Judges: DUSTIN McDANIEL, Attorney General
Filed Date: 2/11/2010
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
The Honorable Walls McCrary State Representative
319 West Academy Street Lonoke, Arkansas 72086-3104
Dear Representative McCrary:
I am writing in response to your request on behalf of a constituent for an opinion on the following questions:
1. What is the maximum annual interest rate that can be charged on a Contract for Sale of lots and/or land?
2. What is the maximum annual interest rate that can be charged on a Contract for Sale of lots and/or land together with a house placed on it?
3. What formula is used to determine the correct amount of interest?
Your request provides no additional context or facts underlying your questions.
In general, with respect to your first two questions, it is my opinion that Amendment 60 (as defined below) may govern the contracts and establish the maximum rate of interest payable thereon. Depending on the prevailing facts, however, it is possible that a federal law will apply to preempt the operation of Amendment 60 and thereby establish a higher maximum rate or permit the parties to contract for any rate desired. Although a general review of all federal law that may preempt Arkansas usury law is not a practicable undertaking in an Attorney General's opinion, I will discuss briefly those federal laws that I believe most likely to be implicated by the fact situations that may underlie your first two questions.
With respect to your third question, it is my opinion that there is no single formula required to be used to determine the amount of interest payable on a contract subject to Amendment 60's interest rate limitation.
§ 13. Maximum lawful rates of interest.
(a) General Loans:
(i) The maximum lawful rate of interest on any contract entered into after the effective date hereof shall not exceed five percent (5%) per annum above the Federal Reserve Discount Rate at the time of the contract.
(ii) All such contracts having a rate of interest in excess of the maximum lawful rate shall be void as to the unpaid interest. A person who *Page 3 has paid interest in excess of the maximum lawful rate may recover, within the time provided by law, twice the amount of interest paid. It is unlawful for any person to knowingly charge a rate of interest in excess of the maximum lawful rate in effect at the time of the contract, and any person who does so shall be subject to such punishment as may be provided by law.
(b) Consumer Loans and Credit Sales: All contracts for consumer loans and credit sales having a greater rate of interest than seventeen percent (17%) per annum shall be void as to principal and interest and the General Assembly shall prohibit the same by law.
(c) Definitions: As used herein, the term:
(i) "Consumer Loans and Credit Sales" means credit extended to a natural person in which the money, property, or service which is the subject of the transaction is primarily for personal, family or household purposes.
(ii) "Federal Reserve Discount Rate" means the Federal Reserve Discount Rate on ninety-day commercial paper in effect in the Federal Reserve Bank in the Federal Reserve District in which Arkansas is located.
(d) Miscellaneous:
(i) The rate of interest for contracts in which no rate of interest is agreed upon shall be six percent (6%) per annum.
(ii) The provisions hereof are not intended and shall not be deemed to supersede or otherwise invalidate any provisions of federal law applicable to loans or interest rates including loans secured by residential real property.
(iii) The provisions hereof revoke all provisions of State law which establish the maximum rate of interest chargeable in the State or which are otherwise inconsistent herewith.
Ark. Const. art.
Because the "Federal Reserve Discount Rate," as referred to in subsection (a)(1) of Amendment 60, is no longer published or in use, the Federal Reserve's primary credit rate is now used in determining the maximum interest rate allowable under subsection (a) of Amendment 60. See Pakay v. Davis,
Subsection (b) of Amendment 60 merely caps interest rates on consumer loans and credit sales at 17% during periods when the rate determined under subsection (a) is higher than 17%. Subsection (b) never allows interest rates on consumer loans or credit sales to be higher than the rate determined under subsection (a). The maximum interest rate on a consumer loan or credit sale subject to Amendment 60 is always, therefore, the lesser of 17% or the rate determined under subsection (a). See Bishop v. Linkway Stores,Inc.,
Amendment 60 contemplates that federal law may in some instances preempt the interest rate limitations of subsections (a) and (b).See Ark. Const. art.
Absent the application of a federal law preempting Amendment 60, the maximum interest rate on the contract at issue2 will be a rate equal to the sum of five percent (5.0%) per annum plus the rate per annum established by the Federal Reserve as the primary credit rate prevailing on the date of the contract; provided, that if the contract at issue is a consumer loan or credit sale, as defined in subsection (c)(i) of Amendment 60, the maximum rate will be the lesser of the rate just described or 17%. *Page 5 It is quite possible, however, that either of two federal preemption provisions might apply here.
First, if the lender is a bank or savings association whose deposits are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the parties may, in my opinion, contract for interest at any rate, unconstrained by Amendment 60 or any other law limiting interest rates.3
Under section 731 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999, codified in relevant part at
In Jessup, supra note 3, the court noted that at least one out-of-state bank had established a branch in Arkansas, and that the laws of its home state permitted parties to contract for interest at any rate, without a maximum limit.5 As a result, theJessup court stated, the Arkansas state bank could also contract for interest at any rate, without limit, on loans made in Arkansas.
Assuming the conditions cited by the Jessup court are still prevailing (i.e., that there is in existence in Arkansas on the date of the contract a branch of an out-of-state bank whose home state law permits parties to agree to interest at any rate), *Page 6 Arkansas state banks and national banks having their main offices in Arkansas are not generally subject to any interest rate limitations on loans made in Arkansas.
The constitutionality of
The second federal law that may have preemptive effect is one passed by Congress just last year. In 2009, Congress enacted the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub.L. No.
I am not aware of any other federal law that would be likely to preempt the operation of Amendment 60 with respect to a contract relating to non-residential real property, the subject of the contract in your first question.
The presence of a house on the property may, however, implicate other federal preemption statutes. For example, FHA and VA loans are not subject to Arkansas usury law. See
There are several other federal statutes that preempt state usury limitations, or establish maximum interest rates for particular types of loans, but they appear to be very unlikely to apply to the loans at issue in the first two questions of your request.See, e.g.,
It is my opinion that unless one of the foregoing federal statutes applies, the maximum rate of interest on the contract at issue in your second question will be a rate equal to the sum of five percent (5.0%) per annum plus the rate per annum established by the Federal Reserve as the primary credit rate prevailing on the date of the contract; provided, that if the contract is a consumer loan or credit sale, the maximum interest rate will be the lesser of the rate just described or 17%.
The Supreme Court of Arkansas has interpreted Amendment 60 and its predecessor provision as referring to simple interest.See, e.g., McElroy v. Grisham,
The use of any one of four methods of computing simple interest is permissible under Arkansas usury law. See McElroy at 13. The methods are known as ordinary *Page 8
interest, exact day interest, bank interest, and discount. SeeMartin's Mobile Homes v. Moore,
Assistant Attorney General J. M. Barker prepared the foregoing opinion, which I hereby approve.
Sincerely,
DUSTIN McDANIEL Attorney General
DM:JMB/cyh
Pakay v. Davis , 367 Ark. 421 ( 2006 )
McElroy v. Grisham , 306 Ark. 4 ( 1991 )
Ross M. Jessup v. Pulaski Bank , 327 F.3d 682 ( 2003 )
National Surety Corporation v. Inland Properties, Inc., ... , 416 F.2d 457 ( 1969 )
aldens-inc-an-illinois-corporation-v-thomas-j-miller-as-attorney , 610 F.2d 538 ( 1979 )
National Surety Corporation v. Inland Properties, Inc. , 286 F. Supp. 173 ( 1968 )
Steve Johnson, ph.d v. Bank of Bentonville , 269 F.3d 894 ( 2001 )
Cooper v. Cherokee Village Development Co. , 236 Ark. 37 ( 1963 )