Judges: DUSTIN McDANIEL, Attorney General
Filed Date: 10/4/2007
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
W. Jackson Williams, Esquire Williams Anderson, PLC 111 Center Street, 22nd Floor Little Rock, Arkansas 72201
Dear Mr. Williams:
This is in response to your request for certification, pursuant to A.C.A. §
Popular Name
A Constitutional Amendment Authorizing the Operation and Regulation of Lotteries by or on Behalf of the State to Fund Scholarships and Grants for Arkansas Citizens Enrolled in Accredited Two-Year and Four-Year Colleges and Universities in Arkansas
Ballot Title
AN AMENDMENT TO THE ARKANSAS CONSTITUTION AUTHORIZING THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO PROVIDE FOR THE OPERATION AND REGULATION OF LOTTERIES BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE STATE; REQUIRING LOTTERY PROCEEDS TO BE USED SOLELY TO PAY THE OPERATING EXPENSES OF THE LOTTERIES, INCLUDING ALL PRIZES, AND TO FUND OR PROVIDE FOR SCHOLARSHIPS AND GRANTS TO CITIZENS OF THIS STATE ENROLLED IN ACCREDITED TWO-YEAR AND FOUR-YEAR COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES LOCATED WITHIN THIS STATE; REQUIRING THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, FROM TIME TO TIME, TO ESTABLISH CRITERIA FOR THE SCHOLARSHIPS AND GRANTS AND TO DESIGNATE THE STATE AGENCIES THAT SHALL ACCREDIT THE TWO-YEAR AND FOUR-YEAR COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES; PROVIDING THAT LOTTERY PROCEEDS SHALL NOT BE SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY; DECLARING LOTTERY PROCEEDS TO BE CASH FUNDS HELD IN TRUST SEPARATE AND APART FROM THE STATE TREASURY; AND PROVIDING THAT LOTTERY PROCEEDS REMAINING AFTER PAYMENT OF OPERATING EXPENSES AND PRIZES SHALL SUPPLEMENT, NOT SUPPLANT, NON-LOTTERY EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES
The Attorney General is required, pursuant to A.C.A. §
In this regard, A.C.A. §
The purpose of my review and certification is to ensure that the popular name and ballot title honestly, intelligibly, and fairly set forth the purpose of the proposed amendment. See Arkansas Women's Political Caucus v. Riviere,
The popular name is primarily a useful legislative device. Pafford v. Hall,
The ballot title must include an impartial summary of the proposed amendment that will give the voter a fair understanding of the issues presented. Hoban v. Hall,
Having analyzed your proposed amendment, as well as your proposed popular name and ballot title under the above precepts, I have concluded that there are several unclear points that must be addressed before a legally sufficient ballot title and popular name can be approved for this measure. A number of additions or changes to your ballot title, and possibly your popular name, may be necessary, in my view, in order to more fully and correctly summarize your proposal. I cannot, however, at this time, fairly or completely summarize the effect of your proposed measure to the electorate in a popular name or ballot title without the clarification of the matters discussed below.
An initial question arises regarding the effect of your proposed amendment on Amendment
Your proposed constitutional amendment provides in relevant part:
Section 1. Section 14 of Article 19 or the Constitution of the State of Arkansas is amended to read as follows:
§ 14. Lotteries prohibited.
No lottery shall be authorized by this State, nor shall the sale of lottery tickets be allowed.
(a) Except as specifically provided in this Section 14 of the Arkansas Constitution, all lotteries and the sale of lottery tickets are hereby prohibited.
Emphasis added.
Your amendment makes no reference to Amendment 84; nor does it define "lotteries." This office has consistently adhered to the view that the game of bingo is controlled entirely by chance and can constitute a "lottery" under art. 19, § 14, as defined by the Arkansas Supreme Court, if the other necessary elements are present. See, e.g., Ark. Ops. Att'y Gen.
In light of the foregoing, I believe there may be some question in the minds of the voters whether games of bingo and raffles authorized pursuant to Amendment 84 and its enabling legislation will continue to be outside art. 19, § 14's lottery proscription if your proposed measure is adopted. Your measure prohibits "lotteries" except as provided in art. 19, § 14. It does not take into account the fact that certain other activities that may fall within the judicial definition of "lotteries" are authorized elsewhere in the Arkansas Constitution. I note in this regard that the proposed amendment contains no general repealer, but the intent is nevertheless somewhat unclear. Because the voters are entitled to a clear understanding of the effect of your measure on games of bingo and raffles authorized under Amendment 84, clarification is necessary so as to avoid a misleading or insufficient ballot title on this point.
