Judges: DUSTIN McDANIEL, Attorney General
Filed Date: 12/10/2009
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
The Honorable Roger Norman, JD, CPA, CFE Legislative Auditor Division of Legislative Audit
172 State Capitol Little Rock, Arkansas 72201-1099
Dear Mr. Norman:
I am writing in response to your request for an opinion on three questions concerning
As noted in the background information you provided concerning Act 756, the Act is largely concerned with assisting motor vehicle dealers experiencing economic difficulties, which purpose is stated in the Act's emergency clause. The Act has 25 sections. Nineteen sections amend title 23, chapter 112 of the Arkansas Code, the Arkansas Motor Vehicle Commission Act. One section amends A.C.A. §
The remaining four sections of Act 756 amend county and municipal purchasing requirements. Sections 21 and 22 address county purchasing. Section 21 amends the definition contained in A.C.A. §
14-58-104 . Specific purchases and contracts.(a) The municipal governing body of a city of the first class, city of the second class, or an incorporated town may purchase the following commodities without soliciting bids:
(1) Motor fuels, oil, asphalt, asphalt oil, and natural gas; and
(2) New motor vehicles from a motor vehicle dealer licensed under the Arkansas Motor Vehicle Commission Act, §
23-112-101 et seq., if the motor vehicle is purchased for an amount not to exceed the fleet price awarded by the Office of State Procurement and in effect at the time the municipal governing body of a city of the first class, city of the second class, or an incorporated town submits the purchase order for the same make and model motor vehicle.(b) The municipal governing body of the city of the first class, city of the second class, or an incorporated town may renew or extend the term of an existing contract without soliciting bids.
Section 24 of the Act amends A.C.A. §
Your request is focused on the scope of A.C.A. §
*Page 31. Does the term "existing contract" as used in Ark. Code Ann. §
14-58-104 (b) apply to any municipal contract, regardless of the commodity, service, or other subject matter involved? [Your emphasis.]2. Is the term "existing contract" as used in Ark. Code Ann. §
14-58-104 (b) modified or limited by the list of commodities in subsection (a) ("[m]otor fuels, oil, asphalt, asphalt oil, and natural gas; and . . . [n]ew motor vehicles. . . .")?
3. Is the term "existing contract" as used in Ark. Code Ann. §
14-58-104 (b) modified or limited by the title, emergency clause, or any other provision ofAct 756 of 2009 ?
In my opinion, the answer to your first question is "yes" and, accordingly, the answer to your second and third questions is "no."
The Supreme Court of Arkansas recently summarized the prevailing rules of statutory interpretation:
[T]he first rule in considering the meaning and effect of a statute is to construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to rules of statutory construction. A statute is ambiguous only where it is open to two or more constructions, or where it is of such obscure or doubtful meaning that reasonable minds might disagree or be uncertain as to its meaning. When a statute is clear, however, it is given its plain meaning, and this court will not search for legislative intent; rather, that intent must be gathered from the plain meaning of the language used.
King v. Ochoa,
In my view, the statutory language "an existing contract" is clear and unambiguous. Giving those words their ordinary meanings in common language, they refer to any existing contract of the municipality. The statute therefore permits the renewal or extension, without soliciting bids, of any existing contract, regardless of the subject matter thereof.
In my opinion, the foregoing construction of the statute is consistent with other rules of statutory construction that may be applicable. Your request cites Fiser v. Clayton,
In addition, reference to the entirety of Act 756 cannot ignore section 22 therof. In section 22, in addition to adding new motor vehicles and oil, asphalt, etc., to the already-lengthy list of items a county can acquire without soliciting bids, the legislature enacted a provision substantially similar to A.C.A. §
Another rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to all words in the statute if possible. See, e.g., Finley v.Astrue,
Your request cites Quinney v. Pittman,
Because it is my opinion that the term "existing contract" as used in A.C.A. §
County and municipal officials should note that nothing in Act 756 prohibits a local government from soliciting bids with respect to any proposed purchase or other contract.
Assistant Attorney General J. M. Barker prepared the foregoing opinion, which I hereby approve.
Sincerely,
DUSTIN McDANIEL Attorney General
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