Judges: DUSTIN McDANIEL, Attorney General.
Filed Date: 8/5/2008
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
The Honorable Scott Sullivan State Representative 1833 North 9th Street De Queen, Arkansas 71832-3507
Dear Representative Sullivan:
I am writing in response to your request for an opinion concerning certain "Production Grower Contracts" between farmers who serve as "independent growers" and various poultry processors. You have provided a copy of an opinion issued by the Oklahoma Attorney General that addresses similar contract growing arrangements of this nature, and against this backdrop you have asked:
My request for you is whether you believe, as expressed by the Oklahoma Attorney General, that these contracts constitute adhesion contracts under Arkansas law and, accordingly, whether you are in full agreement with the position taken by the Oklahoma Attorney General as applied to Arkansas law[?]
With regard to your second question, which I interpret as inquiring generally as to Arkansas law concerning so-called "contracts of adhesion," my research has disclosed only one case in which the Arkansas Supreme Court, by referring to another state's law, appears to have adopted a definition of an "adhesion contract." In Plant v. Wilbur,
A contract of adhesion is a form contract submitted by one party and accepted by the other on the basis of this or nothing. It is an instrument devised by skilled legal talent for mass and standard-industrywide use which does not allow for idiosyncrasy. It is a transaction not negotiated but one which literally adheres for want of choice.
Haines v. St. Charles Speedway, Inc.,
Plant v. Wilbur involved an "exculpatory agreement," which exempts a party from liability.
"Adhesion contracts usually involve the unequal bargaining power of a large corporation versus an individual and are often presented in pre-printed form contracts." [Whitney v. Alltel Comm'ns, Inc.,
173 S.W.3d 300 ,310 (Mo.App.W.D. 2005)] (quoting Swain v. Auto Servs., Inc.,128 S.W.3d 103 ,107 (Mo.App.E.D. 2003)). Missouri courts do not "view adhesion contracts as inherently sinister and automatically unenforceable." [Hartland Computer Leasing Corp., *Page 3770 S.W.2d 525 ,527 Mo.App.E.D.1989).] "Rather, as with all contracts, the courts seek to enforce the reasonable expectations of the parties garnered not only from the words of a standardized form imposed by its proponent, but from the totality of the circumstances surrounding the transaction." Id.
This "total transaction" approach seems to be reflected in several other Arkansas cases involving the allegation that a contract was one of adhesion and unenforceable. See Jordan v. Diamond Equipment Supply,
While I am unable for the reasons stated above to answer your specific question concerning particular contracts, the foregoing will hopefully be of assistance regarding Arkansas case law in this area of the law.
Assistant Attorney General Elisabeth A. Walker prepared the foregoing opinion, which I hereby approve.
Sincerely,
DUSTIN McDANIEL, Attorney General
DM:EAW/cyh
*Page 1
Jordan v. Diamond Equipment & Supply Co. ( 2005 )
Norman Haines and Barbara Haines v. St. Charles Speedway, ... ( 1989 )
Hartland Computer Leasing Corp., Inc. v. Insurance Man, Inc. ( 1989 )
Whitney v. Alltel Communications, Inc. ( 2005 )
Nelms v. Morgan Portable Building Corp. ( 1991 )
Midwest Division-Oprmc, LLC v. Dept. Soc. Serv., Div. of ... ( 2007 )
Swain v. Auto Services, Inc. ( 2003 )
Spychalski v. MFA Life Insurance Co. ( 1981 )
Estrin Construction Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. ( 1981 )