A related question involves the General Assembly's authority to provide for games of bingo and raffles that might, according to Amendment 84, currently be prohibited by Ark. Const, art.
(b) The General Assembly may by law provide for the operation and regulation of lotteries by or on behalf of the State[.]
If Amendment 84's authorization of certain games of bingo and raffles is unaffected by your amendment, there may be a remaining question whether your proposed amendment would permit the General Assembly to provide for the operation and regulation of games of bingo and raffles that are not authorized under Amendment 84. This raises the issue of the scope of the term "lotteries" under your amendment.
Although there is a long-standing judicial interpretation of the term "lottery" under art. 19, § 14, voter awareness of the judicial definition is an uncertain matter. I believe it is unclear, moreover, whether it is your intention for the meaning of the term "lotteries" to accord with the expansive meaning promulgated by the Arkansas courts. As my Texas colleague pointed out when called upon to determine what the voters intended in adopting a 1991 amendment to the Texas Constitution that permits the legislature to "authorize the State to operate lotteries . . . [,]" Tex. Const. art. III, § 47(e)), there may be a distinction between the "modern common meaning of the term ``lottery'" and the "technical meaning as construed by courts of old . . ." Tex. Op. Att'y Gen. GA-0103 (2003) 5-6. Like the Arkansas courts, the Texas courts had historically construed the term "lottery" broadly to include an extensive variety of games of chance. Id. at 3. The specific issue before the Texas Attorney General was whether the voters intended to authorize the State to operate video lottery terminals. After noting the judicial interpretation, which would have encompassed "any kind of game of chance, including slot machines and a variety of casino games[,] id. at 6, my colleague quoted several dictionary definitions reflecting the common or "popular" meaning of the term "lottery," id., including the following from Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1969):
[a] scheme for the distribution of prizes by lot or chance; esp., a scheme by which prizes are distributed to the winners among those persons who have paid for a chance to win them, usually as determined by the numbers on tickets as drawn at random from a lottery wheel.
Id. at 1338.
Based upon the particular history of the relevant Texas constitutional provision, as well as the ballot proposition, which referred to a "state lottery," the Attorney General concluded that voters in 1991 approved a "narrow and particular form of state-operated game" and did not intend to authorize the state to operate video lottery terminals. Op. at 5-6. He also quoted the following from a previous Texas Attorney General opinion:
[I]t is self-evident that voters presumed from the ballot language that they were voting for or against the common perception of a ``state lottery,' as denoted by the clear language of the ballot proposition, rather than a broad spectrum of games which embody the ``lottery principle,' as articulated by . . . judicial decisions.
Id. at 7, quoting Tex. Op. Att'y Gen. DM-302 (1994) at 7 (emphasis original).
As reflected by this opinion, the meaning of the term "lotteries" under your proposed amendment is of critical importance. Voters who are deciding whether to adopt your measure may wish to know whether they are authorizing the General Assembly to approve all species of gaming that constitute a "lottery" as broadly construed by the Arkansas Supreme court, i.e., a "scheme for the distribution of prizes by chance among persons who have paid, or agreed to pay, a valuable consideration for the chance to obtain a prize." Banks v. Harris,
In my opinion, the ballot title must convey a clear understanding of the substance of your proposal with respect to the authorization of "lotteries." These ambiguities prevent me, however, from summarizing the measure in a substituted ballot title.
Another area of concern involves the provision for scholarships and grants to "citizens of this State enrolled in accredited two-year and four-year colleges and universities located within this State." First, with regard to the term "citizens," I must note that based on my research, this term can vary according to context. See, e.g., Arkansas Highway Transportation Department v. Hope Brick Works,
It is apparent, however, from a study of legislation and court decisions, that, except where a citizen of the United States is referred to, a variety of meanings is loosely given to the term, ``citizen,' and that such use creates legal ambiguity. It is to be observed that the term, ``citizen,' is often used in legislation where ``domicile' is meant and where United States citizenship has no reasonable relationship to the subject matter and purpose of the legislation in question.
Id. at 293 (emphasis added).
The court continued with the following discussion of an Arkansas case:
In the case of McKenzie v. Murphy,
Id. at 294.
