National Pawn Shop within five years of June 2, 2011, and
continuing up through and until judgment may be rendered in this matter; and
(2) Any and all persons who have owed, currently owe, or will incur debts to
Wilmoe Corp. d/b/a National Pawn Shop pursuant to pawn transactions with
Wilmoe Corp. d/b/a National Pawn Shop within one year of June 2, 2011, and
continuing up through and until judgment may be rendered in this matter in
which: 1) the amount financed exceeds $75.00 and the finance charge exceeds
$7.50; or 2) the finance charge exceeds $5.00.
Appellee opposed certification of the classes. At a hearing on the motion, appellee argued
that no class could be certified because no class existed and that the requirements of Arkansas
Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (2016), which governs class certifications, were not satisfied
here. Following the hearing, the trial court entered an order denying the motion. This
appeal followed.
The determination that the class-certification criteria have been satisfied is a matter
within the broad discretion of the trial court, and this court will not reverse the trial court’s
decision absent an abuse of that discretion. ChartOne, Inc. v. Raglon, 373 Ark. 275, 283
S.W.3d 576 (2008). In reviewing a class-certification order, this court focuses on the
evidence in the record to determine whether it supports the trial court’s conclusion
regarding certification. Id. Neither the trial court nor this court shall delve into the merits
of the underlying claims when deciding whether the Rule 23 requirements have been met.
Id. In this regard, “a trial court may not consider whether the plaintiffs will ultimately
prevail, or even whether they have a cause of action.” Carquest of Hot Springs, Inc. v. Gen.
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Parts, Inc., 367 Ark. 218, 223, 238 S.W.3d 916, 920 (2006). We view the propriety of a
class action as a procedural question. Id.The proposed class must be susceptible to precise definition, and before a class can
be certified under Rule 23, the class description must be sufficiently definite so that it is
administratively feasible for the court to determine whether a particular individual is a
member of the proposed class. See Van Buren Sch. Dist. v. Jones, 365 Ark. 610, 232 S.W.3d
444 (2006); Arkansas Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. Hicks, 349 Ark. 269, 78 S.W.3d 58 (2002).
The six requirements for class-action certification as stated in Rule 23 of the Arkansas Rules
of Civil Procedure are (1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) typicality, (4) adequacy, (5)
predominance, and (6) superiority. Diamante, LLC v. Dye, 2013 Ark. 501, at 2, 430 S.W.3d
710, 714.
Appellees argued below and argue again on appeal that the class cannot be ascertained
because no class exists. Although the trial court denied class certification on grounds other
than whether the class was ascertainable, this does not bar us from considering the argument,
as this court is not constrained by the trial court’s rationale and may go to the record for
additional reasons to affirm a decision by a circuit court. State of Washington v. Thompson,
339 Ark. 417, 6 S.W.3d 82 (1999).
With respect to class definition, it is axiomatic that for a class to be certified, a class
must exist. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Bryant, 374 Ark. 38, 53, 285 S.W.3d 634, 645 (2008).
Furthermore, for a class to be sufficiently defined, the identity of the class members must be
ascertainable by reference to objective criteria. Id.3
In Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Pipkin Enterprises, Inc., 359 Ark. 402, 198
S.W.3d 115 (2004), the plaintiffs filed a class-action complaint in which they alleged that
the defendant charged usurious rates of interest. The circuit court certified a class defined
as: “All Arkansas customers of Defendants who paid or were charged usurious interest
charges since November 15, 1997.” This court reversed the class certification, holding that
certification was improper because the trial court would be required to determine whether
the rates charged constituted usury before it would be able to determine whether a proposed
plaintiff qualified for inclusion in the class.
Although the class definitions in the instant case do not require a determination of
whether potential plaintiffs paid or were charged usurious interest charges, this is not the
only issue to be determined as part of this action. The class definitions require potential
plaintiffs to have incurred a debt arising out of pawn transactions with National Pawn Shop.
Here, appellee contends that no loans were ever made and, by extension, no one ever
incurred a debt pursuant to pawn transactions with National Pawn Shop. Thus, the circuit
court would be required to determine one of the ultimate issues in the case—whether a
debt was incurred—before it could be determined whether prospective plaintiffs could
properly be included in either of the proposed classes. As in Southwestern Bell, the definitions
of the proposed classes are not based on objective criteria. Accordingly, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to certify the classes.
Affirmed.
Omavi Shukur, for appellant.
Williams & Anderson, PLC, by: Heather G. Zachary, Philip E. Kaplan, David M. Powell,
and Alec Gaines, for appellee.
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