In light of the foregoing, I have considered the context of your proposed measure — higher education scholarships and grants — and I remain uncertain whether the phrase "citizens of this State" is intended to refer to national citizenship. I note that the Arkansas Supreme Court has commented generally on the distinction between "resident" and "citizen," and has stated in dicta that these terms are "most often synonymous." Arkansas Gazette Co. v. Pickens,
Another unclear point involving the language with respect to scholarships and grants relates to the phrase "located within this State." As noted above, your amendment would extend these benefits to citizens of the State who are enrolled in "accredited two-year and four-year colleges and universities located within this State." This language presumably would encompass both public and private Arkansas institutions, similar for instance to the Arkansas Governor's Scholars Program, A.C.A. §
The reference to accreditation of two-year and four-year colleges and universities is also ambiguous, in my view. Following the reference to "accredited" institutions, the text of your proposed amendment states:
The General Assembly, from time to time, shall establish criteria for the scholarships and grants and shall designate the State agencies that shall accredit the two-year and four-year colleges and universities.
Emphasis added.
I am somewhat uncertain as to the meaning or scope of the term "accredit" as used herein. Federal law provides for the recognition of State, regional, or national accrediting agencies and associations for federal purposes, based on criteria established by the Secretary of the United States Department of Education. See
Finally, regarding the designation of lottery proceeds as "cash funds" under the proposed amendment, I note that the measure is silent with respect to the management of such funds. It simply states:
Lottery proceeds shall not be subject to appropriation by the General Assembly and are specifically declared to be cash funds held in trust separate and apart from the State treasury.
By declaring that the lottery proceeds are to be held in trust outside the treasury, it seems clear that your amendment effectively exempts these revenues from the provisions of Title 19, Chapter 4, Subchapter 8, governing the budgeting and expenditure of "cash funds." See A.C.A. §
In conclusion, I must emphasize that my office, in the certification of ballot titles and popular names, does not concern itself with the merits, philosophy, or ideology of proposed measures. I have no constitutional role in the shaping or drafting of such measures. My statutory mandate is embodied only in A.C.A. §
At the same time, however, the Arkansas Supreme Court, through its decisions, has placed a practical duty on the Attorney General, in exercising his statutory duty, to include language in a ballot title about the effects of a proposed measure on current law. See, e.g., Finn v. McCuen, supra. Where the effects of a proposed measure on current law are unclear or ambiguous, it is impossible for me to perform my statutory duty to the satisfaction of the Arkansas Supreme Court without clarification of the ambiguities.
The problems recited above prevent me from certifying your submission at this time. My statutory duty under these circumstances is to reject your proposed popular name and ballot title, stating my reasons therefor, and to instruct you to "redesign" the proposed measure and ballot title. See A.C.A. §
Sincerely,
DUSTIN McDANIEL Attorney General
Finn v. McCuen , 303 Ark. 418 ( 1990 )
Bailey v. McCuen , 318 Ark. 277 ( 1994 )
Pafford v. Hall , 217 Ark. 734 ( 1950 )
Arkansas Highway & Transportation Department v. Hope Brick ... , 294 Ark. 490 ( 1988 )
Gaines v. McCuen , 296 Ark. 513 ( 1988 )
Christian Civic Action Committee v. McCuen , 318 Ark. 241 ( 1994 )
Hoban v. Hall , 1958 Ark. LEXIS 774 ( 1958 )
Crochet v. Priest , 326 Ark. 338 ( 1996 )
Scott v. Dunaway , 228 Ark. 943 ( 1958 )
Donovan v. Priest , 326 Ark. 353 ( 1996 )
Shuffield v. Raney , 1956 Ark. LEXIS 373 ( 1956 )
Plugge Ex Rel. Arkansas for Representative Democracy v. ... , 310 Ark. 654 ( 1992 )
Becker v. McCuen , 303 Ark. 482 ( 1990 )
Arkansas Women's Political Caucus v. Riviere , 283 Ark. 463 ( 1984 )
Moore v. Hall , 229 Ark. 411 ( 1958 )
Chaney v. Bryant , 259 Ark. 294 ( 1976 )
Becker v. Riviere , 270 Ark. 219 ( 1980 )
Leigh v. Hall , 232 Ark. 558 ( 1960 )
McCarroll, Commr. of Revs. v. Gregory-Robinson-Speas , 198 Ark. 235 ( 1939 )